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1  Background, objectives and approach of the study 
Given the policy decisions towards a fully liberalised telecommunications market within 
the European Union by the end of the decade (or earlier?), interconnection is essential 
and  necessary  to  develop  a  viable  competitive  environment.  For  that  reason,  any 
successful  telecommunications  policy  has  to  provide  a  proper  framework  for 
interconnection of networks and services to reach that goal. Interconnection is the key 
to a future European telecommunica~ons  policy. 
Given these developments it is obvious that the Commission has to identify the relevant 
policy  issues  for  the  interconnection  of  networks  and  potential  barriers  to 
interconnection which could inhibit the interoperability of services at a European level. 
The study on network interconnection should be seen in this context. 
Against this background, the substantive objectives of the study may be summarised as 
follows: 
•  Develop  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  different  forms  of  interconnection  of 
telecommunications networks and services at a conceptual level. 
•  Assess  the  practice  of  interconnection  in  countries  with  relevant  experience,  in 
Europe as well as overseas. 
•  Identify  and  investigate  the  issues  that  arise  at  all  levels  and  interfaces  where 
int~rr.onnection may be demanded. 
•  Investigate  mechanisms  by  which  potential  barriers  to  interconnection  may  be 
avoided or overcome to assure free and unimpeded Europe-wide services. 
•  Develop recommendations for the  Commission  regarding the further development 
of a European interconnect policy. 
Besides providing an  analytical framework for dealing with all  relevant policy issues of 
interconnection the study should in particular examine the interconnection framework of 
the proposed voice telephony Directive and should make recommendations on further 
developments  . 
Our  approach  to  the  study  is  conceptual  and  empirical.  Conceptually,  we  derive 
frameworks  for  interconnection  including  problems  which  have  to  be  solved  by  the 
int~. ested parties aild/or the regulatory authorities.  '1\1~ derivA optionc; for  ~n!• ttinns and 
performance  criteria  for  evaluating  arrangements  and  interconnect policy  measures. 
This  conceptual  part  of  the  work  is  based  on  our previous  work  on  interconnection 
issues, a careful reading of the relevant literature and results of previous reports carried 
out by the Commission. 2  -.  · · -.  ....  ---.-c.--Call  isiiUi  ----·--·-·- .....  ---B./, liC -- ~y  IIUif  MIIV ~~~  1.1  I  ~ 
In the empirical part of the study we examined experience with interconnect policies in 
all Member States and in the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. We also identified 
plans  and  policies  in  those  Member  States  which  have  not  yet  had  any  relevant 
experience.  The  dominant  approach  to  gather  and  evaluate  information  in  these 
countries  has  been  personal  interviews  with  TOs,  new  network  operators,  NRAs, 
manufacturers,  service  providers  and  independent experts.  For  a  limited  number  of 
countries  information  gathering was  based on  a questionnaire  sent out to  the  same 
group of organisations. 
Our report consists basically of three.patts. Jn_tbe .more...aoaly.tical part .d  .fua.study we 
examine the interconnection issue from three different perspectives and deal with three 
different aspects.  We  take  a technical,  economic and  regulatory view to identify and 
analyse  problems  and  their  solutions  concerning  the  interconnection  of  networks. 
These contributions form Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapter 5 entails the second part of the 
study.  Here  we  present the  empirical  basis  of the  study in  a summarised form.  The 
empirical  basis  consists  of  country-by-country  case  studies  where  we  describe  and 
analyse the experience with interconnection, the way in which the regulatory institutions 
have  dealt  with  interconnection  and,  of  course,  the  solutions  developed  in  these 
countries.  The  third  part  of  the  study  develops  recommendations  concerning  a 
comprehensive European interconnect policy. These are developed on the basis of the 
analytical results in  Chapters 2 through 4 and the world-wide experience and practice 
with interconnection. To come to c1  comprehensive policy model we also examine and 
evaluate  the  current approaches  and  elements  of a European  interconnect policy  in 
Chapter 6. 
During  the  study  tirneiable  thGre  was  a  concurrent  study  undertaken  bj  Arthur 
Andersen. The Arthur Andersen study examines the practical questions associated with 
the establishment of appropriate cost allocation and accounting systems and assesses 
the  way  in  which  interconnect  charges  should  be  established  in  preparation  for  full 
service liberalisation. 
2  Interconnection as a technical issue 
Technology  makes  possible  a  wide  variety  of  ways  to  supply  telecommunications 
services. There are a large number of potential interfaces and points of interconnection 
between  operators,  and  telecommunications  technology  is  compatible  with  vertically-
integrated,  horizontally-integrated,  and  specialised  operators.  Economic  factors 
-including economies of scale, economies of scope,· and product differentiation- rather 
than  strictly  technical  factors  determine  and  should  determine  where  operators  and 
service providers will seek to interconnect. 
Changes  in  vertical  and  horizontal  relationships  are  redrawing  the  boundaries  of 
telecommunications  entities.  Key  interfaces,  formerly  managed  within  the  firm  or 
incumbent TO network, are now points of technical and commercial interconnection. 
• .. 
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Relationships between an incumbent TO and competitors will frequently be asymmetric. 
Regulatory  attention  will  be  required  to  ensure  that  competitors  obtain  access  to 
interlaces  that  constitute  bottlenecks,  and  to  insure  that  TOs  make  the  technical 
changes needed for equal access to achieve fair competition. 
Bottlenecks controlled by a dominant TO range from access to end users to intellectual 
property  rights  in  software  and  equipment  design.  The  principal  technical  issues 
affecting  competition  among  interconnected  fixed  operators  are  equal  access  to 
network  components  and  services,  collocation  of  equipment,  and  numbering.  Until 
technical alternatives to these esseotial resources are developed, re_gulatory action will 
be necessary to ensure fair competition. 
Interconnection relationships may be classified by: 
- type of player (TO, service provider, end user) 
- type of facilities (fixed, mobile, satellite) 
- type of services (basic, enhanced, intelligent) 
- type of users (private user groups, users of public networks). 
Of the many possible combinations that can  occur,  our analysis concentrates on  four 
major scenarios.  They  are  the  ones  that,  in  discussions  with  the  Commission  staff, 
were identified as having leading importance for interconnection: fixed-to-fixed network 
interconnection,  fixed-to-mobile,  mobile-to-mobile,  and  interconnection  to  intelligent 
nAtwork infrastructure and to intelligent network-based services. 
Fixed  networks have well-defined  external  interfaces at  several  levels of  the  network 
hierarchy, located primarily at switches but also in the distribution system that extends 
to the end user. 
Europe-wide operation of GSM service is technically limited in areas where TOs have 
not implemented advanced signalling capabilities needed to support roaming by mobile 
subscribers. Direct interconnection of mobile operators can overcome this limitation and 
should not be restricted by regulatory action. 
Interconnection to intelligent network services and resources will be of interest to many 
fixed and mobile network operators and to service providers. Although there are many 
conceptual  types  of intelligent network interfaces,  only  those  for the  most basic call 
control  capabilities  have  thus  far  been  standardised.  Moreover,  technical  means  to 
ensure esseniial requiremetais are not yet developed. 
Interconnecting parties need to use interfaces to interconnect even if their networks are 
otherwise compatible. If there are only two interconnecting parties, standards would not 
necessarily  be  required,  only  case-by-case  agreements  about  technical  solutions. 
However,  such  agreements  are  likely  to  be  complicated  and  subject  to  change  as 4 
technology progresses and networks are upgraded to meet new demands. Once there 
are many parties that want to interconnect, multilateral agreements are required that 
naturally  would  tend  towards  standards.  Such  standards  lower  transactions  costs 
because they reduce the amount of asset specificity. The same asset, •design•, can be 
used in many instances of interconnection. Standards may also be essential to provide 
interoperability, network security and integrity. 
Standards are not always beneficial. There is, for example, an ambiguous relationship 
between standardisation, interconnection and technical progress. Standardisation may 
increase  the  market  for  interconnection  and .  thereby .potentially_. increase_ .tbe  __ Jatal 
telecommunications  market.  On  the  one  hand,  this  may  make  innovations  in 
telecommunications  equipment  and  software  more  attractive.  At  the  same  time 
standardisation may lock-in a technology and thereby retard technical progress. Also, 
the  resulting  increase  in  competition  in the market may  reduce  competition  for the 
market.  This  could  decrease  the  profit  potential  for  radical  innovations,  such  as 
complete changes in paradigm. 
Another ambiguous effect of standards is the need for industry cooperation in order to 
reach and implement standards. This cooperation can  lead to innovative standards by 
bringing  together  innovative  ideas  from  different  enterprises.  Conversely,  the 
cooperation can also result in collusion in the market. 
In  general,  striking  an  optimal  balance  between  the  gains  and  the  costs  of 
standardisation  for  interconnection  will  have  to  be  assessed  for  particular  cases. 
Generally, we  can say that a policy of standardisation tends to shift competition from 
innovation  in  technology .  to  competition  in  service  innovation  and  standardised 
production. 
The  Commission's policy of  leaving  most interfaces to  be  standardised  by  voluntary 
efforts strikes the appropriate balance between the gains from standardisation and the 
gains  from  innovation.  Regulatory  oversight  of  industry  collaboration  to  develop 
standards  will  be  required  to  guard  against  collusive  behavior.  For  a  limited  set  of 
interfaces- those required for Europe-wide services, emergency and directory services, 
and numbering- the Commission should actively encourage development of standards 
and be prepared to mandate their adoption. 
There is a potentially rich set of logical points of interconnection to intelligent network 
interfaces. Access at network control and switching points could pose significant risks 
to network integrity and security. Technical standards for mediated access have not yet 
been developed, but licensing of interconnectors could provide an  alternative to open 
interfaces.  Nevertheless,  the  availability  of  several  suppliers  of  access  and  network 
services  can  be  expected  to  increase  the  reliability  and  availability  of 
telecommunications  services.  The  service  control  and  management  interfaces  to  IN 
services should be opened to interconnection. The Commission should encourage the 
development of technical standards for mediated interconnection to service control and 
service switching. 
., • 
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In most instances, physical collocation of an interconnectors equipment in the facilities 
of the dominant TO is technically achievable and provides more nearly equal  access 
than virtual collocation. 
Subscriber number portability is difficult to achieve with  current technology, but some 
alternative  measures  can  reduce  the  TO's advantages  of  incumbency.  Portability  is 
more readily achieved for freephone and other database-related services. 
Because  upgrading  switching  systems to support equal  access to  multiple  operators 
has  high  costs  when  older-technology  switches  must  be  retrofitted,  a  policy  of 
mandatory end-user equal  access should be  limited  to  newly-installed  switches  and 
software upgrades of existing digital switches. 
3  Interconnection as an economic issue 
The  economic  approach  towards  interconnection  can  best  be  presented  by  the 
following figure. 
An  implication of the economic approach to interconnection is that we study the market 
for interconnection. This is likely to be a fast-growing market. Its size depends on the 
concentration of the  retail  markets for telecommunications services and the degree of 
vertical integration of TOs  . 
As  such,  interconnection  corresponds  precisely to what we  observe  everyday  in  the 
majority  -.>1  market transactions  wht;;rG  C:t  f~rm  bu~fS a product  beC".ause  it  needs  that 
product as a raw material or a semi-finished input for the production of its own product. 
What makes  it appear different from  goods and  services exchanged in  other market 
transactions are essentially four characteristics: 6  .·.. .  .~  .:.. 
(1)  Interconnection is often considered a bottleneck input without which the demander 
eould not produce his own service and, due to technical or legal barriers, he cannot 
produce  this  input  himseH.  In  addition,  the  supplier  and  demander  of 
interconnection  often  compete  with  each  other  in  the  retail  market  for 
telecommunications services. 
(2)  Interconnection involves a degree of ongoing cooperation and interaction between 
the contrading parties that surpasses other purchaser-supplier relationships. 
(3)  Conversely,  if  the  two  networks  ~p!oach  _equal  size, -~e relationship  may  be 
reciprocal, in that the operators mutually demand interconnedion with each other's 
network. 
(  4)  lnterconnedion effedively intemalises network externalities that are created by the 
availability of access to subscribers of other networks. 
All  four  aspects  have  implications for the  conclusion  of interconnedion  agreements, 
especially  the  degree  with  which  the  one  or  the  other  party  benefits  from  the 
relationship. 
The  bottleneck  property  is  of  utmost  importance  because  it calls  for  some  kind  of 
government intervention establishing  a right to interconned (by  regulatory  decree  or 
competition  policy).  However, the  bottleneck property itself does not necessarily hold 
for  all  types  and  aspects  of  interconnection.  It therefore  has  to  be  established  on  a 
case-by-case basis. 
A buttleneck can be identified by tha following propar!ia~: 
•  control of a facility by a single firm, 
•  facility essential for production, 
•  inability of others to practically duplicate the facility, 
•  denial of access with substantial harm to competition, 
•  absence of a valid business reason for not providing access. 
The  most  relevant  example  of  bottlenecks  in  telecommunications  is  access  to 
residential customers who  have only one  line running  into their homes. The cost of a 
second  line  from  a  different  supplier  is  usually  prohibitive  relative  to  the  cost  of 
interconnection.  Thus,  access · to  such  residential  custoi:'lars  es  a  bottleneck 
independent  of  the  supplying  local  operator's  market  share.  In  contrast,  access  to 
multiline  business  customers  or  to  trunk  transport  may  not  be  such  a  bottleneck. 
Multiline  businesses  have  access  lines  that  could  be  distributed  between  several 
carriers.  And  there are  many equivalent routes of trunk transport between two points 
that are far enough away from each other. 
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A specific feature of interconnection agreements is that they usually involve traffic flows 
and capacity provision on both ends. Thus, both parties are at the same time buyers 
and  sellers.  Depending  on  the degree of symmetry of this relationship,  it  can  be  a 
source  of  commonality  of  interest  In  the  case  of  full  symmetry,  for  example, 
interconnection charges would totally net out between the two parties and therefore be 
no  source  of contention,  as was exemplified  by international  accounting  tariffs  over 
many years. Usually, the degree of asymmetry is a function of the vertical integration 
and  relative  size  of the parties involved. The degree of  symmetry and  reciprocity  in 
interconnection relationships should be taken as an  important indicator for regulatory 
-.policy~ T.be..mora.asymm~th&.relatioflsAip:between·  iAterconnecting -parties the more 
need there is for direct regulatory intervention. The more symmetric and reciprocal the 
relationship is, the greater is the need for monitoring the danger of collusion. 
The relationship between the demander for and the supplier of interconnection depends 
to a  large  degree on  the  types of firms interconnecting with  each  other.  If both  are 
operating in totally separate markets, the relationship is simply one of vertical market 
power.  This  would,  for  example,  approximately  hold  for  the  US  until  now. 
Interconnection is further complicated through the fact that the interconnecting parties 
often  find  themselves  in  a  competitive  relationship,  in  that  both  compete  for  the 
business of the same enduser. Thus, control over the bottleneck facility may not only 
tempt  the  supplier  to  engage  in  simple  monopolistic  pricing  but  also  to  shut  out 
competition by refusing to deal (or by raising  rival's cost).  As a general rule  one  can 
expect that,  in  the case of competitive or substitutive  relationships between the  final 
outputs, interconnection and the final outputs will be substitutes as well. Conversely, in 
the  case of complementary relationships between the final  outputs,  the  relationships 
beiween  inier""onnection  aild  the  fin&!  outj.Jut~  i~  IH\ely  to  ba  c.orr.plcrr.~ntary.  As  a 
result, a party with bottleneck power over interconnection facilities will want to receive a 
markup above cost for interconnection services in the former case and may be willing 
to grant charges below cost in the latter case. 
Interconnection is called for by certain combinations of economies of scale, economies 
of scope and externalities. If there are strong economies of scale and scope and strong 
positive  network  externalities,  the  traditional  concept  of  an  integrated  monopoly 
provider would be superior to several interconnected providers. At the other extreme, if 
there  are  no  economies  of  scale  and  scope  and  no  externalities  at  all,  then  many 
independent suppliers would coexist totally without interconnection. The global network 
externality  that  is  realised  when  formerly  not  connected  networks  become 
interconnected is highly important. Together with the bottleneck property it provides the 
strongest case for policy intervention in  interconnection and for a duty of operators to 
ofier inh~l t.uih 1ection. 
Economic aspects of specific tyPes of interconnection 
This study concentrates on four major types of interconnection, namely interconnection 
of fixed  networks,  interconnection  of  fixed  and  mobile  networks,  interconnection  of 8 
mobile  networks  and  interconnection  in  an  intelligent  network  environment.  These 
cases are characterised by some economic differences. The benchmark case to which 
these differences are related is the interconnection between fixed networks. 
The framework for interconnection between  two or more fixed networks needs to be 
able  to  deal  with  a  large  variability  of  cases.  This  should  be  done  by  keeping  the 
framework sufficiently open. 
Under the same general interconnection framework there are no economic reasons to 
treat  fixed-mobile  interconnection  .  agreements  differently  from  fixed-fixed 
interconnection-s.  "The  differences,  if  any:. cancem  specificS,  such .as  the  naturally 
asymmetric  positions  of the  two parties,  the  potentially complementary nature  of the 
two retail products and implications for access charges. 
There  are  good  economic  reasons  to  allow  and  encourage  direct  mobile-mobile 
interconnection.  The  same  holds  for  undistorted  transit  interconnections,  which  can 
provide an alternative and a yardstick for direct mobile-mobile interconnections. 
There  are  no  economic  reasons  to treat interconnection  agreements  in  an  intelligent 
network  environment  differently  than  under  the  same  general  interconnection 
framework  as  for  fixed-fixed  interconnections.  The  differences  concem  specifics.  In 
particular, 
(a)  the  intelligent  network  environment  is  likely  to  prevent  stable  and  standardised 
interconnection  agreements  from  emerging  in  the  near  future.  Interconnection 
agreements will have to continue to change over time and to become adapted to 
new  circumstances.  This  is  import&nt  bee&use  of  the  nature  of  specific 
investments. It means that long-term contracts for interconnection have to remain 
open  to  change  although  the  accompanying  investments  are  largely  sunk  and 
therefore  cannot  be  undone.  The  necessary  adaptation  may  provide  for  a 
continuing role of the regulator. 
(b)  To  the  extent  that  IN  features  embody  innovations  by  the  interconnecting  TO 
(rather than  innovations  by  equipment  manufacturers)  licence  fees  incorporating 
the  value  of these  innovations  need  to  be  considered  as part of interconnection 
charges. 
Pricing for interconnection 
Price  regulation  of  interconnection  needs  to  do  better  than  the  unregulated 
interconnection  markP.t  wotJid  perform.  The  Affer.ts.  of  laicsez  faire  on  pri~cs  for 
interconnection  services  depend,  to  a  large  extent,  on  the  prior  structure  of  the 
telecommunications  (end-user)  market.  Thus,  we  have  to  consider  the  interaction 
between these two markets and have to differentiate between laissez faire in the end-
user market for telecommunications and laissez faire in the market for interconnection. .. 
g· 
.  The conclusions on  pricing under a regime of laissez faire  are:  If left to themselves, 
markets for interconnection services are likely to reflect either collusive arrangements 
or monopoly power of incumbent TOs. In either case, interconnection prices are likely 
to be high relative to prices that would emerge under competitive conditions. If there is 
a danger of collusion, low regulated interconnection prices may be advisable. However, 
they may be hard to achieve against industry interests, and their likely uniformity may 
spur collusion in the retail market. It may then be better to leave the market to itself and 
only  intervene  through  the  tools  of  competition  policy.  The  lower  interconnection 
charges  are  kept,  the  less  harmful  are  the  effects  of  any  collusion  in  the  end-user 
-·-market;-becat!se~tasiYe:onmrtcaperareatttet  Pbas~lowei  tna• gil sal "Costs. -The·  more 
likely case  is that of monopoly power in  the market for interconnection.  At  the  same 
time, prices in telecommunications retail markets are likely to reflect both the effects of 
partial  competition  and  regulatory  preferences  (including  cross  subsidies,  USOs  and 
the like). As a consequence, interconnection prices cannot simply be left to the market, 
nor  are  they  easily  regulated.  This  necessitates  a  methodology  for  interconnection 
pricing under regulation. 
A number of pricing rules  have been  proposed  in  the  literature, based  on  theoretical 
models.  These  models  make  various  assumptions,  upon  which  the  relevance  and 
range  of their results depends. Because of the wide  range of possible outcomes and 
because  of  the  complicated  interaction  of  variables  that  regulators  find  difficult  to 
observe,  the  theoretical  models  are  likely  to  provide  insight  but  little  practical 
applicability for the regulator. 
We believe that a fair summary of the theoretical models is as follows: 
•  The pricing prescriptions depend crucially on the assumptions made. The ranges for 
possible  pricing  outcomes  in  the  Ramsey  (i.e.,  Laffont-Tirole)  and  the  efficient 
component  pricing  rule  (ECPR)  (Baumoi-Willig)  frameworks  are  large  and  can 
extend above and below all reasonable cost measures. 
•  The  results  themselves are  derived  under a number of  restrictive  assumptions.  In 
particular, the  ECPR  assumes price-taking behavior,  an  absence of sunk costs on 
the part of the interconnectors, and efficient pricing on the part of the TO. It is not a 
priori clear what the effects of lifting the assumptions are. 
•  The models, in particula.r ECPR,  have little to say if prices in  other markets served 
by the TO are not optimal. 
•  The  more  general  Ramsey-pricing  models  for interconnection  provided  by  Laffont 
and Tirole are extremely hard to interpret and even harder to irnplen1ent 
In summary, the guidance from the theoretical models is limited. The models do agree 
on  some  outcomes  for  special  cases.  We  may  therefore  be  able  to  narrow  the 
outcomes  by  observing  certain  market  features  and  desiderata  in  the  form  of 
constraints not imposed in these models. These observations include the following: 10 
•  The main basis for allowing and promoting network entry is that economies of scale 
and scope are not so pronounced that they will make network competition infeasible 
or inefficient. 
•  A second basis for allowing network competition is that entrants are likely to be more 
efficient  than  the  incumbent.  This  would  compensate  for  entrants'  smaller  size, 
should economies of scale continue to play some role. 
·-
•  The  results  desired  from  network  competition  are  lower  resource  costs  to  the 
economy and lower prices to customers. Changes in the incumbent TO's retail price 
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structure as a consequence of network competition are inevitable. 
•  Even  with  interconnection charges set as low as marginal or average incremental 
costs the incumbent is unlikely to lose its market quickly.  Usually,  there  are  sunk 
costs  (that  entrants  have  to  expend),  switching  costs  by  customers,  name 
recognition, brand loyalty and other advantages of the TO over entrants that prevent 
consumers  from  switching  to  entrants  even  at  substantially  lower  prices.  For 
example,  in  the  UK Mercury only gained about a 10o/o  market share in  its first ten 
years. 
•  Pricing  distortions  (unbalanced  tariffs)  in  other  markets  served  by  the  TO  are 
desirable only in exceptional cases and therefore deserve special scrutiny. Since the 
individual  outputs  should  generally  contribute  different  amounts  to  common  and 
overhead costs  of the  TO,  the  existence  of a valid  •local  access loss"  cannot be 
established by simply using fully-distributed costing rules. 
•  Making  it  hard  to  add  access  charges  to  interconnection  charges  sets  the  right 
incentives to rebalance retail tariffs in an economically efficient way. 
•  Interconnection  charges  under  a  Ramsey  rule  or  ECPR  are  extremely  hard  to 
calculate. This problem is compounded if interconnection services are unbundled (as 
we  believe  they  should  be).  Such  explicit  calculations  should  therefore  be  the 
exception rather than the rule. 
•  lnterconnectors  offer  services  that  are  differentiated  from  the  incumbent  TO's 
services and from  each other.  Differentiation can  occur physically by delivery (wire 
or  wireless)  or through  pricing  policies  (at  a high  price  wireless  services  may  be 
complementary to fixed-link services, while at a low price wireless services may be 
substitutes to fixed-link services). Using Ramsey models or the ECPR would lead to 
individualised interconnection charges, depending on the competitive relationship of 
each interconnector to the TO and other fa~tortt. Such  sav~re price discrin1ination in 
the  market for interconnection  is  likely to be  inequitable,  invite  arbitrage,  become 
arbitrary and interfere with sound competition policy. 
•  A  mature  telecommunications  market  is  likely  to  be  characterised  by  price  and 
service  competition  in  retail  markets.  However,  bottlenecks  in  reaching  individual 
• .. 
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customers are likely to persist and with them the necessity to interfere in the market 
for interconnection through regulation or competition policy. Because of the diversity 
of  uses  to  which  interconnection  services  will  be  put,  the  principles  for 
interconnection charges should be independent of the specific service created with 
interconnection. 
Concluding  from  these  observations  we  call  for cost-based  interconnection  charges 
(based on average incremental costs). We believe that cost-based charges should form 
the  base-line  case  but  that  markups  on  top  of  average  incremental  costs  may  be 
justified dep~nding on the incumbenfs  J~gitimate revenue requirements. The burden of 
proof for determining these markups must be on the incumbent. 
In  order to base  interconnection charges on  the costs of interconnection, one  has to 
know what the costs are and how they are related to interconnection as a service. The 
incumbent incurs five types of costs for interconnection: 
(1)  costs of conditioning the system of the incumbent TO for competition, in particular 
measures  to  ensure  network  security  and  integrity,  particular  standardisation, 
introduction of equal access, changes in the numbering system; 
(2)  costs of establishing the physical interconnection between specific networks, such 
as one-time costs of compatibility testing and making routing arrangements; 
(3)  costs  of  providing  sufficient  capacity  for  switching,  transmission  and  related 
network components to accommodate traffic from the interconnecting network at 
the TO's peak period; 
(4)  variable costs of call recording, directory enquiries, billing, etc.; 
(5)  overhead costs for accounting, management, legal expenses and those overhead 
costs associated with the four other cost types. 
How do these types of costs relate to interconnection services? The first type of costs is 
related  to  interconnection  in  general  and  not  to  a  particular  interconnection 
arrangement.  The  second  type  of  costs,  in  constrast,  occurs  each  time  a  new 
interconnection  arrangement  is  made.  The  third  type  of  costs  is  due  to  the  use  of 
facilities that  are  usually  shared  with  other interconnectors and final  users.  Types of 
costs (1)  to  (3)  are essentially one-time capital  costs. The fourth  type of costs varies 
directly with usage and it contains little or no capital costs. The fifth type again is shared 
and has only a small capital component. 
Of the five types of costs associated with interconnection, three are fairly easy to relate 
to interconnection. They are the costs of conditioning the system of the incumbent TO 
for  competition,  the  costs  of  establishing  and  maintaining  the  interconnection  of the 
particular  interconnector,  and  the  variable  costs  associated  with  interconnection 
services. The more difficult costs to  deal with concern costs for network capacity that 
are shared with other users and the overhead and common costs. 12  ·  ·  ·  Sludy b  I•  Euaopwa CGiiiAIIarr ·  ~. ~- ,. 
One of the most important questions of interconnect pricing is capacity pricing versus 
usage pricing  and the  relationship  of this issue to peak-load pricing.  We  suggest a 
flexible  and  optional  approach  to  the  type  of charging.  If  possible,  capacity-based 
charges should be offered, and they could be applied either ex ante or ex post (a) Ex-
ante application would mean that the interconnector and TO would agree on the busy 
hour and  the  busy hour contribution(s)  to be  paid by the  interconnector. This  might 
require  both  parties  to  make  point  estimates,  and  there  could  be  penalties  for 
exceeding limits and  bonuses for staying below.  (b)  Ex-post application  of capacity-
based charging would be very similar to peak-load pricing, except that it would apply to 
.  the .  -TO's .aGtual-eystems-peak- .. hoof-1of'8thersatMn z.f&za =ptedefined-""Sehedule.  As ·an 
alternative or option, sophisticated peak-load pricing of interconnection services would 
be  offered. This would be based on the expected system peak.  Uncertainty could be 
taken care of by spreading the capacity charges according to the probability with which 
the  system  peak  occurs  at  different  hours  of  the  week.  As  a  further  option  the 
interconnector  could  choose  to  be  charged  according  to  the  time-of-day  schedules 
offered to retail customers. These schedules are likely to be unsophisticated and driven 
by concerns other than the system peak (e.g., regular business hours). 
The share of the costs of conditioning the system of the incumbent TO for competition 
to be paid by the interconnector should reflect to what extent his customers (through his 
prices)  are  to  pay for the  introduction  of competition.  In deciding  this,  consideration 
must be  given to the beneficial effect that competition will have on all customers, also 
those who are customers of the incumbent. Costs of types (2) to (  4) are costs caused 
by a specific interconnector and should be bome in full by him. Prices for interconnect 
services should contribute to overhead costs through an appropriate margin. Costs of 
USOs are not directly related to interconnection and will be treated below. 
Some  concluding  observations  as  regards  pricing  for  interconnection:  Costs  depend 
heavily on  investment decisions and these decisions in turn are strongly influenced by 
expectations. Thus, costs are  not something objective and independent of the actions 
of  the  major  players.  In  a  market  with  vigorous  competition,  one  can  trust  that 
management normally makes here the  right decisions, both with  regard to investment 
and the costing of long-lived capital goods.  In  a regulated industry, it is the  regulator, 
who by strongly influencing expectations, determines to a large extent what the costs 
are.  The  regulator  then  also  has  to  decide  on  tariffs  and  charges.  In  these 
circumstances,  management  may  not  have  the  incentive  to  determine  costs  as 
accurately as possible, with the result that reported costs are often not at all reflective 
of the actual cost causation. Given this,  it appears less shocking if the regulator also 
proceeds to  determine how the  costs should be  measured. The regulator should shy 
away from trying to determine costs in actual detail, however. 
Another important aspect is that questions of costing of interconnection services and 
questions  connected  with  their  pricing  must  be  considered  as  distinct  issues.  The 
regulator's role with respect to costing is to define the methodology by which costs are 
to  be  determined but not to get involved in  their actual  calculation.  Once  costs  are N8tWork .,_ODI&wcticwi In trw Damaln of 0NP • Executive Summary  13  ·. 
known, the question of how they are included in charges m·ust be a separate decision in 
which  the  regulator  may  also  be  involved  to  the  extent  that  he  determines  actual 
values.  In  this decision a number of  policy  considerations  (efficiency,  equity,  market 
conditions, property rights, etc.) may play a role. 
Over time,  as  the  market for  interconnection  develops,  regulation  of  interconnection 
should  decline  and  give  way  to  competition  policy  as  a  safety  net.  How  can  one 
gradually  deregulate  interconnection  charges?  In  our  view,  the  path  toward 
deregulation goes via flexibility and the establishment of competition policy standards 
for  interconnection  char,ges.  Rexibility would  first be  introduced  in  the  form  of  price 
caps which, over time, would be increasingly freed from rebalancing and restructuring 
constraints. Furthermore, optional tariffs could be introduced as alternatives to capped 
tariffs. Then the scope of price caps would be changed. Paradoxically, both an increase 
and a decrease of their scope can increase the flexibility of a TO's pricing policy.  An 
increase  in  the  scope  of price  caps allows the firm  more  restructuring  because  now 
more different prices can be traded off against each other. A decrease in the scope of 
price  caps  can  increase  pricing  flexibility  because  those  prices  outside  the  cap  are 
constrained  only  by  the  market  Thus,  the  question  is  if  the  regulator  wants  to 
deregulate  by  reducing  the  number  of  services  constrained  or  by  constraining  all 
services less. At the same time that pricing flexibility is increased, standards should be 
imposed for prices that are  not considered  compatible  with  competition.  Such  prices 
would  normally  be  those  below  incremental  costs  or  above  stand-alone  costs. 
Exceptions  would  need  special  justification  in  case  prices  were  challenged  under 
competition law. 
Unbund!in~ 
Unbundling of interconnect services is one of the most controversial issues. On the one 
hand,  unbundling  has the  potential to make  the  telecommunications markets and the 
market  for  interconnection  more  competitive.  On  the  other  hand,  unbundling  may 
sacrifise  economies  of  scope  that  are  achieved  by  bundling  services,  or unbundling 
may  be  costly  to  achieve,  due  to  high  transaction  costs  or  regulation.  Since  the 
economic  literature  has  discovered  many  motives  for  bundling  of services,  some  of 
which are anticompetitive, the case for economies of scope and low transactions costs 
of bundling has to be made specifically before the call for unbundling is rejected. 
The desirability of unbundling depends on the administrative and construction costs of 
offering unbundled elements. The benefits of unbundling consist of increased flexibility 
in  combining  network elements,  resulting  in  cost  savings  and  increased  competition. 
The  pro~~s~ of unbundling  should be  industry driven,  with  some  regulatory guidance 
that unbundling should occur if its benefits exceed its costs.  In principle, customers of 
unbundled elements should pay for the costs of unbundling {because they also derive 
the  benefits).  Such  payments  also  establish  a  prima-facie  case  that  unbundling  is 
desirable.  Since  unbundling  costs  (like  costs  of  equal  access)  are  largely  one-time 
costs,  they  may  have  to  be  recovered  over  a  longer  period  of  time.  A  regulatory 14 
determination may be required to establish the appropriate costs per unit of unbundled 
element  sold.  The  more  unbundling  occurs  the  less  opportunity  exists  to  assign 
overhead and common costs. Thus, the fully-distributed cost pricing approach becomes 
less and less feasible the more unbundling progresses. 
4  Interconnection as a regulatory issue 
The main  reason  why market solutions for interconnection will  not meet the  general 
· ·  --·pubHc-interest'must'"be --seen·irr1he·markef·structure:-of--the·1etecommunications sector 
still  prevalent  in  most  countries.  In  such  an  environment,  the  incentives  to  the 
incumbent to offer interconnection to other network operators, in particular new market 
entrants,  on  a  fair  and  efficient  basis  are  not too  strong  if  the  services  the  other 
networks offer are substitutive and competitive to its own. There are only a few cases 
where in  actual practice market entrants have negotiated the interconnection of their 
networks with  that of the  incumbent completely on  their own without any  regulatory 
involvement. 
Competition policy versus regulation 
Even in countries with no authority to explicitly regulate the telecommunications sector 
there  always exists  an  oversight over market players as  regards  their adherence to 
prescribed market rules.  In  other words there is at least a competition policy and an 
authority taking  care  that the  relevant codes are  being  observed.  The  question  that 
needs  to  be  addressed  is  whether  a  sector-specific  regulation  of  the 
telecommunications sector is in fact needed or whether ·a competition policy, applied in 
the same way as to all other segments of the economy, could be considered sufficient 
to  deal  with  its  structural  and  institutional  problems,  in  particular  those  posed  by 
interconnection. 
Competition  policy  can  approach  interconnection  issues  either  by  influencing  the 
behavior  of  market  participants  or by  influencing  market  structure.  The  property  of 
interconnection  of providing  access  to  bottleneck  facilities  leads  to  several  types  of 
behavior that can be forbidden under competition law. These types of behavior, known 
as abuse of a dominant firm's market power, include exclusion of competitors from the 
bottleneck facility,  squeezing  (charging a  price for the  bottleneck facility that is  high 
relative to the price to end users), predatory pricing, price discrimination (raising rival's 
costs),  bundling and vertical restraints (for example, fixing prices that interconnectors 
can charge end users). Competition policy can help uncover and rectify such abusive 
behavior by offering (potential) interconnectors actual and punitive damage awards aud 
by  penalising  offending  parties.  Structural  competition  policy  steps  in  when  policy 
measures  aimed  at  controlling  behaviour  are  considered  inadequate  to  deal  with 
problems  due  to  corporations'  large  size  and  deep  pockets.  Structural  competition 
policies  consist of forbidding  mergers,  prescribing  separate  subsidiaries and,  as the 
most radical  measure,  forcing  the  divestiture of parts of a  corporation's  businesses. 
--
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Structural policy measures may intervene to prevent mergers that are due (in part) to a 
failure  to  solve  interconnection  issues  between  different  providers  of 
telecommunications services. 
The  prevention  of  collusive  behaviour  of  competing  telecommunications  suppliers 
should  generally  be  the  task  of  a  cartel  office  applying  general  competition  law. 
Structural  competition  law is  best pursued  by a cartel  office  in  conjunction  with  the 
courts.  Assuming  that  a  specific  regulatory  authority  is  established,  cooperation 
between  it  and  the  cartel  office  is  advisable  in  those  cases  that  involve  issues  of 
. ---.inter.canDection. 
The  most widespread policy approach  to interconnection  is  proactive  regulation  by  a 
government appointed Regulatory Authority (RA).  Historically, this may have to do with 
the  prevailing  regulation  of telecommunications  markets  for  end  users  that  made  it 
natural to place competitive issues and therefore interconnection issues with the  same 
agencies.  A  major  difference  to  competition  policy  is  the  more  industry-specific, 
proactive  and  ongoing  nature  of  regulation.  An  immediate  consequence  is  that 
regulation  may  be  more  adequate  if  industry-specific  expertise  and  continuous 
adjudication  are  required.  In  our  view,  that  is  likely  to  be  the  case  as  long  as 
telecommunications  end-user  markets  are  regulated  and  as  long  as  the  market  for 
interconnection  is  highly  asymmetric  (dominated  by  a  single  firm)  and  has  not  yet 
matured  in  its  rules.  The  RA  should  have  the  power  to  impose  its  decision  in  all 
situations in  which,  according to  its evaluation,  the  normal  market process would  not 
lead  to  acceptable  solutions.  Legislation  should  provide that decisions by the  RA  are 
subject  to  judicial  review  to  mitigate  any  fears  of  arbitrary  regulation.  Regulatory 
att~ntion shouid  piirtJarHy  be  d;rcctec  to  the  con~tellations of  network-network  and 
network-service provider interconnection. 
Realisation of interconnection 
In identifying the conditions for interconnection the RA should clearly designate (a) the 
networks  or  network  segments  that  constitute  bottleneck  facilities  and  (b),  for  each 
declared bottleneck facility, the classes of suppliers of telecommunications services that 
would  be  entitled  to  interconnect  with  it.  The  RA  should  carry  out  the  relevant 
evaluations balancing global externality effects and  the  effects of  economies of  scale 
and scope against the potential dynamic benefits that may arise when new competitors 
are  denied  interconnection  and  have  to  search  for  and  find  alternative  ways  of 
delivering their services. The time  period during which  the  status of bottleneck facility 
for a network or network segment is to be maintained should be specified. The end of 
th~t time  period  ~ould be  dP.f!ned  in  tarms  of  the  competitive  state  of  the  relevant 
market.  For  carrying  out  these  evaluations,  specific  technical,  economic  and  legal 
expertise will be required which should be at the disposal of the RA. 
Once  particular segments  or the  whole  of  a telecommunications  network have  been 
declared bottleneck facilities, service providers and other network operators should be 
granted adequate rights to interconnect with them. Conversely, the operator controlling 16  ·  Sludrfa lwEuopwaQwaaaiukia 
these bottleneck facilities should be under an obligation to grant interconnection. Rights 
to  obtain  and  duties  to provide  interconnection  should  be  fonnulated  in  secondary 
legislation  promulgated  by  the  RA.  Ucences  given  to  telecommunications  network 
operators  and,  where  relevant,  to  service  providers  should  specify  the  conditions 
relevant  to  the  particular case  and  provide  for specifics  according  to  the  particular 
circumstances. 
The right to demand and the duty to provide interconnection should be made contingent 
on  the  finding  that a network or a network segment has been  declared a bottleneck 
facility for the use intended py the demande.L_!bis.shQWd.he .specifiecUn tbeJicence. 
If certain  providers of telecommunications services are not required to have licences, 
the  RA  should  specifiy  in  a  regulation  treating  the  case  in  general  what  their 
interconnection rights are and who has the duty to provide interconnection. 
Regulation of interconnect pricing 
There is a wide range of possibilities of involvement by the RA with respect to charges 
for interconnection services. This involvement may range, at the one end, from leaving 
the fixing of charges completely to negotiations between the parties concerned and, at 
the other, to determining them on the basis of the RA•s own evaluation of relevant costs 
and market conditions. 
The  RA  should  allow private  party negotiations for the  conclusion  of interconnection 
arrangements. It should also specify under what circumstances and in what way it will 
intervene  in  private  party  negotiations.  This  should  be  the  case  when  negotiations 
threaten to fail or they in  fact have failed. The approaches could include facilitation of 
negotiations,  arbitration  and  ex-post  determination.  The  RA  should  aim  at  bringing 
about  an  understanding  with  the  incumbent  TO  and  smaller  demanders  (service 
providers  and  smaller  network  operators)  regarding  a  standardised  set  of 
interconnection services. Charges for the  standardised set of interconnection services 
should be proposed by the incumbent TO and be subject to the approval of the RA. The 
RA will  have to establish a regime by which charges for standardised interconnection 
services can be adjusted over time as demand and cost conditions change. The price-
cap  regime suggests itself as the best approach currently available. The adjustment of 
charges  over  time  for  individually  negotiated  arrangements  should  be  left  to 
negotiations between the parties concerned. 
The  RA  should  not aim  to  impose  interconnection  charges  that claim  to  correspond 
exactly to socially-optimal prices. The  RA  should define lower and upper limits within 
which interconnection charges must be  set. The standard for setting the lower limit of 
an  interconnection  charge  should  be  that  of  Long-Run  Average  Incremental  Cost 
(LRAIC). The upper limit of an interconnection charge should be a charge calculated by 
adding to LRAIC a markup that when applied to the LRAIC of each service would lead 
to revenues sufficient to cover all revenue requirements (minimum uniform markup). If 
negotiations fail, the RA should determine charges that fall within the given range using 
• • 
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its assessment of demand conditions and allowing prices in other regulated markets to 
vary so  that the  incumbent may meet his overall  revenue  requirement.  Charges  for 
standardised  interconnection  services  should  also  be  fixed  within  the  range  given 
above.  They  would  result  from  a  process  in  which  the  incumbent  TO  submits  a 
proposal,  the  RA  examines  it and,  if it meets the  RA's  criteria,  the  RA  approves  it, 
otherwise it would make a determination. 
The  best  cost  accounting  approach  currently  available  to  derive  cost  measures  is 
Activity-Based  Costing  (ABC).  It  appears  that,  if  consistently  applied  and  based  on 
forward-looking  cost  data,  ABC  will  lead  to  measures  that  are  close  to  reflecting 
efficient LRAIC. The RA should require TOs falling under their mandate to use an ABC 
methodology for the  costing of their services.  Until an  ABC  methology can  be  put in 
place, efforts should be made to use the available methodology as flexibly as possible 
with the aim of avoiding grossly misleading cost figures as the basis for interconnection 
charges. 
Tariff rebalancing and universal service obligations 
Interconnection  pricing  is  often  used  to  serve  as  a  financing  mechanism  for  local 
access losses from  unbalanced tariff structures and universal service obligations. This 
need not be, nor is it the best solution. On the basis of our analysis and the evaluation 
of  international  experience  the  following  strategy  with  regard  to  unbalanced  tariff 
structures and USOs seems to  be appropriate to us:  Potentially the  major competitive 
burden for a TO might be an unbalanced tariff structure in voice telephony. In line with 
established  EU  policy.  we  recommend  not to  maintain this situation but to  accept or 
even foster a strategy of tariff rebalancing.  Although  rebalancing will  take some  time, 
we  do  not  recommend  that  TOs  be  compensated  for  remaining  access  losses  via 
access charges  in  the  transition period.  Otherwise, they might also lose incentives to 
increase  efficiency  in  access  services.  The  temporary  competitive  disadvantage  can 
usually be  accepted because  at  least in  the  initial  phase  of competition  TOs  are  still 
enjoying advantages that competitors do not have. 
The NRAs should also rationalise their USO policy, develop solutions and remove non-
telecommunications  related  burdens  from  TOs.  In  general,  our  position  is  that  USO 
burdens  placed  on  TOs  be  compensated  out  of  a  general  Universal  Service  Fund 
(USF).  In  principle, the  USF could be funded from  any source.  However, the  realistic 
approach  would  be  to  require  all  telecommunications  network operators  and  service 
providers  to  pay  into  it  on  the  basis  of  their  volume  of  activity  in  the  retail 
telecommunications market. This approach would have the important advantage of de-
coupling the issue of interconnection charges from the issue of financing USOs, which 
would already be a substantial advantage. 
After a period of  3 to 5 years from  the  introduction of competition,  the  NRAs should 
review the situation. In  particular they should  reconsider the decision not to introduce 
access  charges.  To our mind the  initial decision  might be  revised  if competition  has 
become effective, the financial burden of unbalanced tariff structures and USOs still is 18  - . .  .  .  .  audytat•••eu.op.n  COillliulaii  - . 
significant, a USF solution is not feasible and the TO is competitively disadvantaged by 
the  situation.  These prerequisites for introducing access charges  might be  different 
from Member State to Member State and have to be made operational for regulatory 
purposes.  Developing  common  operational  criteria  could  be  done  at the  European 
level. NRAs then have to verify and to apply these criteria to come to a final conclusion. 
Effectiveness of competition can be measured by the market share of competitors and 
by movements in market shares and in prices. Local access losses and the financial 
burden of USOs can be identified by proper cost accounting methodology. Whether or 
not a USF solution for financing  USOs is feasible mainly is a question of political or 
~  ..  regulatory..decisioD-making~·:T.A8Ja&AtifiaatiOA..of...a~~isadvantage1)f'1he TO 
caused by the resulting situation seems to be more complicated. If the corresponding 
TO is financially in good shape and earns an appropriate rate of return on capital, then 
there is some indication that the asymmetric regulatory burden from unbalanced tariffs 
and USOs are outweighed by other competitive advantages compared to competitors. 
Then  no  (urgent)  need  for  access  charges  arises.  If the  TO  is  in  a  bad  financial 
situation  and  earns  an  insufficient return  on  capital,  the situation  is more  difficult to 
evaluate  for  the  regulator.  Such  an  outcome  might  result  from  the  regulatory 
asymmetry. However, it might also be caused by poor competitive performance,  less 
customer responsiveness or inefficiency in production. 
Network integrity 
There  is  no  question  that  the  interconnection  of  different  networks  and  service 
providers requires careful attention to maintaining the integrity of networks, in particular 
that of the  PSTN. At the  beginning of the process of introducing competition into the 
~ector, it will be the incumbent TO that must assume the responsibility of  assuri~g the 
integrity of its network. The cost for this will then have to be included in the charges for 
network  services  that  it  charges  its  own  business  units  downstream  as  well  as  its 
competitors  through  interconnection  charges.  As  a  corollary,  network operators  and 
service providers should be  charged with the cost of network integrity in  proportion of 
their shares  in  volume  of business in  the  relevant markets.  As competition  develops 
and competing networks gain in size, the operators of the latter will have an interest of 
their  own  in  assuring  the  integrity  of  networks,  not  only  of  their  own  networks  but 
overall, and be interested in finding common least-cost solutions. 
Collocation 
The collocation of an interconnecting operators equipment accomplishing the physical 
interconnection, or, as regards service providers, the collocation of their computers and 
switches  on  the  premises  of  the  interconnection  granting  network  operator,  hrings 
advantages both in  terms of quality and costs.  If there are no reasons with  opposite 
effects of comparable importance, it should be granted in order to minimise the cost of 
providing  services  in  a  competitive  environment.  The  RA  should  require  that  the 
incumbent TO offer competitors physical collocation of their interconnecting equipment. 
Virtual collocation should be accepted as an alternative to physical collocation. Lower 
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levels of the quality of interconnection due to virtual collocation should be compensated 
through lower charges. 
points of interconnection 
The  issue  of  points  of  interconneqtion  is  essentially a special  aspect  of  the  issue  of 
unbundling. If there is a sufficient degree of unbundling of interconnection services, and 
if demanders for these  services can  freely select from  the  available set  according  to 
their needs,  then  there  are  also sufficient points of  interconnection  for  demanders  of 
interconnection services to select from. 
The  RA  is  not  well  positioned  to  determine  on  an  ex-ante  basis  the  proper 
interconnection  points  for  the  various  demanders  of  interconnection  services.  The 
determination of  points of interconnection should  be  left to private  party  negotiations 
with  a  role  for  the  RA  if  negotiations  fail.  Solutions  for  the  standardised  points  of 
interconnection  should  be  the  task  of the  industry  committee  entrusted  with  finding 
solutions for the proper degree of the unbundling of services in general. 
End-to-end quality 
The  provision  of  services  by new competitors  is  not infrequently associated  with  the 
notion  of inferior quality.  From  this one  concludes that the  RA  should  assure that the 
introduction  of  competition  be  accompanied  by  requirements  placed  on  new 
competitors regarding end-to-end quality. The  relevant point is that interconnectors do 
not get a quality of service that they do  not want or that they have  to  pay a price for 
high  quality  services  while  actually  getting  a lower grade.  Conversely,  the  legitimate 
concern  of  the  incun•b~nt operaiur  may  be  that,  indepei1dcnt  cf  w~ct quGHt'/  cf 
interconnection he offers, he might be identified with the quality the new market entrant 
brings to market which, if of a low grade, could reflect on his reputation with end users. 
Issues  of  quality  should  in  general  be  left  to  negotiations  between  the  parties 
concerned.  If an  agreement cannot be  reached  during negotiations, the  RA  should be 
ready  to  intervene to  bring  about a solution.  For this  it should preferably proceed  by 
facilitation of negotiaitions, mediation or expert arbitration, and only in the last resort to 
ex-post determination. The fallback solution of the RA should be that the interconnector 
be  supplied with  the  same  quality that the  incumbent TO  provides  itself.  An  industry-
wide  committee  should  be  charged  with  the  setting  of  performance  parameters  for 
standardised interconnection services in  a way to assure appropriate goals of end-to-
end quality. 
A framework for negotiation 
Interconnection  arrangements  should  in  principle  be  the  outcome  of  commercial 
negotiations.  Given  the  reality  of  imperfections  in  the  market  for  interconnection 
services, a regulatory involvement will be inevitable and needed with respect to at least 
a  number  of  issues.  There  should  be  clear  ex-ante  determinations  on  some  major 
interconnection  issues  from  which  private  party  negotiations  would  have  to  start. 20 
Whatever issues that need to be resolved for an operative interconnection arrangement 
and not determined ex ante by the RA should be resolved in negotiations between the 
parties to such an arrangement. The RA may facilitate these negotiations by arbitration 
activities if they are in danger of failing. The RA should also, depending on the given 
situation, place particular restrictions on the negotiating process and on the range of 
expected results and impose minimum standards to be met. 
Interconnection and the international settlement process 
Interconnection between incumbent telecol!'munications network operators of different 
countries is currently following the international settlements process, which is based on 
the presumption that these operators do not compete with each other on their domestic 
territory. Once a unified interconnection regime is established for the Member States of 
the  EU,  whereby  new market entrants will be able  to compete  across  international 
borders, the question arises how this will impact on the international settlement system 
and what the policy of the RA should be. There are basically two options: either bring 
the settlement system within the ambit of the interconnection regime or to allow it to co-
exist with  it.  We will  argue that the second option  should be preferred provided that 
certain precautions are taken. 
The  regulatory  authorities  should  for  the  time  being  not  interfere  with  the  current 
international settlement system.  It can be expected that this system will  rapidly adjust 
and with time become part of the interconnection regime in those countries covered by 
the  regime.  The  regulatory  authorities  should  be  aware  of  the  potential  for 
anticompetitive elements in future (settlement or interconnection) agreements between 
the  former monopoly suppliers of international telecommunications services.  A policy 
may  have  to  be  developed  vis-a-vis  countries  not  covered  by  the  prospective 
interconnection  regime,  in  particular  countries  with  a  restrictive  telecommunciations 
policy whose suppliers might exploit the liberal regime in the EU to their advantage. 
5  European and worldwide experience with interconnection 
To our knowledge this study brings together the most comprehensive description and 
evaluation of interconnection experience in the world. The study analyses how all the 
12 Member States have dealt with interconnection issues in their national environment 
so far. To make use of the rich experience with interconnection in countries which have 
liberalised  telecommunications  earlier  than  the  European  Union,  some  additional 
countries are also analysed (namely the US, Japan, New Zealand and Australia). 
In  all  countries  that  have  introduced  network  competition  in  telecommunications, 
interconnection has been among the most pressing issues. As experienced in the US 
from the early parts of this century onward, incumbent TOs may simply want to refuse 
interconnection  with  competing  network  operators.  Later  experiences  in  the  UK, 
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. licence  or  statute,  do  not  voluntarily  grant  interconnection  to  competing  network 
operators  at terms  and  conditions  that  would  be  acceptable  to  regulators.  Without 
regulatory interference negotiations often reach an impasse. This experience suggests: 
(a)  that a right or duty to interconnect is necessary to ensure network entry; 
(b)  that  some  form  of  regulatory  interference  with  private  negotiations  on 
interconnection agreements is helpful in reaching outcomes that regulators desire. 
The  experience  also  suggests  ~at network  interconnection  is  too  complicated  and 
possibly too individualised an  issue-to be regulated· in all its aspects. ·Thus, a balance 
between  regulation  and  commercial  agreements  needs  to  be  reached.  Since  most 
interconnection regimes start out with a highly asymmetric market position between the 
incumbent TO and the interconnector, ex-post regulation has proven to be an effective 
tool  in  helping the interconnector's negotiating position.  In  order to  create  reasonable 
expectations about the outcome of ex-post regulatory interference, ex-ante regulation 
has to establish a set of basic guidelines for the issues that can be treated through ex-
post  regulatory  determination  and  the  criteria  to  be  used  by  the  regulator.  The  UK 
framework has created such  rules in  great detail. It is  questionable if the  UK level of 
detail  is  needed  or  whether  more  general  rules  suffice.  The  trade-off  is  between 
constraining the regulator and requiring frequent changes in  the  ex-ante regulation  on 
the one hand and regulatory discretion and vagueness on the other. 
Many  countries  use  their  interconnection  regime  as  an  active  regulatory  tool  for 
promoting  competition  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  The  objectives  of 
interconnection regulation as revealed by regulators in our country studies include entry 
help and the viability of the incumbent. Entry help is provided to the interconnector via 
low interconnection charges (and/or high prices for retail telecom services) that improve 
their competitive position via  the  incumbent TO.  Entry help is  also provided via  rules 
that equalise interconnection charges across interconnectors and thereby improve the 
competitive  position  of  small  interconnectors  relative  to  large  interconnectors  (US 
"equal charge" rule).  As appropriate, entry help is most pronounced at the beginning of 
the interconnection regime  (US,  UK and  Japan).  While the question of the  viability of 
/
~.he incumbent TO is raised at the outset, it becomes a more pressing issue  ove~  ~ime, 
as "bypass" occurs and  the  incumbent loses market share.  A major reason  given for 
(this problem by incumbents is the slow speed allowed to rebalance retail tariffs. 
The viability of the incumbent is taken care  of through fully-distributed cost pricing of 
interconnection  and  through  (implicit  or  explicit)  access  charges  or  access  loss 
,  contributions. We have not found any satisfactory regime of access charges among the 
'countries we studied. The US is actively searching for a replacement for the status-quo 
approach  currently  used  (which  was  derived  largely  from  a  formula  for  separating 
interstate  and  intrastate  costs).  The  UK approach  is  much  more  explicit and  rational 
:than the US approach but it requires superhuman objectivity in making waiver decisions 
as  well  as  complicated  and  questionable  calculations.  Access  charges  have  been 
justified in  some countries by constraints on  tariff rebalancing and/or by USOs. While 22  - -.  .  Sludyfor~  Conlriiltialt"- . 
~  . . 
constraints on  tariff rebalancing  should be  lifted to accommodate competition  and  to 
promote  cost-based  pricing,  USOs  may  actually  become  more  desirable  under 
competition. So far, only Australia has a method for establishing and financing the costs 
of USOs in place. Experience in this area is needed. 
The interaction between regulatory bodies and official competition policy in the area of 
interconnection varies among the countries studied. In New Zealand, competition policy 
fully dominates; there is no regulation. In the US the two types of policy often compete 
with  each  other.  Major  parts  of  the  US  interconnection  regime  are  the  result  of 
''  1'  .fa  1e  ........  di  I  tioo  i ...  +~ •---•  nd  Jn~~tan  , competiti.On  ... po tcy..,.  r_examp  ,  .  ...&,UC; .ve  ca  separa  ~~..a ·:'ft4~  · ce  __ 
carriers,  the  equal-access  stipulations  and  the  •equal  charge•  rule.  In  the  UK 
interconnection  regime,  the  regulator  seems  to  actively  pursue  competition  policy, 
without  facing  strong  constraints  from  other  instruments  of  competition  policy.  Our 
expectation is that active regulation of interconnection will eventually disappear as the 
market for interconnection matures.  Competition policy will  then  have to take  over as 
the  main  policy  tool  for  dealing  with  problems  arising  in  this  market.  It  is  therefore 
imperative that the role of competition policy be established early on. 
Most  countries  have  gained  their  first  experience  with  interconnection  agreements 
through fixed-mobile interconnections. For full-fledged network competition, fixed-fixed 
interconnections are currently more important. The question is, to what extent countries 
can  learn  from  their fixed-mobile  interconnection  experience  for  the  upcoming  fixed-
fixed  case  and  to  what  extent  they  are  locked  in  by  their decisions  on  fixed-mobile 
interconnections.  For  several  countries  a  particular  emphasis  of  fixed-mobile 
interconnection  agreements  is  on  low  tariffs  for  private  circuits.  In  the  UK,  the  only 
European  country in  our :study  wiLh  fixdd-fixed  interconnections,  preferential  tariffs for 
private circuits have  not been  provided  under fixed-fixed  interconnection agreements. 
The ostensible reason for this asymmetry has been to encourage facilities investments 
by competing fixed-network operators and to discourage similar investments by mobile 
operators.  That  there  can  be  ample  room  for  private  circuits  in  fixed-fixed 
interconnection  agreements  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  importance  of  the  US 
special-access regime. 
Over time,  interconnection  moves  from  something  infeasible or difficult to  something 
resembling  business  as  usual.  At  the  beginning  of  interconnection  regimes,  there  is 
usually a single entrant that wants to be interconnected to the incumbent TO. The pace 
of  introducing  interconnection  along  with  interconnection  charges  appears  to  be  the 
most pressing issue. While timing to  realise  interconnection remains important for the 
newcomers,  the  feasibility  of  interconnection  has  long  been  established,  and  most 
parties face other issues. Countries with  long experience in  e1etwork  cornpetition  (US, 
UK)  are  confronted with a diversity of parties that want to interconnect and that have 
different  interests.  An  interconnection  regime  that  individually  takes  care  of  these 
interests  is  likely  to  become  cumbersome  and  complex.  Rather,  standardisation  of 
agreements  on  many  issues appears  possible,  leaving fewer issues that  have  to  be 
solved  for  individual  cases.  As  the  market  for  interconnection  matures,  non-Netwoltc lntercolw.aian  1n the Doinaln of QNp·.· Executnle'Swnmary  .  23 
. discrimination between interconnectors becomes pressing, and the case is made  that 
alii  potential  interconnectors  should  be  treated  similarly  (as  in  US  expanded 
interconnection). 
How  can  countries  at the  beginning  of their  interconnection  regimes  learn  from  the 
countries  that  have  more  experience  with  interconnection  in  a  competitive 
environment? Clearly, the more advanced countries have gone through stages in their 
interconnection  regimes  that  might  be  skipped  or  shortened  by  the  followers.  For 
I 
e~ample, the  technical  feasibility  of interconnection  has  by  now been  demonstrated 
_ .  .-UI1der  varin••s-network-cootiga•rations  •. ..:Iber.a .is...ample....nce.,.with  .. location  of 
interconnection points and with compatibility between different types of networks and 
lif1e capacities. Similarly, there are many issues relating to interconnection agreements 
for  which  solutions  could  be  adapted  from  UK  interconnection  agreements  or  US 
interconnection tariffs, both of which are in the public domain. Some issues are not so 
cl~ar-cut but nevertheless learning is likely to be helpful.  For example, the  costs and 
b•nefits of  equal  access,  while  possibly different in  magnitude  across  countries,  are 
I 
ur!llikely to differ much in  kind. Methods for cost-benefit analysis of equal access may 
therefore be transferable. 
In the US and the UK the publicity of the contents of interconnection agreements goes 
a~ong with an involvement of the whole telecommunications sector in the process that 
shapes the  interconnection  regime.  Such  an  involvement and  public  discussion  may 
stow down the speed of decision making but it is likely to improve the understanding of 
tlie issues and trust in the outcome of regulatory decisions. 
The  LIS  country  ~~se study is the  only one that could be  relevant for the  relationship 
between  the  European  Commission  and  the  Member  States  in  terms  of  regulatory 
division of  labour and  responsibility. The US experience suggests that dual regulation 
causes  problems  of jurisdictional  cost  separation  and  of conflicts  between  rules  that 
govern  intrastate  and  interstate  transactions.  The  US  has  generated  reasonable 
uniformity of approaches throughout the country where either the federal regulator has 
preempted  state  regulation  or where  competing  interstate/intrastate  regulation  exists 
and  operators  can  arbitrage  between  jurisdictions.  Translated  to  the  case  of  the 
quropean Union,  this suggests that the  European  Commission  could  either prescribe 
~inding rules  on  interconnection  or  establish  European  standard  rules  that  can  be 
followed on  a voluntary basis. Voluntary rules could lead to a unified approach to the 
extent  that  arbitrage  possibilities  for  telecommunications  services  between  countries 
can be realised through facilities-based competition through interconnection. 24  Stucfy fo( the EiitoPeM a.  ........  . 
6  Towards a European interconnect policy- recommendations of 
the study 
All  experience  with  competition  in  the  European  Union  and  in  the  rest  of the  world 
proves that interconnection is the key for transforming the former monopolistic market 
structure  in  telecommunications  into  a  competitive  one.  Viable  competition  is 
unthinkable  without  interconnection  between  mainly  (but  not  exclusively)  the 
incumbenrs and the new competitors• networks. Economic analysis can show and can 
give  the  answer  why  that  is  the  case.  Technical  analysis  gives  evidence  that 
· --;nterconnectiorrisieasibte""anctmore-costJ&'ffective tharrstand=atomrsotutions~· It is· not 
only  competition  in  public  voice  telephony that requires  interconnection  of networks. 
The  status of  service competition  in  the  EU  proves that viable  service competition  in 
other  service  fields  benefits from  interconnection to existing  networks.  The  case  for 
policy and regulatory involvement can be made quite easily. This holds on the national 
as  well  as  on  the  European  level.  In  the  following  we  will  focus  our findings  on  the 
necessity  for  and  the  best  approach  to  a  consistent  and  coherent  European 
interconnect policy. 
Need for a comPrehensive European interconnect policy 
We  see  four  major arguments  in  favour of the  need  for a comprehensive  European 
interconnect policy. First, the European Union has taken the lead in the transformation 
of  the  telecommunications  sector  from  a  monopolistically  structured  market  to  a 
competitive  one.  Member  States  therefore  expect that  major policy  frameworks  and 
measures which govern and  structure the transition from  monopoly to competition will 
also  be  developed  on  the  European  leveL  lnter~orlnection is,  of course  one  of  them. 
Second,  a  European  interconnect  policy  can  act  to  counter  divergences  in  national 
approaches.  Quite different national  approaches have already been  developed  in  the 
case  of  mobile  networks.  So  far,  only  the  UK  has  developed  an  approach  toward 
interconnection between fixed networks. A European policy thus could take the lead in 
establishing a uniform and  innovative approach in  this area,  as well  as with  regard to 
interconnection  in  an  intelligent  network  environment.  Third,  similar  conditions  of 
access  to  networks and  network functions  under equal  terms  and  conditions  in  each 
Member  State  favour  the  development  of  European-wide  networks  and  services~ --
Interconnection can  be a bottleneck for such services if it is not provided everywhere. 
Fourth,  the  European  policy  framework  for  interconnection  developed  so  far  is 
consistent with  a variety of very different interconnect policies in  the  Member States 
and does not lead to a harmonised development. 
Current European interconnect policy 
Our  evaluation  of  the  current  European  interconnect  policy  leads  to  the  following 
conclusions: 
The  fundamental  principles  for  open  network  provision  which  have  been  developed 
within the  legislative ONP framework,  including the  voice telephony Directive  rejected . ·25 
by ;  the  European  Parliament  in  the  summer  of  1994,  are  a  sound  basis  for  a 
co~prehensive European  interconnect policy.  Although  developed  for  and  within  an 
en~ronment of monopolistic provision  of voice  telephony and  network  infrastructure 
harmonised  conditions,  basic  principles  and  essential  requirements  are  also 
fundamental regulatory conditions in an environment of competitive provision of voice 
telephony and network infrastructure. 
As  compared  to  the  regulatory  framework  and  the  regulatory  rules  conceming 
int  rconnection in countries which have introduced competition in the core business of 
tel  communications, however, the current .elements of a European interconnect policy 
ar  too  broadly  defined  and  do  not address  all  relevant  regulatory  challenges  and 
pr  blems.  They  are  consistent  w•th  quite  divergent  national  approaches  in  the 
E  ropean  Union  and  therefore  neither  lead  to  harmonised  conditions  for 
in  rconnection nor facilitate or foster the development of European-wide networks and 
setvices. 
Major policy decisions on the transition to a fully-liberalised telecommunications market 
environment are to be expected soon in Europe. This progress increases time pressure 
to
1  develop  a  more  comprehensive  and  detailed  European  policy  approach  towards 
interconnection  and  its  regulatory  implementation.  Efficient  competition  requires  the 
appropriate interconnection  regime  to be available in  advance. This analysis  leads to 
our first recommendation: 
~commendation  1: 
slnding ::uro..,ean legislation civaling w:th ;:;!! lt''3 major in!"!rt:onnection issues should be 
available and effective before full-scale competition is introduced in 1998. 
ArY European interconnection legislation includes an  element of harmonising national 
approaches  and  at  the  same  time  any  interconnection  legislation  sets  conditions  or 
regulates competition. We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 2: 
I 
~uropean legislation on interconnection could be based upon both Art.  100 (a) and the 
c¥>mpetition  rules of the Treaty. There is no a-priori reason why one or the other legal 
~asis should be excluded or preferred. 
i 
I 
! 
European and national responsibility 
One  of  the  objectives  of  the  study  is  to  identify  regulatory  issues  conceming 
interconnection  which  are  dealt with  most properly at  the  European  level  and  those 
which are best performed at the Member States' level. This division of labour has to be 
tound in the current constitutional order of the  EU.  This mainly implies that European 26  Studt' tar ..  Eutapu&'l Conaaltsaiui• 
policy  can  predominantly  provide  the  legislative  framework  and  provisions.  The 
administrative control and implementation remains with the Member States' institutions. 
The European legislative process, however, exhibits shortcomings and weaknesses for 
dealing  with  dynamic  market  and  competition  developments  like  interconnection. 
Therefore,  concerning  the  upcoming  discussion  on  a  regulatory  authority  on  the 
European level we recommend: 
Recommendation 3: 
. JUh.e...upcoming  disc• •ssion  ~..on...the .organisation  t4f...regwlatioo~~rope-tfeads- to·1he 
creation of a European regulatory authority for telecommunications, then this authority 
should predominantly deal with all regulatory aspects of interconnection. 
Interconnection and the comoetitjon rules 
Although  the  Commission  cannot  at  this  time  directly  regulate  telecommunications 
operators,  it  can  directly apply  the  competition  rules  of the  Treaty.  The  competition 
rules of the  EC Treaty directly apply to most interconnection problems. The advantage 
of "regulation" through competition rules is their unified application throughout the Union 
by the Commission. However, their effect is limited by their scope of application and by 
the  fact  that  their  primary  objective  is  to  provide  for  fair  competition.  They  are  not 
designed to achieve other objectives and are no substitute for a comprehensive set of 
rules  for  interconnection  equally  applicable  to  all  players.  As  a  matter of  fact,  most 
interconnection agreements have to meet the criteria of the competition rules of the EC 
Treaty. This also means these provisions empower the  Commission to enforce these 
rules  with  regard  to  interconnection  if  it  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  specific 
interconnection agreements violate the competition rules. Networtc tnlercomectiolt in1he Domain of ONP-- Executive Summary  27 
We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 4: 
4.1  The  Commission  should  enforce  the  competition  rules  if  it  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  specific  provisions  in  particular  interconnection  agreements 
violate these rules. 
4.2  Enforcement  activities  should  be  concentrated  on  interconnection  cases  with 
direct relevance for European-wide networks and services. 
4.3  Applying the European competition rules might also be regarded as a European 
policy instrument in  case a Member State has not yet (properly)  implemented a 
European legislation on interconnection. 
4.4  Competition  policy  should  act  against  collusive  behaviour  of  interconnecting 
parties, the refusal of a dominant network operator to interconnect, discrimination, 
unfair pricing for interconnection and the refusal to unbundle network services. 
Policy options 
We see two major policy options the Commission may choose: 
(  1)  Rely on the proposed voice telephony Directive. 
(2)  Develop a comprehensive intercoranect policy in ihe ONP in:m1a·.~·oik. 
The first option would  regard the  interconnect policy model  included  in  the  proposed 
voice  telephony  Directive  as  sufficient  for  developing  a  fully-competitive 
telecommunications  market  in  Europe.  In  our view,  the  voice  telephony  Directive  is 
compatible with quite different national interconnect approaches and it does not include 
all relevant interconnection cases. We therefore recommend: 28 
Recommendation 5: 
5.1  European  policy  should  develop  comprehensive  legislation  towards 
interconnection which does not only deal with  interconnection to the TOs' voice 
telephony networks. 
5.2  Concerning  voice  telephony,  this  legislation  should  include  the  following 
interconnection cases not yet covered by the voice telephony Directive: 
(a)  Interconnection between two mobile telep~ony  ne~orks  ~ithin the same 
·Membe-r "State; 
(b)  interconnection between two fixed public telephone networks within the 
same Member State; 
(c)  interconnection between mobile networks from different Member States. 
Right and obligation to interconnect 
The following recommendations mainly deal with a comprehensive legislative European 
framework  on  interconnection.  The  most  important legislative  provisions  should  deal 
with  the  right  to  interconnect  and  the  obligation  to  provide  interconnection.  In  this 
context we recommend: 
Recommendation 6: 
6.1  European legislation should require the right to interconnect and the obligation to 
provide interconnection in all relevant cases. 
6.2  This  legislation  should  be  implemented  in  Member  States,  preferably  in  the 
national telecommunications laws. 
6.3  The  right  to  interconnect should  be  specified  by  regulatory  rules  set  by  NRAs 
and/or by the licences which are granted to network operators. ... 
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Recommendation 7: 
7.1  There should be no general regulatory barrier preventing network operators and 
service providers from entering into interconnection agreements with each other. 
7.2  Network operators endowed with a special or exclusive right creating bottleneck 
facilities,  or  having  a  dominant  market  position  due  to  actual  control  over 
bottleneck  facilities,  should  be  obliged  to  provide  interconnection  for  these 
bottleneck facilities to other network operators and service providers. 
7.3  If service providers in future gain dominant market positions due to actual control 
over  bottleneck facilities,  these  service  providers  should  be  obliged  to  provide 
interconnection  for  these  bottleneck  facilities  to  network  operators  and  other 
service providers. 
7.4  These  principles  should  be  set  by  European  legislation,  and  specified  case  by 
case by the NRAs in granting licences to network operators. 
Recommendation 8: 
8. 1  European  legislation  should  permit  communities  of  interest  in  cases  in  which 
there  is  little  or  no  demand  by  others  for  interconnection  or in  which  there  is 
sufficient public  interest in  not interconnecting  to  justify an  exemption  from  the 
genera!  inter~onner.tion requirP.ment. 
8.2  NRAs should make case-by-case decisions on such requests based on published 
decision criteria, in particular those based on competition law. 
Recommendation 9: 
9.1  European  legislation  should  require  that  network  operators  who  must  provide 
interconnection should offer points of  interconnection that maximise the benefits 
to telecommunications users and thereby optimise opportunities for competition  . 
9.2  The Commission should study whether the introduction of a common structure for 
network interconnection  based  on  sub-national  geographical  units  is  a feasible 
and useful approach. 30  Slur:tfb1he 'EiiiOpearrComrnfsslol •. _, - . -
Begylatory intervention and negotiations 
At least in the initial stages of network competition, interconnection has to be regarded 
as a customer-specific service and has to be arranged for not on general terms and 
conditions but on  case-by-case outcomes. The regulator is not best equipped to deal 
with the complex issues of interconnection by himself. He should as far as possible rely 
on  the market mechanism which means relying on  commercial  negotiations between 
the  interested parties.  However,  he  has to  involve  himself to make the  negotiations 
approach successful. According to our regulatory model, the RA should set some ex-
ante  conditions  for _ne_gatiations..m:Wnw  betveen~amsted 
parties,  leave  major  issues  for  negotiation;  facilitate  negotiations,  arbitrate  if 
negotiations  are  in  danger  of  failing,  and  be  prepared  to  make  a  determination  if 
negotiations  have  totally  failed.  Most  of these  regulatory  actions  are  case-by-case 
interventions which therefore typically fall into the responsibility of the NRA. However, it 
makes sense to  harmonise those interconnection issues which should be  determined 
ex ante by the  NRA and which function as a framework for negotiation. The following 
recommendations define this regulatory model: 
Recommendation 10: 
10.1  European  legislation  on  interconnection  should  identify  those  issues  which 
should be determined ex ante by the NRA. 
10.2  Ex-ante determinations should deal with the following interconnection issues: 
•  The right to interconnection of network operators and service providers to 
designated telecommunications networks. 
•  Principles that the NRA applies for the determination of interconnection 
charges as well as of access charges if they are used. 
•  The cost accounting methodology to be used by the TO so that the relevant 
cost standard can be applied. 
•  Provision of equal access and collocation. 
•  Conditions of numbering. 
•  Rules regarding publication of all or a selected range of the terms in 
interconnection agreements. 
•  Technical standards for interconnection if applicable. - / LJiC  - - Natwor1c lntercolwMtcaon1n thatroinaln of ONP ·ExecutiVe Summary  31 
Recommendation 11: 
11.1  To  harmonise  the  structure  and  content  of  interconnection  agreements, 
European legislation on  interconnection should give some guidance  on  issues 
upon  which  negotiating  parties  should  agree  without  being  legally  binding  to 
them. 
11.2  Agenda items for negotiations and agreements should be the following ones: 
•  Concrete structure and level of interconnection charges. 
•  Changes of interconnection charges over time. 
•  Locations of the points of interconnection. 
•  Concrete technical realisation of interconnection. 
•  Quality of interconnection services. 
•  Access to ancillary and supplementary services. 
•  The  precise  set  of  signalling  functionalities  to  be  provided  by  the 
interconnection providing carrier. 
•  Network management, forecasting of traffic flow, provisioning. 
•  Measures  for  meeting  essential  requirements  (network  security,  network 
integrity, interoperability of services, protection of data). 
•  Intellectual property rights. 
•  Liability and indemnity. 
•  The  method  of  dispute  resolution  procedure  to  be  used  before  a 
determination by the regulator could be requested. 
•  Dates  and  time  periods  for  carrying  out  agreement,  duration  and 
renegotiation of agreement. 
Recommendation 12: 
European legislation should require that NRAs have the  right and the responsibility to 
make ex-post determinations on  major interconnection  issues if negotiations between 
interested parties fail. 32 
Recommendation 13: 
13.1  European  legislation should  require that NRAs,  before they become  effective, 
approve  all  interconnection  agreements  involving  network  operators  that  are 
under  the  obligation  to  provide  interconnection.  Other  interconnection 
agreements would only be subject to ex-post oversight according to competition 
taw. 
13.2  Approval  of interconnection  agreements  should  be  made  dependent  on  their 
compliance wi~  requir~ry~ents set ex ante.._.by-lhe..biBA...aod.theit~asistency.with 
general competition policy standards. 
13.3  In  case  it refuses  to  approve  an  interconnection  agreement,  the  NRA  should 
provide  for  a  mechanism  (renegotiation,  determination  by  the  NRA)  for  the 
elimination or modification of the objectionable clauses. 
Recommendation 14: 
NRAs should facilitate negotiations by using these means and instruments: 
(a)  The NRA should set maximum time periods for negotiations in advance. 
(b)  Ex-post  determinations  should  only  be  made  after  unsuccessful  attempts  to 
arbitrate. 
(c)  Arbitration should aim at avoiding determinations. The NRA should arbitrate upon 
request of either party. 
Recommendation 15: 
An  arbitration  mechanism  at  the  European  level  should  be  introduced  to  solve 
interconnection disputes 
(a)  between operators from different Member States, 
(b)  concerning European-wide network operations, and 
(c)  concerning national cases with significant European-wide implications. Networt lntefCOI118Cttoi I h  t 1he OOriiairi. of  CNP :. Executive Summary  33 
.  Standardisation 
The  availability  of  standards  for  interconnection  interfaces  makes  it  easier  tor 
interconnecting parties to  agree  on  technical  issues of  interconnection.  On  the  other 
hand,  developing  (common)  standards is a time-consuming  process  and  can  re~uce 
the  incentives  for  competitive  innovations.  If  interconnection  of  competing  operators 
would only be feasible on the basis of European standards, then standards would have 
to  be  regarded  as  real  bottlenecks to  interconnection and  competition.  However,  we 
have  seen  in  our  country  studies  that  access  to  interconnection  interfaces  can  be 
agreed upon ·by  n~gotiation. In most.cases these .access. problems could .be dealt with 
without regulatory intervention. We thus regard the current European approach towards 
standardisation as appropriate also in the interconnection context. 
Recommendation 16: 
16.1  The  Commission's  policy  of  leaving  most  interfaces  to  be  standardised  by 
voluntary  efforts  strikes  the  appropriate  balance  between  the  gains  from 
standardisation  and  the  gains  from  innovation.  We  recommend  this  policy 
approach also for standards for interconnection interfaces. 
16.2  Regulatory  oversight  of  industry  collaboration  to  develop  standards  will  be 
required  to  guard  against  conusive  behavior  at  the  national  and  the  European 
level. 
16.3  For  a  limited  set  of  interfaces  - in  principle,  those  required  for  Europe-wide 
services,  ~~P.rgqnr.y and directory services - the  Commission should encourage 
development  of  standards  and  be  prepared  to  make  their  implementation 
mandatory. 
Pricing and access charges 
We  have  pointed  out  theoretically,  and  our  empirical  analysis  strongly  supports  this, 
that interconnect pricing is a key factor to determine the  structure and the  inten_slty of 
competition  in  the  transformation  process  from  a  monopolistic  market  structure  to 
effective competition. Interconnection charges can not only determine 50°/o and more of 
the new entrant's costs, it also to a significant degree determines his network structure 
and  therefore  overall  competitive  strategy.  What  might  or  should  be  done  at  the 
European  level  of  regulation  to  reach  an  efficient  outcome?  Incumbents  and  new 
c.lir  .Jnt~ ,)ft0il faH  to  re'~ch ~n agreement in particular on interconnect pricing. At least 
for the initial phase of the transition to effective competition, where the market positions 
are very asymmetric, we recommend a strong role of the regulator. 
In our view the regulator should set upper and lower limits for interconnection charges 
and let the interested parties negotiate structure and level of charges in detail. 34  - SludytDr~Ccwlliisalau- ~-··  - ·· 
Before  interconnect charges can  be  determined  successfully a  proper approach  on 
tariff  rebalancing  and  financing  USOs  has  to  be  developed.  We  clearly  favour 
economically  efficient  rebalancing  of  retail  tariffs  and  financing  USOs  outside  the 
interconnection charging regime. The following set of recommendations develops our 
pricing and access charge model in detail. 
Recommendation 17: 
17.1  The  Commission  and  Member  States  should  accelerate  a  strategy  of  tariff 
..  - -..rebalanoing-aneklet·aeeept permanent1najor tocataccess-fosses.-
17.2  Instead of generally subsidising local access, if regarded necessary, NRAs should 
arrange  for social  tariffs that provide targeted subsidies to  marginal  consumer 
groups.  Preferably, social tariffs should be arranged within the framework of an 
optional tariff structure. 
Recommendation 1  B: 
18.1  European  legislation  should  set  the  following  principles  with  regard  to 
interconnect  pricing:  Interconnection  charges  should  be  based  on  objective 
criteria, be cost-based, be transparent and non-discriminatory, and be sufficiently 
unbundled and economically efficient. 
18.2  To  facilitate  negoiiations  NRAs  shcuid  set  upper  and  lower  limits  for 
interconnection charges. 
18.3  The lower limit should be the long-run incremental cost of providing services used 
for interconnection. The upper limit should be the long-run incremental cost plus a 
markup that,  when applied to each service, would lead to revenues sufficient to 
cover all revenue requirements of a TO. 
18.4  If NRAs have to determine interconnection charges they should also set charges 
within  these  bounds,  with  neither the  upper nor the  lower limit being  excluded 
from consideration. 
18.5  Costs due to conditioning the incumbent TO's network for competition in a multi-
carrier environment (measures to ensure network security and integrity, particular 
standardisation; introdnr"tion of equal access, changes in the numbering system) 
should  be  treated  as  common  costs  of  all  networks/services  which  are 
interconnected, including services offered by the incumbent. ... 
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Recommendation 19: 
19.1  The  relevant  cost  standard  for  regulatory  purpose  of  interconnection  pricing 
should be forward-looking long-run incremental costs. 
19.2  This standard can be supported using information from Activity-Based Costing.  If 
the existing costing system does not provide the proper cost information and  its 
adaption requires time.  information from  engineering cost models (which  should 
routinely be available in TOs) should be used. 
Recommendation 20: 
If  the  NRA  has  determined  (initial)  interconnection  charges  or  if  interconnection  is 
offered by a TO as a standardised service offering. interconnection charges should be 
regulated by using a price-cap mechanism to give sufficient price setting flexibility. 
Recommendation 21: 
Telecommunications-related  public service  obligations should  be  treated  as  USOs  in 
voice telephony. 
Recommendation 22: 
In  any  interconnection  legislation  the  European  Union  should  give  preference  to 
financing USOs via  a Universal Service Fund  system  instead of access charges. The 
burden  of  proof  should  be  on  individual  Member  States  that  in  their  particular 
environment a USF system  is  not viable  or feasible  and  other approaches  might be 
necessary  . 36  - - -·  Stadytar ..  Eui(ijJWI COiiliilwlali  --' 
Recommendation 23: 
23.1  If  the  European  Union  and/or  individual  Member  States  follow  the  policy  of 
financing  USOs via access charges.  some common  access charge  principles 
should be set at the European level. 
23.2  Access charges for financing  USOs should be set in  a fair,  efficient and  non-
discriminatory  way.  They  should  be  fully  justified  and  meet  the  criterion  of 
proportionality. 
Recommendation 24: 
24.1  An imbalanced tariff structure should not be considered as part of USOs. 
24.2  Access  charges  designed  to  compensate  the  incumbent TO  for  the  costs  of 
imbalanced tariffs should not be included in interconnection charges initially, as 
rebalancing eliminates them over time. 
24.3  Three to five years after the introduction of competition NRAs should review the 
situation and reconsider the decision not to provide for compensation for costs 
due to remaining imbalances of tariffs. Access charges should be introduced if 
competition  has become effective. the corresponding financial burden  of a TO 
_ still is si.gnifi~nt, and the TO is competitively disadvantaged by the situation. 
Recommendation 25: 
A  European  interconnect  policy  should  not  allow  non-telecommunications-related 
financial burdens to be compensated by access charges. 
Recommendation 26: 
Access  charge3  should  not  be  used  to  compensate  TOs  fer  restiictions  which  are 
imposed on them to control or regulate their dominant market position. Netwof1t Interconnection In the Domain of ONP - Exacutive Summary  37 
Egual access and collocation 
Equal access will intensify competition and in our view is an  essential prerequisite for 
fair and efficient competition between network operators. On the other hand, there are 
significant network set-up costs related to the introduction of equal-access capabilities. 
These costs should be kept as low as possible by choosing an appropriate time path for 
its implementation. Whether and to what extent a harmonised approach of introducing 
equal access European-wide is feasible needs further study. 
Recommendation 27: 
27.1  The Commission should study the Europe-wide implementation of equal access. 
In  this  context,  the  standardisation for equal-access  arrangements  should  be 
considered. 
27.2  On the basis of these results a strategy of introducing equal access should be 
made  mandatory for Member States as  soon  as possible. This strategy might 
imply different time paths depending on  the status of network development in 
the Member States. 
For operators that physically interconnect their facilities to  another operator,  physical 
collocation of terminating equipment is usually technically superior to virtual collocation 
at some distance from the switching point.  From  the  regulatory point of view physical 
collocation  should  therefore  be  the  benchmark.  If  only  virtual  collocation  is  provided 
interconnectors  should  be  compensated  for  ar.y  loss  i!'1  quality  by  a  lower 
interconnection charge. 
Recommendation 28: 
28.1  European  legislation  should  require  that the  incumbent TOs  offer competitors 
physical collocation of their interconnecting equipment. 
28.2  NRAs should accept equivalent virtual  collocation  as  an  alternative to physical 
collocation. 38  .  - Study  for the"Bnapean Coiflmislial"•-
public access to interconnection agreements 
The  principle  of transparency  requires  public  access  to  interconnection  agreements 
which are in the regulatory domain. There may be items in the commercial agreements 
where confidentiality is justified. Therefore we recommend: 
Recommendation 29: 
29.1  NRAs  should  have  mandatory  access  to  the  full  text  of  interconnection 
~._agreements. 
29.2  Interested parties generally should have access to those agreements. 
29.3  Parties  of  interconnection  agreements  should  have  the  right  to  petition  for 
confidentiality concerning specific documents before the NRA. The NRA should 
decide on such requests on the basis of published criteria. 
Our  recommendations  show  that  the  European  Union  still  has  a  major  task  to 
accomplish before a comprehensive European interconnection policy is in place. Networtc fnten::uunediau-in 1he OornaJn-of ONP"  I  . 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  The topics 
1  .1.1  Interconnection and competition 
From some discussions on interconnection with regard to competing network operators 
-, ··-- ·-a•  1d  service  pt ovtders-orte""Tnigl it -get 1he-intpress;o, 1 -tl rat .fi tteiG-ot  11 lection·;s ·a -retative 
new issue in telecommunications. That is really not true. The history of interconnection 
is  as  old  as  the  history  of  telecommunications  itself.  From  the  old  days  of 
telecommunications  the  predominant  pattern  of  interconnection  has  been  the 
interconnection of networks from  operators which  were  active  in  locally,  regionally  or 
nationally separated markets. The main purpose of interconnection was to enable users 
in one region to reach users in another region. The new dimension of interconnection in 
the modern history of telecommunications results from the intention of operators to be 
interconnected to another operator's network in the same region or market. 
Many people have difficulties to understand how competition in telecommunications can 
be  introduced  and  can  work  when  in  the  initial  situation  an  incumbent  operator 
dominates the  market on  the basis of a nation-wide universal network where  he  has 
invested  tens  of billions  of  ECUs.  The  key  to  understand  the  opportunities  and  the 
structure  of  competition  in  such  an  environment  is  interconnection.  By  using  the 
bottleneck facilities of the incumbent's network new competitors can  concentrate their 
activities  on  market  segments  where  competition  is  \liable,  need  not  set  up  fully-
separated  stand-alone  network solutions  and,  nevertheless,  are  able  to  offer  end-to-
end  services  to  their  customers  on  a  nation-wide  basis.  Although  there  remain 
economies of scale in some parts of the telecommunications network interconnection is 
desirable  because it enables competition  to work efficiently  in  areas where  there  are 
less  economies  of  scale.  Pure  stand-alone  solutions  would  limit  the  scope  of 
competition  in  telecommunications  significantly.  The  barriers to  entry would  be  much 
higher  as  compared  to  a  solution  where  interconnection  of  competing  operators  is 
possible. 
Interconnection is  not only essential from  the competitor's point of view.  It is  of equal 
importance from the user's point of view. With interconnection they get all the benefits 
of  the  integrated  monopolistic  system  and  in  addition  the  benefits  of  competition. 
Without  interconnection  the  benefits  of  competition  to  users  would  be  less  obvious. 
They would have to compare advantages of competition with disadv&ntagt=s. 2 
1  .1 .2  Interconnection as a regulatory challenge 
The  interconnection of networks is economically beneficial and therefore should be a 
predominant  objective  of  any telecommunications  policy.  Because  of its  competition 
supporting  nature  new  market  entrants  generally  require  interconnection  at fair  and 
equal  conditions  as  compared  to  incumbent TOs.  Because  of the  same  relationship 
and,  in  addition, because of the positive network externality implication interconnection 
of networks is in the interest of telecommunications users. 
Given the  necessi~ of interconnection for:.~.ff~ctive. competitiorun telecomm•anications, 
there  are  some  reasons  to  assume  that  the  dominant  (if  not  monopoly)  integrated 
networ~ operator having bottleneck control over access to most customers will  regard 
that access as  his major competitive advantage and will be  less willing to provide the 
public interest solution for interconnection. We will show in  the following chapters that 
the incentives of the incumbent to offer interconnection on a fair and efficient basis are 
mixed.  These  incentives  may  be  positive  if  the  services  other  operators  offer  are 
complementary to its own. The contrary is true, however, if the services are substitutive 
and  competitive. Then the incumbent may expect disadvantages from  interconnection 
and  might attempt to  refuse  it altogether,  offer it at too  high  a price  or at  a too  low 
quality.  This  incentive  structure  leads to  our presumption  that pure  market  solutions 
based on  commercial negotiations for interconnection will  not lead to socially efficient 
outcomes.  This  evaluation  defines  the  regulatory  challenge  with  regard  to 
interconnection. Regulatory intervention should aim at compensating the market failure 
aspects of  the  commercial  relationship between different network operators.  Like  any 
regulatory intervention  it  should  be  as  market conform  as  possible  and  should  make 
maximum use of ihe mark~i mdchanism. 
1 .1 .3  ONP and a European interconnect policy 
The  European Union is on the way to fully opening up the telecommunications markets 
for  competition.  In  June  1993  the  Council  decided  to  definitively  end  the  voice 
telephony  monopoly  in  the  Member  States  by  the  end  of  1997.  A decision  to  set  a 
similar date for the infrastructure monopoly of the  TOs is  in  preparation. As  an  interim 
step the  unrestricted provision of network infrastructure for services which are already 
liberalised  is  under discussion.  Each  of  these  liberalisation  measures  will  require  the 
interconnection  of  new  networks  with  existing  ones  to  develop  viable  and  efficient 
competition. 
At  the  same  time  the  whole  regulatory  approach  of  open  network  provision  will  be 
under review in the next few years. Although developed for and within an environment 
of  monopolistic  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  network  infrastructure  harmonised 
conditions,  basic  principles  and  essential  requirements  of the  ONP  concept are  also 
fundamental  regulatory conditions in  an  environment of competitive provision of voice 
telephony  and  network  infrastructure.  What  seems  to  be  necessary  is  to  apply  the 
• 3  -.. 
general  regulatory rules  of ONP to interconnection and to  develop a  comprehensive 
interconnect policy. 
1.2  Introduction to the study 
1.2.1  Background and objectives 
The  European  concept  of  Open  Network  Provision  was  developed  to  support  the 
_  ~. regulatory_,.strategy .of.,..senf.ice  JibeFalisation  .. tliAdAhe..  .  ..pmvjsion· d  '"=transborder -service 
offerings.  At  the  same  time  TOs  were  maintaining  their  network  infrastructure 
monopoly. The basic concept of ONP was to oblige TOs to open their network under 
fair  competitive  conditions  to  competing  service  providers  and  to  interconnect  with 
them. 
The scope of competition is changing in  Europe from service competition in  data and 
value-added  non-voice  services  to  the  core  telecommunications  business  of  voice 
telephony and  network infrastructure provision.  This  process  has  started  with  mobile 
communications in most Member States where for the first time TOs are challenged by 
operators  who  compete  against  them  on  the  basis  of  their  own  physical  network 
infrastructure. This process will  continue when service providers get the  right to freely 
choose on their infrastructure provision. At the final point of this development integrated 
network  operators  compete  against  the  TOs  on  all  service  levels  including  voice 
telephony on their own network infrastructure. 
In  this  development more  and  more  network operators  want  to, be  interconnectl9d  to 
each  other and  to  the  TOs'  networks  in  particular.  The  basic  nature  of  ONP  will  not 
change in that environment. The intention of ONP to promote fair competition between 
vertically-integrated  TOs  and  new  competitors  which  have  to  rely  on  services  and 
resources of the TOs to produce and offer their own services is of equal importance in 
that environment as all experience with network competition proves. 
Given these developments, it  is  obvious that the  Commission has to  identify what the 
relevant  policy  issues  for  the  interconnection  of  networks  are  and  how  to  identify 
potential barriers to interconnection which could inhibit the interoperability of services at 
a European level. The study on network interconnection should be seen in this context. 
Given the policy decisions towards a fully-liberalised telecommunications market within 
the European Union by the end of the decade (or earlier?), interconnection is essential 
and  necessary  to  develop  a  viable  competitive  environment.  For  that  reason  any 
successful  telecommunications  policy  has  to  provide  a  proper  framework  for 
interconnection of networks and services to reach that goal. Interconnection is the key 
of the future European telecommunications policy. 
Against this background, the substantive objectives of the study may be summarised as 
follows: 4 
•  Develop  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  different  forms  of  interconnection  of 
telecommunications networks and services at a conceptual level. 
•  Assess  the  practice  of  interconnection  in  countries  with  relevant  experiences,  in 
Europe as well as overseas. 
•  Identify  and  investigate  the  issues  that  arise  at  all  levels  and  interfaces  where 
interconnection may be demanded. 
•  Investigate  mechanisms  by  which  potential  barriers  to  interconnection  may  be 
·  · -·avoided-or overcome to assure free ancf  unimpeded·Europe-wide services. 
•  Develop recommendations for the Commission regarding the further development of 
a European interconnect policy. 
Besides providing an  analytical framework of dealing with all  relevant policy issues of 
interconnection, the study should in particular examine the interconnection framework 
of  the  proposed  voice  telephony  Directive  and  make  recommendations  on  further 
developments. 
1.2.2  Approach and work programme 
Our  approach  to  the  study  is  conceptual  and  empirical.  Conceptually,  we  derive 
frameworks  for  interconnection  including  problems  which  have  to  be  solved  by  the 
interested parties and/or the regulatory authorities. We derive options for solutions and 
performance  criteria  for  evaluating  arrangements  and  interconnect  policy  measures. 
This  conceptual  part  of the  work  is  based  on  our  previous  work  on  interconnection 
issues, a careful reading of the relevant literature and results of previous reports carried 
out by the Commission. 
To  keep  the  project manageable  and  to  concentrate  activities  and  resources  on  the 
most  relevant  policy issues  it  was  first  of  all  necessary to  identify the  most relevant 
interconnection  scenarios  in  the  broad  range  of  actual  and  potential  interconnection 
cases.  After  intensive  discussion  with  the  Commission's  staff  the  following 
interconnection cases have been jointly identified as  most relevant for the  purpose of 
the study: 
(1)  Interconnection of fixed networks. 
(2)  Interconnection of fixed and mobile networks. 
(3)  Interconnection among  mobile  networks concentrating  on  GSM  to  GSM  network 
interconnection. 
(  4)  Interconnection in an intelligent network environment. NetWOrk"1ntercolwi8Ctiol 1  1n the Domain of ONP ·-- 5  -
First of all  we identHied the specifics and differences in these cases.  Although  some 
interconnection issues and problems in these various scenarios look quite different, our 
attempt  was  to  develop  an  interconnection  (policy)  framework  which  can  deal  with 
these cases in an uniform way. In our mind we succeeded with this approach. 
In the empirical part of the study we examined experience with interconnect policies in 
alt Member States and in the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. We also identified 
plans  and  policies  in  those  Member  States  which  have  not  yet  had  any  relevant 
experience. The  dominant approach to gathering and  evaluating  information  in  these 
___ countries. .has  ...be.en ._personaJ  .intentiews. with ..  TOs, .  .new .. network  .  ..op.erators,  NRAs, 
manufacturers,  service  providers  and  independent  experts.  For  a  limited  number  of 
countries  information  gathering was based  on  a questionnaire sent  out to  the  same 
group of organisations. 
The  result  of  the  country  studies,  our  cross  country  comparison  and  first  tentative 
conclusions  on  a  European  interconnect policy  have  been  presented  in  a workshop 
early  June  in  Brussels.  About  1  00  representatives  coming  from  NRAs,  TOs,  user 
organisations, new operators from most Member States and in addition from  Sweden, 
Finland and Norway attended this workshop. Many helpful comments and suggestions 
have been made to us at the workshop and afterwards which we used to reassess our 
findings and to complete our knowledge. 
1.2.3  Interrelationship of this study with concurrent studies 
During  the  study  timetable  there  was  a  concurrent  study  undertaken  by  Arthur 
Andersen entitled "Cost Allocation and the General Accounting Principles to be used in 
the  Establishment  of  Interconnection/Access  Charges".  The  Arthur  Andersen  study 
examines the practical questions associated with the establishment of appropriate cost 
allocation and accounting systems and assesses the way in which interconnect charges 
should be established in preparation for full service liberalisation. 
1.3  Structure of the report 
Our report consists basically of three parts.  In the more analytical part of the study we 
examine the interconnection issue from three different perspectives and deal with three 
different aspects.  We  take  a technical,  economic  and  regulatory  view  to  identify and 
analyse  problems  and  their  solutions  concerning  the  interconnection  of  networks. 
These  contributions form  Chapters 2,  3,  and  4.  Chapter 5 contains, in  a summarised 
form,  the  second part of  the  study.  Here we  present the  empirical basis of the  study. 
This  basis  consists  of  country-by-country  case  studies  in  which  we  describe  and 
analyse the experience with interconnection, the way in which the regulatory institutions 
have  dealt  with  interconnection  and,  of  course,  the  solutions  developed  in  these 
countries.  Although  not  all  Member  States  have  any  experience  with  network 
interconnection we  have analysed the situation in  all  Member States of the  European 6 
Union. We do not only report on actual experience with interconnection in the Member 
States; we also report on plans and concepts which have been developed or are being 
discussed  in  the  Member  States.  Because  there  is  more  experience  with  network 
competition  in  other parts of the world than  in  the European  Union,  the Commission 
was  interested in  the  interconnection experience and solutions in  such countries.  For 
that purpose we carried out in-depth case studies on Japan, the US, Australia and New 
Zealand. Att these case studies are presented in Cha-pter 5 in a summarised form. The 
full-length country studies are presented in the Annex to this report. 
The  third  part of  the  study develops  recommendatia~s...ccnceminQ a crunpr.ehensive 
European  interconnect  policy.  These  are  developed  on  the  basis  of the .  .analytical 
results  in  Chapters  2  through  4  and  the  world-wide  experience  and  practice  with 
interconnection.  To  come  to  a  comprehensive  policy  model  we  also  examine  and 
evaluate  the  current approaches  and  elements of -a  European  interconnect policy  in 
Chapter 6. 
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2  Interconnection as a Technical Issue 
2.1  General approach and scope 
2.1.1  Overview 
The scope of this chapter is the technical aspects of interconnection that relate directly 
to  conditions  of  competition  among  two  or  more  suppliers  of  telecommunications 
services.  We  focus  on  general  principles  and  seek to  identify fundamental  technical 
conditions  that  characterise  interconnection  in  most  types  of  networks  and  raise 
important issues for regulatory policy. 
Our analysis  is  based  on  the  empirical  information  gathered  in  the  series  of  country 
studies for this project.  In  addition, it draws on the findings and  problems identified in 
recent specialised studies that have examined particular technical aspects of ONP and 
on issues identified by telecommunications standards bodies. 
Interconnection  of  networks  divides  broadly  into  two  categories  - approximately 
symmetric relationships of two networks, and asymmetric relationships in which the two 
parties are substantially unequal in  size or technical conditions.  These  categories are 
useful  not  only  in  examining  interconnection  as  a  technical  issue,  but  also  as  an 
economic issue in Chapter 3. 
•  Symmetric  relationships  typically  exist  between  TOs  that  interconnect  for 
international  service  at  national  frontiers,  and  between  two  mobile  operators  who 
are directly interconnected. 
•  More  frequently,  interconnection  relationships  between  TOs  and  other  operators 
and service suppliers are asymmetric. In these cases, technically dissimilar facilities 
must  often  be  joined  together,  and  the  directional  flows  of  traffic  and  services 
between the two networks may be  quite disproportionate. Moreover, the incumbent 
network  operator  is  often  the  dominant  supplier whereas  interconnection  is  often 
demanded for technologically advanced services by an entrant. In many cases, if it 
is to be viable a competitor requires access to the incumbent's network facilities or 
services. 
Therefore, we give particular attention to: 
•  interlaces that provide  access to bottlenecks - points at which  the  incumbent,  by 
controlling  the  technical  arrangements  of  interconnection,  can  affect  the 
competitor's viability, product or costs. 8  Stod)'for ....  EOraPeM COrnl'riissl6n.  ., . 
•  t~chnical  requirements  that  are  necessary  to  achieve  equal  access  and  thus 
contribute to conditions necessary for fair competition, both between two or more 
competitors, and between new network operators and an incumbent operator. 
Limits on open access are permitted under ONP to the extent they may be required to 
achieve essential requirements. Our analysis will focus on: 
•  the  nature of technical  risks (to network security,  integrity, service interoperability, 
and data protection) that may exist at major points of interconnection 
• 
• 
technical measures that can reduce or-resolve these risks 
the  possibility  of  offsetting  benefits  to  essential  requirements  from  multiple 
suppliers. 
We conclude that: 
1  . Asymmetric relationships between incumbent TOs and competitors will be frequent. 
2.  Regulatory attention will be required to ensure that (1) competitors obtain access to 
bottlenecks,  and  (2)  TOs  make  the  technical  changes  needed  to  ensure  equal 
access to achieve fair competition. 
2.1 .2  Analytic framework 
A single  telecommunications  network contains  a large  number of interfaces at  which 
components  are  interconnected.  The  network  operator  internally  manages  these 
connections by coordinating  its  staff,  and  by  establishing specifications to ·its external 
suppliers  of  components.  The  operator  and  the  suppliers  sometimes  rely  on 
international technical standards to define portions or all aspects of an interface. More 
often  a  national  TO  has  modified  these  standards  or  has  developed  proprietary 
interface requirements to be met by (all of its) suppliers. 
The focus of this study is the  external points of interconnection at boundaries between 
two  telecommunications  entities  - either  two  distinct  network operators  or a network 
operator and  a service  provider.  Only  incidentally do  we  need  to  touch  on  the  many 
types of interconnection within a single network. 
Conceptu~lly, network relationships may be represented in a series of service provision 
layers (Figure 2.1.2-1 ). 
1.  The bottom layer - infrastructure - provides capacity (bandwidth). It is built up from 
way leaves (rights-of-way) and transport facilities (cables, radio links, and satellite 
facilities).  This  layer  includes  the  transport facilities  of different  entities  such  as 
TOs; cable television distribution companies, and television broadcasters. 
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2.  The  technology  at  the  second  layer provides  routing  of  signals  and  messages 
through the infrastructure. It consists of network switches and control facilities. The 
network services at this level include voice telephone service, X.25 data service, 
and television distribution. 
3.  At  the  third  level,  networks  provide  access  to  information  or  communication 
services  which  can  be  selected  by  the  individual  user,  e.g.  cashless  calling; 
freephone; videotex; e-mail messages. 
4.  Finally,  the  top  layer  provid~s  information  content,  e.g.,  data  files;  travel 
information; television programmes. 
The  two lower levels shown  in  Figure 2.1.2-1  comprise the so-called  'basic services', 
while  'enhanced' or  'value-added' services require ·higher-layer features  as  well.  This 
distinction is found in  the  regulatory regimes of some countries, generally to  separate 
monopolistic provision from competitive provision of services. 
Figure 2.1.2-1:  The layered model for telecommunications and tete-information 
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The layered network model of Figure 2.1.2-1  can be expanded into three dimensions in 
order  to  show  more  explicitly  the  possibility  of  competitive  provision  of  resources. 
Graphically,  competitive  facilities  or  services  offered  at  a  given  layer  by  different 
telecommunication  entities can  be  shown  as  duplicated symbols  in  that  layer.  To  be 
able  to  distinguish the different competing providers at each layer,  the four layers can 10  -- -.  --Stady ...  Ebi~Ccaiiiissiuli 
be extended horizontally into four service planes. In each service plane, the  (potential 
or real) competitors are spaced apart in one direction, while the perpendicular direction 
in the plane indicates the hierarchical distance to the end user in the delivery chain of 
network  components.  Figure  2.1.2-2  shows  this  resulting  three-dimensional 
"interconnection space" with four service planes. 
Figure 2.1.2-2:  Interconnection space for competitive telecommunications and 
telematic service provision 
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Obviously,  this  interconnection  space  contains  an  abundance  of  internal  interfaces 
where  network components  belonging  to a  single telecommunications firm  might be 
interconnected.  Selecting  the  best  path  of  intemal  interconnections  is  a  classical 
economic problem faced  by all telecommunication firms in their ongoing engineering 
processes  of  procuring  equipment  from  the  best  manufacturers  and  optimally 
reconfiguring the network in response to market needs. 
With the classical monopolistic supply of telecommunications resources, the perimeters 
of telecommunication organisations encompassed much of the interconnection space of 
. Figure_ 2. 1...2-2.  The  TO .supplied .all  of  .. the jnfrastru.cture  ... comp.onents .. between  the 
international gateways, at the far right of the bottom level, up to and often including the 
end user's terminal equipment at the far left. Initially only a few external interconnection 
interfaces  existed  - the  international  gateways  (transit  switches  at  the  highest 
hierarchichal level), and later also interfaces for user access, as the terminal markets 
gradually become liberalised. In Figure 2.1.2-2, these external interfaces appear to the 
extreme  right  and  left,  respectively.  As  a  result  of  this  history,  these  "extreme" 
interfaces have become the most widely standardised. In  similar fashion, the TO was 
also vertically integrated, and supplied not only routing capability but also value-added 
services  (such  as  operator  services  and  cashless  calling)  and  information-content 
services (such as directory assistance, weather, etc.) in the higher service planes of the 
figure. 
However, as elaborated upon in the following, this study is mainly concerned with new 
interconnections  between  different  telecommunication  firms.  The  corresponding 
external  interfaces  are  laid  open  by  strong  new technological  and  economic forces, 
which  are  creating  new  relatio:lships  between  th9  v~rious  providers  of 
telecommunications.  For  example,  in  the  infrastructure  plane  of  the  figure  an 
independent mobile operator (indicated by shaded ovals) is interconnected to the TO's 
infrastructure at an intermediate or higher level in the switching hierarchy. That operator 
may also supply some of the routing services needed for mobile calls, interconnecting 
its signalling facilities with  the TO's signalling network in  the second plane. The figure 
also shows independent service providers in the value-added services and information 
content  levels,  which  are  interconnected  to  the  TO  for  routing  and  infrastructure 
services. 
2.1.3  Vertical and horizontal relationships 
Telecommunications firms make use of  many types of communications technology to 
supply  rnar~et~. They  are  driven  by  (per~eptions of)  market C::sm3nds  and  customer 
needs,  and  are  not  necessarily  constrained  by  the  hierarchy  of  the  technical 
relationships. 
•  Typically,  a  firm  will  integrate  two  or  more  service  layers  within  its  own 
organisation  in  order  to  serve  market  needs  more  effectively  and  to  realise 12  - ·  Slucty kA  1118 Eun;piai  1 Cull  •ission· · · ·  -
economies of  scope  by reducing  costs that may otherwise occur from  using 
separate suppliers or technologies at each layer. The PTT organisation is the 
leading  example  of  such  vertical  integration.  A PTT integrates  three  or four 
layers  to  provide  voice  telephone  service  and  information  services.  Other 
telecommunications  suppliers,  including  cable  television  and  broadcast 
services, have traditionally also been organised along vertical lines. 
•  Network components can be conceived in a second hierarchy of relationships, 
one determined by the proximity to the final user. In this hierarchy, the delivery 
-·cnain--'consists-ot-'tJSeT te 11 ninaf;'"8ccess -networlr,  .. 1oca1:network; 1runk  ·  network, 
and  international network. At one time European PTTs integrated all elements 
of  the  chain  from  the  terminal  up  to  international  services.  User  terminal 
equipment has  subsequently been unbundled, and in  some countries access, 
local switching, and trunk services are already supplied by separate firms. 
•  Finally, users themselves may be multi-level entities. Users demand access to 
the  network.  In  addition, they may self-supply some  services (PBX switching, 
private  network),  and  may  be  offering  value-added  services  and  intelligent 
network services to others. 
Fundamental  changes  in  the  basic  technologies that support telecommunications  are 
now  altering  the  long-standing  vertically-integrated  organisation  of  production. 
Economies  of  specialisation  are  giving  some  suppliers  advantages  in  producing  at  a 
single  layer  of  the  hierarchy.  At  the  same  time,  developments  in  transport  capacity, 
switching  and  computer control  are  enabling suppliers to  integrate horizontally and  to 
supply  formerly  separate  networks  or  services  by  using  common  infrastructure  and 
software facilities. 
We conclude that: 
1.  Technology makes possible a wide  variety of ways to supply telecommunications 
services.  There  are  many  potential  interfaces  and  points  of  interconnection 
between operators. 
2.  Economic factors - including economies of scale, economies of scope, and product 
differentiation - rather than strictly technical factors determine where operators and 
service providers will seek to interconnect. 
3.  Telecommunications  technology  is  compatible  with  vertically-integrated, 
horizontally-integrated, and specialised operators. 
The  net  effect  of  these  changes  is  to  redraw  the  perimeters  of  many 
telecommunications  organisations.  Firms  are  vertically  dis-integrating,  and  new  firms 
are supplying single components within the vertical chain. At the same time some firms 
are horizontally integrating across distinct types of networks. The implications of these • 
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new  organisational  relationships  for  network  interconnection  are  that  some  key 
interfaces that were  formerly  managed within  the firm  or network are  now  points  at 
which two firms meet in both technical and commercial relationships. 
In  the  uinterconnection  space" in  Figure 2.1.2-2 changing organisational  relationships 
between firms may correspond to entirely new paths through this space between  two 
end  users,  or between  an  information  service  provider and  an  end  user. -Generally, 
such  new  paths  represent  innovative  technical  relationships  in  terms  of  external 
interlace standards, management of security and integrity, allocation of service quality 
_  .. lev.els, ~.Moreoller_  new_jmerconne~so  Jnvolva .enticsly  .new~  economic 
transactions between organisations, with costs and benefits yet to-be determined. The 
policy issues facing the European Union are to decide to what extent costs and benefits 
of  a  particular  path  through  the  interconnection  space  can  be  discovered  - and 
allocated  - by  a free  market,  and  to what extent regulations  are  required  to  enforce 
desirable  interconnection  paths.  For  instance,  regulatory  interventions  might  be 
deemed necessary to open appropriate paths by removing bottlenecks (Section 2.1.4) 
or  by  suitable  open  standardisation of crucial  interlaces along  certain  paths  (Section 
2.4).  On  the  other hand,  paths  which  depart from  overriding  public-policy objectives, 
such  as  universal  service  obligations,  may  be  subjected  to  appropriate  financial 
charges,  or  perhaps  even  be  completely  barred.  These  regulatory  aspects  will  be 
further discussed in relation to the economic interconnect model (Chapter 3.1 ). 
We conclude: 
1  .  Changes  in  vertical  and  horizontal  relationships  are  redrawing  the  boundaries  of 
telecommunications entities. 
2.  Key  interfaces,  formerly  managed  within  the  firm  or  network,  are  now  points  of 
technical and commercial interconnection. 
2.1.4  Bottlenecks 
A bottleneck exists when  a competitor,  in  order to  produce its own  service,  absolutely 
requires  as  an  input a  resource  that  is  produced  by  the  dominant operator  and  the 
competitor  is  unable  to  produce  this  input  itself.  Interconnection  to  the  operator's 
network then becomes necessary to obtain access to the essential resource necessary 
to achieve actual competition. Despite the technical possibilities for multiple paths in the 
interconnection  space,  the  dominant  TOs  control  several  r&sources  that  may  be 
essential to a competitor. Competitors differ in the inputs they require from TOs. For at 
least one type of competitor, there is no technical alternative to obtaining the following 
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•  Apcess to small end users. The traffic volumes of most residential subscribers and 
many  small  business  users  are  too  small  to  require  multiple  access  lines.  To 
terminate calls that originate on a competing network, a second line that is supplied 
by a second operator is prohibitively costly relative to the costs of interconnection. 
•  End-office switching. For an operator that competes in providing local distribution to 
enct  users  (such  as  a  cable  television  network),  the  costs  of  supplying  local 
switching may greatly exceed the costs of interconnection to TO switching. 
•  Numbering.  Telephone  numbers  are  ~n essential  resource  to  providing  end-user 
access. In most networks, numbers provide network routing information as well as 
subscriber addressing.  New  carriers  are  better able  to  compete  for  customers  if 
subscribers can retain their telephone numbers when changing carriers. 
•  Access to trunk network. For a competing trunk operator (e.g., Mercury in the UK or 
MCI  in  the  US)  access to  the  dominant TO's trunk  network is  needed  during  the 
period its network is being established, in order to deliver calls to areas in which it 
has  not  yet  constructed  facilities.  For  all  service  providers  seeking  to  market 
services  beyond  a  local  exchange  access  to  the  trunk  network  is  necessary  to 
reach their customers. 
•  Intelligent  network  CINl  services.  Creation  and  management of  new  services  will 
require  access to  IN functionalities. To obtain comparable quality of service to that 
enjoyed  by  the  TO.  competitors  will  require  interconnection  to  IN  control  and 
database facilities. However, in the second plane of the "interconnection space" the 
IN  concept  is  closely  bound  up  with  the  signalling  systems  required  to  provide 
routing  through  the  dominant  network(s).  Carriers  are  inclined  to  invoke  this 
relationship  and  to  deny  or  restrict  interconnection  to  their  IN  by  citing  their  own 
obligation  to  meet  essential  requirements  (Section  2.6).  This  gives  them  a 
competitive advantage on the third and fourth planes in the "interconnection space", 
where modern value-added telematic services are located. 
•  Intellectual  property  rights.  Important internal  interconnection  interfaces  employed 
by  national  TOs,  e.g.,  the  national  side  of  international  transit  exchanges,  have 
been  designed  and  developed  by  equipment  manufacturers,  who  are  seldom- -
entitled to  offer equipment based on  the  same  national interfaces to  third  parties. 
The  lack  of  shared  rights  to  such  national  interfaces impedes access  by  service 
providers  and  competitive  facilities  operators,  primarily  in  the  analog  PSTN. 
However,  country  experience,  especially  in  the  US,  suggests  that  with  strong 
regulatory encouragement industry committees and standards groups can establish 
workable  arrangements  for  standardised  interfaces.  Less  difficulty  occurs  in  the 
interfaces  in  the  ISDN  and  GSM  networks,  and  also  the  versions  of  the  IN 
developed by  Bellcore for US  local exchange carriers.  These  efforts by standards 
and  industry  organisations  envision  from  the  outset  procurement  from  multiple 
suppliers, although not necessarily access for competing operators. Natwortc Interconnection 1n 1he Doinain of ONP  15  -
We conclude that: 
1.  The dominant TO  has bottleneck control  of resources  essential  to a competitor. 
Bottlenecks  range  from  access  to  end  users  to  intellectual  property  rights  in 
software and equipment design. Until technical alternatives to these resources are 
developed, regulatory action wilt be necessary to ensure fair competition. 
2.  With  respect to intellectual property rights,  regulators  can  improve  prospects  for 
access to resources  in  the  an~log PSTN by encouraging industry participants to 
establish voluntary workable standards (see Section 2.4  ). 
2.2  Major interconnection scenarios 
In the interconnection space of Figure 2.1.2-2 interconnection relationships may be 
classified by: 
- type of player (TO, service provider, end user) 
- type of facilities (fixed, mobile, satellite) 
- type of services (basic, enhanced, intelligent) 
- type of users (private user groups, users of public networks). 
Of the  many possible combinations that can occur,  our analysis concentrates on  four 
major scenarios. They are the ones that,  in discussions with the Commission staff, we 
have identified as having leading importance for interconnection: fixed-to-fixed network 
interconnection,  fixed-to-mobile,  mobile-to-mobile,  and  interconnection  to  intelligent 
network infrastructure and to intelligent network-based services on the levels three and 
four in the "interconnection space". 
2.2.1  Fixed-to-fixed 
Interconnection between two operators of fixed network facilities includes a wide variety 
of relationships, of which the following are typical: 
e  TQ  to  TO.  lnterc~nnection via  international gateways connects  symmetrically 
situated  operators.  Technical  arrangements  follow  international  standards 
supplemented by bilateral agreements. 
•  Incumbent to  a  second  national  TO.  Such  interconnection  today  connects  a 
dominant national operator with a much smaller entrant (e.g., BT and Mercury 16  Study for the "EuroPNn Cormission  . 
in  the  UK).  Both  operators  seek  to  provide  a  full  range  of  services.  Key 
technical  issues  include  points  of interconnection  in  the  dominant  network's 
architecture, collocation of equipment, and numbering. 
•  Access TO to long-distance ooerator.  In  national markets where  operators do 
not  necessarily  provide  end-to-end  service,  access  networks  which  directly_ 
supply end users must be interconnected with trunk (interexchange) carriers in 
order  to  complete  long-distance  calls  (e.g.,  local  exchange  carriers  to 
interexchange carriers in the US). 
•  Broadband  distribution  network  to  TO.  Broadband  service  distributors  that 
supply  end-user access  interconnect to  local  or  regional  TO  networks  (e.g., 
cable television networks to BT in the UK). 
•  Service  provider  to  TO.  Information  service  providers  need  both  physical 
interfaces  (lineside  access,  trunkside  access,  signalling,  and  data  interfaces) 
and administrative relationships (numbering, billing service creation) with a TO. 
2.2.2  Mobile-to-fixed 
Mobile  operators  require  interconnection  to  fixed  operators  to  exchange  traffic  and 
complete  calls.  In  addition  they  need  fixed  transmission  facilities  to  link  their  base 
stations and mobile switching centers, links which they frequently (have to)  lease from 
the TO.  A mojor issue for the cost and design of the mobile network is the number and 
location of interface points with the fixed network. 
•  GSM  operator  to  TO.  Mobile  systems  seek  interconnection  directly  into  the 
trunk  side  of  the  PSTN.  Technical  aspects  of  the  mobile/fixed  interface 
encompass  specifications  for  physical  interconnection,  transmission  and 
signalling  standards  to  be  used,  circuit  capacity,  and  advanced/intelligent 
services to be provided. 
•  Cellular operator to trunk TO.  In  markets such  as the  US  in  which  access and 
trunk  carriers  are  no  longer  vertically-integrated  mobile  operators  may 
interconnect directly with  both  the  local  exchange  TO  and  with  one_  or  more 
trunk (interexchange) operators. 
2.2.3  Mobile-to-mobile 
Because  only  a  small  percentage  of  mobile  calls  connect  the  subscribers  of  two 
different mobile  operators,  these  calls  are  usually supplied  via  the  interconnection  of 
each  of  the  mobile  operators  with  the  fixed  TO.  However,  direct  interconnection Network lntarconneclian in·1he Domain of ONP- 17 
between  mobile operators does enable  mobile  operators to  improve  the  quality  and 
customised management of their service. 
•  GSM to GSM. GSM systems access specialised equipment and user location 
register databases by using the  Mobile Application  Part (MAP)  on  top of the 
SS7  signalling  system  protocol  stack.  However,  few  TOs  have  as yet  fully 
implemented the TCAP portion of the SS7 protocol, which is  required  by the 
MAP. Within their own networks, mobile operators supply this capability over 
leased  lines  or their  own  facilities.  When  two  mobile  operators  are  able  to 
·  ·  · ··interconnect  1heir-system!r'directly1hey  ""Bnrwable--to--query .:each ""Other's ·tocation 
registers and provide roaming between the two systems. If they are not directly 
interconnected, roaming requires that the fixed TOs' signalling systems support 
the MAP. Direct mobile-to-mobile links would also enable operators to transport 
voice traffic and thus bypass the TO network and its access fees. 
•  Dissimilar  mobile  interconnection.  An  operator  licensed  for  both  analog  and 
digital  mobile  systems  may  accelerate  the  uptake  of  its  digital  service  by 
offering dual-mode terminals and portable numbers. 
2.2.4  Intelligent network interconnection 
As  it  becomes  possible  to  separate  the  control  of  network  resources  from  basic 
telecommunications  services,  TOs,  service  providers  and  end  users  are  seeking  to 
interconnect  to  other  operators'  network  intelligence  and  data.  Interconnection  to 
intelligent  network  services  and  resources  is  thus  an  additional  dimension  of 
interconnection for the  fixed-to-fixed,  fixed-to-mobile,  and mobile-to-mobile scenarios. 
The technical potential exists for a rich  variety of  interconnections between intelligent 
network  services  of  different  operators.  However,  as  yet  there  is  quite  limited 
experience with IN interconnection. Moreover, standards for interfaces are in very early 
stages of development (Section 2.4.3.4.). 
•  Service provider to  intelligent network.  In  many instances the  IN  interface provided 
by network operators to  date involve administrative and management relationships, 
supported by computer-system access to data bases of a limited set of parameters 
for  services  designed  by  the  TO.  Enhanced  service  providers  are  seeking  much 
more extensive access to IN capabilities at three levels of IN structure: 
1.  service creation environment pointability to design, code and test service 
logic programmes and to customise service parameters 
2.  service control point - ability to process IN service logic and to read and write 
network-embedded databases for service-specific data (destination numbers, 
call-forwarding instructions, etc.) 18  --Studyforttle Euaupwn Conunbwiun ~-· 
3.  service switching point - ability to control call processing in real time and 
geographically. 
•  User to intelligent network. End users, .for example those with  SS7  -controlled 
private corporate networks, seek to interconnect their private databases over 
TO signalling networks. 
•  TO  to  intelligent  network.  TOs  that  are  interconnected  for  delivery  of  voice 
telephone  services  usually  supply  related  value-added  services,  such  as 
·cashless -calling,  free-phone  services~· call  forwarding  and other services.  In 
order to offer these services to customers of other operators, TOs must provide 
signalling,  database  access,  and  call-control  capabilities  to  interconnecting 
operators. Other operators, such as cable television operators who provide end 
user access, may seek to use a TO's intelligent network service to supplement 
its own voice-circuit facilities. 
2.2.5  Summary 
There  are  a  large  number of interconnection  relationships,  according  to  the  type  of 
player, facility, service, and end user. The scenarios of most immediate importance for 
regulatory  policy  are  fixed-to-fixed,  fixed-to-mobile,  mobile-to-mobile,  and  intelligent 
network interconnection. 
We conclude that: 
1 .  The  principal  technical  issues  affecting  competition  among  interconnected  fixed 
operators  are  equal  access  to  network  components  and  services,  collocation  of 
equipment, and numbering. 
2.  Europe-wide operation  of GSM  service is  technically limited where TOs have not 
implemented advanced signalling capabilities needed to support roaming by mobile 
subscribers. Direct interconnection of mobile operators can overcome this limitation 
and should not be restricted by regulatory action. 
3.  Interconnection to intelligent network services and resources will be of interest to 
many fixed and mobile network operators and service providers. Conversely, denial 
of  IN  access  can  prevent  offering  of  new  telematic  services  by  value-added 
providers or put these providers at a considerable disadvantage. Development of 
~tandards for interccnnectio~ torN functionalrties is at an early stage and technical 
means  to  ensure  essential  requirements  have  not  yet been  agreed.  Regulators 
should encourage further development of voluntary standards (see Section 2.6.1 ). ..  19 
2.3  Network architecture 
The technical opportunities for interconnection between two operators are determined 
by their network architecture,  i.e.,  the  logical  and physical  arrangement of transport 
links,  switching,  and  control  facilities.  The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  identify  the 
relevant points of network interconnection in fixed networks, mobile networks and  the 
intemgent network. 
2.3.-1 ..  .Reference~figw:ation..for.  .. J:JatwDrk'tintercoooection 
Figure  2.3.1-1  shows  the  generic  reference  configuration  for  the  interconnection 
between  two  networks  (or  between  parts  thereof).  Interconnection  is  realised  by 
connecting network interconnect access points by a transmission facility (which may be 
either a simple transmission line, or a transit path through another network). Note from 
the figure that: 
•  there may be several different network interconnect access points (e.g., at different 
levels in  the  network hierarchy, such as national and  regional  access points of a 
TO). 
•  internal  points  of  interconnection  between  subsystems  within  one  network  lie 
outside  the  scope  of  this  study  (but  some  internal  points  may  also  be  suitable 
external points for interconnect access by third parties). 
Relevant technical aspects of the network interconnection interface include: 
•  choice of location for the interface (e.g., collocated with TO facilities, or not); 
•  interface specification for physical interconnection; 
•  specification of transmission and signalling service levels to be supported (e.g., ETSI 
standards); 
•  required circuit capacity  I  quality  I  and availability of the transmission facility; 
•  advanced facilities to be supported. 20 
Figure 2.3.1·1:  Network interconnection reference configuration 
user-network 
access point  Internal points of 
inten::onnedion 
(between subsystems) 
•  access point 
e  interface 
TE  terminal equipment 
network interconnect 
.  ~points 
user-network 
access point 
For some detailed examples, the reader is referred to Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Dutch 
country study. 
2.3.2  PSTN/ISDN network architecture 
The  architecture  of  a  national  PSTN/ISDN  is  depicted  in  simplified  form  in  Figure 
2.3.2-1. The main elements of the architecture are: 
•  the  International  Switching  Centres  (ISC)  which  are  the  gateways  to  the  national 
networks in  other countries and  for which  interconnect agreements are  a classical 
business matter 
•  the Transit Exchanges (TEx) 
•  the Local Exchanges (LEx) • 
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Figure 2.3.2·1:  PSTN/ISDN network architecture 
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In principle, the national network can provide interconnect access for other networks at 
several points of the hierarchy: 
•  National Access Points (NAP - point H) 
•  Regional Access Points (RAP - point F) 
•  Local Access Points (LAP - point D) 
In  addition  to these  three  different  ~runk-side" access  points for  other networks,  the 
"line-side" access points (A,  8, and C) are of importance fer tv:o groups of competitors -
competitive  access  providers who  offer facilities  that  bypass  some  or  all  of  the  local 
distribution  network,  and  some  service  providers  and  resellers,  particularly  in  those 
countries  with  developed  value-added  service  competition  which  do  not  (yet)  permit 
infrastructure competition  (see  e.g.,  the  Danish  country study). The  interconnect point 
'B' has received little attention in Europe, but may become of importance in the future if 
public  telephone  service  can  be  offered  locally  by  non-TOs  using  different  local-loop 
technologies, such as cable television or wireless access (e.g., by DECT). 
The  initial  interconnect access points to  a TO  network tend  to be  chosen  high  in  the 
network hierarchy, typically as a National Access  Point (H).  As  the  interconnect traffic 
grows and the new interconnector's marketing knowledge of the geographical demand 
distribution  increases,  Regional  or even  Local  Access  Points  (F  and  D,  respectively) 
become more important. The actual choice will be  strongly influenced by the regulatory 
terms  grc.ntsd  to  tr.3  new  o~~raior for  establishir ag  favourab!a  trar.5m!sf.ion  faci!ities 
from  his  Points  of  Presence  (PoP)  to  the  corresponding  TO's  Access  Points,  or for 
collocating  these  (see  Section  2.5.2).  Each  PoP  is  a  physical  location,  where  the 
interconnector  has  established  facilities  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  interconnect 
access to  the  TO.  Generally,  the  number  of  PoPs  will  increase  as  the  interconnect 
traffic grows. 22 
2.3.3  PLMN/GSM network architecture 
Figure  2.3.3-1  shows  the  basic  architecture  of a  mobile  (GSM)  network.  A  mobile 
network contains the following elements:  1 
•  the Mobile Switching Centre (MSC), which supports switching and call management, 
including the handover of calls, 
•  the  Base Station System  (BSS), consisting of a Base Station Controller (BSC) and 
one  or more Base Transceiver Stations (BTS),  which support .mobile  management 
.  . 
and control of the radio network, 
•  registers  (Visitor  Location  Register,  Home  Location  Register,  Equipment  Identity 
Register), which hold the parameters applicable to each subscriber and the location 
of the subscriber, 
•  the  Mobile  Station  (MS),  which  is  the  mobile  terminal  equipment  used  by  the 
subscriber. 
The  MSC  (or  Gateway  MSC)  supports  the  interfacing  to  other  (fixed  or  mobile) 
networks, such as the PSTNIISDN discussed in the previous section. 
Figure 2.3.3-1:  PLMN/GSM network architecture 
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2.3.4  IN architecture 
The IN conceptual model consists of four planes: 
•  service plane, 
•  global functional plane, 
•  distributed functional plane, 
•  physical plane 
where each plane represents a different abstract view of the capabilities provided by an 
IN-structured  network.  Each  plane  interacts with  adjacent planes.  Within  each  plane 
entities  are  defined,  and  between  pairs  of  entities  relationships  may  exist.  Figure 
2.3.4-1  shows  the  entities  and  their  functional  relationships  for  the  IN-distributed 
functional plane model.  2 
Figure 2.3.4-1:  IN distributed functional plane model (ITU-T Recs. a. 1204 and 
a. 1211), (IN network functions and their functional relationship) 
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SMAF  Service management access function 
SMF  Service management function 
SRF  Specialised resource function 
SSF  Service switching function 
2  ITU-T Rec. 0.1204. 24  · · · -~  to;h  e-un;pean ·Coiimasion  ··  .. • .. _  • 
Ttie generic relationships in the distributed functional plane model are the basis for the 
ongoing specific standardisation activities of JTU-T and ETSI. 
The functional entities in the distributed functional plane can be mapped onto physical 
entities in the physical plane. The physical plane identifies different physical entities, the 
allocation  of  functional  entities  to  physical  entities,  and  the  interfaces  between  the 
physical entities. Between these physical entities reference points may be defined and 
for  these  reference  point  interfaces  may  be  standardised.  ITU-T  Rec.  a.  1215 
describes the physical plane of the IN architecture for Capability Set 1 (CS-1 ), the first 
set of .call-control .. elements that .have .been..-standatdised:.'tbe:;»bysicatplane identifies 
different physical entities, the  allocation of functional  entities to physical  entities,  and 
the interfaces between the physical entities. 
If the physical entities are located in  different networks the endpoints at both sides of 
the  interfaces may be considered as access points for network interconnection. Figure 
2.3.4-2  depicts  the  functional  relationships  and  their  associated  reference  point 
between the  IN  functions that are located in two different networks. CS-1  transactions 
encompass service control using translation and validation via exchange of information 
with a data function in a second network. Thus a reference point P is within the scope 
of CS-1.3 The other reference points (0, N, a, R) lie beyond the scope of this initial set 
of standardised call-control functions. 
Figure 2.3.4-2:  Possible network interworking functional relationships 
Network A:  Network B: 
IR 
-e-- Functional relationship to be standardised for C5-l 
SMF = service management function 
SDF = service data function 
SCF =service control function 
SSF = service switching function 
3  ITU-T Aec. Q. 1211. • 
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. 2.3.5  Summary 
We conclude that: 
1.  Fixed  networks  have  well-defined  external  interfaces  at  several  levels  of  the 
network hierarchy, located primarily at switches but also in the distribution system 
and local loop that extends to the end user. The choice between the corresponding 
access  points  is  largely  determined  by  economic  considerations  and  by  any 
regulatory.  constraints.  Jimiting  the . fr.eedom _.of . choice  by  the . party  seeking 
interconnection. 
2.  Open access to points of interconnection at all  levels will enable competitors who 
pay  at  least the  incremental  costs  of  interconnection  to  combine  their  own  and 
incumbent  network  operator's  services  and  facilities  to  produce  services  at 
minimum costs. However, in most markets incumbent operators are dominant and 
have  incentives to minimise rivals' opportunities to interconnect and to  raise  their 
costs.  Regulatory  authorities  should  require  incumbent  operators  to  provide 
interconnection at multiple network levels absent a demonstration of high costs that 
are unlikely to be recovered from interconnecting operators. 
3.  Mobile networks have a single type of external interface for service providers and 
other operators, located at the mobile switching centre. 
4.  The transmission facility connecting the access points of two different networks can 
be a single line or a transit path through a third party's network. The economic and 
regulatory conditions for establishing such a facility are important technical design 
constraints. 
5.  Although  there  are  many  conceptual  types  of  intelligent network  interfaces,  only 
those for the most basic call control capabilities have thus far been standardised. 
2.4  Interfaces and standards 
2.4.1  Relationship of standards and interconnection 
There is a range of possibilities for the use of standards to govern interconnection and 
network access relationships. Interconnection encompasses network interfaces within a 
single organisation and access to interfaces by second organisations. 
Interconnect access at a given  interface may be  unavail~ble. Alternatively,  it  may be 
required {in pursuance of the EU's ONP policy or by national regulatory policy). A third 26 
possibility  is  voluntary  interconnection  - thus,  some  networks  offer  interconnection 
without ·a  regulatory requirement. With regard to standards, they may not exist for the 
point of access. Or, standards may be available, but it is not required that they be used. 
Finally, a single standard may be required at the point of interface. 
Table 2.4.1-1:  Relationship of interconnection and technical standards 
Standards 
Interconnection  None  Voluntary  Mandatory 
.. Required 
; 
No  1  2  3 
Yes  4  5  6 
The various possibilities, shown in Table 2.4.1-1, are as follows: 
1.  Interconnection  not  required,  no  standards.  Within  a  TO  or  other  firm  the 
connections between components of one network are internally managed. Access 
to these interfaces is not required by regulation. As it sees fit, the firm may use its 
own  standards,  proprietary  standards  of  equipment  vendors,  or  industry  and 
internationally-agreed standards. 
2.  Interconnection is not required, but some networks make it available. The regulator 
may encourage use of standards, but not require them.  The  ISDN ·u·  interface in 
the U.S. is a possible example. 
3.  Interconnection  is  not  required  by  regulation,  but the  regulator  or industry  body 
requires adherence to common technical (ITU-T, formerly CCITT) standard at the 
interface. 
4.  Access to the network is required, but there is no standard. The regulator requires 
unbundling so that a second operator can purchase just those services on the TO's 
side of the interface, and leaves it to industry to establish technical arrangements. 
US expanded interconnection is an  example. Open access with functional (but not 
technical) standards could be  placed in  this category. For example, a requirement 
to provide access at a ·u· interface with the functional requirement that emergency 
powering is guaranteed to a standard of 1 minute outage in  10 years would leave 
technical arrangements unstandardised. 
5.  Access  is  required  by  one  or  more  NRAs  in  the  EU,  and  standards  are 
recommended. For example, if the ·u· interface were offered outside of ONP, ETSI 
could still develop a standard that would then be voluntary for Euro-ISON. 
6.  Access is required, and the standard is mandatory. 27 
2.4.2  Economic aspects of standardisation 
Viewed  in  economic  terms.  standards  are  a  way  of  lowering  individual  transactions 
costs of parties: the individual costs of negotiating and deciding on  the arrangements 
necessary for interconnection. Standards can improve the functioning of markets by: 
•  reducing equipment costs (economies of scale. increased number of suppliers), 
•  reducing transaction costs of negotiating interconnection agreements, 
... jncreasing  compatibility·  of ···offerings ·from  multiple ·suppliers,· ·thus  harmonising 
services across Member States. 
•  increasing the availibility of service and thus promoting universal service. 
Interconnecting parties need to use interfaces to interconnect even if their networks are 
otherwise compatible. If there are only two interconnecting parties, standards would not 
necessarily  be  required,  only  case-by-case  agreements  about  technical  solutions. 
However,  such  agreements  are  likely  to  be  complicated  and  subject  to  change  as 
technology progresses and networks are upgraded to meet new demands. Once there 
are  many parties that  want to  interconnect,  multilateral agreements are  required  that 
naturally  would  tend  towards  standards.  The  reason  why  such  standards  lower 
transactions costs is that they reduce the amount of asset specificity. The same asset, 
"design",  can  be  used  in  many  instances of  interconnection.  Standards  may  also  be 
essential to provide interoperability, network security and integrity. 
Standards  r,an  P.volvP.  voluntarily  through  market  dominance  of  an  individual  firm, 
through  spontaneous  adoption  by  many  firms,  or  through  conscious  industry 
collaboration.  The  first  of  these  is  likely  to  create  market  power  that  would  call  for 
government intervention. The second is desirable but too unlikely to be  relied  upon ex 
ante.  Because  of  the  highly  technical  nature  of  standard  setting,  the  third  option, 
industry  cooperation,  is  definitely  the  preferred  option.  However,  because  of  the 
accompanying  dangers  of  (a)  collusion  or (b)  lack  of  agreement,  regulatory  oversight 
remains desirable. 
Standards are  not always beneficial. There is,  for example, an  ambiguous relationship 
between standardisation, interconnection and technical progress. Standardisation may 
increase  the  market  for  interconnection  and  thereby  potentially  increase  the  total 
telecommunications  market.  On  the  one  hand,  this  may  make  innovations  in 
telecommunications  equipment  and  software  more  attractive.  At  the  same  time 
standardis~tion may lock in  a tr,chnology and  thereby retard  technical progress.  Also, 
the  resulting  increase  in  competition  in  the  market  may  reduce  competition  for the 
market.  This  could  decrease  the  profit  potential  for  radical  innovations,  such  as 
complete changes in  paradigm.  An  example is the  choice  of a wireless  local loop for 
narrowband  (voice)  and  a  wired  local  loop  for  broadband  (broadcast),  the  so-called 
Negroponte switch. 28 
Another ambiguous effect of standards is the need for industry cooperation in order to 
reach and implement standards. This cooperation can lead to innovative standards by 
bringing  together  innovative  ideas  from  different  enterprises.  Conversely,  the 
cooperation can also result in collusion in the market. 
The  very  activity  of  establishing  and  agreeing  on  standards  may  itself  introduce 
significant overall costs: 
•  delay in the introduction of service or interconnect access, 
•  costs of the operations of standards and regulatory bodies, 
•  reduced flexibility to adapt to local conditions and satisfy particular market needs. 
In  generar.  striking  an  optimal  balance  between  the  gains  and  the  costs  of 
standardisation  for  interconnection  will  have  to  be  assessed  for  particular  cases. 
Generally, we  can  say that a policy of standardisation tends to shift competition from 
innovation  in  technology  to  competition  in  service  innovation  and  standardised 
production. 
We conclude: 
1.  Mandatory  standards  for  interconnection  interfaces  should  be  reserved  only  for 
services  and  technical  components  of networks for which  the  benefits  of  Union-
wide harmonisation are very high. This would include communication technologies, 
such  as  GSM,  designed  for  high  geographic  portability;  network  numbering 
systems; and emergency and directory services. 
2.  In  most other cases,  standards reached  through  voluntary coordination are  more 
likely  to  balance  the  gains  from  rapid  innovation  with  the  widest  use  of  common 
interlaces. 
2.4.3  Interfaces and standards 
The purpose of this section is to identify both  existing and desired interlace definitions 
for the major network interconnection scenarios. • 
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2.4.3.1  Fixed - to - Fixed 
Figure  2.4.3.1-1  shows  the  reference  points  (K,  M,  N,  P  and  SIT)  for  network 
interconnection defined in ITU-T Rec.l. 324. 
Figure 2.4.3.1-1:  Architectural relationships between the ISDN and other networks 
including ISDN (From: CCITT Rec. I. 324) 
•  Potnl of tnlerconnectton  +  Interface 
General arrangements for network interworkmg between ISDNs (N  reference point) are 
described  in  ITU-T  Recommendation  I.  520.  The  interworking  functions  and 
requirements to support interworking between an ISDN and a PSTN (K reference point) 
are described in ITU-T Recommendation I. 530. The I. 400-series of Recommendations 
describe  the  characteristics  of  user-network  interfaces  (SIT  reference  point).  The 
internetwork interfaces at the reference points M and Pare not yet defined by ITU-T. 
2.4.3.2  Mobile - to - Fixed 
In principle, the interconnection between a mobile network and a fixed network can be 
at  any level  in  the  fixed  network hierarchy,  e.g.,  at the  local  exchange  (LEx),  transit 
exchange  (TEx),  international  switching  centre/exchange  (ISC),  or  a  combination  of 
these.  The  network  scenarios  in  Figure  2.4.3.1-1  are  some  examples  (CCITI 
Rec. E. 220). 30 
Figure 2.4.3.2-1:  Examples of mobile-fixed network interconnection 
a)  All mobile traffic via interconnect at local exchange 
b)  All mobile traffic via interconnect at transit exchange 
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c)  Mixed  case:  Interconnect  national  mobile  access  via  transit  exchange  and 
international traffic via international switching centre. 
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Figure 2.4.3.2·2:  Interconnection between a mobile network and other networks (from 
PA Consulting Group, page 61) 
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Figure 2.4.3.2-2 shows the general model of mobile network interfaces drawn up  in  a 
recent consulting study for the Commission.  4 
The following interfaces are identified: 
A  Fixed  network  interface  - to  PSTN,  ISDN,  or  PSPDN  {mobile-to-fixed  network 
interconnection) 
B  Air interface 
C  User interface 
D  Interface to value-added service provider directly connected to the mobile network 
E  Interface to value-added service provider connected to the fixed network 
F  Interface to airtime retailer (or similar organisation) 
G  International PSTN gateway interface 
H  International link to fixed or mobile network over a leased line 
Direct  link  to  mobile  network  using  same  technology  (mobile-to-mobile  network 
interconnection) 
J  Direct link to mobile network using dissimilar technology 
K  Direct link to corporate network 
L  Internal interfaces within leased lines and switches of the mobile core network 
For each of the interfaces identified technical standards have already been developed 
by CCITT/ITU-T, ETSI, ISO, and other international bodies. In the PA Consulting group 
4  PA Consulting Group (1992). 32  ..  ..  Study for the European  t:omriission"  . 
study.  extensive overviews of existing technical standards are given for several types of 
mobile  networks:  GSM,  analog  cellular,  paging  PAMR,  mobile  data,  and  telepoint 
networks. 
2.4.3.3  IN interconnection 
Network interworking is  a process in  which two or more networks (IN to  IN,  or IN  to 
non-1 N)  cooperate  to  provide  a  service.  The  term  interworking  is  used  to  express 
interactions between networksr between-end "Systems. ·or between_.parts  .. thereof,  with 
the  aim  of  providing  a  functional  entity  capable  of  supporting  an  end-to-end 
communication. The interactions required to provide a functional entity rely on functions 
and on the means to select these functions. Network interworking requirements exist at 
different levels: 
•  service processing; 
•  service management; 
•  service creation 
At each level, some network interworking gateway functions need to be defined. These 
functions  include the  conversion  of  physical and  electrical states and the  mapping of 
protocols.  An  interworking  function  may  be  implemented  in  the  ISDN,  in  the  other 
network(s),  at  the  user's premises,  through  a third-party service provider,  or in  some 
combination  of  these.  However,  current  IN  standards do not adequately address  the 
---
need for interworking between INs under separate ownership. This is an inhibitor to the 
successful and rapid deployment of pan-European services.s 
One  perspective  on  network  interconnection  flows  from  the  view  of  networks  and 
service providers as suppliers of functions that control communications pathways and 
access  to  information  arranged  in  a  logical  architecture.  In  Figure  2.4.3.3-1  these 
logical  functions  are  schematically  related  to  the  physical  telecommunications 
resources. Points of logical interlace are shown with dots. 
Two  networks are  logically interconnected  at  one  or  more  interface points when  one 
network's  logical  resources  provide  control  or  information  to  the  other.  For example, 
one network may provide a second network with access to its customer information for 
directory inquiries and call routing.  Service suppliers and end users may also logically 
interconnect their own  information and management resources at these interfaces, for 
example,  to  route  terminating  green-number  calls  over  an  interconnected  private 
network. 
5  KPMG Peat Marwick (1993). 
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Figure 2.4.3.3-1:  Logical interconnect model 
Control  of  calls  and  access  to  essential  data within  the  TO  network  depend  on  the 
network  signalling  system.  The  conversion  by  TOs  from  in-band  signalling  to  the 
common-channel signalling system {SS7) will make possible standardised interfaces for 
logical or programmatic {in  contrast to physical) interconnection with  the  TO  network. 
For example,  an  independent information services provider could provide a database 
that  would  interconnect  through  a  service  control  point.  Another  enhanced  service 
provider could access a TO database, using defined SS7 messages, independently of a 
telephone call. 
Information  industry participants  have  requested  access  to  software,  databases,  and 
control  logic  of  the  TO  network.  These  demands  amount  to  several  types  of  logical 
interconnection to the  network.  In  the  US  a "high-level description'' of  various types of 
logical requests has been developed, for preliminary discussion, by a task group of the 
Information  Industry  Liason  Committee  (IILC).6  Interconnection  is  described  with 
reference to several types of logical network objects: 
- Switch, including functionality to communicate with service platforms and respond to 
their instructions. A call-control  capability is  included within the  switch's connection 
to end-user lines, to recognise that action by a service platform is needed to handle 
a call at points throughout a call attempt, 
- Service platform, a point external to a switch that receives and  responds to queries 
from switches on how to handle calls, 
- Database. a point external to a switch where service-related data are stored and are 
accessed in real time during call processing, 
- Resource  element,  functionality  that  includes  announcements,  tones,  and  input 
collection (by voice or keypresses), 
6  IILC Issue 026 Task Group (1993), Draft Presentation, 9.2.93. 34 
Service  creation,  the  functionality  for designing,  coding  and  testing  service  logic 
programmes. 
Figure 2.4.3.3-2 shows 11  possible types of logical requests (labeled A through K)  that 
could  arise  when  two  networks  are  interconnected.  A  number of these  requests  for 
access to service creation, data bases, and service platforms also arise when a service 
provider interconnects with a network operator. 
Figure 2.4.3.3-2:  High-level logical requests 
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Table 2.4.3.3-1:  Types of Logical Requests between Interconnected Networks 
Key  Logtcal Request 
A  Net 1 service platform retneves data from Net 2 data base 
B  Net 1 switch accesses Net 2 resource element 
c  Net 2 service platform uses Net 1 switch to access resource elements 
0  Net 2 directs end-user call-control capabilities via Net 1 switch to access service platforms 
E  Net 1 service platform obtains call-processing instructions from Net 2 service platform 
F  Net 2 service platform retrieves data from Net 1 data base 
G  Net 2 stores end-user data in Net 1 data base for call processing 
H  Net 2 uses Net 1 service-creation tools to write programmes and store them in Net 1 
I  Net 2 uses own service-creation tools to mm Net 1 
J  Net 2 switch accesses Net 1 resource element 
K  Net 2 switch accesses Net 1 resource element via Net 1 switch 35 
We conclude that: 
1.  There  is  a  potentially  rich  set  of  logical  points  of  interconnection  to  intelligent 
network interfaces. 
2.  Access  at  control  and  switching  points  could  pose  significant  risks  to  network 
integrity and security. 
3.  Technical  standards to  protect network integrity and  security  in  the  presence  of 
interconnection  have  not  yet  been  developed,  but  establishing  interconnectors' 
· liability ·1or  breakdowns: ·in -network-integrity -and-.-security,  by  1icensing  or  other 
means, could provide an altemative to open interfaces. 
2.4.4  Recommendations from other studies concerning interconnection 
standards 
Several  recent technical working groups and consultancy studies for the  Commission 
have  conducted  in-depth  examinations of the  present state  of standardisation  in  the 
areas of intelligent network functions, broadband, local loop, mobile networks, satellite, 
and  network management.  The  principal findings and  recommendations that  concern 
network  interconnection  from  these  studies  are  summarised  in  the  Annex.  They 
include: 
•  Additional user interfaces in the local loop (e.g., aU interface) are likely to evolve in 
some  markets  in  response  to  user  needtt  \:md  the  cost  savings  (and  cost 
reallocation) possible from integrating functions in terminal equipment. 
•  Barriers  to  GSM-to-GSM  interconnection  are  not  technical,  but  administrative  and 
economic. 
•  Interconnection to  intelligent network interfaces, especially at control and  switching 
points, could pose significant risks to network integrity and security. It will be several 
years  before  technical  interface  standards  can  be  developed  that  would  protect 
against these  hazards.  In  the  interim,  an  alternative  to  open  interfaces could  be  a 
requirement that operators and service providers be licensed in order to interconnect 
to  IN  capabilities.  Licencees  would  be  required  to  assume  liability  for  lapses  in 
network integrity and data protection caused by their interconnected operations. 
2.4.5  Evolution of interconnection standards 
Compared  to  the  interconnect  and  interface  situation  in  the  US,  it  is  important  to 
understand that the  European  Union is evolving from  precisely .the opposite situation: 
The  Member  States  of  the  EU  each  have  a  NRA  and  a  national  TO  with  its  own 
engineering practices and internally determined interfaces. The only common interfaces 36 
were  at  the  highest  hierarchical  level  in  the  •interconnection  space•,  namely,  the 
international transit gateways,  the  international side of which adhered to appropriate 
CCITI  Recommendations  or  CEPT  agreements.  For  the  rest,  the  national 
telecommunications  networks  were  internal  affairs,  with  proprietary  interfaces  often 
subject to  restrictions  on  publication  or reuse  by equipment manufacturers.  In  these 
fragmented  circumstances  it is  not strange that  predo~inant European  successes  in 
interconnection have been achieved (only) in the area of new mobile networks: These 
could be designed and engineered afresh as separate entities, albeit with the strongest 
possible  incentive  to  be  interconnected to the  different national TO's and  to  provide 
international ·  ., roaming/portabi1ity  · oapabilities--· hithertD-non-existent· ·1n · ·Europe.  As 
confirmed by our country studies, the standardised GSM networks are the emblematic 
European  symbol of the  new internal telecommunications market, and of the  general 
interconnection practice in  Europe, namely, starting from the highest hierarchical level 
at  National  Access  Points  in  a  technological  environment  akin  to  international 
gateways,  and  evolving  towards  more  Regional  Access  Points  in  accordance  with 
actual market needs. 
Compare the North American situation. Only some ten years ago, the US (with adjacent 
Canada)  had  the  omnipresent  ·sell  System•  with  its  widely  published  engineering 
practices, and with a dominant equipment manufacturer owned by the operator, AT&T. 
This  ensured  an  informal,  but consistent system  of interfaces and an  internal market 
second to  none in  size.  Since divestiture, this impressive body lies smouldering in the 
grave,  but  the  soul  is  marching  on:  Despite  the  many  changes  in  ownership  and 
regulatory  arrangements,  most  of  the  basic  network plant,  standards  and  interfaces, 
and  American  engineering practices are  still largely the  same as  in  the  heyday of the 
old  AT&T.  Accordingly,  important  key  notions  for  interconnectivity  and  competitive 
service provision, notably the  IN concept, have come out of Bellcore, the joint research 
center  of  the  (non-competitive)  RBOCs  and  been  picked  up  by  virtually  all 
Interconnecting secondary operators and service providers. 
The  result  of  these  differences  is  significant.  In  continental  Europe,  interconnect 
arrangements  descend  slowly  from  the  highest  hierarchical  level,  when  operators  of 
entirely new  (wireless) standardised services become licensed in  the  Member States. 
Accordingly,  national  bilateral  arrangements  (plus  international  agreements  for 
roaming)  are  evolving  downwards  in  the  infrastructure  at  different  paces  in  each 
Member State. In  the  US,  on  the other hand, more radical interconnect arrangements, 
including  traditional  high-volume  services,  were  immediately  necessitated  by 
divestiture,  and  could  be  based  on  common  network  interfaces  already  existing  at 
several hierarchical levels. 
The  different  starting  points  at  least  partly  explain  why  the  US  policy  approach  to 
interconnection in a competitive environment could- and still can- be so different to the 
EU's.  They  may  also  explain  why  there  is  remarkably  little  policy  insistence  on 
(standardised) wireless networks for mobility in a country so given to travel as the US. 
However,  it  should  not  escape  attention  that  the  marketing  expertise  in  a significant 
• ... 
• 
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number of GSM consortia in Europe, especially in rasped of new service provision and 
the  related  technical  experience with  the  IN,  is  provided  by partners  from  the  more 
competitive shores of the Atlantic. 
These different directions of evolution of interconnect arrangements in the US and. EU 
suggest that some caution is required in adopting each other's regulatory approaches. 
It  should  be  noted that telecommunication  networks have  no dominant technological 
imperative akin to the  much faster-developing areas of information technologies such 
as  micro-electronics components  and  computer hardware:  Economic,  regulatory  and 
tecbnological"network  .evslutions-are~-all ·processes -with  significant  memory  of  past 
conditions,  especially  where  basic  (wired)  network  infrastructure  and  public  access 
conditions  are  involved.  In  the  terms  of  our  study,  bottlenecks  for  interconnection 
therefore often appear different in  the states of Europe and the US: the economies of 
scale  and  the  allowed  number  of  alternative  paths  in  •interconnection  space"  were 
much larger in North America right from the outset of divestiture. 
2.5  Equal access 
The technical quality of interconnection affects the quality of service to the end user as 
well as the costs of that service. From a competitive perspective, however, it is not the 
absolute quality of interconnection that is of concern, but rather quality relative to that of 
other  suppliers  in  the  market.  The  concept  of  equal access to  network facilities  and 
services emphasises: 
1  .  Non-discrimina!ory  treatment  of  all  potential  operators  and  servics  suppliers 
seeking interconnection with an incumbent network operator. 
2.  Conditions  of  interconnection  for  a  competing  supplier  that  are  substantially 
identical to those for the incumbent operator itself. 
Important  requirements  for  equal  access  arise  in  provisioning  facilities  and  services, 
collocation of TO and interconnector facilities, numbering of subscribers' lines, and end-
user access to competing operators. 
2.5.1  Provisioning of facilities and services 
Competitors  are  disadvantaged  if  they  cannot  order  and  obtain  leased  lines,  circuit 
rearrangements,  and  enhanced  services  on  reliable  commercial  schedules  that  are 
equivalent  to  the  service  a  TO  provides  to  its  own  departments  or  subsidiaries. 
Experience in liberalised markets (US, UK) suggests that regulators need to establish a 
requirement  for  equal  provisioning  and  to  monitor TO  performance  to  ensure  equal 
access. 38 
2.5.2 . Collocation 
For operators that physically interconnect their facilities to another operator, physical 
collocation of terminating equipment in the latter's cable or switching facilities is usually 
technically  superior to  virtual collocation  at  some  distance from  the  switching  point. 
These interfaces may offer higher-speed control and signalling connection, higher data 
quality,  and  greater  reliability  and  availability.  At the  point of collocation  competing 
operators'  transmission  equipment  (fiber· optic  cable,  metallic  trunks,· or microwave 
radio transceivers) is electrically cross-connected at a trunk distributing frame pursuant 
to  standards  defined -by-' equipment-:-manufadufers  ... or-· --engineering-bodies:·· Similarly, 
service  providers  collocate  processors  and  database  equipment  in  order  to  obtain 
higher-speed access to network control and signalling. 
Collocation agreements typically cover: 
•  physical space, either floor space in a switching building, or cage space in a vault or 
manhole 
•  electrical power and environmental conditioning for terminating equipment 
•  access arrangements for technical service personnel 
Experience with collocation in the US and the UK suggests that in many cases physical 
collocation  has  both  technical  and  economic  advantages  compared  to  virtual 
collocation.  Negotiated agreements  reached  under encouragement or requirement  of 
the  regulator  demonstrate  that  physical  collocation  is  achieveable  for  important 
interfaces. 
We conclude that: 
In  most  instances,  physical  collocation  is  technically  achievable  and  provides  more 
nearly equal access than virtual collocation. 
2.5.3  Numbering 
The  numbering  of  network  lines  can  be  a  bottleneck  to  effective  competition  and 
interconnection. 
A unique telephone number is  required for each And-user access line that connects to 
the  PSTN.  Most  national  numbering  plans  combine  within  a  subscriber's  telephone 
number a set of digits identifying the particular subscriber line and geographic or carrier 
codes  that  simultaneously  convey  some  routing  information  to  the  networks  that 
transport the  call.  Switching and  routing  technology,  particularly in  analog networks, 
has  been  designed  to  minimise  costs  in  a  single-operator  environment.  Providing 
carrier-specific  codes  in  analog  networks  should  be  based  on  a  study  of  costs  and ·Network Interconnection in lie Domain ofONP  39· 
benefits.  Even-handed treatment of multiple operators can  readily be  provided for  in 
digital networks and future routing software. 
Competitive  supply  of  end-user  access  requires  allocation  of  blocks  of  telephone 
numbers to additional operators and technical arrangements that can route calls dialed 
to those numbers to the facilities of the appropriate operators.  The allocation activity 
can  readily  be  separated  from  the  other  provisioning  activities  of  the  incumbent 
operator, and should be assigned to a neutral party. 
Portabili_ty of telephone numbers means that a subscriber can change access carriers 
and  retain  the  same  telephone  number for  both  outgoing  and  incoming  calls.  Full 
portability  has  been  implemented  for freephone  service  in  the  US  by  using  several 
centralised databases that associate a  specific service provider with  each  freephone 
telephone number. Consequently, in the US an end user (typically a retail business that 
publicises  its  telephone  number)  can  choose  a  different  operator  for  incoming 
freephone service without needing to inform his customers of a new number. However, 
full portability of subscriber numbers at the local exchange awaits further development 
and  installation  of  intelligent  network  capabilities  in  local  exchanges.  Lacking  full 
portability,  new  entrants  in  the  end-user  access  market  face  a  barrier  to  attracting 
customers currently subscribed to the TO. 
Several technical means are available to reduce the number portability handicap: 
•  foreign  exchange  - a  leased  line  connects  the  local  switching  office  to  a  foreign 
(distant) switching office 
•  call forwarding - calls to a subscriber's original number are intercepted in the original 
switching office, re-originated and directed to the forwarded number. 
•  separate  exchange  (NXX)  numbering  code  - an  entire  block  of  10,000 exchange 
numbers is  reserved for a single subscriber; the NXX code can then be reassigned 
to a new operator.  This approach is applicable only to the largest subscribers. 
•  DID  (Direct  Inward  Dialing)  trunking  - Incoming calls  are  routed  through  the  local 
exchange,  over  dedicated  DID  trunks,  directly  to  a  customer  or  the  customer's 
service provider. The final four or five digits of the called number are delivered to the 
customer for further processing (e.g., routing to a specific telephone). 40  Study for the European tomrrission  •  . 
We conclude that: 
1.  Network numbering systems are likely to favour transport and routing of calls via 
the  incumbent operator.  Implementing numbering codes for competing operators 
may be costly in analog networks.  Regulators should require even-handed coding 
and  routing  for  all  operators  in  new  software  and  technology.  Extending  this 
requirement to analog network technology should be based on a study of costs and 
benefits. 
2.  .  Allocation. of. subscriber. nurnbers-~to_  -operators~d:·be·.:-assigned .to  a  neutral 
party. 
3.  Subscriber-number  portability  is  difficult to· achieve  with  current  technology,  but 
some other measures can  reduce the TO's advantages of incumbency. Portability 
is more readily achieved for freephone and other database-related services. 
2.5.4  End-user access to operators 
End-user access to multiple operators and service providers is constrained by the need 
for technical mechanisms by which users can designate suppliers and access networks 
can  route traffic to them.  As  discuGsed  in  Section 2.4.4, all TO networks were  initially 
designed  assuming  a  single  national  operator,  and  traditional  switching  technology 
does not provide for a choice of carrier routing. 
Upgrading  switching  systems  to  support  access  to  multiple  operators  is  most  easily 
accomplished in  stored-programme control, and especially digital switches. Retrofitting 
older-technology  switches  has  proved  costly.  A  preliminary  recommendation  is  that 
newly-installed switches and  software upgrades should  incorporate choice-of-operator 
technology such as digit recognition. 
•  Symmetric access  to  operators  can  be  provided  by  pre-subscription  by  the 
subscriber of a preferred operator. The access carrier maintains a record of the 
choice  for  each  subscriber  line  and  routes  calls  directly  to  the  designated 
operator.  The  equipment  to  implement  equal-access  presubscription  has 
normally been installed at tandem switches in  the second level of the network 
hierarchy. 
•  A carrier access code,  dialled as a prefix to a telephon'3 number, overrides the 
choice of the carrier to which the line is pre-subscribed and enables a caller to 
direct a  specific  call  to  any  available  supplier  at  the  cost  of dialing  several 
additional digits. A carrier access code can also be the only way of accessing a 
supplier,  i.e.,  when  there  is  no  pre-subscription.  This  would  then  also  be 
symmetric access as  long  as  all  competitors  (including  the  incumbent)  have 
access codes with an equal number of digits. 
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•  Other forms of access to competing operators can be supplied through a local 
telephone  number.  Subscribers  then  dial  a  local  access  number,  obtain  a 
second  dial  tone  from  the  alternative  operator,  and then  dial  the  destination 
number, or dial a service code for information services. 
We conclude that: 
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Because  upgrading  switching  systems to support equal  access to  multiple operators 
has  high  costs  when  older-technology  switches  must  be  retrofitted,  a  policy  of 
mandatory  end-user  equal  access  should  be  limited to newly-installed  switches  and 
software upgrades of existing digital switches. 
2.6  Other technical issues of interconnection 
2.6.1  Essential requirements 
Limits on open access are permitted under ONP to the extent they may be required to 
achieve essential requirements. Essential requirements include: 
•  security of network operations, especially service level in emergency conditions, 
•  maintenance of network integrity, 
•  interoperability of services, where justified, 
•  data protection. where justified. 
Security  and  integrity  of  te!ecommunications  networks  have  become  more  difficult to 
achieve,  even  in  single-provider  networks,  as  information  services  and  user-
configurable  features  have  expanded.  For  example,  direct-inward  dialing  and  voice 
messaging systems are  vulnerable  to fraudulent access and  use  of  trunk dialing  and 
other services. 
Network integrity and reliability 
Network  interconnection  can  contribute  to  increased  reliability  of  service  to  the  final 
user  by  making  alternative  paths  available  for  routing  calls  and  providing  second 
sources of supply. Using fiber-optic distribution rings, competing access providers have 
offered larger commercial customers increased reliability against cable outages. In the 
US,  competition  among  trunk  operators  has  substantially  increased  total  capacity. 
Mutual aid agreements among operators provide for rerouting of traffic and sharing of 
supplies, vehicles and personnel in emergency conditions. 42  •Study far1tle~'CQrnrnuion ..... 
Network security and mediated access 
The technical aspects of these issues are being addressed in industry discussions of 
interconnection  to  intelligent  network  services.  Maintaining  essential  requirements 
places  the  most  stringent  demands  on  technical  and  administrative  interconnection 
arrangements when  interconnection provides direct access to network intelligence. An 
advanced  intelligent  network  will  require  very  generalised  types  of  mediation,  with 
especially  strong  protection  for  network  elements  and  the  integrity  of  the  IN 
infrastructure. 
The technical  architecture of the IN  has initially been developed for a single-operator 
environment. Even in this form, protection of network integrity and reliability has proved 
more difficult than first anticipated as shown, for example, by the unintended interaction 
of  value-added features  (such  as  call-forwarding and call-waiting) and flooding  of the 
signalling  network  with  shutdown  messages  when  faulty  software  upgrades  were 
installed. 
Three basic levels of access are currently under discussion: 
•  Service creation  and  management.  Service  providers can  configure parameters of 
service  offerings  and  use  programming  tools  to  create  customised  service  logic. 
Interaction is not real time and data entries can be screened before being activated. 
•  Service  control.  'Read  access'  to  databases  can  be  provided  with  password  and 
authentication  controls.  'Write  access'  poses  most  of  the  problems  of  potential 
feature interaction and network-data integrity. 
•  Service  switching.  Service  provider  and  other-operator  access  at  the  switch  is 
sought for  perlormance  reasons,  to  respond  in  real  time to call  triggers  in  order to 
provide  services  during  call  set-up  and  conversation.  Equal  access  for  non-TO 
operators  could  be  technically  very  costly  to  provide,  requiring  redesign  and 
upgrading  of  software  for  all  switches  where  access is  sought.  Limiting  access  to 
SCPs,  however, may restrict service  providers to offering inferior service quality in 
comparison with the TO services that are integrated into the switches. 
Until  standards  are  developed  that  can  provide  a generalised  approach  to  ensuring 
network integrity, mediation  of access  to  IN  capabilities will  be  based on  establishing 
specific  mediation  elements  and  software  protocols  to  protect  intemetworking 
procedures. Country study experience indicates that interconnection to service creation 
and  management  can  be  successfully  offered  to  service  providers  and  operators 
without compromising network integrity. 
Data protection 
Two categories of data protection issues arise in interconnected networks: NeiWOrk lntM:CM•-.c::tion 111 the Domain of ONP  43 
•  Caller identification. ISDN and some analog networks enable end users who wish to 
maintain the privacy of their telephone number when dialing calls to specify that their 
number  not  be  presented  to  the  called  party.  To  maintain  this  data  protection, 
interconnecting  networks  must  be  required  to  respect  the  privacy  indicators 
associated with the call in the signalling messages. Equivalent privacy protection has 
not been established for calls to freephone and audiotex service providers. 
•  Customer  proprietary  network  information.  The  operator  who  provides  end-user 
access  services  is  in  possession  of  information  about  the  telecommunications 
.  ~requirements-and sentice- usage  .. ,of.those~customers  ..  :rhis ~nformation can  provide 
the  operator  with  a  competitive  advantage  in  marketing  other network  services. 
Interconnecting and competing operators seek to limit this advantage by demanding 
access  to  those  databases  and  by  requiring  the  operator  not  to  disclose  the 
information to its other service divisions. 
In summary we conclude: 
1  . The availability of several suppliers of access and network services can be expected 
to increase the reliability and availability of telecommunications services. 
2.  Service  control  and  management interfaces  to  IN  services  should  be  opened  to 
interconnection. The Co;nmission  should  encourage  the  development of technical 
standards for mediated interconnection to service control and service switching. 
3.  Protection  of caller  identification  privacy  should  be  considered  for freephone  and 
audiotex  calling.  Incumbent  network  operators  possess  a  ccmpetitive  advantag~ 
from  the  customer  network  information  they  obtain  by  supplying  services  to  end 
users.  Regulators  should  require  operators  to  safeguard  such  information  and 
prevent its use by marketing and other service divisions. 
2.6.2  Network management 
Network  management  is  concerned  with  ongoing  operation  and  maintenance  of 
network  facilities  and  services  and  the  ordering  and  provisioning  of  new  services. 
Maintenance  in  interconnected  networks  requires  coordination,  sharing  of  data,  and 
cooperation in testing. Provisioning of network facilities and services requires a similar 
degree of coordination of order-taking and supply of network service elements. 
The concept of a Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) is being developed 
by network operators and standards bodies. ETSI is in the early stages of developing 
standards for user-TO and service provider-TO interfaces. 44 
2.6.3.  Measuring, charging and billing 
Practices  for  measuring  interconnected  traffic  include  enumeration  of billing  pulses, 
aggregation of traffic seconds, and erlang measures of busy-hour occupancy of trunks. 
Current  practices  used  by interconnecting  operators  are  arrived  at by  commercially 
negotiated  agreements.  To  support  charging  arrangements  based  on  capacity 
utilisation, considered in the economic analysis of interConnection in Chapter 3, network 
operators  could  extend  measurement  systems  that  they  currently  use  to  monitor 
network utilisation to all of the major points of interconnection. 
Methods  of  measuring and  charging for interconnection  to IN  services are  only  now 
beginning to be developed. Database access can be charged on a per-request basis, 
the  method  that  is  used  for  collect  and  calling-card  calls  that  reference  a  line. 
information  database  maintained  by a separate operator.  The  technical  capability  to 
sample  and  charge  for  other  types  of  signalling  message  traffic  has  not  been 
standardised. 
2. 7  Conclusions 
Technology  makes  possible  a  wide  variety  of  ways  to  supply  telecommunications 
services. There are a large numbe:- of potential interfaces and points of interconnection 
between  operators,  and  telecommunications technology  is  compatible  with  vertically-
integrated,  horizontally-integrated,  and  specialised  operators.  Economic  factors  -
including economies of  scale,  economies of scope, and product differentiation - rather 
than strictly technical factors determine where operators and service providers will seek 
to interconnect. 
Changes  in  vertical  and  horizontal  relationships  are  redrawing  the  boundaries  of 
telecommunications  entities.  Key  interfaces,  formerly  managed  within  the  firm  or 
tncumbent TO network, are now points of technical and commercial interconnection. 
Relationships between an incumbent TO and competitors will frequently be asymmetric. 
Regulatory  attention  will  be  required  to  ensure  that  competitors  obtain  access  to 
interfaces  that  constitute  bottlenecks,  and  that  TOs  make  the  technical  changes 
needed to ensure equal access to achieve fair competition. 
Bottlenecks controlled by a dominant TO range from access to end users to intellectual 
property  rights  in  software  and  equipment  design.  The  principal  technical  issues 
affecting  competition  among  interconnected  fixed  operators  a,.e  equal  access  to 
network  components  and  services,  collocation  of  equipment,  and  numbering.  Until 
technical alternatives to these essential resources are developed, regulatory action will 
be necessary to ensure fair competition. Network lnten::omection in the Domain of ONP  45 
Fixed  networks have well-defined external interfaces at several levels of the  network 
hierarchy, located primarily at switches but also in the distribution system that extends 
to the end user. 
Europe-wide operation of GSM service is technically limited in  areas where TOs have 
not implemented advanced signalling capabilities needed to support roaming by mobile 
subscribers. Direct interconnection of mobile operators can overcome this limitation and 
should not be restricted by regulatory action. 
~ Interconnection .to intelligent networ-k .seFVices· anc:J .resources will be ·of· interest to many 
fixed and mobile network operators and to service providers. Although there are many 
conceptual  types  of  intelligent network interfaces,  only those  for the  most  basic  call 
control  capabilities  have  thus  far  been  standardised.  Moreover,  technical  means  to 
ensure essential requirements are not yet developed 
The  Commission's policy  of  leaving  most interfaces to be  standardised  by  voluntary 
efforts strikes the appropriate balance between the gains from standardisation and the 
gains  from  innovation.  Regulatory  oversight  of  industry  collaboration  to  develop 
standards  will  be  required  to  guard  against  collusive  behavior.  For  a  limited  set  of 
interfaces - those required for Europe-wide services, emergency and directory services, 
and numbering - the Commission should actively encourage development of standards 
and be prepared to mandate their adoption. 
There  is a potentially rich  set of logical points of interconnection to  intelligent network 
interfaces. Access at  network control and switching points could pose significant risks 
to network integrity and security. Technical standards for mediated access have not yet 
been  developed, but licensing of interconnectors could  provide an  alternative  to  open 
interfaces.  Nevertheless,  the  availability  of  several  suppliers  of  access  and  network 
services  can  be  expected  to  increase  the  reliability  and  availability  of 
telecommunications  services.  The  service  control  and  management  interfaces  to  IN 
services should be  opened to  interconnection. The  Commission should encourage the 
development of technical standards for mediated interconnection to service control and 
service switching. 
In  most instances, physical collocation of an  interconnector's equipment in the facilities 
of  the  dominant TO is  technically achievable  and  provides more  nearly equal  access 
than virtual collocation. 
Subscriber number portability is  difficult to  achieve with  current technology, but some 
alternative  measures  can  reduce  the  TO's  advantages  of  incumbency.  Portability  is 
more readily achieved for freephone and other database-related services. 
Because  upgrading switching  systems to  support equal  access to  multiple operators 
has  high  costs  when  older-technology  switches  must  be  retrofitted,  a  policy  of 
mandatory  end-user  equal  access  should  be  limited  to  newly-installed  switches  and 
software upgrades of existing digital switches. ...  ...  ..  . .  - -·  .. 
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2.8  Annex 
A.1  Intelligent network (IN) interconnection 
"The  Application  of  ONP  to  Intelligent  Network ..  Functions,"  KPMG  Peat 
Marwick, March 1993. 
•  ETSI should create standard definitions of advanced services, by 1996. [19] 
Note:  The  Commission  has  subsequently  mandated  ETSI  to  do  this  for  five  key 
services: freephone, cashless calling, premium rate, virtual private networks, universal 
personal telephone services. [•Mandate to ETSI on Intelligent Networks- Explanatory 
Note,• 10 Nov. 1993] 
•  ETSI should develop standards and tests: 
(1)  to permit open provision of IN applications to access switching infrastructure 
based on SS7. 
(2)  for  essential  requirements  between  key  IN  elements,  to  protect  network 
integrity. [20] 
The  report  finds  that  current  technology  and  standards  are  inadequate  to  allow  IN 
interfaces to  be  identified, let alone  be  opened through technical specifications. Open 
interfaces  will  take  many  years  to  be  adopted,  and  SS7  is  inherently  insecure. 
Therefore, it recommends: 
•  National  licensing  of  IN  operators,  substituting  license  requirements  to  achieve 
essential requirements for the lack of sufficient technical interface safeguards. [152-
154] 
•  ETSI develop a functional model applicable to regulatory interfaces by end 1995.[19] 
FCC,  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  Docket  91-346,  "In  the  Matter  of 
Intelligent Networks'', Adopted 8/3/93. 
The FCC proposes to require that mediated access be available to third parties. Access 
would be  implemented in  stages: first at the service management system (SMS),  next 
at  the  service control  point (SCP),  and  finally  at the  switch.  The  comment and  reply 
period for the  proposed rules  closP.d  December 1;  the issues will  be  examined in  the 
U.  S. country study. 
Mediated access: the means by which a non-LEC (local exchange carrier) could  gain 
access to the switch for limited purposes, but is prevented from  engaging in  activities 
that might compromise network reliability. [para. 22] 47 
Mediated access to the SMS is already in use for some services, such as 800 database 
service. Two LECs have proposed gateway access  to the  SCP.  FCC suggests that 
mediated  access  to each  switch  would  place  significant mediation  requirements  on 
every switch. [para. 51] 
Standards issues raised: 
- should a standard set of •triggers• for services be developed for use by all  service 
suppliers? (para. 43] 
- should there be industry-wide formats and standards?  What should they be? Who 
should establish them? [para. 55] 
FCC  proposes  to  encourage  technical  and  market  trials  to  test  different  access 
arrangements. 
In this regard, what is the analogous regulatory mechanism in Europe for trials? Action 
by individual  NRAs? How would a  European regulatory policy of first promoting trials 
and  subsequently  establishing  common  ONP  standards  be  implemented  at the  EU 
level? 
A.2  Broadband interconnection 
.. The Application of ONP to MAN, Frame Relay and Advanced Transmission 
Networks and their Services", Fischer & Lorenz and Ovum, September 1993. 
•  Add to the Leased Lines Directive the following higher-speed leased lines: [193] 
- 34 Mbps, unstructured and structured 
- 140 Mbps, unstructured and structured 
- 155 Mbps 
•  Update  the  ONP  reference  list  of  standards  published  in  the  Official Journal,  to 
include  the  added  leased  lines,  and  to  include  Integrated  Broadband  Services as 
part of the Packet Switched Data Services. [197] 
•  Frame  Relay:  ETSI  should  establish  an  lnterworking  task  force  to  co-ordinate 
standardisation activity within CCITI, ETSI, and the Frame Relay Forum. [189] 
•  A  TM  Cross-Connect:  Consider an  ETSI  mandate  to  define  service  offerings  and 
access interface standards. [190] 
•  Integrated Broadband Services: U.S. markets are rapidly developing frame relay and 
ATM Cross-connect. ETSI should shift emphasis from connectionless services (e.g., 
CBDS)  to  frame  relay  and  ATM.  ETSI  should be  mandated to  reinforce  work  on 48  Study tor the european Comrrilliorf  · · 
definition of throughput classes needed for quality of service and tariffing. ETSI work 
should occur through an lnterworking task force for Broadband-ISDN to co-ordinate 
standardisation activities now underway in several fora. [191 J 
•  Addressing:  ETSI  should  endorse  the  addressing  scheme  adopted  by  the  A  TM 
Forum  and  should investigate possibilities for Internet address mapping into E.164 
addresses. [193] 
The report makes these regulatory points: 
Frame  relay,  MAN  and  other  broadband  services  and  networks  are  fully  in  the 
competitive  domain,  with  the  exception  of  voice  telephony  and  provision  of 
infrastructure. Only limited regulatory measures are recommended. 
Video  conferencing,  which  includes  real  time  voice,  is  a  TO  prerogative  in  some 
Member  States.  It  is  the  report's  view  that  any  service  with  non-trivial  elements  in 
addition to  voice telephony should be  in competitive domain, therefore including video 
telephony. 
Access  to  high-speed  leased  lines  is  limited  by  very  high  prices.  Cost-based  tariffs 
would yield large welfare gains. 
Collocation of equipment on TO premises may be important, for both cost and technical 
reasons. 
A.3  Local loop interconnection 
.. ONP Applied to the Local Loop", Analysys, Ltd. Nov. 1993. 
Local Loop: ETSI Definition: 
The  Local  Loop  (or  Access  Network)  covers  any  system  implemented 
between the  Local  Exchange and the  user,  replacing a part or the  whole  of 
the  local  line  distribution  network.  An  Access  Network  may  consist  of 
multiplexing, cross-connect and transmission functions, and may use optical 
fibre, copper or even radio transmission {or a combination). [79] 
Local Loop: Analysys Definition: 
The  local loop is  that part of the network which  provides the  customer with 
access to the core network, and for which it is both feasible and practical to 
attribute the cost of dedicated plant and transmission facilities, in whole or in 
part,  to  individual  customers.  The  core  network  includes  all  switching  and 
transmission which is not dedicated to a particular customer. [79] Network Interconnection in the ~n  of ONP  49 
. In practical terms, the two definitions are equivalent, except that Analysys includes the 
local exchange line card in the local loop. 
The Analysys report makes these recommendations: 
•  Modify Voice Telephony Directive by January 1996 to require that TOs publish,· by 
January 1988, a tariff for use of local loop by telephony service providers. Technical 
and  network  integrity  aspects  should  be  considered  in  the  ONP  interconnection 
study. 
•  Commission  working  with  NRAs  should,  by  January  1996,  produce  standard 
definitions and initial measurements for access deficit charges. 
•  Commission  and  ETSI  should  review  progress  in  standardising  network 
management standards (03, others). 
•  Commission should mandate ETSI to ensure that future standards enable customers 
to select alternative core networks from the access network. One possibility is digit-
recognition to enable call-by-call selection of a core network. 
•  Reference the ETSI V5.1  and V5.2 standards in the Official Journal 
•  Add  •including  video or audio signals where  individually selected  by the  user"  to 
ONP Framework directive, thus providing within definition of a telecommunications 
service, explicit coverage of access on demand to entertainment. 
•  Modify the LP.ased  Lines Directive so that where collocation is technically needed in 
order to offer a service open to competition, then the TO provides non-discriminatory 
access at a cost-oriented tariff. 
•  ETSI  should  standardise  ADSL  transmission,  based  on  ANSI  and  Bellcore 
recommendations. 
•  Modify the Leased Lines Directive to unbundle into separate charges for each end 
and for the transmission link. 
•  The  ONP  interconnection  study  should  consider  technical/commercial  aspects  of 
non-discriminatory  access  to  the  ISDN  D  channel  by  service  providers  for  data 
transport uses. 
•  Ensure that customers can request, under general contractual conditions, access to 
dark fiore. 
•  Mandate ETSI to investigate definition of a plain copper leased-line standard. 50  Study  for thlt Europearr Cormission .  .  ·- . .  . . 
3  .  Interconnection as an economic issue 
3.1  Overview and economic model 
In  addition to interconnection as a technical telecommunications issue, it is instructive 
to consider it in a purely economic context. Figure 3.1-1  schematically presents major 
interconnection issues revealed by the economic approach. 
Figure 3.1-1:  Economic interconnect model 
Independent of  how and  in  which  of  the  many heterogeneous forms  interconnection 
takes  place,  it  always  involves  a  service  rendered  by  a  network  operator  (service 
provider) to another network operator (service provider). It thereby functions as an input 
to the product that the second network operator (service provider) wants to place on the 
market. As  such, interconnection corresponds precisely to what we observe every day 
in the majority of market transactions where a firm buys a product because it needs that 
product as a raw material or a semi-finished input for the production of its own product. 
We  have  to  answer  the  questions:  what  are  the  essential  characteristics  of  these 
various  market  transactions?  what  types  among  them  have  obvious  similarities  with 
interconnection?  and,  in  what  respect  is  the  demand  for  and  provision  of 
interconnection different,  so  that it  warrants special handling on  the part of regulatory 
authorities? Approaching interconnection from this vantage point has the advantage of 
recognising that it falls within a general class of economic relationships the handling of 
which by public policy in other contexts may cast light on how to deal with the particular 
problems  posed  by  interconnection.  Such  related  relationships  are  to  be  found,  for Network lntercomecllon In the Domairrof ONP  51 
example, between adjacant railroads, between gas producers and pipeline companies, 
and between electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies. 
A  fundamental  observation  about  market  transactions  involving  inputs  needed  for 
further  production  is  that  they  reflect  a  division  of  labour  among  many  different 
producers of goods and services. In principle, each buyer of such an input could decide 
to produce the input himself rather than purchase it.  In fact, that is what we observe for 
the  so-called  vertically  integrated  producers.  In  the  overwhelm!ng  majority of  cases, 
however,  firms  specialise,  so  that  in  the  value  chain  of  a  firm's  product  we  find  a 
-··-. substantiaLpraportion not  produced by the-firm itself. 
Interconnection  fits  this  view  of  an  input  provided  by  a  specialised  provider  to  a 
demander who has not specialised in this particular link in the value chain. What makes 
it appear different from goods and services exchanged in other market transactions are 
essentially four characteristics: 
(1)  Interconnection is often considered a bottleneck input without which the demander 
could not produce his own service and, due to technical or legal barriers, he cannot 
produce  this  input  himself.  In  addition,  the  supplier  and  demander  of 
interconnection  often  compete  with  each  other  in  the  retail  market  for 
telecommunications services. 
(2)  Interconnection involves a degree of ongoing cooperation and interaction between 
the contracting parties that surpasses other purchaser-supplier relationships. 
(3)  Conversely,  if  the  two  networks  approach  equal  size,  the  relationship  may  be 
reciprocal, in that the operators mutually demand interconnection with each other's 
network. 
(4)  Interconnection effectively intemalises network externalities that are created by the 
availability of access to subscribers of other networks. 
All  four  aspects  have  implications  for  the  conclusion  of  interconnection  agreements, 
especially  the  degree  with  which  the  one  or  the  other  party  benefits  from  the 
relationship. 
As  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter,  physical  interconnection  usually  occurs  between 
different networks or network components. In telecommunications networks, economies 
of  scale  and  scope  are  often  realised.  Telecommunications  ·networks  also  exhibit 
externality  effects  that  come  about  because  an  increase  in  the  size  of  a  network 
prov:des its subs=ribsrs wiit•  acces$ to  ~ gr~uter nu;nber of  communic~tion partners. 
The very fact of interconnection may increase these effects and/or extend the benefits 
realised in the one network or component to users of the interconnecting part. Against 
these  benefits one  should  weigh  the  more  dynamic benefits that could be  realised  if, 
instead  of  using  interconnection,  new  ways  of  reaching  out  for  customers  and 
functionalities were developed and possibly made available for the industry at large. On 52 
balance,  because  of  property  (4)  interconnection  is  likely  to  be  highly  desirable. 
However, particularly because of property (1), unregulated markets will generally supply 
insufficient interconnection. 
Once interconnection between two entities has been decided upon (by accord between 
the parties or by regulatory mandate) two of the crucial questions on which agreements 
must  be  reached  are  the  pricing  of interconnection  services  and  the  unbundling  of 
these  services.  To a  large  extent the pricing  evolves around the  question  of proper 
costing. For many of the elements, a direct costing is impossible due to strong effects 
of  economies  ~ot scale  . .and  ... scope. in .. tbeir4)mduction..:·lbis:.:compficates. ·the  price 
determination  in  any  setting.  The  issue  of  unbundling  depends  in  tum  on  technical 
feasibility .and  the  willingness  of  the  iriterconnector  to  comply  with  the  demander's 
request.  If  left  to  negotiation  between  the  parties,  both  issues  may become  largely 
separated from questions of cost and actual feasibility. 
As  we  have seen,  interconnection requires a large degree of cooperation,  yet it often 
takes place  in  an  environment conditioned by competition between the parties. There 
are  two dangers. On the one  hand, there is too much cooperation,  which  is  ideal for 
solving  all  the  technical  problems,  including  unbundling,  and  which  facilitates 
agreement  on  prices,  but  which  may  lead  to  less  than  the  desirable  degree  of 
competition  and  even  to  outright  collusion  and  consequent  restriction  of  trade  and 
thereby  too  high  prices  to  end  l!sers.  On  the  other  hand,  one  may  have  too  little 
cooperation  and  too  much  competitive  positioning of the  parties  involved,  so  that  no 
pricing agreement is  reached at all.  Examples for both of these possibilities appear in 
our country studies, although too much cooperation is harder to detect than too little. 
An  implication of the economic approach to interconnection is that we study the market 
for interconnection. This is  likely to  be  a fast-growing market. Its size depends on  the 
concentration of the  retail  markets for telecommunications services and the degree of 
vertical integration of TOs. 
Assume that all telecommunications operators are vertically integrated. If customers of 
operator  i  distribute  their  calls  randomly  between  i  and  other  operators,  then 
interconnected traffic as a fraction of total traffic is  1-H, where His the Herfindahl index 
of  concentration.7 Hence, in  this case the  amount of interconnected traffic is  inversely 
related to market concentration. It (and its value added) is also inversely related to the 
amount of vertical integration, for example, as entrants substitute their own facilities for 
interconnect services. An  example for this possibility is provided in the  UK by NYNEX 
CableComms which initially depended on Mercury (and,  to some extent, on  BT) for all 
its switching but now does 90°/o  of switching itself. An  extreme example occurs in  the 
US where, due to vertical separation between local and trunk operators, the market for 
interconnection  has  more  than  $20  billion  in  annual  revenues.  Under  full  vertical 
7  As explained below, under the assumptions made, the fraction of outgoing traffic via interconnection 
is 1-s, where s, is an operator Is market share. Total interconnected traffic as a fraction of all traffic is 
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separation  of  local  and  trunk  networks  the  market  for  interconnection  for  trunk 
operators alone equals the size of the trunk retail market (in terms of quantity of calls 
conveyed rather than in terms of value).l 
The consequences of these properties of interconnection markets have to be seen  in 
light of the worldwide trends toward (a) increased competition,  (b)  vertical  unbundling 
and  (c)  horizontal  differentiation  of  telecommunications  services.  As  a  result,  the 
market(s) for interconnection services will quickly gain in importance and will, for some 
time, be characterised by substantial asymmetries in the size and the characteristics of 
'-'ffiarket- participants. ·Over-time ttur number ·of market- participants· and their variety will 
increase.  In  a  mature  situation  we  can  expect that the  market dominance  of former 
monopoly providers will subside and that the market for interconnection will offer choice 
for interconnectors. Nevertheless, we expect that many final subscribers will continue to 
be reachable only via interconnection through a single TO. 
3.2  Special aspects of interconnection 
3.2  .1  Bottleneck 
The aspect of interconnection as a bottleneck input has received most of the attention, 
and from it the need for mandatory interconnection has been derived. 
A bottleneck is  also known as  an  essential facility,  which has some tradition in  the US 
antitrust policy. The "essential facility" doctrine originally evolved from a railroad case in 
1912.  A number of railroads  had  controlled  the  only bridge  into  St.Louis and  denierf 
access  to  this  bridge  to  their  competitors.  The  Supreme  Court decreed  the  bridge  a 
bottleneck and  declared denial  of  access to  be  a restraint  of trade  in  violation  of  the 
Sherman Act. The main elements of a bottleneck are 
•  control of a facility by a single firm, 
•  facility essential for production, 
•  inability of others to practically duplicate the facility, 
•  denial of access with substantial harm to competition, 
•  absence of a valid business reason for not providing access. 
While we do not question the bottleneck property for a large number of interconnection 
cases,  we  nevertheless  provide  examples  demonstrating  that  it  does  not  apply 
generally.  These  examples  contribute  to  answering  the  question,  under  what 
circumstances  should  interconnection  be  considered  a  right  and  be  guaranteed  by 
regulatory  rules?  and,  what  are  the  conditions under which  the  competitor should be 
8  Bypass by use of direct trunk facilities would already be a form of verical integration. 54 
obliged  to  seek  a  stand-alone  solution,  i.e.  gain  access  to  end-users  by  his  own 
devices? 
The  most  relevant  example  of  bottlenecks  in  telecommunications  is  access  to 
residential customers who have only one line running into their homes. The cost of a 
second  line  from  a  different  supplier  is  usually  prohibitive  relative  to  the  cost  of 
interconnection.  Thus,  access  to  such  residential  customers  is  a  bottleneck 
independent of the supplying local operator's market share.  For example, a cable TV 
company  having  5°/o  share  of  local  lines in  a city would  have  a bottleneck over the 
supply ·Of its 5°/d ·of-FeSidential·-subsoribers.··SDGtF&-mble +V·eompany  .WOUld-have the 
ability,  though  not  an  incentive,  to  exclude  others  from  local  access.  A  vertically 
separated  TO  with  the  remaining  95°/o  market share would  have a similar ability but 
possibly  more  incentive  to  exclude  others from  local access,  because  its customers 
could  complete  95°/o  of  their  local  calls  without  interconnection  with  the  cable  TV 
company. A vertically integrated TO with the 95°/o market share might, in addition, have 
an incentive not to interconnect with competing trunk operators. 
In  contrast,  access  to  multiline  business customers or to  trunk transport may not be 
such  a  bottleneck.  Multiline  businesses  have  access  lines  that  could  be  distributed 
between  several  carriers.  And  there  are  many  equivalent  routes  of  trunk  transport 
between two points that are far enough away from  each  other.  In  such  instances, the 
bottleneck property would have to be established on a case-by-case basis. 
We conclude: 
1  .  The  bottleneck property is of utmost importance because it calls for some kind  of 
government intervention establishing a right to  interconnect (by regulatory decree 
or competition policy). 
2.  However, the  bottleneck property itself does not necessarily hold for all types and 
aspects  of  interconnection.  It  therefore  has  to  be  established  on  a case-by-case 
basis. 
3.2.2  Asset specificity 
Interconnection  usually  requires  dedicated  capital  equipment,  such  as  transmission 
lines and  switches that have a long life and  are  not easily reused if interconnection is 
ceased c·putty-clay" aspect of investment). There is a cost to changing interconnection 
partners or going alone, once the arrangements have been made. Asset specificity has 
received particular attention in  the  institutional economic literature (Williamson,  1985). 
Once the assets are sunk,  asset specificity gives rise to many kinds of anticompetitive 
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.  intervention,  vertical  integration  or long-term  contracts.  9  Contractual  interconnection 
agreements as contracts are generally long term in nature, either implicitly (by right of 
interconnection) or by explicit clauses on duration. Also, the assets involved tend to be 
many,  raising  the  level  of complexity of the  transactions.  Such  complexity  could  be 
reduced through trade rules that could be embedded in  an  interconnection framework. 
In some cases, equipment used for interconnection is more fungible between potential 
partners (e.g. satellites). In such cases interconnection agreements could be on shorter 
term and more easily left to the market. 
...  Asset .specificity -also generates  ..a:symmetric·.information -because 1here are no market 
prices for all aspects of equipment entering into the costs of interconnection. Even if the 
interconnecting partner knows these items they may not be verifiable in the courts. This 
may  call  for  government  intervention.  However,  while  asset  specificity  disturbs  the 
functioning  of  markets,  the  accompanying  asymmetries  of  information  also  burden 
government  intervention.  Many  aspects  of  interconnection  agreements  deal  with 
specific  technical,  geographic,  organisational  or  customer-specific  information  that 
regulators ordinarily cannot assess. 
From this we conclude: 
1  .  If  there  is  to  be  government  intervention  it  has  to  strike  a  balance  by  leaving 
enough "localised" issues to  private party negotiations and by focusing  on  issues 
that lend themselves to general rulings. 
2.  Furthermore, government intervention should put emphasis on methods that make 
the different parties reveal their private inforrr.ation. 
3.2.3  Reciprocity (but asymmetry) 
A specific feature of interconnection agreements is that they usually involve traffic flows 
and  capacity provision on  both ends.  Thus,  both parties are at the  same  time  buyers 
and  sellers.  Depending  on  the  degree  of  symmetry  of  this  relationship,  it  can  be  a 
source  of  commonality  of  interest.  In  the  case  of  full  symmetry,  for  example, 
interconnection charges would totally net out between the two parties and therefore be 
no  source  of  contention,  as  was  exemplified  by  international  accounting  rates  over 
many years.  Usually, the  degree of asymmetry is a function of the  vertical integration 
and relative size of the parties involved. 
9  It  may  also call  for  the  creation  of  new property  rights,  such  as  joint ownership  rights  in  network 
facilities, something we expect will happen in the long run. 56  Study tor the eUropean COmrrissiOn' 
We conclude: 
1.  The degree of symmetry and reciprocity in interconnection relationships should be 
taken as an important indicator for regulatory policy. 
2.  The  more  asymmetric the  relationship  between interconnecting parties the  more 
need there is for direct regulatory intervention. 
3.  The more symmetric and reciprocal the relationship is, the greater is the need for 
monitoring the danger of collusion. 
3.2.4  Interconnection and final outputs as related goods 
The relationship between the demander for ·and the supplier of interconnection depends 
to  a large  degree  on  the  types  of  firms  interconnecting  with  each  other.  If both  are 
operating in  totally separate markets, the relationship is  simply one of vertical  market 
power. This would, for example,  approximately hold for the US until now, where local 
exchange carriers (LECs) interconnect with interexchange carriers (IXCs) and the two 
types  of  firms  do  not  compete  for  final  consumers  (except  for  short-distance  -
intraLATA  - trunk  calls).  Even  in  this  case  there  are  basic  substitutional  and 
complementary  relationships  that  complicate  the  analysis.  First,  LECs  sell  access  to 
final consumers, and the demand for this access depends, among others, on the price 
for trunk calls.  As  the price for trunk calls decreases, demand for consumer access to 
the  network increases. Since the demand for trunk interconnection is derived from that 
for  trunk  calls,  trunk  interconnection  and  end-user  access  are  likely  to  be  demand 
complements. Second, reciprocal calling effects can make incoming and outgoing trunk 
calls  complements  (or,  less  likely,  substitutes)  for each  other.  Third,  the  local  loop  is 
used  for  both  local  and  trunk  traffic.  They  therefore  compete  for  the  same  facilities, 
when  it  comes  to  peak-load  congestion.  Thus,  they  are  also  substitutes  in  supply. 
Similar relationships hold for international calls. 
Interconnection is  further complicated through the  fact that the interconnecting parties 
often  find  themselves  in  a  competitive  relationship,  in  that  both  compete  for  the 
business of the  same end-user. Thus,  control over the bottleneck facility may not only 
tempt  the  supplier  to  engage  in  simple  monopolistic  pricing  but  also  to  shut  out 
competition  by  refusing  to  deal  (or  by  raising  rival's  cost).  Only  in  the  case  of 
completely  complementary  networks  would  this  tendency  vanish.  However,  what 
services are competing with those of a TO and what are complementary is not always 
clear to an outsider and may not be  stable. For example, at high prices and low levels 
of penetration mobile services appear to be complementary to fixed-link services, while 
at  low prices  and  high  levels  of  penetration  the  two  are  likely to  compete  with  each 
other.  As  a  further  example,  some  information  services  compete  with  information 
services  supplied  by  a  TO  while  others  do  not.  In  general,  however,  information 
services are complementary to the TO's network services. • 
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As a consequence of this discussion the relationship between interconnection services 
and the final outputs produced by the interconnecting parties is likely to be complex. 
Nevertheless, we conclude: 
1.  As  a general  rule  one  can  expect that,  in  the  case  of competitive  or substitutive 
relationships between the final outputs, interconnection and the final outputs will be 
substitutes  as  well.  Conversely,  in  the  case  of  complementary  relationships 
between the final outputs, the relationships between interconnection and  the  final 
outputs is liketyto be· complementary. 
2.  As a result, a party with bottleneck power over interconnection facilities will want to 
receive a markup above cost for interconnection services in  the former case  and 
may be willing to grant charges below cost in the latter case. 
3.  The question is whether such deviations from costs are economically beneficient. 
3.2.5  Externalities and economies of scale and scope 
Interconnection is called for by certain combinations of economies of scale, economies 
of scope and externalities. If there are strong economies of scale and scope and strong 
positive  network  externalities,  the  traditional  concept  of  an  integrated  monopoly 
provider would be superior to several interconnected providers. At the other extreme, if 
there  are  no  economies  of  scale  and  scope  and  no  externalities  at  all,  then  many 
independent suppliers would coexist totally without interconnection. With  technological 
change,  growth  and  increasing diversity of  telecommunications markets,  intermediate 
cases  have  become  optimal  that  make  interconnection  attractive.  Interconnection 
between  independent  firms  occurs,  for  example,  if  several  firms  with  economies  of 
scale and scope supply different segments of the market, each customer is not buying 
from  all  these  firms  at  the  same  time,  and,  because  of  demand  externalities.  the 
customer of one firm wants to communicate with the customers of all the other firms to 
which  he  does  not  subscribe.  By  providing  positive  network  externalities  to  the 
interconnected customers interconnection increases social surplus . 58 
We conclude: 
1.  The  global  network  externality,  that  is  realised  when  formerty  not  connected 
networks become interconnected, is highly important. 
2.  Together  with  the  bottleneck  property  it  provides  the  strongest  case  for  policy 
intervention in interconnection and for a duty of operators to offer interconnection. 
3.  Interconnection  increases  social  surplus.  In  its  first-round  effect,  opening  the 
bottleneck  helps  competitors,  while  taking  care  of  the  externality  helps 
·· consumers.10 
4.  The duty to interconnect is not unlimited. It faces two types of limits. First, it has to 
be assured that interconnection can work at reasonable costs. Second, the scope 
of  interconnection  and  level  in  the  network,  at  which  interconnection  occurs, 
depend  on  technical  and  market  requirements,  including  the  availability  of 
competitive options and the protection of innovations (as explained for IN services). 
5.  While  the  general  case  for  a  right  to  interconnection  follows  directly  from  the 
network externality, one may hold that strong economies of scale and scope could 
establish  a  case  for  vertical  integration  _instead  of  interconnection.  We  do  not 
believe  that  economies  of scale or scope  should  (as  it has  in  the  past)  interfere 
with the right to interconnection. 
3.2.6  Communities of interest 
Network  externalities  may  also  be  called  demand  economies  and  diseconomies  of 
scope.  Such  economies  and  diseconomies  occur  simultaneously  when  certain 
consumer groups choose not to interconnect or to do so only in an asymmetric fashion. 
Internally,  these  groups  want  to  communicate  intensively,  while  they  exclude  others 
from  freely communicating with  them.  A simple example of this is the  choice of nearly 
60°/o of residents of Los Angeles to have an unlisted telephone number. More important 
for the interconnection between telecommunications service providers are communities 
of  interest  that  build  their  own  networks,  for  example,  banks.  In  a  way,  geographic 
entities  can  often  be  treated  like  communities of  interest:  countries or states within  a 
country. 
Communities of interest may create a desire not to interconnect with others or at least 
not to interconnect in a reciprocal fashion. This desire may be a legitimate and socially 
accepta~ie concern but it may also interfere with a "'right-to-in:erconnect" or an "'any-to-
any" interconnection policy. 
1  0  A duty corresponds to a right to interconnect. The duty can be imposed on each operator specifically, 
while a right cannot be granted without specifying the duty. Network ·tnt8rconnectiarr  the Domain 'Of ONP  59--
We conclude: 
1.  A specific case  for a  refusal  to  interconnect,  based  on  communities  of  interest, 
needs to be made. 
2.  Such  a case  would  have  to  include  a showing  that  there  is  (a)  no  demand  by 
others to interconnect or a demonstrated absence of monopoly power, (b) sufficient 
public  interest  in  no  interconnection  (national  secrecy,  private  intrafirm  network, 
protection of innovation). 
3.  We  believe--that such  a  .. case  can- either :be -tFeated by way of ·specific exemption 
from  the  general  requirement  to  interconnect  or  by  creating  a  private  operator 
status that is associated with loss of some other privileges (such as wayleaves). 
3.2.7  Price rebalancing and universal service obligations (USOs) 
In  most  countries  telecommunications  retail  tariffs  are  unbalanced  in  the  following 
sense: 
- rental charges for telephone lines and one-time charges for establishing subscriber 
connections do not cover the corresponding costs, 
- local usage charges have lower markups on costs than long-distance charges, 
- peak and off-peak prices do not correspond to actual load patterns. 
The  stated  justification  for  these  unbalanced  rate  structures  invariably  rests  on  the 
objectives  to  help  low  income  subscribers  and  to  achieve  universal  service.  Since 
unbalanced rate  structures affect all  subscribers, they fulfill neither of these objectives 
well.  As income distribution measures they are untargeted and possibly regressive. As 
a means of increasing subscriber penetration they become less suitable the higher the 
percentage of subscribers in  the population that would continue to subscribe at higher 
line rental and at higher initial connection charges.  Both, for distributional and universal 
service reasons. targeted price discounts for needy and marginal subscribers are much 
more  effective  than  a  generally  unbalanced  rate  structure.  Politicians  often  fear 
opposition  from  subscribers  that  have  to  pay  more  for telecommunications  servicies 
under rebalancing. In fact, rebalancing (at constant aggregate tariff levels) leaves most 
consumers better off.  Only low-usage consumers would be worse off and they can  be 
targeted by special low income and low usage tariffs. • 
This  report  is  not  so  much  concerned  with  the  justification  and  scope  of  universal 
service  obligations  placed  on  TOs.11  Rather,  we  concentrate  on  the  effects  of 
11  This has been done in Cave. Milne and Scanlan (1994). 60  Study tor lie Ellf'OPMn Commission  .  - . 
interconnection on the fulfillment of such obligations and the reciprocal effects of uses 
on interconnect pricing. 
The pricing of interconnection is tied in with the universal service obligations placed on 
dominant telecommunications network operators in  the following way.  The obligations 
may  increase  the  costs  of  the  operators  in  question  and,  more  importantly,  cause 
serious  distortions  in  their  price/cost margins.  If no such  obligations  are  placed  on 
competitors,  the  latter could  gain  an  advantage  by exploiting  the  imbalances  in  the 
incumbents'  price  structures.  Thus,  interconnection  may  effectively  increase  the 
burdens of  USOs.oo _incumbent  tOs..lt-..bas.Jheo  ..  ,to-be.:decided-w.hether-~and-to·what. 
degree competitors should also be burdened with uses, either directly or by having to 
pay part ot the costs. 
In  order to  simplify understanding and treatment of USOs,  it helps to view USOs as 
special telecommunications services that are demanded by the government (acting as 
an  agent for certain customer groups). As is the case for other services demanded by 
government,  the  questions  are,  who  shall  provide  them,  what  are  their  costs,  what 
should be their price and who shall pay (or, how should they be paid)? If they were paid 
directly  by  government  (financed  by  taxes  or  otherwise)  this  would  be  a  standard 
government procurement problem. As  long as we  can  separate the procurement .task 
from payment, we may still want to treat USOs as a standard procurement problem and 
then  treat the payment as a separate issue. Starting with the procurement, we may ask 
what services USOs include. There appear to be two generic types. First, USOs consist 
of  services  that  are  deemed  basic  and  are  provided  to  low  income/deserving 
subscribers  (including  the  handicapped).  Such  subscribers  are  distributed  randomly 
over a geographical area and are likely to be low volume users. Second, USOs consist 
of  services  that  are  deemed basic and  are  provided to high  cost'remote subscribers. 
Such  subscribers are restricted to certain geographical areas, usually with low density. 
In both cases, different types of telecommunications service providers are likely to have 
advantages  in  providing  USOs.  For  example,  satellites  may  be  the  best  means  of 
supplying remote areas, and mobile radio may be the best means of providing services 
to  low users (because capital costs are low and spectrum is used sparingly). However, 
because of  its sunk network the  incumbent TO  may have advantages using fixed-link 
services in  both  cases.  A potentially third type  of USOs  is  a constraint preventing the 
incumbent  TO  from  increases  in  local  interconnect  and  rental  charges  and  from 
geographic  tariff  deaveraging.  We  may  interpret  such  rebalancing  constraints  as 
including both of the generic types of USOs. 
There  are  two  basic  ways  of  procuring  and  pricing  of  USOs  in  the  context  of 
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.•  costing out of obligations for all TOs and interconnectors providing the services.  In 
this case subscribers, by choosing a particular TO, decide who provides the USOs. 
A refinement of subscriber choice  can  be achieved by using  USO vouchers  with 
prespecified values, that are given to needy and remote subscribers. 
•  auctions that lead  to  least-cost procurement.  In  this case  the  government decides 
who provides the uses. 
Both  voucher systems and auctioning of USOs should.  through  the  targeting and  the 
competition involved,  .. drivs  .  .down .the.costs. ot.providi"g  ~USOs. The payment for USOs 
needs to have nothing to do with interconnection. USOs could be paid for 
•  out  of  government  subsidies.  This  is  likely to  be  economically  most  efficient  but 
politically not feasible. 
•  by  a levy  on  all  telecommunications  retail  services.  The  allocative  distortions  and 
administrative costs of such a levy are likely to stay very small so that this could be 
economically  quite  efficient.  Such  a  levy  could  be  of  the  VAT  type  or  of  the 
consumption  tax  type.  Because  of  the  likely  small  amount.  an  ad  valorem 
consumption  tax  is  to  be  preferred.  It should  be  paid  out  of  the  operators'  total 
revenues  from  telecommunications  services  and  need  not  be  an  explicit  part  of 
consumer bills.  The  collected amounts would  flow into a USO fund  and  would  be 
disbursed to operators performing USOs or as targeted subsidies to consumers who 
receive them, for example, in the form of USO vouchers. Vouchers would have the 
advantage of not distorting the  tariff structure. Also,  the  administrative costs should 
stay small. 
•  through  internal  subsidies  by  all  service  providers.  This  is  historically  the  most 
relevant case  and  the  one  that leads to  the  desire to include payment of  USOs  in 
interconnection  charges.  Also,  internal  subsidies  have  often  been  justified  with 
universal  service obligations, but the  link between the  two was  rarely if ever made 
explicit. 
•  through  a  component  of  interconnection  charges  paid  by  all  interconnectors  and 
imputed  to  interconnection  services  provided  by  a  TO  to  itself.  This  requires  a 
transparent process of arriving at the charges and becomes cumbersome, once the 
dominant TO ceases to be the only supplier having USOs. 
In  our  opinion,  in  most  countries  the  most  lacking  property  of  USOs  is  the  proper 
identification and financial assessment of costs incurred and/or revenues lost because 
of  USOs.  If  such  identification  has  been  achieved,  USOs  can  be  treated  in  various 
ways  as  indicated  above.  Although  this  is  not  our  preferred  method,  we  discuss 
financing of USOs through interconnection charges below in Section 3.5. 62  Study for 1he European Commission 
3.3  Alternatives to interconnection between separate operators 
If  we  were  to  assume  that  interconnection  between  different  telecommunications 
operators  were  prohibited  by  law,  what  would  happen?  We  see  two  extreme 
possibilities. The first is complete separation, the second is full integration. 
3.3.1  Stand-alone solution 
First.  as  illustrated  above  in  Figure  3.1-1,  the  stand-alone  solution  of  complete 
separation means that a·customer·whcr"has wbscribect to  -a-particular network-provider 
and wants to communicate with another customer, can only do so if the other customer 
is on the same network. In order to communicate with many or all other end users in an 
economy,  a customer therefore  may have to subscribe to several network providers. 
One consequence of this arrangement is duplication which may lead to higher overall 
costs to society. It will also lead to advantages for larger network providers over smaller 
ones  because  of  the  economies  from  less  duplication.  Depending  on  other 
economies/diseconomies in  the  provision of network services and,  depending  on  the 
type of competition, the result may be market dominance by one firm or full monopoly. 
M. Mueller (1988) claims that the advantages to be gained by a firm from reaching such 
market  dominance  will  spur  innovation,  so  that  the  Schumpeterian  gain  has  to  be 
weighed against the static efficiency loss from market power. There may, however, also 
be  a long-term (innovative) efficiency loss associated with  it in  that the dominant firm 
retains first-mover advantages that hinder further innovations by others. 
Full  separation may also lead to inefficient entry by other firms or bypass by end users 
if  the dominant firm cannot fully price discriminate. In this case, the dominant firm  may 
rather want to lose some consumers than give up on monopoly pricing. The well-known 
dominant  firm  price  leadership  model  with  a  competitive  fringe  would  be  applicable 
here.  It  shows  some  erosion  of  the  dominant  firm's  market  power  by  the  fringe. 
However, as a rule this occurs by increasing total industry costs. 
We conclude: 
1.  A stand-alone solution that results from  refusals to interconnect or from  excessive 
interconnect prices charged by TOs should not be tolerated. 
2.  Stand-alone telecommunications service providers may have their niche for private 
communities of interest, or they may be the very unlikely result of strong scale and 
scope economies, but that needs to be demonstrated. The latter would give an ex-
post justification for the bygone era of telecommunications monopolies. 
3.  Stand-alone  provision  of telecommunications  services  may also  be  the  result  of 
interconnection  charges  that  lead  to  inefficient bypass.  While  inefficient  bypass 
should  be  avoided,  this  may  not  always  be  possible,  due  to  inability  or 
unwillingness to price discriminate with respect to interconnection charges. Network Interconnection In the Domaii1 of ONP  "63. 
3.3.2  Vertical integration/mergers 
Second, if separate firms were not allowed to interconnect they may instead choose to 
merge with each other. In its end result this case may resemble the previous one in that 
a dominant vertically  integrated  firm  or a  monopoly  emerges.  Only  the  path  to  this 
outcome is different. In particular, it may be faster and appear more organised. At the 
same  time,  consumers  are  less  likely to  benefit on  the  way because  competition  is 
excluded  from  the  outset.  An  in-between  case  is  that  of  strategic  alliances  between 
firms that take equity positions in each other. 
We conclude: 
Mergers and alliances should be treated under standard competition policy criteria. 
3.4  Economic aspects of specific types of interconnection 
3.4.1  Interconnection of fixed networks 
The physical and technical differences between different types of interconnection have 
been treated extensively in Chapter 2.  In this section we want to describe and analyse 
some economic differences between specific types of interconnection. The benchmark 
case to which the differences are related is the interconnection between fixed networks. 
That has been the case implicitly described in the previous sections in this chapter and 
will be the background for the sections to come. 
When we distinguish differences between the fixed-fixed and the other cases.  it  has to 
be borne in mind that the variation within the fixed-fixed case is substantial and may be 
just as large as the variation between the fixed-fixed and the other cases.  In particular, 
the  relationships  between  fixed-link  operators  can  be  highly  asymmetric  by  size, 
amount of traffic, dependence, final outputs, and so on. 
We conclude: 
The  framework  for interconnection  between  fixed  networks  needs  to  be  able  to  deal 
with  a large  variability of  cases.  This  can  either  be  done  by  keeping  the  framework 
sufficiently open or by anticipating and explicitly dealing with the different cases. 
3.4.2  Interconnection of fixed and mobile networks 
From  an  economic  perspective  the  difference  between  fixed-mobile  and  fixed-fixed 
interconnection  could  lie  in  the  supply  conditions  and  in  demand.  In  fact,  it  is  a 
combination  of  the  two.  From  the  demand  side  mobile  services are  more  convenient 64 
than  fixed  services  because  they  are  almost  ubiquitous.  However,  their  quality  is 
inferior,  in  particular when  used  indoors.  From  the  supply side,  mobile  services  are 
currently  more  expensive  to  provide  (due  to costly  handsets  and  limited  spectrum). 
Thus, mobile services are an imperfect substitute to fixed services. In particular, at low 
penetration rates fixed and mobile services may in  many countries be complementary 
to each other. This feature would explain why interconnection agreements with mobile 
operators have, in several countries, occasioned little regulatory interference. As mobile 
services penetrate further, they may substitute for fixed services. In particular, they will 
replace  fixed-service  usage  and  2nd and 3rd fixed  lines into homes.  New PCN  and 
PCS services ·may actually-even replace~  stiixed lines. 
Due  to  spectrum  scarcity  and  public  spectrum  management  policies,  mobile 
telecommunications has in the past been supplied by narrow oligopolies, with duopolies 
being the  most common case. This is, however, unlikely to be a natural duopoly, and 
there is no reason why the market should not be able to support 1  0-15 operators in the 
same  geographical area.  A peculiarity of the  market so far has been  that one  of the 
operators  is  usually  owned  by  the  dominant  TO  and  that  the  others  have  to 
interconnect to this TO.  Contrary to entry in fixed-link telecommunications, the non-TO 
mobile operators are commonly of equal size as the TO's mobile operator. 
Mobile  operators  may  have  to  interconnect with  fixed  operators  for  their  backbone 
network and  for  call  completion  ;,,  either direction.  Other than  issues  raised  by  their 
competitive position, demand relationships, or regulatory distortions, we  currently see 
no major economic differences between fixed-mobile and fixed-fixed interconnection. 
The  framework should,  however, be  open to  different market structures, technologies 
and demand configurations. For example, the  success rate  of call attempts is  likely to 
differ between  fixed-fixed  and  fixed-mobile  interconnections.  If  conveyance  rates  are 
charged per minute, a different success rate may have to lead to different cost-based 
charges.  However,  if  call  attempts were  charged  in  addition  to  successful  usage,  the 
charge per call attempt and the charge per minute need not differ for the two types of 
interconnection. 
As a consequence, we conclude: 
1.  There are  no economic reasons to  treat fixed-mobile interconnection agreements 
differently  under  the  same  general  interconnection  framework  for  fixed-fixed 
interconnections. 
2.  The  differences,  if  any,  concern  specifics,  such  as  the  naturally  asymmetric 
positions of the two parties, the potentially complementary nature of the two retail 
products and implications for access charges. 
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3.4.3  Interconnection of mobile networks 
Since  mobile-mobile  interconnection  occurs  between  competing  parties  (unless  they 
supply disjoint geographic territories), issues of asymmetric market power and collusion 
play a major role.  An  economic demand for mobile-mobile  interconnection arises  for 
adjacent or overlapping mobile operators, but this in and of itself would not create new 
economic issues.  Such  issues arise largely from  inefficient and anticompetitive transit 
arrangements  for  indirect  interconnection  between  mobile  operators.  In  principle, 
mobile operators should  make an efficient choice between  interconnecting directly or 
· ·via  transit· agFeements·.with-·a':fi-xec:J..Iink -carrier.  ~.=fhis- choice·  :will "depend  among  other 
things on the intensity of usage and availability of interconnection points. 
We conclude: 
1.  There  are  good  economic  reasons  to  allow  and  encourage  direct  mobile-mobile 
interconnection. 
2.  The  same  holds  for  undistorted  transit  interconnections,  which  can  provide  an 
alternative and a yardstick for direct mobile-mobile interconnections. 
3.4.4  Interconnection in an intelligent network environment 
As described in  Chapter 2,  interconnection in an intelligent network environment poses 
problems  on  top  of  those  solved  for the  other environments.  In  particular,  intelligent 
networks  require  technical  innovations  that  have  to  be  developed  through  resources 
and  ingenuity.  The  incentives for  achieving this  have  to  be  created  and  the  costs for 
providing these incentives have to  be  covered from  interconnection agreements. Also, 
information may have to be  shared at a time when intellectual property rights have not 
yet been fully established. Interconnection policy will therefore have to strike a balance 
between the  legitimate  secrecy concerns of those  developing the  technology and  the 
interests  of  interconnectors  and  service  providers  in  influencing  and  learning  about 
these developments and evolving new industry standards  . 66 
As a consequence, we conclude: 
1.  There  are  no  economic  reasons  to  treat  interconnection  agreements  in  an 
intelligent  network  environment  differently  than  under  the  same  general 
interconnection framework as for fixed-fixed interconnections. 
2.  The differences concern specifics. In particular, 
(a)  the  intelligent  network  environment  is  likely  to  prevent  stable  and 
-~·standardised interconnection agreement~m-emergingin1tle·neariuture. 
Interconnection agreements will have to continue to change over time and 
to become adapted to new circumstances. This is important because of the 
nature  of  specific  investments.  It  means  that  long-term  contracts  for 
interconnection have to remain open to change although the accompanying 
investments are  largely sunk and therefore cannot be made undone. The 
necessary adaptation may provide for a continuing role of the regulator. 
(b)  to the extent that IN features embody innovations by the interconnecting TO 
(rather  than  innovations  by  equipment  manufacturers)  licence  fees 
incorporating the value of these innovations need to be considered as part 
of interconnection charges. 
3.4.5  Interconnection in a broadband environment 
Interconnection in a broadband environment could have been treated under fixed-fixed 
interconnection. It does, however, pose some of the same issues as interconnection in 
an  IN  environment.  In  particular,  broadband  investments,  due  to  their high  capacity, 
reintroduce economies of scale and therefore natural  monopoly concerns.  Broadband 
has almost only fixed costs, no variable costs, and virtually unlimited capacity. Efficient 
pricing  is  therefore  going  to  be  very  difficult,  at  least  initially.  In  order  to  maintain 
competition  in  the  telecommunications  markets  in  general,  the  introduction  of 
broadband may have  to  occur on  a joint  ownership  basis.  This  could  follow patterns 
already established in other network markets, for example for natural gas pipelines. 
3.5  Pricing issues 
3.5.1  Pricing under laisse:z faire without regulatory interlerence 
Price  regulation  of  interconnection  needs  to  do better  than  the  unregulated  market 
would  perform.  The  effects  of  laissez  faire  on  prices  for  interconnection  services 
depend, to a large extent, on  the prior structure of the telecommunications (end-user) 
market. Thus, we have to consider the interaction between these two markets and have 
to differentiate between laissez faire in the end-user market for telecommunications and 
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laissez  faire  in  the  market  for  interconnection.  There  are  three  canonical  market 
structures that can serve to identify policy issues and to evaluate policy solutions. First, 
a local exchange monopoly may be vertically separated from the trunk market (which 
may be oligopolistic or competitive). Second, a vertically integrated dominant TO may 
face a competitive fringe in  the trunk market. Third,  the vertically integrated dominant 
TO faces an oligopoly in the trunk or mobile market. 
Assume that both interconnection ar:-d  end-user markets are  under total  laissez fa ire, 
and  we  start  out  with  a  vertically  integrated  monopoly  in  the  end-user  market  and 
therefore no  int~rconnection. Then_ the monopolist  may  .. mimic. tha.outcome of Section 
3.3.1  and refuse interconnection. This certainly makes entry by others difficult, because 
an  entrant  would  first  have  to  find  a  critical  mass  of subscribers  in  order  to  make 
subscription worthwhile. An  entrant could only hope to gain such a critical mass if he 
could offer some guaranteed subscriber base. Any guarantee of this type (for example, 
special rebates if a certain number of subscribers is not met) would be very expensive 
and would create a substantial barrier to entry. 
A  second  possibility  for  the  incumbent  monopolist  is  to  interconnect  with  potential 
entrants and try to maximise profits through interconnection prices.12 In particular, the 
incumbent firm will have an incentive to use this strategy if the entrant offers a service 
that does not compete with the incumbent's service. Then interconnection will actually 
increase the value of the incumbent's offerings and the incumbent will charge a set of 
multiproduct monopoly prices for all its services (including interconnection) that will take 
into consideration the demand complementarity and the entrant's options of bypassing 
the incumbent. The case is different if the entrant offers a substitute to the incumbent's 
services. Even then it may be optimal for the incumbent not to foreclose intarconnection 
but rather make money from it (Economides and Woroch, 1992). Since interconnectors 
will  charge  their  own  mark-up  for  their  customers,  an  inefficiency  due  to  double-
marginalisation may emerge.13 
If,  by  virtue  of  regulation  or  competition  policy,  a  mature  market  for  end-user 
telecommunications  services  has  developed  that  is  horiziontally less  concentrated  or 
vertically  separated,  or  both,  then  the  laissez  faire  market  for  interconnection  may 
evolve  very  differently.  Assume  that  all  operators  have  the  same  amount  of  vertical 
integration  and  that  there  are  several  equally-sized  operators  that  compete  for  end 
users.  Each  operator  i  has  market  share  s,  among  end  users.  If  customers  of  an 
operator i would want to distribute their calls randomly between i and other operators, 
then interconnected traffic as a fraction of total traffic originating from operator i is 1-s, 
The  demand  for  interconnection  by  an  operator  is  therefore  larger  the  smaller  the 
operatoi. This does not, however, mean that the marginal willingness to pay per 1.1nit o: 
12  In fact, as an optimisation problem, refusal to interconnect is a special case of pricing. 
13  Double-marginalisation means that both the interconnection charge and the retail service have their 
own markups on marginal costs. In contrast, a vertically integrated monopoly only incurs one markup. 
As a result, the allocative inefficiency of vertical separation is increased if there is market power on 
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inter~nnected capacity  or traffic  conveyed  necessarily  differs  in  any  way  between 
small and large operators. Such differences would depend, among other things, on the 
value  of the  network externality as  penetration  increases.  We  would  expect that the 
marginal network externality decreases with penetration. For example, we would expect 
that a customer, who can currently reach  99°/o of her acquaintances by phone, values 
the  increase  to  1  00°/o  less  than  a  customer,  who  can  currently  reach  1  °/o  of  her 
acquaintances,  values  an  increase  to  2°/o.  The  correctness  of this  conjecture  would 
imply  that  the  smaller  operator  i's  market  share  the  larger  its  demand  for 
interconnection.  In  oligopolistic  markets,  this  situation  could  lead  to  unstable 
competitive ··retationships and dichotomous market- structures;·once market shares have 
become .asymmetric. 
The  fact  that  telecommunications  operators  sell  each  other  interconnection  and 
compete with each other for end users is likely to increase their incentives for collusion. 
While  we  have  not seen  much formal  modelling of this tendency,  it is  in  line with  the 
economists'  folklore  outside  telecommunications  about  the  behavior  of  multinational 
and  conglomerate  enterprises  that  often  face  situations  of  reciprocal  dealings.  In 
particular,  certain  interconnect pricing practices are likely to facilitate  collusion. These 
pricing  practices  include  the  currently  used  international  settlement  procedures  and 
revenue sharing. Also, interconnect prices that are based on an operator's retair tariffs 
may well  have collusive  effects. The  likelihood of collusion is further enhanced by the 
long-term nature of interconnection agreements (due to asset specificity, as mentioned 
above).  There  is  some  formal  modelling  confirming  the  related  tendency to  use  high 
interconnection  prices  to  implement  high  end-user  prices  in  the  special  case  of 
international accounting rates (Lu  and Hakim,  1993).14 Carter and Wright (1994) show 
that collusion among interconnectors can  be  used to  implement collusive outcomes in 
end-user markets,  but  this  collusion  can  be  efficient because  it  reduces  the  effect  of 
double marginalisation. 
To  summarise  the  diverse  set  of  possibilities,  there  appears  to  be  little  hope  that  an 
efficient market for interconnection services will develop without policy intervention. 
14  Hypothetically,  we  might  want  to  consider  a  perfectly  competitive  end-user  market.  Under  fairty 
general conditions such a market implies that a competitive market for interconnection services will 
emerge  and  have  properties  similar to  those  in  other competitive  markets.  Network  externalities 
would, however, only be overcome to the extent possible without subsidising consumers. .. 
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The conclusions on pricing under a regime of laissez faire are: 
1.  If left to themselves, markets for interconnection services are likely to reflect either 
collusive  arrangements  or  monopoly  power  of  incumbent  TOs.  In  either  ~ase, 
interconnection prices are likely to be too high relative to prices that would emerge 
under competitive conditions. 
2.  If  there  is  a  danger  of  collusion,  low  regulated  interconnection  prices  may  be 
advisable.  However,  they may be  hard to  achieve against industry interests,  and 
·--their likely uniformity ·may ·spur colltJsion·in·1he· retait market.~  It ·.may then be better 
to  leave  the  market to  itself and  only  intervene through  the  tools  of  competition 
policy. The lower interconnection charges are kept, the less harmful are the effects 
of any collusion in the end-user market, because collusive markups are then based 
on lower marginal costs. 
3.  The more likely case is that of monopoly power in the market for interconnection. 
At the  same time,  prices in  telecommunications retail  markets are  likely to  reflect 
both the effects of partial competition and regulatory preferences (including cross-
subsidies,  USOs and  the  like).  As a consequence,  interconnection prices  cannot 
simply  be  left to  the  market,  nor are  they  regulated  easily.  This  necessitates  a 
methodology for interconnection pricing under regulation. 
3.5.2  Methodology for pricing with regulation 
We  further  develop  the  case  for  regulation  in  Chapter 4.  Here  we  sketch  the  broad 
implications  of  a  regulatory  pricing  regime.  The  pricing  prescriptions  would  apply  to 
ongoing regulation or to specific regulatory determinations. The special emphasis is on 
interconnection with a dominant TO. 
3.5.2.1  Regulatory objectives 
The  optimal  regulatory  pricing  policy  for  interconnection  depends  on  regulatory 
objectives and the institutional and other constraints that the regulator faces. 
The objectives include the following: 
•  social welfare. This can be viewed as the aggregate overall objective function of the 
regulator and would include all of the subsequent objectives. 
•  efficiency.  The  prime  objective  considered  in  the  economic literature  on  regulatory 
pricing has been efficiency in the sense of Pareto optimality and the maximisation of 70  .  .  Study for the EUrapean Comrrlssion  . 
social surplus.15 The use of social surplus is compatible with the partial equilibrium 
approach  commonly  used  for  telecommunications  pricing.  Social  surplus 
maximisation leads to the famous marginal cost pricing rule (socially optimal prices). 
Efficiency can be subdivided into 
(a)  production efficiency (technical efficiency and efficient input prices) and 
(b)  consumption  efficiency  (efficient output prices  and  maximisation  of consumer 
surplus) 
•  equity and fairness.· Distributional equity of pricing can be captured through weights 
attached to  the different groups in  society, for example, according to their income 
and  wealth.  This  is  commonly  done  for the  components  of social  surplus,  giving 
different weights  to  consumers,  firms  and government.  Fairness  is  not that  easily 
quantifiable. There are many aspects to fairness. For example, fairness can relate to 
the process by which regulatory decisions are made; it can relate to property rights 
in  the  status quo, to  rights of access to telecommunications,  to equal treatment in 
equal situations, to the costs caused by a consumer and other items. These different 
views of fairness are not all compatible with each other. They have in common that 
they may only be tractable as constraints in a regulatory objective function. The most 
important fairness constraints for interconnection prices include the following two: 
•  non-discrimination.  The  equal  treatment of similar cases  is  usually  viewed  as  fair, 
and  it  is  the  result of competition even  if it is not efficient under all  circumstances. 
Thus,  to  the  extent  that  competitive  outcomes  are  taken  as  a  benchmark  for 
interconnection pricing, non-discrimination is a desirable constraint. 
•  cost-orientation. Again,  this is a fairness constraint that is usually also called for by 
competition.  Cost-orientation,  however,  is  not  unambiguously  defined.  While 
marginal  cost  pricing  is  definitely cost  oriented,  views  can  differ about pricing  that 
takes  both  costs  and  demand  elasticities  into  consideration  (the  inverse  elasticity 
rule or Ramsey pricing). 
Cost  orientation  is  of  overriding  importance for interconnection pricing.  Below  we  will 
argue that  it  is long-run costs that should ideally be  the  cost standard used  whenever 
the  cost  of  providing  interconnection  services  is  at  issue.  For  telecommunications, 
where economies of scale and scope play an important role, two kinds of long-run costs 
must be distinguished: stand-alone costs and incremental costs.16 
Stand-alone costs, as the name implies, arise from the provision of a service or a group 
of services all by itself, that is  to  say without the benefit of any economies of scale or 
scope afforded through its provision together with  other services.  For example, a new 
15  Pareto optimality means that no economic agent can be made better off without making at least one 
economic agent  worse  off.  Social  surplus is the  sum  of consumer surplus,  firms' profits and other 
rents generated in the market. 
16  See Baumol (1991) for a full treatment of the ideas sketched below. • 
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competitor would face stand-alone costs for its services if it had to provide end-to-end 
service without any possibility of interconnection. 
Incremental costs,  in constrast, are the costs that arise if the provision of the relevant 
services occurs in the context of the production of other related services and there  is 
the  possible  advantage  of  economies  of  scale  and  scope.  For  example,  if  a  new 
competitor is  granted interconnection with the network of an  incumbent operator,  the 
cost to the incumbent of providing this interconnection will normally be an  incremental 
cost because it is provided in conjunction with other similar services, which give rise to 
. the. said. advantages. 
Incremental  costs  play  an  important role  in  the discussion  surrounding the  pricing  of 
interconnection services. They generally constitute a lower limit at which  an  intercon-
nection  service  is to be  priced.  Stand-alone costs in tum serve as  a standard for the 
upper limit of interconnection prices. 
We conclude: 
1  .  If  the  new  competitors  stand-alone  costs  of  connecting  with  its  customers  are 
lower than  the  incremental costs of interconnection with the incumbent's facilities, 
interconnection would bring no economic advantages. 
2.  If, however, the new competitors costs of stand-alone provision are higher than the 
incumbent's  incremental  costs  of  interconnection,  interconnection  would  be 
economically beneficient.  The  new competitor would obviously take advantage of 
interconnection whenever the corresponding price would be below its stand-alone 
costs. 
3.5.2.2  Constraints faced by the regulator 
The constraints faced by regulators include: 
•  informational constraints.  Regulators are  not fully  informed about a trrm's cost and 
demand  functions  and  other  aspects  of  the  pricing  problems.  This  creates 
constraints  on  their  ability  to  maximise  the  regulatory  objective  function.  To  the 
extent that the  regulated firms  possess this information, regulators may be  able  to 
extract  the  information  via  incentive  mechanisms  (treated  in  Laffont  and  Tirole, 
1993a). 
•  institutional  constraints.  Regulators  do  not  have  unlimited  powers.  They  are 
constrained in  various ways.  In particular, (a) they have a limited term of office and 
therefore cannot commit over time,  (b)  they have limited powers while in office and 
are constrained by laws, courts and government, (c) their jurisdiction is constrained 72 
geographically,  and  (d)  the  regulator  is constrained  by staff size  and  regulatory 
budget restrictions. Especially important for interconnection charges are: 
1.  jurisdictional constraints. A regulator may have no control over activities outside 
its jurisdiction. Interconnection can occur between TOs that are under the same 
or under different jurisdictions. If the TOs are under different jurisdictions either 
a  regulatory  body with  jurisdiction··over both  needs to be  created  or the  two 
regulators have to cooperate. 
2.  restrictions  to  types  of  regulation .. For  example  •. -the.Jange._.of ... peanissible 
incentive  schemes may be  restricted by requiring  cost-based or rate-of-return 
regulation.  Also,  restructuring  of  regulated  prices  may  be  institutionally 
restricted.  Finally,  regulation  may  exclude  external  subsidies  or  taxes. 
Regulation  then  has  to  assure  that the  regulated  firm  at least  breaks  even. 
Under  social  surplus  maximisation  by  a  monopolist  facing  such  a  balanced 
budget  constraint  and  producing  at  decreasing  costs,  the  famous  Ramsey 
pricing rule emerges. According to this rule, the regulator should set prices such 
that the price markups over marginal costs of the firm's outputs vary in  inverse 
proportion to the (super-) elasticities of the outputs.17 The rationale for this rule 
is  that the  regulator has to trade off allocative inefficiencies created by higher 
markups  against  contributions  to  finance  fixed  costs.  The  lower the  demand 
elasticity,  the  higher  the  contribution  from  a  price  increase.  Thus,  a  higher 
markup is justified for outputs with lower demand elasticities. 
We conclude: 
The objective function and constraints adopted for this study include the following: 
•  maxrmisation of social surplus, including profits of TOs and interconnectors 
•  balanced budget to allow efficient TOs at least to break even 
•  non-discrimination for interconnection charges paid by different interconnectors. We 
leave open at this point whether the TO should impute to itself the same charges 
•  upper and lower bounds on  interconnection charges given by stand-alone costs and 
incremental costs, respectively 
•  restrictions on retail price rebalancing 
17  The  super-elasticity  gives  the  total  effect  of  a  price  change,  including  cross-effects  from  related 
markets. 
• • 
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. 3.5.3  Theoretical pricing models and their implications 
A number of pricing rules  have been proposed in the  literature, based on  theoretical 
models.  These  models  make  various  assumptions,  upon  which  the  relevance  and 
range of their results depends.  Because of the wide range of possible outcomes and 
because of the complicated interaction of variables that regulators have a hard time to 
observe  the  theoretical  models  are  likely  to  provide  insight  but  little  practical 
applicability for the regulator  . 
.  ~ .  Ihe...generic .case. for. .interconnection used. in most  .. theoretical .models has an incumbent 
TO that produces an intermediate service called "interconnection" or "access" and one 
or two final outputs (local and trunk services). The incumbent is either a monopolistic 
(bottleneck)  supplier of the  intermediate  input or can  be  bypassed  at  some  (higher) 
cost.  An  interconnector therefore either needs interconnection as an  essential input or 
has some choice. lnterconnectors sell a single final output (trunk services) that can  be 
a perfect or imperfect substitute (or a complement) to the TO's final output(s).18 Prices 
that need to  be  determined in  the models include the  two or three  final  output prices 
and  the  price for interconnection (and possibly tor bypass).  The  models  generally do 
not treat the  case  of unconstrained profit maximisation by the  TO.  Rather,  the  TO  is 
usually  assumed  either to  maximise  social  surplus  or to  be  regulated  by  a surplus-
maximising regulator, while interconnectors maximise profits. We now discuss some of 
the resulting outcomes. 
3.5.3.1  Unconstrained socially-optimal interconnection charges 
Assume  that  the  regulator  sets  all  the  TO's  prices  optimally  but  can  influence  the 
interconnector's behavior only via the TO's pricing. The  pricing outcomes under social 
surplus maximisation without constraints then depend on the type of competition in the 
"trunk" market (Armstrong and Doyle, 1993). 
If  competition  in  the  trunk  market  is  of  the  Bertrand  type  and  if  all  types  of  trunk 
services  are  perfect  substitutes  for  each  other,  then  interconnection  charges  should 
equal  the  marginal  costs  of  interconnection  services.  Under Bertrand  competition  the 
outcome  in  the  trunk  market  is  fully  efficient.  So,  interconnection  charges  should  be 
fully efficient as well. The  reason is that under Bertrand competition firms take price as 
their strategic variable. The regulator will induce the TO to charge a marginal cost price 
in  the  long-distance  market  as  long  as  the  TO  is  at  least  as  efficient  as  the 
interconnector.  Otherwise,  the  TO  will  charge  slightly  more  than  the  interconnector's 
marginal costs to assure that the inter-connector serves tne ICJng-disiance  naaa ket at an 
efficient price. However, this result is of limited significance because trunk services are 
18  With  the  exception  of  Willig  (  1979)  the  models  generally  do  not  treat  network  consumption 
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unlik~ly to  be  perfect substitutes for each other (and the same holds tor other retail 
services in telecommunications). 
If trunk services supplied by the TO and by interconnectors are imperfect substitutes 
and if interconnectors compete with each other in Coumot fashion then interconnection 
charges  should  be  set  below  the  marginal  costs  of  interconnection  services.  Under 
Coumot competition  (with  output or capacity as the  strategic variable) each  firm  has 
some  market power and  profit-maximising firms will price above marginal costs.  The 
reason  for  setting  the  regulated  interconnection charge below marginal costs  then  is 
,  that .the. trunk..services, suppJied by:tbe.latereonnector=have· an:inefficiently ·nigh market 
price  that  can  be  (partially  and  imperfectly)  corrected  through  lower interconnection 
charges. Thus, the tendency of firms with market power to price above marginal costs 
is counteracted by reducing their marginal costs. This counterintuitive result is efficient 
though not distributionally satisfying. 
We conclude: 
1.  Interconnection  pricing  at  or below  marginal  costs  of  providing  interconnection 
services can be optimal. 
2.  Marginal  cost  pricing  of  interconnection  is  strictly  optimal  only  for  very  specific 
cases. 
3.  Interconnection charges  below marginal  costs,  which  have  to  be  financed  out  of 
taxes or higher prices elsewhere, are likely to be distributionally unacceptable. 
3.5.3.2  Ramsey pricing of interconnection charges 
Pricing  at  or  below  marginal  costs  can  lead  to  losses  for  the  incumbent.  Thus,  a 
balanced-budget constraint guaranteeing an efficient incumbent TO  normal profits may 
need to be imposed on the regulator's objective function. If the incumbent TO does not 
itself  provide  retail  telecommunications  services  (vertical  separation),  interconnection 
charges  should  equal  average  costs  of  interconnection  services,  as  long  as  the 
balanced-budget constraint is binding.19 
If the incumbent does produce retail services and faces a balanced budget constraint 
then  both  the  retail  services  and  interconnection  contribute  to  balance  the  budget. 
Under constrained social surplus maximisation, contributions to the TO's profits have to 
be  traded  off against contributions  to consumer surplus and to the  interconnector(s)' 
profits. This leads to possibly complicated Ramsey pricing formulae. Ordinary Ramsey 
19  If the incumbent TO sells several interconnection services the average costs of interconnection are 
no longer well-defined. In this case markups over marginal costs may optimally differ for the various 
interconnection services. This may become a problem for unbundling of interconnection services. • 
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prices are  already hard to deal  with  by a  regulator because  (a)  marginal  costs  and 
(super-)  elasticities have to be measured and (b)  consumers with  inelastic demands 
oppose  high  prices  associated  with  their  purchases.  In  addition  to  the  demand 
relationship  between  the  final  products,  the  Ramsey  pricing  formulae  with 
interconnection charges depend (a)  on  the type and intensity of competition  between 
the TO and the interconnector(s), (b) on relative sizes of the firms, (c) on differences in 
costs of supplying the final output(s), (d) on the strength of the budget constraint and 
(e)  on  the  cost  of  interconnection.  Most  of  these  variables  are  extremely  hard  to 
determine even by insiders to the firms, let alone by a regulator.20 In  order to  assess 
the importance. ot..these..terms,..we.briefly .go .through· them: 
In the simplest case of a dominant TO and a competitive fringe of other operators in the 
trunk  market,  the  optimal  interconnection charge 'a'  equals a= MC,x + (pfrt){)J(1+'A)), 
where  MC,x  is  the  marginal  cost  of  providing  interconnection,  A.  is  the  Lagrange 
multiplyer of the TO's budget constraint, p is the price charged by the interconnector in 
the trunk market and 11  is the super-elasticity faced by the interconnector. Reflecting the 
inverse elasticity  rule,  the  less  elastic the  interconnector's trunk  market segment the 
higher the interconnection charge should be. 
A  more  elaborate  case  that  is  typical  for  the  Ramsey  approach  to  interconnection 
charges  is  provided  by  Masmoudi  and  Prothais  (1994,  building  on  Laffont-Tirole, 
1993b).  They  assume  the  incumbent  is  a  vertically  integrated  TO  that  sells 
interconnection  to  an  interconnector  who  competes  with  it  in  mobile  services  in  a 
differentiated  Cournot  duopoly.  In  setting  the  interconnection  charge  and  the 
incumbent's other prices the  regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader, meaning that the 
regulator  acts  optimally,  knowing  that  the  market  participants  solve  their  own 
optimisation  problems  (while  the  market  participants  take  the  regulated  prices  as 
given).  The  resulting  formula  for  the  interconnection  charge  is  the  sum  of  four 
components: 
•  a Ramsey term  as  above but including market shares and competitive interaction in 
the  tru!"k market. The more competitive the  trunk market, the smaller should be the 
markup of the  interconnection charge over marginal costs of interconnection. Thus, 
a more competitive trunk market is treated like a market with a higher elasticity. 
•  a  differential  efficiency  term.  This  term  contains  (a)  the  difference  in  efficiency 
between the incumbent and the TO, (b) competitive interaction and (c)  A..  The main 
effect is that the more efficient the interconnector relative to the incumbent, the more 
the  interconnector  should  produce  and  therefore  the  smaller  the  interconnection 
20  Under an  informational  constraint  and for  surplus  maximisation  with  welfare  weights,  Laffont  and 
Tirole (1993b) derive informationally adjusted Ramsey prices. These prices,  in  addition, contain an 
incentive adjustment that may be taken care of already by other regulatory tools, such as the use of 
pnce caps for the TO's retail services. 76 
charge should be.  21  On the other hand, the larger the concern for the incumbent's 
profrt, the lower the concem for the interconnectors efficiency. 
•  an  interconnection charge  revenue  effect. This effect is nonnegative and contains 
the  reciprocal  of  the  elasticity  of the  interconnectors  output  with  respect  to  the 
interconnection  charge.  Thus,  the  less  elastic  this  output  is,  the  higher  the 
interconnection charge. 
Because the different parts of the pricing formula have different signs the  cumulative 
outcome cannot be assessed in  general terms but only for specific parameter values. 
The .authors .therefore  resort. .to--simulation -in..-:araer·Jo  .  .:evaluate .the  ..  sensitivity. of the 
outcome  to  parameter  values.  Their  judgement  suggests  that  the  interconnection 
charge can exceed MC,x by a substantial margin, but this is not a general result. 
We conclude for Ramsey pricing models of interconnection: 
1.  Interconnection charges should be  lower, the more competitive the trunk market, 
the  more  efficient  the  interconnector  relative  to  the  incumbent  and  the  less 
endangered are the incumbent TO's profits. 
2.  Although  the  principle  of  Ramsey  pricing  models  is  fairly  straightforward,  their 
explicit  application  to  interconnection  pricing  leads  to  complicated  and  opaque 
results that do  not lend themselves to straightforward prescriptions for regulatory 
action. 
3.  The Ramsey pricing models can, however, be used to assess whether markups for 
purposes  other  than  USOs  are  advisable  or  not.  Criteria  suggested  by  these 
models include the  competitiveness of the  trunk market,  the  relative  efficiency of 
interconnectors  in  supplying  trunk  services  and  the  financial  condition  of  the 
incumbent. 
3.5.3.3  Efficient component pricing for interconnection 
Baumel and Willig have, for a monopoly provider of interconnection·services to be sold 
to  a competitor of the  TO's  trunk  services,  developed the  efficient component pricing 
rule  (ECPR).22  Compared to the complicated Ramsey pricing rules for interconnection 
charges, developed by Laffont-Tirole and others, the ECPR has the attraction of looking 
simple  and,  according  to  its  proponents,  of  being  widely  applicable  and  optimal. 
According to  this  rule  the  interconnector should pay to  the  incumbent monopolist the 
"opportunity costs" of in!erconnection. These opportunity costs include the incremental 
costs of providing the  interconnection plus the  profit contributions that the  monopolist 
21  If  the  final  goods  market  is  not  regulated  it  is  usually  a  social  welfare  improvement  to  have  a 
competitor enter and provide competition for the final  stage even if that competitor is less efficient 
than the incumbent monopolist. 
22  See Willig (  1979) and Baumol (  1983). 
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forgoes  by selling  interconnection  rather than  retail  services.  Since  the  contributions 
foregone depend on the TO's retail price, efficient component pricing is based on retail 
prices. 
The  regulated  operator would  always prefer to  price  interconnection  charges  on  the 
basis of opportunity costs. When the market is opened to competition and the regulator 
orders  interconnection,  the  regulated  operators  whole  opportunity  set  is  affected. 
Expectations regarding volumes and prices in all areas, not only in those where there is 
now  competition,  must  be  revised  and  in  most  instances  revised  downwards  . 
.  ...  Management would Jave .  .to..include.the..money  .  ..equivalent .of these lost-opportunities in 
the interconnection charges. This is exactly what the Baumel/Willig rule implies if taken 
at its face value. 
The  ECPR  is  described  extensively  in  Baumol  and  Sidak  (1994),  who  claim  four 
properties: 
•  First, it sends the right signal to potential entrants who will only enter if their services 
are more efficient than those provided by the incumbent. 
•  Second, it is revenue neutral for the incumbent. 
•  Third, it does not interfere with (desired?) cross-subsidisation. 
•  Fourth,  it eliminates incentives for incumbents to keep  rivals out.  In particular, there 
is  no  incentive for a price squeeze because competition by interconnectors cannot 
i1urt the incumbe11t TO. 
The  ECPR  is  highly  controversial.  It  has  been  applied  explicitly  by  US  regulators  to 
railroad  regulation  and,  less  explicitly,  by  UK  regulations  to  interconnection  with  the 
dominant TO.  It  is  under review  as  a competition  policy  standard  for  interconnection 
charges in New Zealand. Among economists, it has been backed by A. Kahn, W. Taylor 
and C.C.  von Weizsacker. It has been vehemently opposed by H.  Ergas, Ralph and W. 
Tye and mildly opposed by Laffont and Tirole. Laffont and Tirole (1993b) argue that the 
ECPR  is  irrelevant  because,  under its  assumptions,  there  would  be  no  sales  by  the 
interconnector if  the  interconnector were  less  efficient  than  the  incumbent  and  there 
would be no sales in the final goods market by the incumbent if the interconnector were 
more  efficient.  In  the  latter  case,  what  would  be  the  meaning  of  the  incumbent's 
.. opportunity costs" of  interconnection as defined for the  ECPR? The objection against 
the  ECPR  is that it bases the  opportunity costs on a ceteris paribus condition that has 
mearung only for the time befoie interconnection occurs. 
The  claimed  optimality  of  the  ECPR  is  based  on  explicit  or  implicit  assumptions, 
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•  the retail trunk market is homogeneous, 
•  interconnectors are price takers in the trunk market, 
•  interconnectors have no fixed costs (only the TO does), 
•  the incumbent's prices in the local and trunk markets are Ramsey optimaf.23 
How restrictive  are  these  assumptions?  In a  number of different cases  analysed  by 
Armstrong  and  Doyle  (1993)  the  ECPR  survives as a  principle,  although  the  actual 
pricing-outcomes-may vary ·substantially· by case; Forexampte~  if trunk· services ·offered 
by the TO and by interconnectors are imperfect substitutes~--an adjustment to the ECPR 
needs  to  be  made  (a)  in  order  to  capture  the  effects  of  market  power  of  the 
interconnectors and (b)  in  order to capture the fact that the TO will not lose its trunk 
demand  one-for-one  when  providing  interconnection  services.  While  Armstrong  and 
Doyle provide cases that still can be interpreted as the ECPR, Ergas and Ralph (1994) 
provide  cases  where  the  ECPR  is  dominated  by lump-sum  interconnection  charges. 
The reason appears to be that, in the Ergas-Ralph cases, interconnection charges are 
used to  raise  a specified amount of money for USOs. In contrast, Baumoi-Willig have 
the costs of USOs embedded in efficient final goods prices. 
The  analysis  by  Ergas  and  Ralph  also  indicates  a  fundamental  problem  with  the 
approach behind the ECPR. The ECPR assumes that the only socially beneficial role of 
interconnectors  is  to  provide  trunk services at costs  lower than  the  TO.  It  otherwise 
assumes that regulation is perfect. In contrast, most economists would tend to see the 
social function of competition by interconnectors in its ability to supplement or supplant 
inherently imperfect regulation. In particular, one function of competition is to determine 
prices. It  is reasonable, under this view, to assume that prices in the markets served by 
the  incumbent  TO  are  inefficient  and  that  competition  by  interconnectors  may  help 
correct  this  problem.  In  contrast,  the  ECPR  provides  no tool  to  improve  final  output 
pricing. On the contrary, it invites price rigidity and collusion in the final output market. 
23  The problem with this assumption is that it recognises that the problem is really one of simultaneous 
optimisation of pricing in  all  markets served by the  incumbent.  Since interconnection charges feed 
back into trunk charges. one cannot take the latter as given and then optimise with respect to trunk 
charges.  Laffont  and  Tirole  (  1993b,  p.20)  claim  that there  must also  be  a general  assumption  of 
constant returns to scale. This is not explicitly made, for example, in Baumol and Sidak (1994). Under 
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_In summary, we conclude: 
1.  The  ECPR  has  been  developed  for  an  almost  perfectly  regulated  monopoly 
situation  that  needs  some  fine  tuning.  It  does  not  deal  with  a  situation  where 
competition is to be introduced into a market dominated by an inefficient incumbent 
with heretofore insufficiently regulated monopoly rights. 
2.  The ECPR evolves around one term, the incumbent's opportunity cost of providing 
interconnection. This cost is potentially complex and hard-to-measure. The  ECPR 
•  I  ·therefore :provides ·no··more oguidance for the· assessment of  access -charges than 
the Ramsey models. 
3.5.3.4  Implications of the theoretical pricing models for interconnection 
In  order to  evaluate  pricing  rules  for interconnection,  in  Figure  3.5.3-1  we  compare 
outcomes under different theoretical rules and the conditions under which they hold. In 
this figure we have provided the most likely size relationships and ranges. In theory, the 
ordering may differ and some of the ranges may be wider. 
Figure 3.5.3.4-1:  Ranges for different pricing rules 
Ramsey 
ECP 
FDC 
AIC 
MC 
Definitions: 
•  a: interconnection charge 
•  MC,;. marginal costs of interconnection. 
Interconnection 
charge, cost 
ASAC 
Marginal costs are defined as the cost change resulting from an infinitesimally small 
change in the quantity of output. The marginal costs of interconnection are therefore 80  Study for the EuroPeAn COrnrTission . 
only  well-defined  if  interconnection  can  be  changed  in  infinitesimally  small 
increments. Realistically, such marginal costs only apply if  there are no fixed/sunk 
costs of  interconnection.  Thus,  marginal costs  are  more  relevant  with  respect  to 
costs  after  interconnection  has  already  been  established  than  for  the  costs  of 
establishing  interconnection.  It  immediately  follows  that  approaches  based  on 
marginal  costs,  such  as  the  Ramsey  pricing  approach,  have  to  be  interpreted 
correspondingly. 
•  MC./
0
:  marginal costs of trunk servic~s for the TO 
•  AIC,;. average incremental costs of interconnection 
•  AIC/
0
:  average incremental costs for the TO of providing trunk services. 
Incremental costs are the  cost incurred by adding an  output increment, where the 
increment can  range from  infinitesimal to a whole set of outputs. Thus, incremental 
costs have wider relevance for interconnection than marginal costs. For a purist, the 
incremental  costs  of  interconnection  would  be  all  the  costs  incurred  by  the 
incumbent TO  in  addition to  the  costs of providing its other outputs. The average 
incremental  costs  would  then  be  the  incremental  costs divided by the  quantity in 
which the interconnection service is measured (for example, in  minutes, busy hour· 
erlang or in call attempts). As explained in Section 3.5.4, our approach is less pure 
in  that we  take  as  AIC,x the  sum  of average costs of the  incumbent TO's facilities 
used for interconnection and weighted by the interconnectors share in  (busy hour) 
use of these facilities 
•  ASAC,;. average stand-alone costs of interconnection. 
The  stand-alone  costs  of  interconnection  are  the  costs  incurred  by  an 
interconnector  to  bypass  the  incumbent's  network.  They  are  only  well-defined  if 
interconnection is considered to be a single service and not a vector. 
•  FDC,;. fully distributed costs of providing interconnection 
•  ECP:  efficient component price 
•  p;, price for trunk services 
•  llr: elasticity of demand for trunk services 
Figure 3.5.3.4-1  conveys the following: 
a =  MC,x  is optimal if there is  no budget constraint, competition in  the  trunk market is 
contestable  and  there  are  no  other  distortions  that  could  be  corrected  through 
interconnection  pricing.  One  such  distortion could  be that the  TO is  inefficient in  the 
initial Situation. In this case, the marginal costs of an efficient TO would be relevant. Network lntercannedion in the Domain of ONP  81 
a < MC,x is optimal if there is no budget constraint and if interconnectors hold market 
power in the trunk market that can be corrected through lower interconnection charges. 
a >  MC,x  is usually optimal if the TO  faces a  budget constraint and if fixed  costs  or 
deficits from other services (local) need to be financed. 
a =  A/Ca is optimal if AIC,x > MCtx and if interconnection as a service has its own budget 
constraint.  In  this case  there  would  be  no  economies  of scale  and  no  necessity  to 
finance losses from other services. Note that AIC can be above or below MC as AIC is 
decreasing or increasing. 
a =  ASAC,x is an upper bound for a if all interconnectors can bypass TO interconnection 
at the same average stand-alone cost. At a > ASAC,x all potential interconnectors would 
bypass,  so  there  would  be  no  interconnection.  If  ASAC,x  differs  between 
interconnectors and the TO cannot perfectly price discriminate between interconnectors 
the  optimal interconnection charge may allow for some bypass and therefore exceed 
ASAC,x for some interconnectors. 
a= Pr- AIC/
0 + AIC,x = ECP is the Baumel-Willig efficient component price. It is optimal 
if  the  trunk  market  is  contestable  and  if  all  other  prices  charged  by  the  TO  are 
(Ramsey)  optimal.  Depending  on  the  net  revenue  foregone  by  the  TO  in  the  trunk 
market,  ECP  can  range  between  AIC,x  and  (AIC,x  + p/rtr).  where  P!rlr  is  the  trunk 
monopoly markup. 
a = Pr - MC/
0  + MC,x is the simplest case of Ramsey pricing if the TO faces a budget 
constraint and  interconnectors form  a competitive  fringe  in  the  (homogeneous)  trunk 
market.  In  general,  the  Ramsey  price  can  range  from  below  MC1x to  (MC1x + P/T1r), 
where P/T1r is the trunk monopoly markup. Thus. the  range of Ramsey prices is at least 
as great as the range of ECPs. 
a >  ECP  can  be  optimal  (a)  if  interconnectors  are  more  efficient  in  supplying  trunk 
services  than  the  TO  or  (b)  in  a  Ramsey  framework  with  a  competitive  fringe  of 
interconnectors  in  the  trunk  market  if  Pr  is  a  Ramsey  price  and  if  (  MCr ro  - MC,x)  < 
(AIC/
0 
- AIC,x).  As  to  case  (a),  the  ECPR  does  not  allow  the  TO  to  share  in  the 
efficiency rents of the  interconnector. Such  sharing may be an optimal way to  finance 
the  TO's social obligations.  However, this  is  likely to  be  the  exception rather than  the 
rule. Usually, a more efficient interconnector should produce as much as possible, thus 
saving  society's  resources.  Also,  the  interconnector(s)  may  have  expended  sunk 
resources to achieve that efficiency, and those need to  be recovered.  As to case (b), 
this  is  only likely to  happen  with  decreasing  marginal  costs.  Thus,  ECP  may  still  be 
viewed as a reasonable upper bound for a. 
a= FDCuc  is optimal only by coincidence.  FDC,x  can,  in  principle be anywhere on  the 
scale.  However,  a  reasonable  lower bound  for  FDC,x  may  be  AIC,X'  assuming  that 82 
incremental  costs can  be directly assigned and that costs have not been  increasing 
over time.24 
We believe that a fair summary of the theoretical models is as follows: 
•  The pricing prescriptions depend crucially on the assumptions made. The ranges for 
possible  pricing  outcomes  in  the  Ramsey  (i.e.,  Laffont-Tirole)  and  the  ECPR 
(Baumoi-Willig)  frameworks  are  large  and  can  extend  above  and  below  all 
reasonable cost measures.  25 
•  The  results themselves are  derived  under a number of restrictive  assumptions.  In 
particular, the  ECPR  assumes price-taking behavior, an  absence of sunk costs on 
the part of the interconnectors, and efficient pricing on the part of the TO. It is not a 
priori clear what the effects of lifting the assumptions are. 
•  The  models, in  particular ECPR, have little to say if prices in  other markets served 
by the TO are not optimal. 
•  The  more  general  Ramsey pricing  models for interconnection  provided by  Laffont 
and Tirole are extremely hard to interpret and even harder to implement. 
In  summary,  the  guidance  from  the  theoretical  models  is  limited.26  The  models  do 
agree on  some  outcomes for special cases. We may therefore be  able to narrow the 
outcomes  by  observing  certain  market  features  and  desiderata  in  the  form  of 
constraints not imposed in these models. These observations include the following: 
•  The main basis for allowing and promoting network entry is that economies of scale 
and scope are not so pronounced that they will make network competition infeasible 
or inefficient. 
•  A second basis for allowing network competition is that entrants are likely to be more 
efficient  than  the  incumbent.  This  would  compensate  for  entrants'  smaller  size, 
should economies of scale continue to play some role. 
•  The  results  desired  from  network  competition  are  lower  resource  costs  to  the 
economy and lower prices to customers. Changes in the incumbent TO's retail price 
structure as a consequence of network competition are inevitable. 
•  Even at interconnection charges as low as MC,x or AIC,x the incumbent is unlikely to 
lose its market quickly. Usually, there are sunk costs (that entrants have to expend}, 
24  FDC are based on historic costs while the other cost categories are forward looking. 
25  Under competition policy standards, which would apply to cases that are not regulated,  AIC 111  would 
form a lower bound and ASAC 111 would form an upper bound for competitive interconnedion charges. 
26  We  have  not  explicitly  discussed  revenue  sharing  between  interconnecting  parties.  Such  an 
interconnection  arrangement  reduces  conflicts  and  therefore  moves  them  toward  joint  profit 
maximisation. This may be advantageous if the parties face sufficient competition by others. If not, it 
is likely to lead to collusion. a 
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switching costs by customers, name recognition, brand loyalty and other advantages 
of the TO over entrants that prevent consumers from switching to entrants even at 
substantially lower prices. For example, in the UK Mercury only gained about a 1  Oo/o 
market share in its first ten years. 
•  Pricing  distortions  (unbalanced  tariffs)  in  other  markets  served  by  the  TO  are 
desirable only in exceptional cases and therefore deserve special scrutiny. Since the 
individual  outputs  should  generally  contribute  different  amounts  to  common  and 
overhead costs of the TO, the existence of a valid "local access loss" cannot simply 
be  established by  using fully_ distributed costing  rules,..Below.Jn  .. Sedion 3.5.9,  we 
describe a method of how local access losses may be calculated. 
•  Making  it  hard  to  add  access  charges  to  interconnection  charges  sets  the  right 
incentives to rebalance retail tariffs in an economically efficient way. 
•  Interconnection  charges  under  a  Ramsey  rule  or  ECPR  are  extremely  hard  to 
calculate. This problem is compounded if interconnection services are unbundled (as 
we  believe  they  should  be).  Such  explicit  calculations  should  therefore  be  the 
exception rather than the rule. 
•  lnterconnectors  offer  services  that  are  differentiated  from  the  incumbent  TO's 
services and from each other.27 Differentiation can occur physically by delivery (wire 
or  wireless)  or through  pricing  policies  (at  a  high  price  wireless  services  may  be 
complementary to fixed-link services, while at a low price wireless services may be 
substitutes to fixed-link services). Using Ramsey models or the ECPR would lead to 
individualised interconnection charges, depending on the competitive relationship of 
mterconnectors to the TO and other factors.  Such severe price discrimination in  the 
market  for  interconnection  is  likely  to  be  inequitable,  invite  arbitrage,  become 
arbitrary and interfere with sound competition policy. 
•  A  mature  telecommunications  market  is  likely  to  be  characterised  by  price  and 
serv1ce  competition  in  retail  markets.  However,  bottlenecks  in  reaching  individual 
customers are likely to persist and with them the necessity to interfere in the market 
for Interconnection through regulation or competition policy. Because of the diversity 
of  uses  to  which  interconnection  services  will  be  put,  the  principles  for 
interconnection charges should be  independent of the  specific service created with 
interconnection. 
From above we generally infer that interconnection charges should be cost-based with 
the basic standard being either MC,x or AIC,x- The issue of contribution to overhead and 
common costs mu:it be  addressed as they aftect the viability of the  incumbent. While 
the  entrant's viability should, in  general, not be increased by forcing the incumbent to 
provide interconnection below costs, the incumbent's viability may legitimately have to 
27  Price  differences  between  incumbent  TOs  and  entrants  indicate  that  retail  telecommunications 
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be safeguarded through interconnection charges above costs. Such a markup would be 
in  line with the Ramsey approach described above and would have to depend on  the 
demand  relationships,  the  state  of  competition  and  the  seriousness  of  financial 
shortfalls.  The  burden  of  proof  for  determining  these  markups  must  be  on  the 
incumbent. 
There  is  also  an  issue  of the  quality  of interconnection  services  that  needs  to  be 
considered in  this context.  If the  incumbent's return from  providing interconnection  is 
substantially below that of providing final  goods and  if the  two types of services  are 
substitutes,  .  then  ,the .  .incumbent  .may_ .• r.esort  -1o.-dlidden..-:quaf~::.deter.ioration  of 
interconnection.  Such behavior may need costly regulatory action and monitoring that 
may be worse than higher interconnection charges. 
Concluding from these observations: 
1.  We call for cost-based interconnection charges (based on MC,x or AIC,x>· 
2.  We  believe  that  cost-based  charges  should  form  the  base-line  case  but  that 
markups  on  top  of  MC,x  or AIC,x  may be  justified depending on  the  incumbent's 
legitimate revenue requirements. 
3.  The burden of proof for determining these markups must be on the incumbent. 
3.5.3.5  Issues of price discrimination 
Price discrimination is the practice of a seller to sell  related goods or ·different units of 
the  same  good  at  different  relative  markups  above  (or  markdowns  below)  marginal 
costs.  Several  price  discrimination  issues  are  relevant  for  interconnection.  We  may 
here differentiate between those issues that occur under vertical separation (that is, for 
a  TO  that  offers  only  local  services)  and  those  issues  that  come  with  vertical 
mtegrat1on. 
Price discrimination in the  case of vertical separation is the result of market power and 
the  ability  to  separate  and  differently  price  different  units  of  sale.  Such  price 
discrimination can occur through quantity discounts (2nd degree price discrimination) or 
through  dividing  market  segments  (3rd  degree  price  discrimination).  If  such  price 
discrimination is combined with an overall pricing contraint (in the form of price caps) it 
may be beneficial because it allows the TO to finance fixed costs and reduce prices for 
other services offered by the  incumbent TO.  However, such price discrimination may 
also distort ccm1petition between interconnectors. So, its overall effects are ambiguous. 
If  the  incumbent can  reap  all  the  benefits from  price  discrimination  directly then  the 
efficiency case  for price discrimination worsens.  Note,  however, that price differences 
that correspond to cost differences are not considered price discrimination. 
Vertical integration of the  incumbent TO is the more relevant case for interconnection 
issues  in  the  EU.  This  case  is  substantially  more  complicated  because  price 
.. AI 
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discrimination  by  the  incumbent  TO  can  occur  with  respect  to  the  market  for 
interconnection and with respect to the final goods markets where the interconnecting 
operators compete. Contrary to the case of vertical separation the incumbent TO is not 
just interested in extracting surplus but also in enhancing its competitive position. Now 
the incumbent will have additional price discrimination incentives in its own favour with 
respect to those interconnectors with which he competes. 
The fear that such discrimination occurs in favour of internal transactions has led to the 
call for internal charges to the incumbent TO itself equal to charges for interconnecting 
·operators. This· practice;- which  .. in··the·-US  is-icnown··as-~imputation·~ iooks reasonable. 
but it has two drawbacks. First, one of the main advantages claimed by economists for 
vertical integration is that internal transfer pricing can be made more efficient (through 
internal price discrimination) than outside pricing.  In the case of regulated  pricing this 
argument probably needs to be dismissed. Second, it is not clear what the real effect of 
imputation is,  since internal prices are a wash. Imputation can only have real effects in 
conjunction with a prohibition of cross subsidisation and its detection (treated in Section 
3.6.1  under accounting separation). 
We conclude: 
1  .  Price discrimination by the  incumbent TO for interconnection may be  beneficial  if 
the  interconnector  does  not  compete  with  the  TO.  However,  the  case  is  quite 
ambiguous. We therefore favour a restriction on (external) price discrimination for 
interconnection. 
2.  Price discrimination by the  incumbent TO in  its favour is hard to detect.  Requiring 
the TO not to discriminate in its favour internally is hard to make effective because 
internal transfer prices are difficult to observe. 
3.  Cost-based  interconnection charges are  likely to  reduce  incentives by the  TO to 
price discriminate internally in its favour because then the TO would internally have 
to price below costs.2B 
3.5.4  Cost-orientated pricing 
In  order to  base  interconnection charges on  the  costs of interconnection,  one  has to 
know what the costs are and how they are related to interconnection as a service. The 
incumbent incurs five types of costs for interconnection: 
28  A similar advantage is claimed by Baumol and Sidak (1994) for the ECPR.  This suggests that there 
are  two  ways  to  prevent  a  price  squeeze.  First,  by  pricing  interconnection  sufficiently  low  the 
incumbent TO  may  be  unable to  make  any profit by undercutting  interconnectors  in  the  end-user 
market. Second, by following Baumol and Sidak, the incumbent TO may price interconnection so high 
that it becomes potentially more profitable for him to sell interconnection than to sell to end users. 86 
(1)  costs of conditioning the system of the incumbent TO for competition, in particular 
measures  to  ensure  network  security  and  integrity,  particular  standardisation, 
introduction of equal access, changes in the numbering system; 
(2)  costs of establishing the physical interconnection between specific networks, such 
as one-time costs of compatibility testing and making routing arrangements; 
(3)  costs  of  providing  sufficient  capacity  for  switching,  transmission  and  related 
network components to  accommodate traffic from  the  interconnecting network at 
the TO's peak period; 
(  4)  variable costs of call recording, directory enquiries, billing etc.; 
(5)  overhead costs for accounting, management, legal expenses and those overhead 
costs associated with the four other cost types. 
How do these types of costs relate to interconnection services? The first type of costs is 
related  to  interconnection  in  general  and  not  to  a  particular  interconnection 
arrangement.  The  second  type  of  costs,  in  constrast,  occurs  each  time  a  new 
interconnection  arrangement  is  made.  The  third  type  of  costs  is  due  to  the  use  of 
facilities  that are  usually shared  with  other interconnectors and final  users.  Types  of 
costs  (1) to  (3)  are essentially one-time capital costs.  The fourth type of costs varies 
directly with usage and it contains little or no capital costs. The fifth type again is shared 
and has only a small capital component. 
Different types of interconnection services will incur these five types of costs in different 
amounts (actually, the first type of cost is not incurred by any particular interconnection 
service).  So,  the  cost  structure  will  differ  between  call  conveyance,  emergency 
services, directory assistance etc., and there will be aggregation problems for the  sum 
of services purchased by an interconnector. 
Basing interconnection charges on  costs means that the interconnection services have 
to  be  related  to  the  five  types of  costs.  Only the  fourth  type  of costs  can  be  directly 
related to the quantity of usage conveyed via interconnection, where the quantity is the 
number of  successful or unsuccessful call  attempts.  The fifth  type of  costs poses  the 
usual  problem of proper inclusion in  the  price calculation  (in  terms of determining the 
proper markup  on  top  of  average  incremental  costs)  the  handling  of  which  we  have 
discussed at the end of Section 3.5.3.4. The variable and overhead costs are important  • 
but they are dominated by the first three types which are all capital costs. 
As already indicated, costs of the first type are assignable to the very fact that there is 
interconnection. They represent identifiable additional costs due to the  introduction of 
competition,  which  are  justified  by  the  beneficial  effects  that  competition  brings  to 
consumers. Given that all consumers, especially also the incumbent's customers using 
services  similar to  those  that  the  competitors  are  going  to  offer,  benefit from  these 
effects  of  competition,  there  is  a  good  case  that  all  these  customers  participate  in ... 
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paying  for  them.  This  means  that  the  costs  would  have  to  be  shared  by  both  the 
interconnector(s)  and  the  incumbent  alike.  A  possible  method  of dividing  the  costs 
would be  in  relation  to the shares of volume of the relevant businesses, which  at the 
beginning would burden the incumbent with most of them. As competitors gain market 
shares the burden would decline as the costs would then  be  divided more and  more 
evenly among  all  competitors.  There  are  other possible  sharing  rules.  In  any  case, 
these costs are very much like common·costs of production. 
The second type of costs is directly related to the particular interconnection agreement 
. in  question_ and Js. a. one:.time  capital .. cost  .. -The.-.oosts~;would  ··have be  _borne  by  the 
interconnector. Only if it is evident that these costs, which are similar to the first type in 
that  they  are  additional  costs of  introducing  competition,  keep  new competitors  from 
entering the market should the regulator consider that they be borne by the incumbent. 
There is also an issue of cost sharing if the facilities can be used for interconnection in 
both directions and the  incumbent TO  can  benefit from  additional traffic generated by 
interconnection. The share of costs to be included in the charges for the interconnector 
must  then  be  determined  according  to  the  relative  weights  of  the  traffic  flows  in 
question. Beyond this, this type of costs does not usually cause major pricing problems. 
In principle, the interconnector could provide the facility itself if that were not interfering 
with  property rights of the  incumbent T0.29 Because of such rights the  incumbent TO 
will  normally want to build such facilities and will  have the interconnector pay for them 
through a one-time payment or rental.  The  type of payment can  reflect property rights 
issues  and  comparative  advantage  in  financing.  In  particular,  the  incumbent TO  may 
want  the  interconnector  to  pay  lumpsum  if  the  interconnector  can  readily  choose 
interconnection  locations  and  equipment  (virtual  collocation).  An  advantage  of  rental 
fees is that they can include follow-up costs of maintenance and can provide incentives 
for the incumbent to provide high-quality interconnection facilities. 
The  third  type  of  capital  costs  is  the  most  problematic,  both  in  its  large  size  and 
because the facilities are  shared with  others.  Controversies concern  the  calculation of 
the  costs  and  the  way  to  charge  them.  In  the  following  we  therefore  concentrate  on 
these costs of shared network facilities. In this connection it is important to differentiate 
between two kinds of network capacity costs, nontraffic sensitive costs (NTS) and traffic 
sensitive  costs  (TS).  While  TS  costs  vary  with  (busy  hour)  interconnected traffic,  the 
NTS  costs  are  unaffected  by  interconnection.  These  NTS  costs  include  the  lines 
connecting  subscribers to  TO  local  switching  offices,  parts of the  local  switches,  etc. 
They are not influenced by interconnection. However, they are used by interconnected 
traffic  and  the  value  of  an  interconnection  agreement  to  an  interconnector  clearly 
depends on  them.  The  question therefore is,  to  what extent the interconnector should 
share in paying for these costs. Two views are worth considering. The US practice has 
been to share the cost according to relative use (although the numbers were distorted 
in actuality). Contrary to US practice, the costs could be collected as a lump sum from 
the  interconnectors.  The  second  view  considers  the  prime  beneficiaries  to  be  the 
29  Such property rights have been a major issue in the US for physical collocation. 88  Study tor the European Coininission 
subscribers. Payment of NTS by interconnectors then becomes an  issue of residuals 
not paid by subscribers. 
Relating the discussion of this section to the conclusions of the preceding section, we 
note  the  following:  Types  of  costs  (2)  through  (4)  would  enter  in  the  average 
incremental  cost  (A/C,x)  of  a  specific  interconnection  service  or capacity  provided  a 
specific interconnector. They would thus always be covered by the  lower limit of the 
corresponding cost-based interconnection charge. In contrast, type (1) is in  the nature 
of an  overhead or common cost and,  like type (5),  would have to be  recovered from 
markups on·-these ~neremental cost measures. 
We conclude: 
1 .  The  share  of  the  costs  of  conditioning  the  system  of  the  incumbent  TO  for 
competition  to  be  paid  by  the  interconnector  should  reflect  to  what  extent  his 
customers  (through  his  prices)  are  to pay for the  introduction  of competition.  In 
deciding this,  consideration must be given to the beneficial effect that competition 
will have on all consumers, also those who are customers of the incumbent. These 
costs are to be treated akin to common costs. 
2.  The  costs  of  establishing  and  maintaining  the  interconnection  of  the  particular 
interconnector, the costs for nP.twork capacity that are shared with other users, and 
the variable costs associated with interconnection services are true input costs for 
the interconnector and should be borne in full by him. 
3.5.5  Cost accounting as the basis for cost-based prices 
How  can  cost-based  interconnection  charges  be  calculated  in  practice?30  The  cost 
standard for pricing decisions that must generally be  satisfied in  any enterprise is  the 
one  of  long-run costs.  For an  enterprise  in  a competitive  market,  this  is  the  relevant 
standard,  since  without  prices  that  cover  at  least  all  costs  in  the  long  run,  an 
entrepreneur  will  sooner  or  later  have  to  exit  the  market.  Long-run  costs  should 
therefore  also  be  the  standard  in  the  telecommunications  industry.  (In  terms  of  our 
conclusions  of  Section  3.5.3.4  this  calls  for  charges  based  on  long-run  average 
incremental  costs  (LRAIC).)  Long-run  costs  are  particularly  related  to  capacity,  and 
basing  interconnection charges  on  them  is  compatible  with  forward-looking  capacity-
based pricing  and  with  peak-load pricing.  While  economic  cost concepts are  always 
forward  !ooking,  a  regulated  firm's  budget constraint  is  usually based  on  its  historic 
costs (for reasons of equity). In order to fulfill such budget constraints, FDC pricing has 
often  been  prescribed  by  regulators.  It  has  two  disqualifying  drawbacks.  First,  it  is 
30  Because of the  large role of fixed assets in the costs of TOs,  a purely cost-based approach always 
prominently contains the  rate-of-return on  investment. We  therefore treat cost-oriented and rate-of-
return regulation as a joint issue. • 
I 
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arbitrary and thereby likely to be  inefficient.  Second,  it is  incompatible  with  effective 
competition.  Under competition,  it leads to additional inefficiencies (by precluding the 
incumbent  from  markets  where  it has  advantages  and  by  precluding  entrants  from 
markets  where  they  have  advantages)  and  does  not  guarantee  survival  of  the 
incumbent. 
In  normal  business  practice,  costing  serves  to  provide  lower  bounds  for  prices. 
Downward deviations from these bounds are to be avoided in  order not to jeopardise 
the  viability  of  the  firm.  Which  costs have to  be  included  in  order to  determine  such 
lower  .. bounds?. Of. what  .  ..is -Gonventionally .CORsidered· common-costs· only those  items 
should be included that - at least in the long run - are causally related to the production 
of the service. In our view, activity-based costing (ABC) based on forward-looking cost 
data is the best way currently available to do it. If they are based on FDC, this would be 
problematic. 
It  must be  recognised  that  the  procedure  of  determining lower limits for  prices  is  an 
important management tool.  Our evaluation of the  efficiency of this  management tool 
would also depend on  how the margins to cover overhead and true common costs are 
determined and the  profit margins (if any). In our view, an  additional procedure should 
be  used to set these margins. To our knowledge,  however,  so  far no such  procedure 
has been developed. 
Since an efficient incumbent TO should be able at least to break even, historic costs do 
matter for interconnection charges.  How then  can  we  avoid FDC  pricing? The answer 
would  be  to  have  uncovered  sunk  costs  due  to  investment  decisions  in  the  past 
included in  the  overhead costs that  m~y  be covered by legitimate markups on  LRAIC. 
In this context it may be helpful, however, to refer to Laughhunn (1989). He argues that 
"FDC is used, almost by default, as an imperiect tool to help solve difficult management 
and  regulatory  control  problems  in  an  environment  where  pricing  decisions  are 
decentralised  .. ,  that  "(m)anagers  ...  tend  to  fill  the  policy  void  with  FDC  because  it 
provtdes  a pricing  target",  and  that  "flexible  use  of  FDC  along  with  IC  (may  be)  the 
preferred route".  His suggestion is to apply FDC rules to broad service categories only. 
Individual services within these categories would not be held to an FDC standard. They 
could,  for  example,  be  evaluated  as  reasonable  if  they  fall  in  the  range  between 
incremental costs and stand-alone costs. The attractiveness of Laughhunn's approach 
may  depend  on  how  much  of  total  costs  would  have  to  be  allocated  according  to 
flexible  FDC  instead of ABC  (the  more by  ABC,  the  better).  If Laughhunn's approach 
makes sense, one needs to develop some ideas as to what •flexible use of Foe· could 
be. 
From  the  above  discussion,  it  follows  that  the  determining  of  costs  of 
telecommunications services in  general and of interconnection services in  particular is 
by  no  means  a  trivial  problem.  In  addition,  management  has  usually  considerable 
discretion in determining how costs are actually measured, with the effect that reported 
costs are often not at all  reflective of the actual cost causation. In the face of this and 90  Study tor ttte european Commission 
similar  other  problems,  if  the  regulator  wants  to  obtain  a  close  measure  of  what 
appears to be ~rue costs", he has the option of trying to have them determined either 
by prescribing to the regulated firm best-practice cost accounting procedures, such as 
ABC, or of having cost studies carried out on his own behaH. When opting for the latter 
approach,  he  would be  well-advised to commission engineering cost studies, as they 
promise to give the most objective results. 
We conclude: 
1.  The cost·standard forpricing-decisionsshoatd-be1ong-TUn·c~sts. 
2.  In the spirit of ABC, as much direct costing should be achieved as possible. 
3.  To the extent that FDC is the only practice feasible for a TO, it should (a) be used 
flexibly, (b) be  replaced by better costing methods as soon as possible, and (c) be 
checked  against  incremental  costs  and  stand-alone  costs,  derived  through 
engineering cost studies. 
3.5.6  The determination of depreciation charges 
In the economics literature on optimal pricing, depreciation usually plays no role. When 
pricing  is  done for the  services of  capital  goods, it is  usually done in  the  context of a 
model  of  lumpy  investment  with  a joint optimisation  over  pricing  and  investment.  In 
practice, however, the costs of capital goods are measured by the sum of depreciation 
and costs of financing. 
The  main  cost  of  financing  is  the  rate  of  return  required  for  financing  the  assets. 
Determining this rate of return deviates from the standard cost-of-capital problem faced 
by  ordinary  firms  in  that  the  prices  and  supply  conditions  for  telecommunications 
services are  influenced by regulation. This in  turn  influences firm  and industry specific 
nsks. Nevertheless, measuring a regulated firm's cost of capital has been done in many 
cases  so  that  regulators  can  receive  advice  on  how  to  do  this  from  many  financial 
consultants. 
Given the  high  capital  intensity of telecommunications,  depreciation may then  well  be 
the  most  critical  component of  the  cost  of  any  telecommunications  service.  Knowing 
how it should be determined reveals much about the problem of cost-based pricing.  31 
While economic depreciation has little to do with capacity utilisation (except for a small 
amount  of  wear  and  tear  added  through  higher  utilisation)  the  cited  literature  on 
economic depreciation relates its magnitude during a particular period to the degree of 
31  In  the  arguments developed in  this  section, we combine our reading of the  literature on  economic 
depreciation,  especially Baumol  (  1971) and  Uttlechild (  1970), with our understanding of both  best 
practice and actual cost accounting. Regarding best practice cost accounting Cooper/Kaplan (  1988) 
is the reference. regarding actual cost accounting it is Laughunn (1989). We also bring in the Boiteux 
(1956) results on pricing, as treated by Pari< (1989), when investment is lumpy. 
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. capacity utilisation of the relevant capital asset In the following, it is assumed that the 
sum of the discounted revenues equals discounted costs. If the asset is used to its full 
capacity,  depreciation  should  equal  the  expected  revenue  for  the  period  minus 
operating costs (assuming here that there are no other costs in  the form of wear and 
tear,  technical  change  and  change  in  capital  goods  prices);  if  it  is  unterutilised, 
depreciation should be set to zero. The relevant values would  have to  correspond to 
the  revenue  and operating cost streams estimated for the periods in  question at the 
time of the investment decision. If evaluation of expected revenue and operating cost 
streams changes  over time,  corresponding changes  in  the value  of  the  asset would 
·have 1o ·be-made am:t the·  depreciation·  -charges·:adjusted· accordingly. Provided that one 
could price the service in each period in a way to assure full capacity utilisation, the full-
use-of-capacity  approach  would  always  apply.  Thus  depreciation  charges,  and 
therefore  the  most  important  part  of  costs,  depend  (a)  on  the  investment  decision 
(when capacity is decided upon) and (b) on changes in the valuation of that capacity by 
the  market  over  time.  At  the  time  of  the  investment  decision,  total  expected 
(discounted) depreciation charges should at least be equal the outlay for that asset. 
Pricing  in  a way to  assure full  use of capacity all  the  time  is  not realistic.  32  Optimal 
pricing prescribes some type of peak-load pricing over the life cycle of the assets: The 
highest price would hold at highest capacity utilisation shortly before new investment 
and the lowest price shortly after new capacity comes on stream. This contrasts sharply 
with FDC pricing over time, according to which the highest price would hold right after 
new  capacity  comes  on  stream.  In  our  view,  the  Boiteux  "uniform"  pricing  rule 
discussed  by  Park  (1989)  provides  for a  realistic  compromise.  It  is  "uniform"  in  the 
sense  that  while.  as  in  the  approaches  of  Baumel  and  Littlechild,  the  total  value  of 
productive services rendered by the capital asset over its lifetime must equal the outlay 
for  that  asset,  service  per  unit of  output  is  valued  the  same  irrespective  of  whether 
there  is  full  use  of  capacity or not.  From  this follows  that  the  depreciation  charge  is 
always proportional to the volume of output. 
In  actual  accounting practice,  depreciation  is  most often  set according to the  straight 
line linear rule.  The depreciation of an  asset for a given period is set equal to a value 
obtained  by  dividing  the  outlay  for  the  investment  by  the  number of  periods  during 
which the asset will  be in  use.  If pricing is  established each period and demand varies 
over time, linear depreciation leads to undesirable fluctuations of capacity utilisation. 
While it is typical that historical prices are used for depreciation, the more sophisticated 
approaches value the asset in  each period at the  current market price. Depending on 
the vintage composition of the  captial  stock and  on  the degree of utilisation of those 
capital items  ~ut in  place most recently, the straight line linear depret.:ialion rule  wm  in 
the  aggregate  lead  to  an  overstatement  or  understatement  of  the  capital  costs  in 
relation  to  those  envisaged  at  the  times  of  investment.  We  would  expect  that 
32  We  are  here  referring  to  long-term  capacity  utilisation.  Our  prescriptions  for  short-term  capacity 
utilisation and the resulting pricing are treated below in 3.5.7. 92  Study for the Europ8an "ComnissiOn.  8/LJZC 
over$tatement is currently the more relevant case. Thus, when there are changes in 
market conditions causing current and expected future output volumes to change  as 
well, changes in the depreciation figure per unit of output should also be affected. 
In ABC, depreciation is essentially defined per unit of output. The corresponding value 
is determined on the basis of an estimate of the total units of output for which the asset 
will render productive services over its useful life. This approach is commensurate with 
the  requirement of the  Boiteux uniform pricing rule and, together with the  handling in 
ABC  of the cost components that in  FDC  are falsely treated as pure common  costs, 
comes close to .providing a-goodappmXimation.to..a·sentice's.LRIC. 
We conclude: 
1 .  The  main  costs associated with  interconnection are for long-lived capacity.  They 
therefore  represent capital  costs  that are the  sum  of financing  costs and  loss  in 
value of the capital goods over time. 
2.  Financing costs are a difficult but standard problem in financial economics. 
3.  Loss in value of capital goods is conventionally captured through depreciation. We 
suggest to follow this practice. However, depreciation that makes the loss in value 
simply a function of time (e.g.,  straight line depreciation) is likely to result in  cost 
patterns that are unacceptable for pricing. Rather, depreciation should be related to 
usage, with constant depreciation per unit of busy hour output. 
3.5.7  Capacity-based versus peak-load pricing 
So far we  have dealt with  the time-related aspect of pricing capacity. Now we  address 
the  issue  arising  from  the  fact  that  capacity  is  shared  between  various  users.  Once 
there  are  various  users  the  question  arises,  what shall  be  priced? The  issue  of  what 
shall  be  priced  for  interconnection  has  gained  prominence  for  two  categories  of 
serv1ces.  First,  treated  in  the  current  section,  is  the  question  of  defining  the  output 
"mterconnect1on". What are the  units in  which interconnection shall be measured? This 
question  leads  to  capacity  versus  usage  pricing  and  the  relationship  of  this  issue  to 
peak-load  pricing.  It  also  leads  to  an  inquiry  into  the  role  of  cost  drivers.  Second, 
treated in Section 3.6.4, is the issue of unbundling interconnection services into smaller 
categories that can be sold and priced separately. 
From  the  above  discussion of  depreciation in  relation  to  pricing it follows  that  pricing 
would  be  "capacity  based"  if  a  user  pClid  at  each  point  of  time  in  relation  to  the 
depreciation charges for that part of the capacity that, either at the time of investment, 
or at the  latest revaluation  of  the  asset because of changing  market conditions,  was 
'reserved'  for  him.  We  need  not  go  into  a  discussion  of  the  usefulness  and/or 
competitive  implications  of  this  idea  when  applied  to  prices  for  normal  users.  The 
enormous  transaction  costs  involved  would  by themselves  forbid  such  an  approach. 
The consumption patterns of individual users are highly varied and almost impossible to 
t 
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predict (by the individuals and by the supplier). It would, however, not be unrealistic to 
apply  capacity-based  pricing  to  large  users,  in  particular  interconnecting  network 
operators. Such users have predictable consumption patterns (derived from the  law of 
large  numbers).  One  probably  beneficial  aspect  would  be  that  in  the  long  run  the 
interconnecting operator would shoulder the true economic risk of the right expectations 
regarding demand of endusers having been made, i.e.  the operator who is  in  a better 
position  to  evaluate the  risk  shoulders it.  From  this it also follows conversely that  as 
long as interconnecting operators or service providers are new and  small  they should 
not be  required  to pay capacity-based charges.  In  their case  the  incumbent operator 
may actually-be  in·· a -better position ·to-assume ·the risk,  -espedally ·it there  are  many 
such  small  demanders  and  the  average  risk  per  demander,  due  to  the  effect  of 
correlation, is smaller than the individual risk. 
Capacity-based costing would not preclude charging for operating costs on the basis of 
actual  usage  with  which  this  kind  of  cost  varies.  Nor  would  it  preclude,  of  course, 
charges based on actual usage if the latter exceeds the capacity that was  reserved for 
the demander. 
Capacity-based  costing  is  also  consistent  with  pure  peak-load  pricing.  The  capacity 
paid for is the amount needed at the peak. The charges due for requiring more services 
at the peak than had been reserved would have to equal the share of capacity covered 
by the capacity price plus a charge for the extra costs caused by exceeding that share. 
Charges  during  off-peak  periods  would  have  to  cover  only  operating  costs.  Smce 
interconnecting  operators'  total  costs  are  highly  sensitive  to  interconnection  charges 
and  since  such  operators  themselves  make  their  output  pricing  decisions  based  on 
such charges,  it is important that the  system peak be  accurately refiected  in  peak-load 
pricing of interconnection. 
The capacity costs relevant for interconnection depend on  whether capacity expansion 
is  required or not.  If no capacity expansion is  required we  recommend to  use the  TO's 
historic SAC  of  the  network as  the  basis.  The  proportionate share  in  capacity  use  by 
the  interconnector during  the  busy hour would  be  a simple  and  acceptable  allocator. 
This would mimic the  result of joint ownership of network capacity in proportion to peak 
use.  If  capacity  expansion  is  required  the  basis  for  charging  should  be  the  IC  of 
expanding capacity. 
Total  network  capacity  costs  can  increase  non-linearly  with  increasing  network 
capacity.  In  particular,  there  may  be  increasing  returns  to  scale.  Pricing  network 
capacity at its marginal costs could then  lead to  insufficient cost coverage. We  believe 
that the  best way to  avoid this problem  is  to  price capacity (both  for  peak~load pricing 
and  for  capacity-based  pricing)  in  proportion  to  peak  capacity  utilisation.  This 
corresponds to pricing by AIC  of capacity. Information on  increasing returns to scale is 
hard to  come by,  and two-part tariffs or other nonlinear pricing schedules are  likely to 
burden entrants. 94  Study tor the eun;pean~-
In practice, charges for call conveyance (conveyance charges) are often priced by the 
minute, and off-peak charges are distinctly positive, in spite of the almost total absence 
of  usage-related  network costs.  One argument  is  that  these  off-peak  prices  reflect 
overhead costs.  However, any overhead costs that are not taken care of in one-time 
interconnection charges, in charges for call attempts and in capacity charges are likely 
to be very small. What remains then is an argument that the time profile and sizes of 
peaks are uncertain. Given the regularity of system peaks this argument is certainly not 
convincing.  It  is  more likely that per-minute charges have simply been  inferred from 
end-user  charges  to  interconnection  charges,  since  minutes  of  use  are  easily 
measured.33 
We  consider capacity-based  interconnection charges to be the optimal  approach  tor 
interconnection  between  a  sophisticated  TO  and  a  sophisticated  interconnector.  In 
practice,  however,  it  may  be  difficult  to  move  directly  toward  such  capacity-based 
charges.  Also,  the  demands  of  interconnectors  on  the  charging  system  may  differ, 
depending  on  whether  the  interconnector  is  a  TO,  a  mobile  operator  or a  service 
provider. 
We therefore conclude by suggesting a flexible  and optional approach to the  type of 
charging: 
1.  If possible, capacity-based charges should be offered, and they could be  applied 
either  ex  ante  or  ex  post.  (a)  Ex-ante  application  would  mean  that  the 
interconnector  and  TO  would  agree  on  the  busy  hour  and  the  busy  hour 
contribution(s) to be paid by the interconnector. This might require both parties to 
make  point  estimates,  and  there  could  be  penalties  for  exceeding  limits  and 
bonuses  for  staying  below.  (b)  Ex-post  application  of  capacity-based  charging 
would  be  very  similar to  peak-load  pricing,  only  that  it  would  apply  to  the  TO's 
actual systems peak hour rather than to a predefined schedule. 
2.  As  an  alternative  or  option,  sophisticated  peak-load  pricing  of  interconnection 
services  would  be  offered.  This  would  be  based on  the  expected  system  peak. 
Uncertainty could be taken care of by spreading the capacity charges according to 
the probability with which the system peak occurs at different hours of the week. 
3.  As a further option the interconnector could choose to be charged according to the 
time-of-day schedules offered to retail customers. These schedules are likely to be 
unsophisticated and driven by concerns other than the system peak (e.g., regular 
business hours). 
33  Nonlinear per-m.nute pricing schedules have also been discussed in the literature. See Mitchell and 
Vogelsang (  1991 . Chapter 1  0). 
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3.5.8  Prescribed price cap regulation 
We  have  advocated  cost-based  interconnection  charges  and  believe  that  this  is  the 
best way to begin a regime of interconnection charges in the transition from monopoly 
to  a  competitive  environment.  However,  we  do  not  believe  that  cost-based  charges 
could or should continue to rule at every moment in time. This would be administratively 
burdensome and would not give TOs the right incentive to keep their costs down. 
Regulatory  authorities  increasingly  resort  to  the  instrument  of  price-cap  regulation . 
.. Under~pr.ice  .. caps, -the--overall  leve4--Gf--reguiated·priee&-may -change  over time  in  step 
with the rate of general inflation less a specified factor 'X' for productivity growth of the 
regulated industry, where the value of the factor 'X' remains fixed for some number of 
years. During this time, the firm can change its prices within the constraints imposed by 
the price caps. These constraints include the following: 
•  upper bounds on  the  level of prices given by the price cap formula.  These  bounds 
hold for the services included under price caps. There may be different baskets with 
different  price  cap  formulas.  In  particular,  interconnection  services  may  either  be 
included in one basket with retail services or may be in a basket of their own. 
•  limits on  the  restructuring  of prices.  Such  limits are  either the  natural  result of  the 
size  of  baskets or the  result of further constraints on  restructuring  or  rebalancing. 
Naturally, there is less room for restructuring if a basket contains only few items than 
if  it contains all  the  firm's services.  Rebalancing constraints can  also include bands 
with  lower bounds.  The  pricing  flexibility provided  under price  caps  has  raised  the 
fear  of  predatory  pricing  or  price  squeezes  exercised  by  the  incumbent  TO.  The 
specter is that the  TO would, for example, increase its interconnection charges and 
decrease its retail trunk tariffs, thus squeezing out interconnectors. Lower bounds on 
pnces  are  supposed  to  prevent  such  price  squeezes  or  predatory  pricing  by  a 
dominant  TO.  Keeping  interconnection  and  retail  services  in  separate  baskets, 
however,  will  prevent squeezing and  is  likely to  prevent predation without explicitly 
imposing lower bounds on prices. 
Whenever the  regulator has  to  specify  (or  respecify)  the  parameters of  the  price-cap 
regime (which  may mean setting the  absolute level of starting prices,  or setting prices 
anew,  and  fix1ng  the  value  of  the  productivity factor for the  coming  years)  he  or  she 
would have to make a cost evaluation on which to base the required decisions, and this 
would  basically follow  the  same  rules  as  when  setting  the  initial  tariffs.  Beyond  this, 
what  the  regulator  can  hope  for,  depending  on  his  or  her ingenuity  and  negotiating 
skills, i" to  com~ reasonably close to an  optima!  value of the  productivity factor in  the 
price-cap  formula.  That  value  should  be  such  that  it  pushes  the  firm  as  close  as 
possible to the goal of the lowest attainable long-run costs. 
Under a price cap  regime,  we  know that there may be  a tendency for prices to move 
over time toward Ramsey prices. So if price caps are installed we  should not worry so 
much  about  the  price  structure  actually  being  implemented,  except  that  one  should 96 
determine the initial price ~  and the size of separate baskets as a precaution against 
predatory pricing or price squeezing which may otherwise be possible under price caps. 
If there is  cost regulation, for example to set the stage for price caps at a later date, 
imposition of a Ramsey price structure is probably not a feasible option. This would in 
particular be  true  in  the  less  advanced  countries  due to  the  lack  of  cost  accounting 
expertise within the TO and the absence of the necessary regulatory instruments. Here 
again  Laughhunn's proposal of using some flexible  FDC  approach may appear to  be 
relevant. 
Under -price  caps, .. the  incumbent  TO.:·may:-.atso.-·want·1o:·offer=.optional··  ~nonlinear) 
interconnection charges as an alternative to the price cap tariffs. The price cap tariffs 
then form  a benchmark against which interconnectors could make their choices. They 
would only choose the optional tariffs if they prefer them to the benchmark tariffs.  For 
household consumers such optional tariffs would be unambiguously welfare improving. 
For  resellers,  however,  such  options  may affect competitive positions and  advantage 
larger over smaller interconnectors. Nevertheless, optional tariffs are worth considering, 
if only as a way to decrease regulation over time. 
We conclude: 
1  .  For  the  establishment  of  initial  interconnection  charges,  a  cost-based  pricing 
approach  is  appropriate;  for  their  adjustment over time,  the  regime  of  price  cap 
regulation. 
2.  Price  cap  regulation  leaves  a  number  of  parameters  to  be  determined  by  the 
r~gulator. These  parameters  include  (a)  productivity  adjustment  factors,  (b)  the 
scope  of  price  caps  and  the  size  of  baskets of services,  (c)  restrictions  on  price 
rebalancing  within  baskets,  and  (d)  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  first  three 
parameters are set and the method by which they can be changed. 
3.  There  are  good  economic  reasons  for  a  price  cap  approach  that  gives  the 
incumbent TO some pricing flexiblity, including the ability to offer optional tariffs. 
3.5.9  Access charges for unbalanced tariffs and USOs 
Normally the incumbent operator has no alternative but to accept it when the  regulator 
significantly changes its opportunity set by opening the market. When interconnection is  .. 
ordered,  the  operator  is  allowed  to  charge  interconnection  charges  that  in  principle 
would  be  cost-oriented  and  possibly are  derived on  the  basis  of  capacity  costs.  The 
charges  would  probably  include  average  costs  of  capacity  and  common  costs.  As 
regards opportunity costs, the  inclusion of an  access charge may be  allowed if this is 
warranted by special circumstances. 
In  our  view,  the  regulator's  position  on  the  access  charge  should  depend  on  his 
evaluation of the extent to which opening of the market has in fact eroded the regulated 
operator's market power and will in future prevent it from reaping extra benefits, either .. 
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in terms of supranormal profits or in unwarranted X-inefficiency. In other words, during 
the  period of transition from  monopoly to effective competition,  one  should leave  the 
incumbent with the obligation to shoulder the burden of the local network cross subsidy 
or USOs, to the extent that the regulator has convinced himself that it is still enjoying 
advantages  that  competitors  do  not  have.  If  these  remaining  advantages  are. not 
considered sufficient, there may have to be some additional source of revenues to help 
to cover unbalanced tariffs or the costs of USOs. 
Note that the  above approach rejects the notion that with  the mere formal  opening  of 
.the market a .kind of parity.is react.aed..between-·incumbent and new competitors. Under 
this notion, if tariffs are unbalanced or if the incumbent faces USC burdens the market 
entrants  should  automatically be  considered  contributors  to  the  money  needed  to  fill 
any gap and thus incur the  same competitive handicap, so that not requiring  them  to 
contribute automatically means that they are provided with an entry assistance. On the 
contrary, the continued obligation placed on the incumbent to cover local access losses 
or  the  costs  of  USOs,  at  least  in  the  short  and  medium  run,  is  to  be  seen  as  an 
additional means to  make entry conditions commensurate with what would exist if  the 
incumbent had not had its protection for decades in the past.  In addition, not including 
specific access charges  in  interconnection  charges puts  pressures on  the  incumbent 
TO  and  on  the  regulator  (a)  to  rebalance  the  retail  rate  structure,34  (b)  to  justify 
additional burdens carried by the incumbent TO in terms of USOs and (c) to find other 
ways to pay for USOs. The incumbent TO may actually have comparative advantages 
in fulfilling USOs, and that can be determined during this initial time period. 
How can one know whether there is a local access loss or not? This obviously depends 
on  how  such  ~ Joss  is  defined  and  how  it  can  be  measured.  One  straight-forward 
definition  is  that  a local  access  loss  exists  to  the  extent  that  a profit-maximising  TO 
would  want  to  cease  serving  access  to  customers  at  the  current  tariffs.  Contrary  to 
widespread  practice  and  political  arguments,  this  definition  is  directed  at  customers 
rather than at individual services. The reasons why we prefer this definition are: 
(a)  Access may not be a service at all. Pricing access would then only be the fixed part 
of a two-part pricing arrangement. 
(b)  Even  if access is  a separate service  it  is jointly consumed with  other services  by 
the  same  TO  subscriber.  Consumers  benefit  from  low  connection  and  rental 
charges  which  may  translate  into higher usage  (via  the  network  externality).  For 
the TO, access is paid under the same account with usage. 
(c)  It  i~ incr~mental (avoided) cost based and thereby avoids arbitrary cost allocations. 
(d)  The  TO  may even benefit from  subscribers that are individually not cost-covering 
but increase usage by others. 
34  In our view, the current ADC practice in the UK,  where BT loses its right to ADCs if  it does not fully 
utilise its ability to rebalance rates, could invite BT to price consumer access above cost. 98  Study for the Eui'Opean ~On· 
Thus,. the  customer (group)  is  the  relevant  unit of observation  for an  eventual  local 
access loss. Whether a local access loss actually exists can then be  established in  a 
two-step procedure: First, calculate whether the incremental costs of subscriber classes 
and  combinations  of  subscriber  classes  are  covered  by  the  revenues  from  those 
customers.  If all  subscriber classes  (and  combinations)  cover their incremental  costs 
there can be no local access loss. Second, if there are any subscriber classes whose 
incremental  costs  are  not  covered,  calculate  the  TO's  total  return  from  all  network 
services  on  network  assets,  based  on  interconnection  charges  without  any  access 
charges.  If this return is at or above the TO's cost of capital then the local access loss 
has·· been  covered-elsewhere  ·and· 'does --not need 1o-be -covered  by -interconnection 
charges. In principle, all these calculations should be made for the case after the effect 
of  interconnection  has  been  factored  in.  However, 1he  effects  of  interconnection  on 
market shares and sales of the incumbent TO are usually gradual (for the case of no 
vertical  or  horizontal  divestiture  of  the  TO).  Therefore,  current  figures  can  be  used 
instead  of  projections.  It only has to  be  assured that interconnection  charges  can  be 
changed in case of large changes in the TO's market share. 
While  we  clearly  prefer  a  customer  specific  approach  to  local  access  losses,  many 
countries  have  been  using  a  service  specific  approach.  As  the  reason  for  this  we 
conjecture  a mixture of  regulatory inertia (fear to change  price structures  even  if the 
average customer ends up paying the same as before) and accounting convenience. If 
one  accepts  that  regulators  in  the  short  run  are unable to move  to  such  a customer 
specific approach, the local access loss may also have to be measured for local access 
as  a service.  In  this  case  the  direct costs  of  local  access  should  be  calculated  and 
compared  to  the  income from  subscriber connection charges and line  rentals  paid  by 
subscribers. Any resulting deficit (and the costs of general overheads) then needs to be 
shared by all the remaining services, of which interconnection is only one. It becomes a 
regulatory  decision  how  this  sharing  should  occur,  but  it  is  not  clear  a  priori  that 
interconnection should bear proportionally more than  any other service.  This  is  where 
the  regulator  may  be  guided  qualitatively  by  the  Ramsey  approach.  Recall  that  the 
requ1red  markup under this approach depends on  the  demand elasticities, the amount 
that  needs  to  be  raised  and  on  the  state  of  competition.  In  our  view,  however,  the 
regulator  may  want  to  use  the  desired competitiveness  of  the  sector  rather  than  its 
actual competitiveness to determine the markup for interconnection charges. 
If  a  decision  has  been  made  to  cover  USOs  or  a  focal  access  loss  through 
interconnection charges,  it  still  needs  to  be  addressed how this can  best be  done.  In 
their opposition  to  the  ECPR  (mentioned  in  Section  3.5.3.3 above)  Ergas  and  Ralph 
(1994) provide an example of lump-sum access charges. Such lump-sum charges may  .: 
not be acceptable due to the  high costs they may impose on small entrants. However, 
under  presubscription  to  competing  trunk  carriers,  there  exist  more  efficient  and 
acceptable charges in the form  of charges paid on  the basis of numbers of customers 
interconnected rather than  on  the  basis of calls  conveyed.  This way,  a long-distance 
company would pay a fee for each of its customers that need to be accessed via the 
incumbent TO.  Similarly, the incumbent TO would impute the same charge to each of • 
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its customers. These access charges could be passed on to the customers in any way 
deemed optimal by each of the operators (and would be in addition to the connection 
charge currently collected by the TO from all its customers). 
Under price  caps  for interconnection  charges,  the  portion  for  USOs  or local  access 
losses is likely to be  best treated as an  external factor,  changes of which  are  passed 
through to the extent that they depend on regulatory decisions. 
We conclude: 
1.  Access  charges  are  not our preferred  way of financing  USOs  and  local  access 
losses caused by an unbalanced tariff structure. 
2.  It  would  make  economic  sense  if  regulators  use  the  time  between  starting  an 
interconnection regime and the time access charges become a pressing issue to 
rebalance tariffs and find other ways of financing USOs. 
3.  If that cannot be  achieved, the standards for calculating the amounts to  be  raised 
by access charges should be high and the burden of proof upon the incumbent. 
4.  If access charges are necessary nevertheless they should be  imposed in the least 
distortionary manner, preferably not on a per minute basis. 
3.5.1 0  Concluding observations on pricing 
Some  concluding  obsarvatioi1s  as  regards  this  section:  \'Ve  have  seen  that  costs 
depend heavily on  investment decisions and  that  these  decisions  in  turn  are  strongly 
influenced by expectations. Thus costs are not something objective and independent of 
the  actions of the  major players.  In  a market with  vigorous competition,  one  can  trust 
that managment normally makes the right decisions, both with regard to investment and 
the costing of long-lived capital goods. In a regulated industry, it is the regulator who by 
strongly influencing expectations determines to a large extent what the costs are.  The 
regulator  then  also  has  to  decide  on  tariffs  and  charges.  In  these  circumstances, 
management may not have the incentive to determine costs as  accurately as possible, 
to  the  effect  that  reported  costs  are  often  not  at  all  reflective  of  the  actual  cost 
causation.  Given this,  it appears to be  less shocking if  the  regulator proceeds to  also 
determine  how the  costs  should  be  measured.  The  regulator  should  shy  away  from 
trying to determine costs in actual detail, however. 
A.1other  important  aspe~t i:;  tiud que:;1iuils  of  th~ cc~ting of interconnection  services 
and  questions connected with  their pricing must be  considered  as  distinct issues.  As 
shown  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  the  regulator's  role  with  respect  to  costing  is  to 
define methodology by which costs are to be determined but not to get involved in their 
actual  calculation.  Once  costs  are  known,  the  question  of  how they  are  included  in 
charges must then be a separate decision in which the regulator may also be involved, 100  Study for the Eu;opeari CorrmSsiori  .. 
to  the  extent  that he  determines actual  values.  In  this  decision  a  number of  policy 
considerations (efficiency, equity, market conditions, etc.) may play a role. 
Over time,  as the  market for interconnection  develops,  regulation  of  interconnection 
should  decline  and  give  way  to  competition  policy  as  a  safety  net.  How  can  one 
gradually  deregulate  interconnection  charges?  In  our  view,  the  path  toward 
deregulation goes via flexibility and the establishment of competition policy standards 
for  interconnection  charges.  Flexibility would  first  be  introduced  in  the  form  of  price 
caps which,  over time,  would be  increasingly freed from  rebalancing and restructuring 
.  constraints. F..urthermore, DptionaLtariffs:.could:.be .introduced.as :afteroatives.  to capped 
tariffs. Then the scope of price caps would be changed. Paradoxically, both an increase 
and  a decrease of their scope can  increase the flexibility of a TO's pricing policy.  An 
increase  in  the  scope  of  price  caps  allows the  firm  more  restructuring  because  now 
more different prices can  be traded off against each other. A decrease in  the scope of 
price caps can increase pricing flexibility because those prices outside the cap are only 
constrained by the market. Thus, the question is if the regulator wants to deregulate by 
reducing the number of services constrained or by constraining all services less. At the 
same  time  that pricing flexibility is  increased standards should be  imposed for prices 
that  are  not  considered  compatible  with  competition.  Such  prices  would  normally be 
those  below  incremental  costs  or  above  stand-alone  costs.  Exceptions  would  need 
special justification in case prices were challenged under competition law. 
3.6  Non-price issues 
3.6.1.  Stl'uctural alternatives- accounting separation 
Structural separation of local and  trunk and information services has been practiced in 
the  US  for  some  time  but  not  much  elsewhere.  There  are  ample  signs  that  vertical 
reintegration  occurs  even  in  the  US.  Thus,  there  seem  to  be  enough  economies  of 
scope  between  these  services.  On  the  other  hand,  vertical  integration  along  with 
interconnection  with  nonintegrated  operators  creates  problems  of  market  power  that 
need to be addressed through regulation. Accounting separation has been proposed as 
a less drastic measure than  structural separation  to  solve  some  of  the  market power 
problems without altogether giving up economies of scope. 
Accounting  separation  has  become  a  potentially  important  policy  tool  for 
interconnection agreements. It can help identify the costs of interconnection and ensure 
that  TOs  charge  the  same  interconnection  prices  to  themselves  as  they  charge  to 
others.  Accounting  separation  shall  also  reveal  the  existence  of  cross  subsidies, 
specifically  in  favour  of  those  final  goods  markets  where  interconnecting  operators 
compete.  It is seen as a(n imperfect) substitute for divestiture or separate subsidiaries 
without  the  accompanying  sacrifice  in  scale  and  scope  economies.  The  potential 
drawback  of  accounting  separation  lies  in  the  imperfections  of  accounting  cost 
allocation.  What  accounting  separation  can  potentially  achieve  is  some  increase  in 
transparency of costs and internal transfer pricing. This increase depends on the quality 
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of the accounting data and the level of detail at which accounting separation is pursued. 
Accounting separation makes sense if interconnection prices themselves are based on 
the  same  accounting  cost  data.35  However,  accounting  separation,  by  establishing 
inefficient transfer prices and by imposing administrative burdens,  may have  its own 
cost in terms of lost economies of scale and scope. 
A crucial question for accounting separation is,  which parts should be separated. The 
answer depends on feasibility and desirability. From the perspective of interconnection, 
the following tasks may be addressed through accounting separation, (a) calculate local 
· -access  losses,  (b)  detect price·squeezing ·of~·interconnecting·operators, (c)  establish 
costs  of  interconnection,  (d)  separate  competitive  and  monopoly  spheres.  All  these 
tasks require an incremental cost approach to be done satisfactorily. 
We conclude: 
1  .  Accounting  separation  is  likely  to  be  preferable  to  structural  separation  when  it 
comes to the preservation of economies of scale and scope. However, not all such 
economies  are  preserved  under  accounting  separation  and  the  efficiency  of 
internal  transactions  may  be  affected  through  unclear  incentives  (because 
accounting separation and command structures need not coincide). 
2.  Accounting separation is  no panacea to discover cross subsidies, price squeezes 
or local access losses. 
3.  Accounting separation based on incremental cost would be most useful. 
3.6.2  Equal access 
The notion of equal access gives specific content to the right (or duty) to interconnect. 
The term "equal access" is normally used for the access of final users to trunk carriers. 
In  a nutshell. equal access means that access to  alternative operators is the same as 
access to  the  incumbent TO.  Equal access can be  viewed from an operator or from  a 
customer perspective.  Unequal  access  from  a  customer perspective  implies  that  the 
operators  receive  unequal  treatment  as  well.  Unequal  access  affects  customer 
convenience and the competitive position of operators. 
From a customer perspective, equal access can be  realised on  a presubsription basis 
or on  a call-by-call basis. The two approaches are likely to imply different competitive 
outcomes in  the  end-user telecommunications market.  From an operator perspective, 
bqual  access  is  directly  related  to  inter~onnectior1  and  means  things  3uch  as 
collocation, direct access to data bases and to numbering resources. 
35  Thus,  accounting  separation  may  have  to  be  incremental  cost  based.  This  could  mean  that 
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While  equal  access  appears to provide  equality between  the  incumbent TO  and  its 
competing interconnectors, the incumbent usually maintains advantages that give it a 
superior market position.  3& In that sense, equal access always comes in shades, and it 
may therefore be appropriate to consider various grades of unequal access along with 
equal  access. If unequal access is cheaper to provide it may allow for effective niche 
entry  at  lower  quality  but  still  with  strong  competi~~ve effects.  For  example,  short-
distance - intraLA  T  A - trunk competition in the US has been quite effective in  lowering 
tariffs  in  spite  of  the  requirement  of  dialing  five  extra  digits  to  reach  alternative 
operators. 
Since incumbent TOs do not usually provide equal access voluntarily, the question is if 
equal access should be a regulatory requirement. Some countries have imposed such 
a requirement, some are currently conducting cost-benefit analyses. Equal access can 
provide strong benefits for interconnecting parties (in the form of lower costs of access 
to a trunk operator) and can improve competitive market conditions (by reducing costs 
of switching suppliers). However, it comes at a cost in terms of lost economies of scope 
for  the  incumbent TO  and  setup  costs.  Setup  costs,  in  particular,  can  be  saved  by 
learning from equal access experience in other countries. 
We conclude: 
1  .  There  is  a  case  for  regulators  to  make  cost-benefit  analyses  of  alternative 
approaches to introducing equal access in their specific country. 
2.  Countries should learn from each other. 
3.  Specifically, standardisation for equal access arrangements should be considered. 
4.  As  more experience is accumulated, the  cost of equal access will  fall,  making the 
case for equal access more and more compelling. 
3.6.3  Quality issues in interconnection 
Quality issues in interconnection have been treated extensively in Chapter 2.  There are 
some  specific  economic  issues  related  to  quality.  Interconnection  means  that 
telecommunications services  are  jointly provided  by  several  operators.  The  customer 
experiencing quality problems, such as congestion or bad transmission quality, cannot 
assign  quality  problems  to  one  of  the  operators.  To  the  extent  that  the  customer 
subcribes to  only one  operator he  or she will hold that operator responsible. Then the 
quality .assignment becomes a problem between the operators. Again, this is not always 
easy. If quality cannot be assigned there may be free riding on the quality of the other 
operator.  Such  free  riding  makes  the  larger  operators  particularly  concerned  about 
36  Because of these advantages it appears dubious to make ADC waivers depend on the unavailability 
of equal access, as done in the UK. 
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quality. Another problem is that of peak congestion due to too much traffic. This could 
be due to wrong pricing, wrong capacity planning, technical problems, etc.  Again,  the 
incentives of the dominant TO and of interconnectors may differ. 
The dominant TO wants to protect its network, while the interconnecting operator wants 
a  quality  of  service  commensurate  with  what  the  ro·s  own  subscribers  receive. 
Ordinarily, each party knows best what it and the other desire in  terms of quality and 
both have a hard time formulating this in such a way that it can be adjudicated by  a 
regulator.  Also,  quality  monitoring  is  hard  for  a  regulator  to  do (in  contrast  to  price 
monitoring)  . 
Hence, we conclude: 
1.  Quality determination and monitoring are best dealt with, at least initially. through 
negotiations between the parties. 
2.  Standard setting can facilitate reaching agreements on quality. 
3.  Industry  arbitration  with  the  help  of the  regulator  should  set  in  if bilateral  party 
negotiations fail. 
3.6.4  Unbundling 
Unbundling of interconnect services is one of the most controversial issues. On the one 
hand  unbundling  has  the  potential  to  make  the  telecommunications  markets  and  the 
market  for  interconnection  more  compP,titive.  On  the  nther  hAnd,  unbundling  m:1y 
sacrifice  economies  of  scope  that  are  achieved  by  bundling  services,  or  unbundling 
may  be  costly  to  achieve,  due  to  high  transaction  costs  or  regulation.  Since  the 
economic  literature  has  discovered  many motives  for  bundling  of  services,  some  of 
which are anti competitive. the case for economies of scope and low transactions costs 
of bundling has to be made specifically before the call for unbundling is rejected. 
The economics of the issue suggests the following approach: 
•  A functioning market would provide interconnectors with as much unbundling as they 
are  willing  to  pay  for.  lnterconnectors  could  then  substitute  their  own  services  or 
network functions for those of  the  incumbent TO wherever the interconnectors are 
more efficient. This presupposes that the unbundled services (or network functions) 
are sold at costs. 
•  Absent this  market,  there  may  have  to  be  an  approach  through  an  industry-wide 
committee  in  which,  however,  the  regulator participates.  The  role  of the  regulator 
would  have  to  be  restricted  to  two  tasks:  (a)  making  sure  that  interconnectors 
receive the unbundled services for which there is a market demand and (b) ensure 
that unbundling does not inter1ere with other policy goals, such as geographic tariff 
averaging.  While  such  goals  may  not  be  compatible  with  competition  (unless 104 
fin~nced as  USOs),  geographic  tariff  averaging  may  also  be  in  the  interest  of 
operators. Geographic tariff averaging is quite common in  nonregulated industries 
(express and parcel services). 
•  It  would  be  efficient  if  the  administrative  costs  of creating  an  unbundled  service 
element are  covered through the  charge for this element.  If there  is an  imputation 
policy  in  place,  according  to which  an ·incumbent TO has  to  impute  to  itself  the 
interconnection  charge  paid  by others,  then  the  administrative  part of the  charge 
should  be  exempted  from  this  policy.  The  burden  of proof for demonstrating  the 
.costs  .. of unbundling should be.on-the:.incumbent TO. 
•  lnterconnectors continuing  to  buy bundled services should not have to  pay for the 
costs of unbundling. There is a presumption that the bundled service does not cost 
more  than  the  sum  of  unbundled  services  (without  the  administrative  cost  of 
unbundling). This presumption is based on  the conjecture that an  integrated TO  is 
likely to experience economies of scope rather than diseconomies of scope. 
•  The demand relationship between unbundled services and telecommunications retail 
services  are  initially unknown.  They are  complex and  difficult to  learn.  Unbundled 
services  therefore  cannot,  in  general,  be  priced  under an  ECPR  or Ramsey  rule 
determined by a regulator.  Rather,  a price cap  approach  is  desirable that  restricts 
the  overall  price  of interconnection services but permits flexibility for the  individual 
services.  A  nondiscrimination  rule  would  nevertheless  hold  with  respect  to  the 
different interconnectors. 
The  suggested  approach  would  link  unbundling  to  the  size  of  the  market  for 
interconnection.  Once  that  market  is  large  enough  the  costs  of  unbundling  could  be 
spread  over large  quantities  of  unbundled  elements,  leading  to  low  unbundling  costs 
per unit of  unbundled elements.  This follows the  dictum that the  "division  of  labour is 
limited by the  extent of the market". A problem with this approach is  that it may face  a 
v1c1ous  circle  in  that  the  market only  develops  through  unbundling.  That fear can  be 
llm1ted in two ways. First. by taking advantage of successful experience with unbundling 
in  other  countries,  for  example,  the  US.  Copying  such  successful  experience  would 
lower  the  costs  of  unbundling.  Second,  the  fear  can  be  limited  by  a  regulatory 
determination  based  on  the  expectation  of  strong  future  market  development.  The 
determination  would  initially  limit  or  eliminate  the  administrative  or  "restructuring" 
component  of  the  unbundled  charge  element  and  would  let  the  TO  recover  the 
restructuring costs later (and with interest), when the market has developed. 
' 
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We conclude: 
1.  The desirability of unbundling depends on the administrative and construction costs 
of offering  unbundled  elements.  The  benefits of unbundling  consist of  increased 
flexibility  in  combining  network elements,  resulting  in  cost  savings  and  increased 
competition. 
2.  The  process  of  unbundling  should  be  industry  driven,  with  some  regulatory 
guidance that unbundling should occur if its benefits exceed its costs. 
3.  In  principle,  -consumers· ·of ·tJnbundled -elements-should  pay  for  the  costs  of 
unbundling (because they also derive the benefits). This also establishes a prima 
facie case that unbundling is desirable. Since unbundling costs (like costs of equal 
access) are largely one-time costs,  they may have to  be  recovered  over a longer 
period  of  time.  A  regulatory  determination  may  be  required  to  establish  the 
appropriate costs per unit of unbundled element sold. 
4.  The  more  unbundling  occurs  the  less  can  overhead  and  common  costs  be 
assigned.  Thus,  the  FDC  pricing  approach  becomes  less  and  less  feasible  the 
more unbundling progresses  . 106  · Study tor the eu;opean-Orimiision  ·  ·· 
4  Interconnection as a regulatory issue 
4.1  The need for regulation 
4.1.1  Impediments to satisfactory market solutions 
We have seen in the discussion of interconnection as an economic issue that it may be 
arranged in a way to provide an optimal balance of benefits to the two or more partners 
in  the  transaction as well as to serve the general public interest. Even if one does not 
aim  at optimal solutions but would be  satisfied with some degree of approximation to 
them, it appears that these are difficult to achieve. What impedes the realisation of this 
kind of solution through the usual mechanism of the market? The main reason must be 
seen  in  the  market structure of the  telecommunications sector still  prevalent in  most 
countries.  It  usually  exhibits  a  dominant  (if  not  monopoly)  integrated  provider  of 
telecommunications services having bottleneck control over access to most customers. 
In  such  an  environment,  the  incentives  to  the  incumbent to  offer  interconnection  to 
other network operators, in particular new market entrants, on a fair and efficient basis 
are mixed. The incentives may be positive and strong if the services the other networks 
offer are  complementary to  its own.  The contrary is  true,  however, if the  services are 
substitutive  and  competitive.  Then  the  incumbent  may  expect  only  disadvantages 
instead of  benefits from  intetconn~ction and attempt to  refuse  it  altogether,  offer it  at 
too high a price or at a quality below the standard applied to its own end-user services. 
This  practice  may  even  be  observed  of  incumbent  carriers  offering  complementary 
services if,  for example, they follow a strategy to enter the  market of these services in 
future. 
There are  only a few cases in  which  in  actual practice market entrants negotiated the 
interconnection  of  their  networks  with  that  of  the  incumbent completely on  their own 
without  any  regulatory  involvement.  The  most  prominent,  and  in  the  present  context 
most  relevant,  cases  are  the  ones  observed  when  the  market  in  New  Zealand  was 
opened  to  competition  (see  the  following  Chapter  5  and  the  Annex  for  a  detailed 
discussion).  These  cases  demonstrate  the  hazards of  such  a laissez-faire  approach. 
The  interconnection  arrangements  that  were  negotiated  by the  new fixed  as  well  as 
mobile services carriers were all reached at a price, either in terms of too high charges 
.  . 
for interconnection serv1ces,  long periods of only partially resolved litigation, and in the 
process very  high  transactions costs.  Because of the  emerging oligopoly structure of 
the market, there is only a modest prospect that the gains in efficiency that undoubtedly 
have intervened will in the end be passed on to customers instead of being retained by 
the  carriers,  especially  the  incumbent.  Instructive  also  is  the  example  of  the  early 
interconnection history in the US. There, in the 1970s, the courts opened the market by 
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forcing  the  incumbent  Bell  System  to  interconnect  with  new  competitors  after  the 
regulatory authoritities had long refused to accede to such demands. The competitive 
process, which in the end proved unavoidable and beneficial, could have started much 
earlier if there had not been this retardation. 
Regulatory policy  in  the  market for end-user services  may,  beside  market  structure, 
also be a reason tending to impede economically desirable interconnection. This may 
be due to price distortions brought about by regulatory intervention that have the effect 
of making access to particular customer groups via interconnection so unattractive that 
the  market  entrants'  stan,d-alone  ..  salutions.appear  .. more .advan~geous although  the 
incremental  costs  of  using  the  facilities  of the  incumbent would  be  less.  The  most 
common instance would be interconnection charges that are fixed  in  relation  to  retail 
prices that in turn average out the cost differences between low and high volume users. 
This circumstance is apt to result in partial non-realisation of interconnection in that the 
market entrant selects the stand-alone solution for high volume users while relying on 
interconnection for the rest of its actual (and potential) customers. 
A situation of asymmetric regulation in the end-user market, assuming that it cannot be 
removed for reasons not to be discussed here, would by itself call for an involvement of 
the  regulatory  authority  for  the  achievement  of  fair  and  efficient  interconnection. 
Furthermore, the hazards contingent on  leaving interconnection issues to be resolved 
by  unrestricted  negotiations  between  the  actors  would  in  the  view  of  most  policy 
makers and  observers be  sufficiently great as to argue against this approach and for 
some kind of regulatory oversight. This view would be reaffirmed even after considering 
the likely costs of such regulatory oversight in terms of the bureaucratic machinery and 
possibly arbitraiY d(3cisions.  Such costs would be considered less than the alternative 
costs due to long drawn-out litigation and dynamic and allocative inefficiencies inherent 
in tight oligopolistic market structures left unregulated. 
4.1.2  What kind of regulation ? 
Even·  in  EU  countnes  with  no authority  to  explicitly  regulate  the  telecommunications 
sector there always exists an oversight over market players as regards their adherence 
to prescribed market rules.  In other words there is at least a competition policy and an 
authority  watching  that  the  relevant  codes  are  being  observed.  The  question  thus 
needs to be addressed whether a sector-specific regulation of the telecommunications 
sector is in fact needed or whether a competition policy, applied in the same way as to 
ail  other  segments  of  the  economy,  could  be  considered  sufficient  to  deal  with  its 
structural and ins'l;tutional problems, in particular those posed by interconnection. 108  •  · - · AStudy tor.- eurtipNn Coimission.  · · 
4.1.2.1  Competition policy 
What can competition policy achieve? Competition policy can approach interconnection 
issues either by influencing the behavior of market participants or by influencing market 
structure. 
The  fact  that  interconnection  means  the  provision  of  access  to  bottleneck  facilities 
implies the danger of several types of behaviour relating to interconnection that would 
be  forbidden  under competition  law.  These types  of behavior,  known  as abuse  of  a 
dominant  firm's  market  power.,  jnclude_ .exclusion  .. of  .  ..competitors .from  the  bottleneck 
facility, squeezing (charging a price for the bottleneck facility that is high relative to the 
price  to  end  users),  predatory  pricing,  price  discrimination  (raising  rival's  costs), 
bundling  and  vertical  restraints  (for  example,  fixing  prices  that  interconnectors  can 
charge  end  users).  Competition  policy ·can  help  uncover  and  rectify  such  abusive 
behaviour by  offering  (potential)  interconnectors actual  and  punitive  damage  awards 
and by penalising offending parties. The prime advantage of using competition policy is 
its self-policing nature and its potentially flexible adaptation to changed circumstances. 
Its  main  drawbacks are that it only sets in  retroactively,  takes quite a long time  until 
court decisions are made and causes high costs if it must be used on an ongoing basis. 
Furthermore, court decision are not easily reversed, even if circumstances change. All 
this  is  actually likely to  make  competition  policy quite rigid  and  cumbersome.  Also,  it 
would  certainly  delay  interconnection  for  the  first  entrants  after  opening  of  the 
telecommunications market. 
In  antitrust  cases  the  US  courts  have  consistently  required  monopolists  to  provide 
competitors  with  reasonable  access  to  the  essential facility.  This  does  not,  however, 
mean that the antitrust laws mandate absolutely equal access. Reasonableness is thus 
a weaker  standard  that  would  preclude  undue  discrimination  but  could  allow justified 
discrimination, for example, due to technical infeasibility or high costs. A question to be 
addressed by policy, however, is whether there should not be entry assistance provided 
to emerging rivals of a dominant TO.  If this is answered in the affirmative, the standards 
of  competition  policy  may  not  be  adequate  to  overcome  monopolistic  control  over 
bottleneck facilities. Proactive regulation would appear more effective for this task. 
A totally different issue from  a dominant firm·s  abusive behaviour is  that of  collusion. 
This  is  actually one that probably can  only be  addressed successfully by competition 
policy.  Contrary  to  the  dominant firm  case,  collusion  usually has  the  backing  of  the 
industry.  Policing  therefore  depends  either  on  outsiders  or on  consumers.  A  cartel 
off1ce  that  is  specifically engaged in  detecting and prosecuting collusion probably can 
suc~c:~o:>fuliy fight producer mterests and take a pro-consume-r position. 
Structural  competition  policy  steps  in  when  policy  measures  aimed  at  controlling 
behaviour are considered inadequate to deal with problems due to corporations' large 
size  and  deep  pockets.  Structural  competition  policies consist of forbidding  mergers, 
prescribing separate subsidiaries and, as most radical measure, forcing the divestiture 
of  parts  of  a corporation·s  businesses.  It almost always  confronts  trade-offs between 
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economies of scale and scope on the one hand and the exercise of market power on 
the other. The handling of these cases is the domain of the cartel office.  It alone has 
the machinery to carry such cases through the judiciary system, as will be necessary in 
most instances. 
Structural competition policy has been pursued with particular vigour in  the  US where 
AT&T was divested and the Regional Bell Operating Companies have to use separate 
subsidiaries to  enter certain lines of business. These kinds of actions necessarily get 
involved in questions of interconnedion. Part of the relevant court decisions in the US 
·therefore  also  addressed ··intercannedion :issues  -:in ~-prescribing  ··rules ·that-had  to  be 
adhered  to  the  maintenance  of  fair  competition.  Their  implementation,  however, 
generally  was  not  entrusted  to  the  institutions  applying  competition  policy but  rather 
turned over to the regulatory authorities. 
Structural policy measures may intervene to prevent mergers that are due (in part) to a 
failure  to  solve  interconnection  issues  between  different  providers  of 
telecomunnications  services.  The  regulatory  authority  and  the  cartel  office  should 
cooperate on these cases so that all relevant information can be brought to bear on the 
cartel office's decisions on them. 
We conclude: 
1  . The  prevention  of  collusive  behaviour by  competing  telecommunications  suppliers 
should generally be the task of a cartel office applying general competition law. 
2.  Structural competition  law is best pursuP.d  by a cartel office in  conjunction  with  the 
courts. 
3.  Assuming that a specific regulatory authority is established, a cooperation between it 
and the cartel office is advisable inasmuch as the cases to be decided involve issues 
of interconnection (this will be taken up again in Section 4.1.2.2). 
4.1.2.2  Government appointed regulatory authority 
The  most  widespread  policy approach  to  interconnection  is  proactive  regulation  by  a 
government appointed Regulatory Authority (RA).  Historically, this may have to do with 
the  prevailing  regulation  of  telecommunications  markets  for  end  users  that  made  it 
natural to place competitive issues and therefore interconnection issues with the same 
agencies.  A  ma!or  difference  with  competition  policy  is  the  more  ·industry-specific, 
proactive  and  ongoing  nature  of  regulation.  An  immediate  consequence  is  that 
regulation  may  be  more  adequate  if  industry-specific  expertise  and  continuous 
adjudication  are  required.  In  our  view,  that  is  likely  to  be  the  case  as  long  as 
telecommunications  end-user  markets  are  regulated  and  as  long  as  the  market  for 
interconnection  is  highly  asymmetric  (dominated  by  a  single  firm)  and  has  not  yet 
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Regulation  deals  with  pnang  and  non-price  issues.  The  criterion  for  determining 
interconnection issues by regulatory rule must be the public interest that is served. This 
has to be decided in general on the basis of the alternatives available to the operator or 
service  provider  requesting  interconnection.  There  may  be  cases  where  viable 
alternatives  to  interconnection  exist,  and  it  might  not  be  in  the  public  interest  and 
possibly deter innovation if it is then mandated. This  _  _!!light be particularly true if there 
are  important  technical  difficulties  in  realising  interconnection.  Alternatively, 
interconnection may not be sought by a competitor because of distortions in the  price 
structure of the incumbent TO,  making it attractive to bypass its network, and  in  this 
·case·it would fall to· the ·RA to correct""Orcompensateior1his-situation-and-bring·about 
the  economically  less  costly  solution  through  interconnection.  It  is  likely  that  these 
issues are best handled by a government regulatory agency. 
We  clearly  see  the  need  for the  establishment  of  a  regulatory  authority  to  oversee 
generally the process of introducing competition into telecommunications and making it 
to  work  and  in  particular to  control  the  process  of  interconnection.  As  long  as  the 
market for interconnection services itself is  not effectively competitive,  the  RA  should 
have the authority to impose its view as regards the appropriate solutions to critical and 
contented issues between the parties. 
There  should  be  a division  of  labour between the  RA  and  the  cartel  office.  The  RA's 
role  would  be  to  introduce  and  foster  competition.  It  should  do  this  by  taking  the 
initiative and inter alia using interconnection as an instrument. If, once the competitive 
process is under way, rules of competition are not adhered to, either by the incumbent 
or a new competitor, then it would be the role of the cartel office to deal with this subject 
matter.  Also  measures of  structural  policy would  be  the  task  of  the  cartel  office.  The 
cartel office  should rely on  its normal criteria for taking  up cases and  apply its normal 
standards  in  deciding them.  It  could,  however,  make  use  of the  RA's  expertise  when 
forming its opinions.  For example,  the  RA's greater familiarity with  interconnection will 
more  easily  enable  it  to  detect  elements  of  collusive  behaviour  expressed  in 
interconnection agreements or to  determine whether interconnection issues are  at  the 
root of intended mergers or would make structural separation decisions unworkable or 
not. 
In  order to  mitigate fears  of arbitrary decisions, the  relevant legislation should specifiy 
that the RA's decisions be subject to judicial review. 
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We thus conclude: 
1.  Issues of interconnection, like those of introducing competition generally, should fall 
under the jurisdiction of an authority explicitly instituted for the purpose of regulating 
the telecommunications sector. 
2.  The  RA  should  have  the  power to  impose  its  decision  in  all  situations  in  which, 
according to its evaluation, the normal market process would not lead to acceptable 
solutions. 
3. Matters falling under competition policy should be handled by the cartel office. The 
RA should co-operate with the cartel office in the evaluation of cases. 
4.  Legislation should provide that decisions by the RA are subject to judicial review to 
mitigate any fears of arbitrary regulation. 
A large  part  of  the  following  sections  will  be  dedicated  to  specifying  the  particular 
measures  that  the  RA  may  use  and  the  reasons  for  using  them,  leaving  as  much 
degrees of freedom  as  possible to  the  immediately concerned  parties.  From  this  will 
emerge  a  picture  of  the  right  balance  between  the  roles  accorded  the  RA  and  the 
interconnecting parties. 
We will not specify the RA more closely except to state that it is assumed either to have 
been  instituted by government or to be itself part of the  government and that it carries 
out its functions under a mandate usually derived from an act of parliament. 
4.2  Options for a regulatory treatment of interconnection issues 
4.2.1  Realisation of interconnection 
4.2.1.1  Identifying the case of interconnection 
Since  any  regulatory  intervention  tends  to  assign  entitlements  that  may  not  emerge 
without this intervention, it is necessary that there be no ambiguity about when there is 
a  case  of  interconnection.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  a  basic  policy  statement 
providing clear guidance on the matter. 
From our dtscussion in Chapters 2 and 3 it toliows ihat as a general ca'eyory operators 
of telecommunications networks and service providers are the entities that should be 
considered  for  interconnection  with  other  telecommunications  networks  and  service 
providers,  where  we  use  "interconnection•  as  a generic term  to  designate  access  to 
respectively  connection  with  the  facilities  of  the  other  party.  In  this  sense, 
interconnection includes what at other places has been called "special network access•. 112  Study for the European Commission 
In the following we will have to indicate - which is particularly relevant at the •lower end• 
of  interconnection,  i.e.  special  network  access  - in  what way  interconnection  differs 
from ordinary customer access. 
The  RA  should  potentially  assume  a  case  of  interconnection  whenever  there  is  a 
competitive relationship between two telecommunications network operators or service 
providers and the one demands the use of the facilities of the other for the delivery of 
its own services. The definition applies clearly to the most relevant case, that of a new 
market entrant, either a network operator or a service provider, seeing itself dependent 
on  the. network of the jncumbent:.telecommunications~operator.ior the.deJivery of its 
services.  It  excludes  the  normal  end  user,  be  it  the  residential  or  business  type 
customer. 
For considerations of regulatory treatment, a distinction will have to be made between 
the different possible interconnection combinations, i.e. 
(  1  )  network - network, 
(2)  network - service provider, 
(3)  service provider- network, and 
(  4)  service provider - service provider, 
where  we  regard  the  first  named  entity  as  the  provider  and  the  second  as  the 
demander of interconnection. Combinations (1) and (2)  undoubtedly fall under the RA's 
mandate regarding  interconnection. All  topics covered in  this report are  relevant for at 
least one  if not both of  these two combinations. The two combinations (3)  and (4)  are 
less  likely  to  be  of  regulatory  relevance.  A network operator is  in  most cases  also  a 
service provider.  In  order to become the  provider of any particular service it would just 
have  to  add  elements  in  the  value  chain  of  a  service.  For  such  offerings  it  would 
ordrnarily not face  any  restraints because  of  bottleneck facilities controlled by  another 
serv1ce  prov1der.  The  case  1s  not  quite  the  same  but  similar  with  respect  to  the 
relat1onsh1ps between different service providers as long as the service provider on the 
demand side 1s assured interconnection with a network operator. This is so because the 
service  provider  being  requested  to  supply  interconnection,  as  service  provider.  is 
unlikely to control a bottleneck resource. 
In summary. we conclude: 
1.  Issues  of  interconnection  may  arise  whenever  there  is  a  (potential)  competitive 
relationship between two telecommunications network operators or service providers 
and the one demands the use of the facilities of the other for the delivery of its own 
services. 
2.  Regulatory attention should primarily be  directed to  the  constellations of network -
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4.2.1.2  Identifying the conditions for interconnection 
We  assume a liberalised market environment in  the sense that legal  monopolies are 
abolished  and  that  there  is  an  explicit  policy  to  facilitate  market  entry  of  new 
competitors.  In  general,  however, we  assume that there is  still a dominant incumbent 
network  operator  offering  the  whole  range  of  telecommunications  services,  and 
competitors are either just entering or,  H they have been  in  the  market for some  time 
already, are still small in  relation to the incumbent. We further assume that the RA has 
the  (explicit  or  implicit)  mandate  of  pursuing  a  policy  of  introducing  and  fostering 
.  ~  competition~  until the degree of-concentration in  the~market··has decreased to an extent 
that warrants treating the sector no differently than any other and leaving oversight of it 
to  general  competition  policy.  Given  this mandate and  recognising  the  importance  of 
interconnection for the success of such a competition policy, it is important that the RA 
documents  very  clearly  its  position  as  to  what  it  considers  justified  demands  for 
interconnection. 
There  are  several  steps to  developing such  a position.  One  is  to  define the  kinds  of 
businesses  (network  operator  or  service  provider)  for  which  interconnection  is  a 
relevant concern; we  have dealt with this point in  Section 4.1.2.2. The next step would 
consist  in  defining  the  types  and  segments  of  networks  with  respect  to  which 
interconnection  by  justified demanders would  be  considered the subject of  regulatory 
concern.  Further the  RA  would  have  to  specify  by  what  kind  of  action  or  measure  it 
intends to have interconnection realised in the possible different cases. 
In  Section  3.2,  we  have  presented  the  economic  arguments  in  favour  of  as  well  as 
against  interconnection.  We  concluded  there  that  the  bottleneck property  inhe:-ent  in 
some parts of telecommunications networks and the realisation of positive externalities 
are  the  strongest  reasons  for  seeking  interconnection.  The  bottleneck  property  of  a 
network,  if  not overcome,  would  prevent any other operator/provider from  serving  the 
market.  The  positive  network  externality  as  a  consequence  of  interconnection 
substantially  1ncreases  soc1al  welfare  so  that  interconnection for  this  reason  is  highly 
des1rable  from  the  viewpoint  of  society.  We  concluded  further,  however,  that  the 
bottleneck property does not  necessarily hold for all  types of interconnection. We  also 
1nd1cated  that  there  may  be  reasons  of  community of  interest that  would  on  a a-priori 
bas1s provtde suff1c1ent reason not to require interconnection with the network for which 
this interest exists. 
From the analysis in Chapter 3 it follows that 
•  there  are  compelling  reasons  to  declare  the  local  network  connecting  single-line 
customers a bottleneck facility; 
•  the trunk network and the intelligent network (IN) of the incumbent TO also fulfill the 
conditions to be declared a bottleneck facility for service providers; 114 
•  local lines of multi-line customers, the trunk network and the IN of the incumbent TO 
should  not  be  considered  a  priori  to  be  bottleneck  facilities  for  other  network 
operators  (offering  long-distance  and/or  international  telephony,  mobile  services, 
etc.); 
•  if that is  necessary for the goal of opening the market to effective competition any 
network.  network segment or specialised resource may temporarily be  declared a 
bottleneck facility. 
The  RA  should carry out a  cas~-by-case ~valuation of eac~  if!~ividualsituation given 
the existing structure of the particular national telecommunications market. This would 
be  called  for  in  particular  in  situations  referred  to  under  the  last  bullet  above.  A 
conceivable example of a temporary bottleneck facility could be the mobile network of 
the  incumbent TO  with  which  a competing mobile operator is  denied interconnection 
because  the  TO  would  prefer  interconnection  to  occur  indirectly  via  the  PSTN  for 
reasons  of  the  higher interconnection charges the  interconnector would  have to  pay. 
Another example could be the incumbent ro·s trunk network for the purposes of a new 
network operator during the specified time that the latter needs to put his own network 
in  place.  There  may  also  be  - unlikely  - cases  where  service  providers  develop 
resources,  like  specialised  data  banks.  that for  other service  providers  and  network 
operators become bottleneck facilities. 
Under the  last bullet above we  referred to the impermanence of certain declarations of 
bottleneck  facility.  We  emphasise  that,  in  principle,  all  such  declarations  should  be 
temporary, at least in a tong-run perspective. This would depend on the development of 
competition.  For  example,  once  competition  in  the  local  loop  has  developed  to  an 
extent that single-line customers could also select between competing providers there 
would  be  no  need  any  more  to  maintain  the  designated  status  of  the  local  loop 
operated by the formerly dominant TO as a bottleneck facility. But, as mentioned, this is 
a long-run perspective. • 
• 
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From this we conclude: 
1.  The  RA  should  clearly  designate  (a)  the  networks  or  network  segments  that 
constitute  bottleneck  facilities  and  (b),  for  each  declared  bottleneck  facility,  the 
classes  of  suppliers  of  telecommunications  services  that  would  be  entitled  to 
interconnect with it. 
2.  The RA should carry out the relevant evaluations balancing global externality effects 
and  the  effects  of  economies  of  scale  and  scope  against  the  potential  dynamic 
benefits that. may arise when .new  .  ...competitors _ar:e.denied .interconnection and have 
to search for and find alternative ways of delivering their services  . 
3.  The time period during which the status of bottleneck facility for a network or network 
segment is to be maintained should be specified. The end of that time period could 
be defined in terms of the competitive state of the relevant market. 
4.  For carrying out these evaluations, specific technical, economic and legal expertise 
will be required which should be at the disposal of the RA. 
A comment regarding the last of above conclusions: There will in the sequel be further 
occasions  to  can  for  specific  expertise  on  which  the  RA  should  be  able  to  rely  for 
arriving at its decisions. In order to avoid redundancy, and because these instances will 
be  obvious,  we  consider  the  above  statement  of  conclusion  to  apply  to  all  such 
instances and shall not r~peat it further. 
4.2.1.3  Granting the right to interconnection 
Once  particular segments or the  whole  of  a telecommunications  network  have  been 
declared bottleneck facilities, service providers and other network operators should be 
granted adequate rights to interconnect with them. Conversely, the operator controlling 
these bottleneck facilities should be under an obligation to grant interconnection. 
There are various options to choose from as to where these rights and duties are to be 
expressed. They could be enshrined in the law constituting the basis for public policy in 
the  telecommunications  sector,  they  could  be  the  subject  of  secondary  legislation 
(orders,  directions,  rules)  promulgated by  the  RA,  or they could  be  made  part of  the 
licences that are granted individual operators and  providers. The approaches differ in 
respect of the  significance  accorded  interconnection and in  respect of the  degree  of 
flexibility with which the RA can react to changes in given circumstances. Enactment in 
a law would provide for greatest assurance of the right to  potent~al demanders but be 
subject to greatest inflexibility. If they are expressed as part of a licence the assurance 
given is much less as licence conditions can always be changed; this,  however, would 
be  the necessary consequence of the advantage of this approach enabling the  RA to 
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There is the possibility that certain providers, for example simple resellers or providers 
of value added services, would be exempted from obtaining specific licences. The RA 
would have to specify clearly in a general regulation what kind of interconnection rights 
they have (in respect of the network services they need) and who would have the duty 
to supply them. A possible solution could be to declare the PSTN of the incumbent TO 
a bottleneck facility for their purposes and the policy statement should extend a blanket 
right to simple resellers and service providers as regards interconnection with it.  The 
policy statement should further place the obligation on the incumbent TO to  provide 
interconnection correspondingly. 
In summary, our conclusions are: 
1.  Rights  to  obtain  and  duties  to  provide  interconnection  should  be  formulated  in 
secondary legislation promulgated by the RA. Licences given to telecommunications 
network operators and,  where  relevant,  to service providers should,  in  conformity 
with the  policy statement, specify the conditions relevant to the particular case and 
provide for specifics according to the particular circumstances. 
2.  The  right  to  demand  and  the  duty  to  provide  interconnection  should  be  made 
contingent on the finding that a network or a network segment has been declared. a 
bottleneck facility for the use intended by the demander. This should be specified in 
the licence. 
3.  If certain providers of telecommunications services are not required to have licences, 
the  RA  should  specifiy  in  a  regulation  treating  the  case  in  general  what  their 
interconnection rights are and who has the duty to provide interconnection. 
The approach expressed in these conclusions strikes,  in  our view, the proper balance 
between assurances with  respect to the provision of interconnection that new market 
entrants  need  and  the  flexibility  that  the  RA  must  have  to  respond  if  there  is  a 
consensus that circumstances have drastically changed. In any case, assuring the right 
to interconnection and obligating the incumbent TO to provide it is only the beginning of 
a  process  of  negotiation  between  the  parties  and,  as  the  case  may be,  regulatory 
determinations on many detailed aspects of the very complex business relationship that 
anterconnection represents. 
4.2.1.4  Providing for a framework for negotiating interconnection agreements 
De:laring righ~s and dtibes regarding interconnection will in general not suffice to bring 
it about in an acceptable way. This will depend on the proper mix of roles assumed by 
the RA, in terms of ex-ante determinations and ex-post interventions if need be, and the 
role that the immediately concerned parties are allowed to assume in the process. We 
argued in our economic analysis that there has to be a right balance between issues of 
sufficient  generality  to  require  regulatory  determinations  and  issues  of a  •localised· 
nature,  reflecting  specific  technical,  geographic,  organisational  or  customer-specific • 
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information, that are better left to be settled in negotiations between the parties. This 
balance has to be found in a framework for negotiating interconnection agreements that 
the RA puts in place. 
In defining this framework, the RA must foremost define its own role in determining the 
various possible issues. This will be the subject of Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 which in 
tum deal with the pricing of interconnection services and non-price issues. Building on 
the results of this analysis, Section 4.3 will  then develop a framework for negotiating 
interconnection agreements allowing for party negotiations to cover the  subjects  too 
-specific to be·.dealt with.·by··regulatory:ex:ante-determinations~ providing nevertheless, 
however, for an involvement of the RA on a stand-by basis. 
4.2.2  Pricing issues 
4.2.2.1  The role of the Regulatory Authority (RA) in respect of interconnection charges 
There is a wide range of possibilities of involvement by the RA with respect to charges 
for interconnection services. This involvement may range, at the one end, from leaving 
the fixing of charges completely to negotiations between the parties concerned and, at 
the other, to determining them on the basis of the RA's own evaluation of relevant costs 
and  market  conditions.  In  our  empirical  analysis  covering  16  different  countries, 
reported in  Chapter 5 and the Annex, we have found examples of both extremes. The 
presumption underlying the analysis of this chapter is that the RA has the mandate to 
exercise  its  regulatory  control  over interconnection  charges  but that the  involvement 
should be differentiated depending on the requirements of the cases in question. 
As we showed in  our discussion covering the economic issues about interconnection, 
there is a case for treating large demanders of interconnection services differently than 
smaller ones. The former would as a rule be other (potentially) relatively large network 
operators  for  which  it  would  be  right,  also  from  the  viewpoint  of  society,  that  they 
receive individually packaged interconnection services requiring, as it were, customised 
pricing. Among the latter one would normally find service providers and smaller network 
operators preferring to be able to choose their interconnection services from an array of 
standardised services offered at standardised charges. 
The RA may consider the two approaches as prototypical for a situation when there has 
been  competition  for  a  while  and  some  experience  with  interconnection  has  been 
gained. It will  mo~t  ..,rc~~bly huve to start the process of implementing intercon;,ection 
using one single approach, which in  its form will be closer to indiviual negotiations. At 
this point, neither the RA nor the incumbent TO would be able to tell precisely what the 
menu of standardised services should be so that even for smaller demanders services 
would  have  to  be  determined  individually.  Once  there  has  been  experience  with 
interconnection, the set of standardised services could be determined in a cooperative 118 
process involving representatives of the smaller demanders, the incumbent TO as well 
as the RA. 
The  two  prototypical  approaches  also  define  two  different  approaches  of  the  RA 
towards interconnection charges. There is an a-priori case that the RA should treat the 
charges for standardised services much like tariffs for end-user services in  that they 
need approval by the RA on an ex-ante basis. Once initially set and approved by the 
RA  on  the basis of the appropriate cost standard (discussed below), the RA will  also 
have to  decide on the  regime by which these charges may be adjusted over time as 
.cost .  conditions_Ghange  ... Jbis..muld .be..-.doae :.Jn ~that.  at;:specitietf  :time  - ... intervals  the 
charges are newly determined by the RA, or, in that the RA installs a mechanism which 
allows for some pricing autonomy on the part of the carrier providing the services. The 
mechanism that fulfills this requirement and that, following our analysis of its properties 
in Chapter 3, we prefer for the purpose is price-cap regulation. 
Individual  interconnection  arrangements  and  the  corresponding  charges  may  prima 
facie be left to negotiations between the parties. The roles that the RA could assume in 
the context of such negotiations are: 
- Participate in the negotiations as a facilitator. 
- Initiate arbitration if negotiations threaten to fail. 
- Make ex-post determinations if negotiations in fact fail. 
As  a facilitator of  negotiations the  RA  may be present at the  meetings,  either as  an 
observer or an adviser to prevent the negotiations from getting stalled or proceeding in 
a dead-end direction. When using the instrument of arbitration, the RA may assign the 
role  of arbitrator to  outside parties. This approach has certain advantages over one  in 
which  the  RA  itself makes a determination. We will  expand on  these ideas in  Section 
4.3.4. 
Irrespective  of  the  scope  available  for  facilitation  of  negotiations  and  arbitration  by 
alternative  agents,  there  should  be  a  right  to  an  ex-post determination.  So  that  the 
prospect of the  potential use of this  instrument develops its full  effect,  the  RA  should 
indicate clearly before negotiations start what the standard is on  the basis of which its 
determination would be made (see the following sections for what this standard should 
be). There should also be a policy statement regarding whether charges that have been 
agreed upon without active intervention of the RA will need to be approved, and, if this 
is  the  case,  what  the  criteria  are  for  such  an  approval.  There  may  be  no  explicit 
approval  procedure  but  the  charges  may  be  subject  to  the  RA's  scrutiny  for 
anticompetitive conditions. 
The adjustment over time as cost conditions of individually negotiated charges change 
may  be  done  by  negotiating  anew,  at  specified  time  intervals  or  at  times  when 
prespecified conditions are fulfilled. There is then no reason to proceed differently than 
.. • 
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when the charges were negotiated the first time.  It may also be agreed between the 
parties that charges adjust following a scheme like the price-cap approach. If the  RA 
had to pass a determination, it may impose the price-cap regime if it expects that also 
next time there may be no prospect of a negotiated result. If there is no reason for the 
latter expectation the finding of new charges may again be left to negotiations between 
the parties. 
We conclude: 
1.  The  RA- should allow ·private·party-negotiations··for 1he··amving at interconnection 
arrangements. 
2.  It  should  specify  under  what  circumstances  and  in  what  way  it  will  intervene  in 
private party negotiations. This should be the case when negotiations threaten to fail 
or they in fact have failed. The approaches could include facilitation of negotiations, 
arbitration and ex-post determination. 
3.  The RA should aim at bringing about an  understanding with the incumbent TO and 
smaller demanders (service  providers and smaller network operators)  regarding  a 
standardised set of interconnection services. 
4.  Charges for the standardised set of interconnection charges should be proposed by 
the incumbent TO and be subject to the approval of the RA. 
5.  The  RA  will  have  to  establish  a  regime  by  which  charges  for  standardised 
interconnection services can be adjusted over time as demand and cost conditions 
change.  The  price-cap  regime  suggests  itself  as  the  best  approach  currently 
available. 
6.  The adjustment of charges over time for individually negotiated arrangements should 
be lett to negotiations between the parties concerned. 
As already mentioned, for both the individually negotiated interconnection arrangement 
and  the  set  of  standardised  interconnection  services,  the  RA  would  need  to  give 
specific directions regarding the methodology on  the basis of which  it would evaluate 
charges. Much of the immediately following discussion will focus on this point. 
4.2.2.2  Socially-optimal vs. cost-based interconnection charges 
Above we derived the need for regulatory intervention whenever a telecommunications 
network operr.!or h&:; ccr.tiol over  _bo:tlcne:k facilities and interconnection would result 
in  the  realisation  of  substantial  positive  network externalities.  The  very  presence  of 
network  externalities  prevents  the  normal  market  mechanism,  even  an  otherwise 
functioning one, to achieve solutions that are optimal from a social point of view. The 
market  mechanism  by  defintion  is  unable  to  take  externalities  into  account.  This 
problem  still  needs  to  be  faced  by  the  RA  after  it  has  guaranteed  the  right  to 
interconnection and imposed the duty to offer it whenever bottleneck conditions prevail. 120 
Our  economic  analysis  has  demonstrated  the  difficulties  of deriving  socially-optimal 
interconnection charges under conditions of network externalities. The results depend 
on  a whole  range of different, and under the various possible circumstances more or 
less  plausible  conditions,  and  their  calculation  would  also  require  the  availability  of 
information  that  is  normally not at the  disposal  of the  RA.  This  conclusion  holds  in 
particular  for  the  much  discussed  efficient  component  pricing  rule  (ECPR)  and  the 
sophisticated  versions  of  Ramsey  pricing,  both  of  which  are  so-called  second-best 
pricing approaches in that they provide pricing rules that are socially-optimal after one 
has taken into account constraints dictated by reality. 
,...  •  I  ••  """••• 
We came to the conclusion that, while socially-optimal pricing rules allow much insight, 
the  attempt  to  implement  them  outright  would  in  all  likelihood  be  infeasible.  In  the 
following we therefore propose an approach that we think would achieve a reasonable 
approximation to results that follow from these rules. 
The  RA  should  require  a methodology for determining interconnection charges that is 
based on  costs.  Costs should be  basically divided into two parts: (a)  costs caused by 
the service in question (or,  more realistically, those that can be traced/attributed to the 
service), and (b) costs that can not be so traced and are therefore common costs. The 
first  type  of  costs  would  determine  the  lower  limit  for  the  charge  of  a  particular 
interconnection service or facility. The second type of costs would have to be covered 
through  contributions from  all  services where  the corresponding  percentage  markups 
on  direct costs would, however, not necessarily be equal across the different services. 
On  the  contrary,  as  we  argue below, there are good reasons that they differ between 
the different services. 
In  the economic analysis of Chapter 3 we identified the standard of Long-Run Average 
Incremental Cost (LRAIC) as the  one  that best meets the  regulatory requirement of a 
standard for the direct cost of interconnection services. This standard should be applied 
to all categories of services supplied by the TO.  All costs not accounted for when long-
run  incremental costs of all services are added up  (i.e.  the  sum  of amounts arrived at 
by  multiplying  LRAIC  with  volume  of  the  relevant  service)  should  be  counted  as 
overhead  and  common  costs.  This  would  in  particular  also  include  the  difference 
between  the  historic  costs  of  a  service  irreversibly  sunk  in  the  past  (because 
investments made in the past are irreversible) and the costs of the service evaluated at 
current, possibly lower prices of inputs. 
Interconnection  charges  set  at  LRAIC  would  fail  to  provide  contributions  to  the 
regulated  firm's  common  costs  and  other  justified  revenue  requirements.  Therefore 
markups  on  this  cosi standard  should  be  allowed  on  the  basis  of  feasible  Ramsey 
pricing.  For  this,  the  markup  for  interconnection  services  should  be  determined  in 
conjunction with those for all other regulated, in particular end-user, services offered by 
the  incumbent.  This  would  require  that  in  setting  markups  on  top  of  LRAIC  for 
interconnection services one takes into account the relevant market conditions and the 
corresponding markups on the LRAIC for all these other services. Setting the markups 
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for all services differently according to perceived market conditions should permit the 
incumbent to set prices that meet its overall revenue requirement. 
The  percentage  markups on  top  of LRAIC for interconnection  services  should  vary 
between zero, as lower limit, and, as upper limit, the minimum uniform markup, i.e. that 
common  markup  which,  when  applied  to the  LRAIC of each  service,  would  lead  to 
revenues  that  cover  all  costs,  including  common  costs,  and  all  other  revenue 
requirements. The reason to constrain markups for interconnection services within this 
range  is ·that in  the market for the typical end-user services for which interconnection 
services  are·--.needed  there: ..is .  generalty_.an_.:above ·:a¥.erage .:degree: .of .competition, 
meaning  an  above  average  price  elasticity,  which  in  the  Ramsey  calculation  would 
make  for  below  average  markups.  Furthermore,  lower  interconnection  prices  mean 
lower input prices for imperiect competitors which will intensify competition and thereby 
increase welfare.  This also argues for the  markup for interconnection  services to  be 
less than the average markup. At the limit, which expressly should not be excluded, this 
would imply that,  when the degree of competition is very high, a markup of near zero 
may indeed be appropriate. Conversely, the minimum uniform markup should definitely 
define an upper bound. 
From the above, we conclude: 
1  . The RA should not aim to impose interconnection charges that claim to correspond 
exactly to socially-optimal prices. 
2.  The  RA  should define lower and upper limits within  which  interconnection charges 
must be set. 
3.  The standard for setting the lower limit of an  interconnection charge should be that 
of Long-Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC) as defined above. 
4.  The  upper  limit  of  an  interconnection  charge  should  be  a  charge  calculated  by 
adding to  LRAIC a markup that,  when applied to the  LRAIC of each service, would 
lead  to  revenues  sufficient  to  cover  all  revenue  requirements  (minimum  uniform 
markup). 
In conclusion we refer to Chapter 3 where we discussed the different types of costs that 
are  incurred  through· the  provision  of  interconnection  services  (Section  3.5.4)  and, 
further,  developed  the  argument  that  access  charges,  to  cover  the  costs  of  an 
unbalanced tariff structure and of USOs, should not be part of interconnection charges 
(Sections 3.2.7 and 3.5.9). In respect of the costs of an unbalanced tariff structure, we 
argued that one should rely on  the process of rebalancing to eliminate them over time, 
and in  respect of the  costs of USOs, that their financing through a Universal Service 
Fund  would  be  the  most  efficient  approach.  We  recognised,  however,  that  existing 
constraints may necessitate the use of access charges for these purposes. 122 
We  do not intend to continue this discussion here but provide in Figure 4.2.2.2-1  an 
overview  over  the  composition  of  overall  interconnection  charges  that  would  be 
consistent with  regulatory requirements.  The figure  shows the  various  types of costs 
entering into the charge for capacity and services used for interconnection, as well as 
the types of costs to be covered by access charges, if it is decided to use them. 
Figure 4.2.2.2·1:  The composition of the overall interconnection charge 
Overall Interconnection Charge 
always included 
Charge for providing the 
interconnection service 
covering  the  LRAIC  of  the 
interconnection service: 
- one-off costs of establishing 
physical interconnection between 
specific networks: 
- costs of redimensioning the 
network. in particular providing 
capacity for conveyance (switching 
and transmission) and related 
network components; 
- variable costs of ancillary and 
supplementary services: 
mcluding a markup on top of LRAIC 
to cover overhead and common 
costs: 
•  contribution toward the costs of 
conditioning the system for 
competition and interconnectaon; 
- contributaon toward overhead and 
common costs. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
included if there is an 
explicit decision for 
access charges 
Charge elements resulting 
from tariff imbalances 
due to historic tariff 
imbalances and current 
regulatory constraints on 
the speed of rebalancing. 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
included if  access 
charges are to cover 
costs of USOs because 
financing from a Universal 
Service Fund is ruled out 
Charge elements to cover 
the costs incurred in 
meeting regulatory 
obligations to 
- serve customers who 
are non-economic as a 
result of geographic 
price averaging; 
- provide non-economic 
services (e.g. 
emergenccy services); 
•  serve specific social 
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4.2.2.3  The mechanisms for arriving at interconnection charges 
We divide the discussion in this section into two parts, one dealing with the case where 
there  shall be  private party negotiations with  the  aim  of agreeing on  interconnection 
charges for an individualised set of services, the other with the case where charges for 
a standardised set of interconnection services are to be fixed by way of a proposal and 
approval process between RA and TO. 
On entering negotiations, parties to a prospective interconnection agreement should be 
instructed  by  the  RA  to  find  charges  that  are  within  the  bounds  defined  above  in 
Section 4.2.2.2: the lower limit should be the LRAIC and the upper limit the LRAIC plus 
the  minimum  uniform  markup.  The  RA  should  indicate  that,  if  no  agreement  was 
reached  and  it  were  asked  to  make  an  ex-post determination,  it  would  determine  a 
charge  in  that range  on  the basis of its assessment of the demand conditions  in  the 
market. This would provide proper incentives for the two sides in the  negotiations. Not 
knowing what the RA would do in case of failure of negotiations, they both would have 
a preference for a settlement on their own accord. Of course, if either party speculated 
that it would have a good chance that its view on charges would be confirmed by the 
RA, it might opt to let negotiations fail and rely on the RA's decision. This would have to 
be accepted as a legitimate part of the process. 
As regards charges for standardised services, the fixing of these charges would have to 
wait  until ·agreement on  the  relevant  set of these  services  had  been  reached,  which 
would  most  probably  occur  only  after  some  time  and  after  consultations  involving 
demanders as  well  as  the  TO  and  the  RA.  The  interconnection  charges  would  then 
have to be set in a prCl~ess in which the TO submits a proposal for the charges and the 
RA  examines and approves them.  They would  have to fall  within  the  bounds defined 
above.  Most probably,  the  process could profit from  the  prior experience with  finding 
interconnection  charges  in  private  party  negotiations  and  possibly  ex-post 
determinations by the  RA.  Conversely, the  standard charges, once established,  could 
serve  as  benchmarks for  individual  negotiations  in  the  sense  that any interconnector 
could request to be served under them. 
For  the  sake  of  supporting  the  emergence  of  competition,  there  may  be  a  case  for 
relatively  low  markups  on  LRAIC  in  the  case  of  charges  for  standardised 
interconnection services.  It is  granted that this approach would at first provide smaller 
contributions to common costs and the revenue requirement of the incumbent TO than 
is warranted. The regime that would provide for the adjustment of charges over time as 
demand  and  cost  conditions  change,  preferably the  price-cap  regime,  could  then  be 
specified in a way that the firm is able to genC3rate suff:=ient contribut:ons eve:- time. As 
mentioned, this approach would amount to  an  explicit policy of facilitating competitive 
entry. The extent of entry assistance would abate with time, however, as the regulated 
firm  would  under the  price  adjustment regime  increase  the  margin  between  charges 
and costs. 124 
Our conclusions are: 
1. The parties in negotiations for interconnection charges should be given ranges, with 
lower and  upper limits, within  which  the charges are to be  fixed.  The lower limit 
should equal LRAIC and the upper limit LRAIC plus the minimum uniform markup, 
as discussed in Section 4.2.2.2. 
2.  If negotiations fail, the RA should determine charges that fall within the given range 
using its assessment of demand conditions on the different markets. 
3.  Charges·ior  ·  standardised-;nter corn aection -services-shoutd ·atso·i>e-fixed ·within 1he 
range  given above. They would result from a process in which the incumbent TO 
submits  a  proposal  which  the  RA  examines  and  approves  if  it  meets  the  RA's 
criteria. If the proposal does not meet these criteria, the RA makes a determination 
which the TO must accept. 
4.2.2.4  Cost accounting as the basis for cost-based charges 
The  best  cost  accounting  approach  currently  available  to  derive  cost  measures  is 
Activity-Based  Costing  (ABC).  It  appears  that,  if consistently  applied  and  based  on 
forward-looking cost data, ABC will lead to measures that are close to reflecting truly 
efficient LRAIC. 
The  methodology  of  ABC  is  likely  to  be  more  demanding  than  the  methodology 
currently used by most TOs,  which  is  likely to be  a  version  of fuUy  distributed costs 
(FDC)  using  historic prices.  We  are  aware  that there  cannot be  replacement of,  for 
example, FDC by an ABC methodology immediately. Until adequate cost accounting is 
introduced,  there  should  be  efforts  toward  a  flexible  use  of  the  available  cost 
accounting  methodology in  order  to  mitigate  any  distorting  effects  of  this  approach; 
preferably,  however,  use  then  should  be  made  of information  from  engineering  cost 
models, which are normally available in TOs. 
The process by which the cost methodology is implemented should be monitored by the 
RA. The RA should also always have access to the cost accounting records of the firms 
it regulates. 1' 
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From the above we conclude: 
1.  The RA should require TOs falling under their mandate to use an ABC methodology, 
based on forward-looking cost data, for the costing of their services. 
2.  Until an  ABC  methology can  be put in  place, in  order to avoid  grossly misleading 
cost figures as the basis for interconnection charges, 
•  the available methodology should be used as flexibly as possible, 
•  reliance should also be placed on information from engineering cost models. 
3.  The RA should always have access to the regulated firms' cost accounting records. 
As  already  mentioned  in  Chapter  1.2.3, there  is  a study  under way,  carried  out  by 
Arthur Anderson and entitled .. Cost Allocation and the General. Accounting Principles to 
be  used  in  the  establishment  of  Interconnection/  Access  Charges",  investigating  the 
concrete requirements regarding cost accounting to be placed on TOs for the purpose 
of costing interconnection services. We will leave to this study any further consideration 
of the matter. 
4.2.2.5  Accounting separation as safeguard against cross subsidisation 
When  the  business  units of  the  incumbent TO  that offer services in  competition  with 
new market entrants use  the  same network services as interconnectors - and this will 
normally  be  the  case  - the  internal  transfer prices  for  these  services  should  be  set 
foiiowing the  same pricing standa.-d as appiied to charges ·:or external  interconnector~. 
i.e.  they should be based on  LRAIC and include the same markups to cover overhead 
and  common  costs.  It  may  well  be  that  due  to  the  application  of  this  standard 
economies  of  scope  are  lost  for  the  downstream  units  of  the  TO.  This  loss  must, 
however,  be  accepted as  less important than the risk of manipulation of the cost data 
by the incumbent for purposes of giving its own units undue competitive advantages. In 
any case, the benefits of economies of scope remain with the upstream business units 
of the TO that supply the interconnect services. 
Provided  that  this  standard  is  maintained  throughout,  the  question  of  cross 
subsidisation then becomes one of whether the prices for the incumbent's competitive 
final  services  cover  all  relevant  costs,  including  the  costs  of  the  services  that 
correspond to interconnection services. This would obviously mean that the  revenues 
from  the  sale  of  competitive  services  must  not  only  cover  the  incumbent's  actual 
LRAICs of these services but also the r11arkups on these LRAiCs. 
The RA should require the incumbent TO to separate its revenue and cost accounts in 
a way that the  adherence to this condition can  be verified. The accounts should show 
the  internal  transfers  between  the  TO's  different  business  units  of  all  services,  in 
particular of those corresponding to interconnection services. Furthermore, they should 
show all  other direct costs and the revenues for each of the competitive end  services. 126 
On  the  basis  of this  information the  required  comparisons could  be performed.  The 
TO's  business  organisation  should  be  aligned  so  that  it  corresponds  to  the 
requirements of this accounting separation. 
Under the  suggested approach of accounting separation it would be  natural to collect 
the  total  of  all  overhead  and  common  costs on  a separate  cost account and  to  set 
against it all the contributions earned by the different services from these margins (as 
well  as  the  negative  contributions,  for  example  the  loss  on  local  access).  The  RA 
should require the use of such an account as it would increase transparency regarding 
the overall jn addition to the ·SeF.Vice-specifio prafitabllily·olth.e.ragulated·firm. 
The provision of information on the basis of separate revenue and cost accounts need 
not necessarily be done on a continuous basis. The information that separate accounts 
can provide with respect to cross subsidisation is really meaningful only if it is compiled 
on  an  incremental cost basis. If the cost accounting system is still done according to a 
different standard it would  be  difficult to provide that information continuously, even  if 
only  approximately.  It  would  then  be  preferable  to  have  reporting  along  accounting 
separation principles be done only periodically but with the maximum possible extent of 
relevant adjustments to the figures. 
We conclude: 
1  .  The  RA  should  consider  requiring  accounting  separation  as  a safeguard  against 
cross subsidisation. 
2.  Accounting  ~eraration should  to  the  extent possible be  carried  out  on  a long-run 
incremental cost basis. 
4.2.2.6  The structure of interconnection charges 
The  question of the  structure of interconnection charges poses itself differently for the 
two  different  types  of  interconnection  arrangements,  i.e.  the  individually  tailored 
interconnection packages demanded by large users of interconnection services, on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  standardised  unbundled  services  demanded  by  service  providers 
and smaller network operators, on the other. The former will probably be served best by 
being  able  to  pay  directly  for  the  capacity  that  is  placed  at  their  disposal,  with 
adjustments  for  deviations  of  actual  use  from  the  capacity  ordered.  For the  latter a 
structure  of  prices  based  on  actual  usage  would  be  the  most  relevant  one.  That 
structure  couid,  however, aiso reflect  the  differences in  cost  causation due to  usage 
during peak and off-peak hours. This could result in a two-part structure of tariffs with a 
fixed part per unit of time and a usage-sensitive part that is lower than in the case of a • 
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.  strictly linear price structure. We have discussed the various aspects of the appropriate 
structure of interconnection charges in our analysis of Chapter 3. 36 
We conclude: 
1.  The  RA  should  support  demands  for  capacity-based  charges  by  large  users 
(network operators) of interconnection services. 
2.  The  RA  should  consider a methodology for determining charges  for  standardised 
services that is based on  the cost due to the  use of capacity during peak and  off-
peak hours. 
4.2.2.7  The burden of an unbalanced tariff structure and the provision of USOs 
In Chapter 3.5.9, we have discussed in detail the efficient treatment of burdens placed 
on  TOs due to  an  unbalanced tariff structure or the obligation to  provide  USOs.  We 
demonstrated that 
- for the  burden  of an  unbalanced tariff structure there  should initially be  no  access 
charge allowed, and 
- with respect to USOs, the efficient approach to their financing would be by way of a 
Universal Service Fund. 
We  neen not and further to the arguments developed there except to point to  aspects 
of proper measurement and calculation that would have to be monitored by the RA. 
Whenever compensation of a burden placed on  a TO,  i.e. the costs of  an  unbalanced 
tariff  structure  or  of  USOs,  is  to  take  place,  the  costs  in  question  need  careful 
determination.  In  particular,  the  amounts  potentially  to  be  recovered  need  to  be 
determined for each relevant period as a separate amount.  From  the total amount so 
determined, the  access charge or the  contribution from  the  USF for that period would 
have to be calculated. 
For the local access loss,  which  is  usually the  most intensively discussed item  in  this 
context,  the  following  is  the  outline  of  a  suggested  methodology  for  its  calculation: 
Determine a forward looking cost measure for the local loop, differentiated by types of 
local networks (metropolitan, medium city,  small city,  rural)  and taking particularly into 
account existing  infrastructure such  as  ducts and  other very long-lived  facilities.  The 
36  When  we  support the  use  of capacity-based  charging,  with  its  implication  that  the  demander for 
interconnection services pay for actual investment cost of the capacity in question, we do not mean 
that these charges should not include a contribution to common costs,  or in other words,  the TO's 
revenue  requirement  as  discussed  in  Section  4.2.2.2.  These  contributions,  or the  mart<up  on  the 
incremental cost,  would  have to  be negotiated  along  with  the  establishing of that cost.  The  same 
obviously also holds for charges on a peak/off peak basis or in the form of a two-part tariff. 128  Study for the European Cotmission 
costs of large parts of local networks are sunk costs which were incurred far back in the 
past and which will not recur for a long time in the future. For this evaluation, special 
studies would need to be carried out.  Having made the detennination on  costs,  one 
would need to decide to what extent the sunk costs of the past should be considered 
having already been covered by profits made in the past. One could presume this if the 
TO in  question had made particularly large profits in the past.  Only after having also 
answered this question could one proceed to the calculation of an access loss to be 
covered from other sources. 
We conclude: 
1 .  For  the  fixing  of  an  access  charge  or contributions  to  the  USF,  a  very  careful 
calculation  of the  costs of an unbalanced tariff structure or of USOs needs to  be 
done. 
2.  Careful calculation of the local access loss would particularly be relevant. This would 
involve  the  establishment of the  proper cost measure for the  local  loop  (forward 
looking, based on current prices) as well as considerations regarding how much of 
these  costs  could  be  considered  to  be  or  have  already  been  covered  by  the 
incumbent's  supra-normal  profits  from  other services,  currently as well  as  in  the 
past. 
4.2.2.8  The safeguarding of network integrity 
There  is  no  question  that  the  interconnection  of  different  networks  and  service 
providers requires careful attention to maintaining the integrity of networks, in particular 
that  of  the  PSTN.  At  this  point  there  is  overwhelming  evidence  that  the  technical 
measures to assure network integrity are available and can readily be implemented. As 
we discussed in Chapter 2.6, if there are several suppliers of network services this can 
be expected to actually increase the reliability of telecommunications services. 
What  still  needs to  be  discussed  is  the  question  of  who  pays for  the  cost  of these 
measures.  As a first approach,  consider the optimal result in  a case where there  are 
networks of symmetric size that compete with each other. Network integrity would then 
be a matter of equal interest for all network operators. In particular, each operator of a 
network knows that, to make sure that his network is protected, he himself must give 
assurances not to imperil those of his competitors. This provides the incentive for all 
competitors to seek a common solution that is satisfactory for all and can be achieved 
at  least  cost.  Since  the  cost  of  providing  network  integrity  will  be  lower  if  assured 
through one common approach than if each network operator sought its own solution, 
one should expect that this common approach is selected and the cost of the system is 
assumed by all on an equal basis. Inasmuch as charges for end-user services cover all 
costs, the users of all networks pay for the cost of network integrity. " 
• 
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The  introduction  of  competition  into  the  telecommunications  sector  is  to  serve  all 
customers in  the  markets where  competition  becomes the  prevalent mode.  It will  in 
particular also benefit those  customers that,  although  not switching  their business  to 
new  market  entrants,  will  take  advantage  of  the  incumbent's  lower  tariffs  due  to 
competition. Given that the benefits of competition will be spread over all customers in 
the relevant markets, it appears natural and fair that the costs of its introduction be also 
so spread. Therefore, following our discussion in Chapter 3.5.4, these costs should be 
borne by the incumbent as well as the new competitors. 
At the beginning of the. process_of jntroducing mmpetition into the sector,  it would  be 
the  incumbent  TO  that  assumes  the  responsibility  of  assuring  the  integrity  of  its 
network. The cost for this would then have to be included in  the  charges for network 
services that it charges its own business units downstream as well  as  its competitors 
through  interconnection  charges.  As  competition  develops  and  competing  networks 
gain in size, the operators of the latter will have an interest of their own in assuring the 
integrity of  networks, not only of their own  networks but overall,  and  be  interested  in 
finding common least-cost solutions. 
We conclude: 
1.  The  RA  should  work  out  a  methodology by  which  the  cost  of  extra  measures  of 
network integrity by the incumbent TO are to be shared between the incumbent and 
new competitors. 
2.  As  the  networks  of  market  entrants  grow  in  size,  they  themselves  will  have  an 
incentive to find common leost-cost eo!utl~ns of assuring network integrity. 
4.2.3  Non-price issues 
Besides on pricing issues, intervention by the RA may be required on a number of non-
price issues. In these cases as well, the involvement of the RA may be in the form of 
- an ex-ante determination, 
- policy  statements  providing  guidance  to  private  party  negotiations  or  decision 
processes at industry fora, 
- participation at private party negotiations as a facilitator of negotiations, 
- arbitration if negotiations threaten to fail, or 
- ex-post determinations if negotiations in fact do not lead to an agreement. 
Again, also with respect to non-price issues on which in  principle negotiated outcomes 
would be  preferred, the parties, in  particular the interconnection demanding operators 130 
and service providers, should have a right to obtain an ex-post determination to clearly 
demonstrate that the right to interconnection will also be implemented. 
4.2.3.1  Equal access 
From  the  perspective  of  customers,  equal  access  is  assured  if  their  access  to 
alternative long-distance providers of telephone services by end-users is the same as 
access to  the  incumbent TO.  It is  usually achieved when  a customer may express a 
choice as to which_pro.vider..is ~to-Sellla  .. him .or her,  .. that-~  ·_is -recorded :at the focal 
exchange, usually belonging to the telephone company serving the local network as a 
monopoly, and the customers long-distance calls are then automatically routed to the 
carrier in question. This preferred mode of equal access is referred to as •preselection•. 
Another  form  of  equal  access  would  require  that each  competitor be  identified  by  a 
distinct  code,  in  form  of  a prefix,  that the  local  exchange  would  recognise  so  that  it 
could route the dialled long-distance calls to the corresponding long-distance carrier. If 
that  code  consisted  of  only  one  digit,  this  could  be  a mode  of equal  access  having 
attractive  features  for  consumers  as  it would  allow flexibility  of  selection.  It restricts, 
however,  the  number  of  competitors  to  only  nine.  As  soon  as  there  are  two-digit 
prefixes, the advantages of flexibility are probably already considerably reduced. 
It  is  an  empirical observation that equal  access in  the  form  of preselection is actively 
demanded  by  competitive  providers  of  long-distance  services.  An  example  is  the 
market entrant in New Zealand who negotiated with the incumbent TO equal access in 
the  form  of  preselection  without any support from  a resulatory authority,  agreeing  to 
take  over  1  00°/o  of  the  costs  involved.  Benefits  are  seen  to  arise  not  only  for  the 
competitors  but  also  for  the  economy  as  a whole  in  that  it  supports  the  competitive 
process.  The  provision  of  equal  access  is  not  unlike access to  a bottleneck facility  in 
that only the incumbent TO can provide it. 
The  RA  has  to  address  the  question  of  whether  to  leave  the  achievement  of  equal 
access  in  a first  round  to  private party negotiations or to  order it ex-ante,  and  if it  is 
ordered,  who  is  to  bear the  cost.  The  balance of expert opinion on  the  matter, taking 
mto  account  the  beneficial  effect  it  has  on  competition  in  long-distance  telephony  as 
well  as the probable reluctance of the incumbent TO to provide such access, is that it 
should  be  ordered  on  an  ex-ante  basis.  Following  our analysis in  Chapter 3.5.4,  the 
incremental cost of its provision should be  borne by the incumbent as well as the  new 
competitor(s). 
The  RA  could  enhance  the  prospect of early installation of equal access facilities if it 
offered an  incentive to the incumbent TO in the form of ending a particular favourable 
treatment of  new competitors once  equal access is achieved. This could for example 
consist  of  renegotiating  interconnection  charges  that  initially were  determined by  the 
RA.  Using this approach should depend on the whole set of conditions making up the 
interconnection framework. 
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We conclude: 
1.  The RA should take a decision supporting the early provision of equal access of final 
users to carriers of long-distance carriers. 
2.  The decision should consist of an ex-ante determination if reluctance to provide it on 
the part of the incumbent TO is expected. 
3.  If equal access is ordered by the RA, a methodology should be worked out assuring 
a fair sharing of the cost of establishing equal access between the  incumbent TO 
and new competitors. 
4.2.3.2  Collocation 
The collocation  of an  interconnecting carrier's  equipment accomplishing the  physical 
interconnection or, as regards service providers, the collocation of their computers and 
switches  on  the  premises  of  the  interconnection  granting  network  operator,  brings 
advantages both  in  terms of quality and costs.  If there are no reasons with  opposite 
effects of comparable importance, it should be granted in order to minimise the cost of 
providing services in a competitive environment. 
The  RA's  general  position  on  collocation  should  be  to  require  the  incumbent TO to 
provide  it  unless  the  TO  can  show  that  acceding  to  the  requirement  is  technically 
infeasible or not justifiable on economic grounds. As an alternative, the incumbent TO 
would have to offer so-called virtual collocation where interconnectors are not physically 
collocated but are otherwise connected to the system on terms that place them in  no 
worse a position than if they had real collocation. 
This would require that the incumbent TO charges its own downstream businesses for 
network  services  the  same  as  its  external  interconnecting  competitors,  although  the 
actual  cost  of  serving  its  internal  units,  which  are  collocated,  would  be  less.  The 
benefits  (in  terms  of  higher  internal  revenues)  of  actual  collocation  that  would  be 
realised with its own downstream business units would be reaped by the upstream unit 
of  the  incumbent  TO  controlling  the  bottleneck  facility.  The  justification  for  virtual 
collocation,  through which the economic advantages of close physical interconnection 
are forgone, would be that none of the near-customer suppliers of services (internal or 
external)  would  benefit  from  a  privileged  relationship  with  the  bottleneck  supplier of 
network services and therefore fair competition would become possible  . 
Virtual collocation may mean that interconnection is realised at a level of quality that is 
less  than  if  physical  interconnection  were  realised.  lnterconnectors  that  are  denied 
physical  collocation  and  have  to  be  satisfied  with  virtual  collocation  should  be 
compensated for the loss in quality by a lower interconnection charge. In particular the 
charge should be less in relation to the internal charge that downstream businesses of 
the incumbent TO having physical interconnection are obliged to pay. 132 
Summarising, we conclude: 
1.  The RA should require that the incumbent TO offer competitors physical collocation 
of their interconnecting equipment. 
2.  Virtual collocation should be accepted as an alternative to physical collocation. 
3.  Lower levels of the  quality of interconnection due to virtual  collocation  should  be 
compensated through lower charges. 
4.2.3.3  Unbundling 
The degree of the unbundling of services belongs to the essentially unsettled issues in 
the  context  of  interconnection.  It is difficult to  sort out empirically to what extent the 
benefits it brings in  terms of making the market more competitive warrant the sacrifice 
of economies of scale and scope that go along with it. The most pragmatic approach 
would  be  to  leave  the  process  of finding  feasible  and  satisfactory  solutions  to  an 
industry-wide  committee  consisting  of  industry  representatives  (like  the  Information 
Industry Liaison Committee - IILC - in the US). Such representatives provide maximum 
expertise and know about their demand for unbundling and the feasibility of supplying it. 
The  RA  may  reserve  for  itself  the  role  of  intervening  with  its  guidance  to  facilitate 
decisions in  favour of pro-competitive solutions. It could use as a basis for identifying 
solutions developments in other countries with more experience. 
Following our discussion in Section 4.2.2.1, charges for unbundled services would have 
to  be  approved (or determined) by the RA if they fall into the category of standardised 
serv1ces.  Also  if  negotiations fail,  the  RA  would  need to  be  able to differentiate costs 
according to the degree of unbundling. The proper approach is to include in the charges 
for  unbundled services the extra cost that is  due to  the  very process of unbundling.  It 
would then be necessary that the cost accounting system provide the information about 
this additional cost or,  alternatively, the cost saved if no unbundling is demanded by a 
particular demander. 
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. We conclude: 
1.  The  RA  would  find  it  difficult to determine on  the  basis  of its  own  evaluation  the 
proper degree of unbundling of interconnection services. 
2.  The best alternative appears to consist in the creation of an industry-wide committee 
consisting  of  industry  representatives  for  the  purpose  of  finding  feasible  and 
satisfactory solutions. 
3.  The role of the RAin respect.to determining the degree of unbundling may best be 
restricted to providing guidance in support of solutions that promise to support future 
development of competition. 
4.  TheRA would need to make a clear policy statement as to the pricing of unbundled 
services. 
4.2.3.4  Points of interconnection 
The  issue  of  points  of interconnection  is  essentially a special  aspect of the  issue  of 
unbundling. If there is a sufficient degree of unbundling of interconnection services, and 
if  demanders for these  services can  freely  select from  the  available  set  according  to 
their needs, it follows immediately that there are also sufficient points of interconnection 
for demanders of interconnection services to select from. 
There  is,  however,  an  additional  aspect  connected  with  the  provision  of  points  of 
interconnection. The determination of points of interconnection has been useo in some 
countries (US, Japan) to equalise the conditions of access for new competitors and the 
incumbent TO.  This has  usually been achieved at the  cost of a substantial sacrifice in 
economies of scope.  Our analysis, as  an  extension of that on  unbundling, leads us to 
the  contusion  that  the  RA  is  well  advised  not  to  impose  a particular configuration  of 
points of interconnection. 
As in the case of the negotiation of interconnection charges, the RA should indicate the 
range  within  which  it  would  expect  solutions  to  be  realised.  The  general  regulatory 
requirement should  be  that  the  TO,  to  the  extent that  doing  so  is  technically feasible 
and  economically justified,  should  comply  with  demands by interconnectors to  obtain 
access  to  points  in  the  network that  are  as  close  as  possible  to  those  preferred  by 
them.  This would  in  the  case  of local  access normally mean  as  close  as possible  to 
their customers' location. Non-agreement on this issue in negotiations would be subject 
to ex-post determination by the HA. 
As  regards  the  process  of  finding  solutions  for  the  standardised  points  of 
interconnection, for smaller demanders, this should be entrusted to the  same industry 
committee charged with the comparable task in respect of the unbundling of services in 
general.  Points  of  interconnection  as  part  of  specially  designed  packages  of 134  Study for the European Comnission 
intercpnnection services for large users should be left to private party negotiations.  In 
these cases the RA should intervene only if negotiations fail~ 
We conclude: 
1.  The  RA  is  not  well  positioned  to  determine  on  an  ex-ante  basis  the  proper 
interconnection points for the various demanders of interconnection services. 
2.  In  the  case of the  demand for individualised packages of interconnection services, 
the  determination  of  points  of  interconnection._should .  be  Jett  to -private  party 
negotiations with a role for the RA if negotiations fail. 
3.  Solutions  for the  standardised points of interconnection  should be  the  task of the 
industry  committee  entrusted  with  finding  solutions  for  the  proper  degree  of  the 
unbundling of services in general. 
4.2.3.5  End-to-end quality of services 
The  provision  of services  by new competitors  is  not infrequently associated  with  the 
notion of inferior quality. From this one can conClude that the RA should assure that the 
introduction  of  competition  be  accompanied  by  requirements  placed  on  new 
competitors regarding end-to-end quality. 
Such  a sweeping  conclusion  neglects,  however,  (a}  that  the  services  of  new  market 
entrants may well be  of superior quality and (b}  that there may also well be a demand 
for services of lower quality if they are offered at lower prices. The essential point is that 
interconnectors should not get a quality of service that they do not want or should not 
have  to  pay  a  price  for  high  quality  services  while  actually  getting  a  lower  grade. 
Conversely, the legitimate concern of the incumbent operator may be that, independent 
of  what quality of interconnection he  offers,  he  might be  identified with  the  quality the 
new  market  entrant  brings  to  market  which.  if  of  a  low  grade,  could  reflect  on  his 
reputation with end users.  It  must be  recognised, however, that, whatever the issue, it 
would be very difficult for the  RA to decide to what extent end-to-end quality should be 
guaranteed at a particular level. 
Issues  of  quality  should  in  general  be  left  to  negotiations  between  the  parties 
concerned. If an  agreement cannot be  reached during negotiations, the  RA should be 
ready  to  intervene to  bring  about a solution.  For this  it should preferably proceed by 
facilitation of negotiations, mediation or expert arbitration, And only as last resort to ex-
post determination. The fallback solution of the RA should be that the interconnector be 
supplied with the same quality that the incumbent TO provides itself. The industry-wide 
committee  charged  with  finding  solutions  to  the  unbundling  of  services  later  to  be 
offered on a standardised basis should also be charged with the setting of performance 
parameters  for  the  resulting  interconnection  services  in  such  a  way  as  to  assure 
appropriate goals of end-to-end quality (see Section 4.2.3.3). • 
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We therefore conclude: 
1.  Questions of performance parameters for end-to-end quality should be a matter to 
be decided in negotiation between the interconnection parties. 
2.  When  called  upon  to  make  a  determination,  the  RA  should  require  that  the 
incumbent TO provide to interconnectors the same quality of service as  it does to 
itself. 
3.  Performance- .parameters  of· ·standardised -·-interconnection .·services  should  be 
determined in the industry-wide committee dealing with the unbundling of services. 
4.2.3.6  Standards 
In  Chapter  2  we  discussed  the  general  aspects  of  standardisation.  We  found  that 
standards  reduce  transactions  costs  and  can  serve  the  functioning  of  markets.  This 
would  in  particular  be  true  in  a  telecommunications  environment  of  interconnecting 
networks  where  interoperability  of  services,  network  security  and  integrity  must  be 
assured at the interfaces. We showed that standards may evolve through adoption of a 
standard of a dominant firm, spontaneous adoption through the market, and conscious 
industry  collaboration.  As  the  first  is  undesirable  (and  therefore  often  prevented  by 
government intervention) and the second unlikely to occur, it is the third which is often 
regarded as the best compromise. 
The  process  of  standardisation  is  highly  complex  and  as  an  activity  may  introduce 
significant costs. The effect of standards may be ambiguous. As mentioned above, they 
reduce  transactions  costs  and  are therefore  beneficial.  Furthermore,  they  may  make 
innovations  in  telecommunications  equipment  and  software  more  attractive.  On  the 
other,  standards  may  lock-in  technology  and  thereby  delay  the  introduction  of  new 
services or interconnect access. Standards may in general retard technical progress. 
We  concluded  in  Chapter 2  that  an  optimal  balance  should  be  sought  between  the 
gains  and  the  costs of  standardisation for interconnection. The  RA  could best assure 
this objective through relying on existing industry-wide standardisation organisations. If 
none  exists,  the  RA  should  take  the  initiative  in  bringing  about the  establishment  of 
such  an  organisation. The  RA  should take  part in  the  work of these organisations.  Its 
role  in  the  standardisation process should be  to prevent the  nonagreement on  issues 
through possible stalling tactics of some participants as well as to block any tendency of 
participating firms to collude to the detriment of competitors and consumers in general. 136 
Following the analysis of Chapter 2.4.2, we thus conclude: 
1.  The  RA  should  support  the  process  of standardisation  at existing  industry-wide 
standardisation committees. It should initiate the establishment of such a committee 
if none exists. It should be represented at the committees and take part in their work. 
2.  The  RA's  role  in  the  standardisation  process  should  mainly  be  limited  to  the 
prevention of non-agreement and collusion among the participants. 
3. -The·. RA~·shouid~reserve  -mandatory -standards- for-iAteroonnection--~nterfaoes only for 
services  and  technical  components  of  networks  for  which  the·  ·benefits  of 
harmonisation are very high (see Chapter 2.4.2). 
4.2.3.7  Public access to interconnection agreements 
The regulatory treatment of issues of interconnection derives from the fact that there is 
bottleneck  control  by the  incumbent  TO over networks  or segments  of  a  network. 
Regulation overcomes the bottleneck which the normal market process would not have 
been able to accomplish. The RA has the mandate to take actions to this effect since it 
advances the competitive process which serves the public interest. 
For  the  market  development effect to  materialise,  it  must  be  assured  that  potential 
competitors  are  informed  of  the  conditions  on  which  they  can  enter  the  market. 
Regulatory determinations regarding the use of bottleneck facilities are obviously very 
important  information  for  this  purpose.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  parts  of 
interconnection agreements that were subject to a determination by the RA should be 
placed in the public domain for scrutiny by interested parties. 
A case could also be made for requiring that the results of private party negotiations be 
made public as long as they concern the use of bottleneck facilities. The rationale for 
this  could  be  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  results  of private  party negotiations 
could never be more favourable for the demander of interconnection than if determined 
by the  regulator and the  regulator's determination should be accessible to all.  If there 
are  deviations  from  what  the  regulator  determines  (or  would  determine)  this  could 
reflect anticompetitive conditions that the interested public should be able to verify. 
The  problem  with  this  position  is  that,  being a departure from  normal practice in  the 
application of competition law, it would require strong justification. The argument that 
the negotiated results should reflect the regulator's determination may not be relevant 
if, for example, there was as yet no such determination. Moreover, one would observe 
negotiated  results  most  likely  in  the  case  of  individually  packaged  interconnection 
services that are tailored to the particular requirements of the demander. Providing all 
interested parties access to the contents of the interconnection agreement may reveal 
a substantial part of the  business plans of this carrier or service provider so that the 
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requirement  may  violate  common  norms  of  data  protection.  The  very  fact  of  a 
negotiated result may also reflect the working of the market process which one  might 
not want to inhibit with unnecessary disclosure requirements. 
We conclude: 
1.  There  are  strong  arguments  in  favour  of  making  the  regulated  parts  of 
interconnection agreements accessible to the public. 
2.  The case for making all  agreements that cover the interconnection with bottleneck 
facilities  accessible  to  the  public is  less  strong.  It would  need  justification  on  the 
basis of particular circumstances. 
4.2.3.8  Numbering 
Numbering  is  a  large  subject  for  which  there  are  expectations  of  many  new 
developments.  One  need  only mention  European or even  global services with  unified 
numbering  spaces  and  universal  personal  numbering.  These  developments  will  with 
time also impact interconnection issues. For the immediate demands of interconnecting 
new  network operators  and  service  providers,  however,  the  numbering  requirements 
are of a less spectacular nature. 
The  issues  need  to  be  considered  according  to  whether  it  is  the  question  of 
interconnecting TOs offering long-distance telephone services, TOs entering the market 
for  local  telephony,  mobile  network  operators,  or  service  providers.  We  take  up  the 
different cases in turn: 
•  TOs  offering long distance telephone services generally demand equal access as a 
consequence  of  which,  if  granted  in  the  form  of  preselection, they would  not  need 
any  particular  numbering  arrangement.  To  allow  the  customer  to  overide  his 
assigned preselection, there must be available a code,  in  form  of a prefix,  signaling 
to the local exchange that an override of the preselection is to be made, as well as in 
addition a distinct code (carrier identification code (CIC)) for each of the competitors 
for purposes of identification at the  local exchange so that the  relevant calls can be 
routed  to  it.  Such  a  distinct  CIC  for  each  competitor  must  in  any  case  also  be 
available  if  there  is  no  equal  access  in  the  form  of preselection  and  the  customer 
must  address  the  desired  carrier  by  dialling  the  code  beforehand.  One  critical 
condition for both  the  override code  and  the  CIC is that they not contain  too many 
digits as otherwise dialing becomes very cumbt:rsome. 
•  TOs  offering  local  telephone  services  need  blocks  of  numbers  from  the  local 
numbering  space  assigned  to  them  which  are  of  adequate  size  to  accommodate 
their customers. 138 
•  Mobile network operators need their own numbering space which can be accessed 
via an access code that in the relevant numbering space has the same status as a 
code by  which,  when  making long-distance calls,  geographical areas (other local 
networks) are addressed. The requirement regarding the code is that it not contain 
too many digits. A code containing more than three digits is usually not acceptable. 
•  Service  providers  may  have  special  numbering  requirements  when  they  want 
numbers to convey pricing and content information. 
The  RA  must assure that the specific  re~uirerne~ts._discussed .above  .  .are met~  as· the 
need  for  them  arises.  For  this  it  is  necessary  that  the  RA  assume  the  regulatory 
authority over the relevant numbering domain. The technical problems posed by each 
requirement differ according  to the  relative  scarcity in  the access code  and  number 
spaces  caused  by the  current  use  of codes  and  numbers.  Normally,  however,  the 
obstacles to  solving these problems should not prove unsurmountable nor to be  very 
costly.  In  deciding  on  new uses  of numbering space,  the  RA  should  reserve  priority 
treatment to the demands from interconnecting carriers and service providers. 
We conclude: 
1 .  The  provision  of adequate access codes and numbers in  the  relevant  numbering 
domain  needed  by  new  network  operators  and  service  providers  should  in  most 
cases not be problematic. 
2.  The  AA  needs  to  assume  the  regulatory  authority  over  the  relevant  numbering 
domain. 
3.  When deciding on  new uses of space in  the numbering domain, the demands from 
interconnecting  network  operators  and  service  providers  for  access  codes  and 
numbers should be given priority. 
4.3  A framework for negotiating interconnection agreements 
4.3.1  General observations 
Interconnection  arrangements,  as  repeatedly  emphasised,  should  in  principle  be  the 
outcome of commercial negotiations. Given the reality of imperfections in the market for 
interconnection  services,  !ikzly  to  pcl&ist  for  some  tima  to  come,  a  regulatory 
involvement  with  respect  to  at  least  a  number  of  issues  will  be  inevitable.  In  the 
preceding sections, we have discussed various options that the RA has in this respect. 
In the following, we will discuss the resulting framework for negotiating interconnection 
as it presents itself to those TOs demanding as well as those offering interconnection. • 
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The discussion will  be organised according to the regulatory approach taken,  i.e.  ex-
ante  determination,  deferral  to  private  party  negotiations,  ex-post  determination, 
mediation  or arbitration  procedures.  As  the  prototype of negotiation  with  respect  to 
which we carry out the discussion, we take the type where an individualised package of 
interconnection  services  between  an  alternative  larger  network  operator  and  the 
incumbent TO is to be negotiated. In this type of negotiation a larger number of issues 
needs to be dealt with than in the type in which unbundled standardised services are 
demanded with charges already determined and approved by the RA. 
4.3.2  Preconditions to be met through ex-ante determinations 
Predeterminations  may be  made through legislation enacted by parliament or in  the 
form of policy determinations on the part of the RA. Which approach is selected should 
depend on  the importance accorded the particular issue. Issues covered in  legislation 
have  a higher order of significance; they can,  however,  less easily be adjusted once 
circumstances change. They should be reserved for issues for which it is essential that 
the  policy in  question is backed by the political will  expressed by a passage through 
parliament. In the following we will not differentiate as to what issues are to be covered 
by the one or other approach as this will have to depend on particular circumstances. 
There should be clear ex-ante determinations on  the following  interconnection issues 
from which private party negotiations would have to start: 
•  The  right  to  interconnection  of  new  network  operators  and  service  providers  to 
designated telecommunication~  n~twnrk~. 
•  Principles  that  the  RA  applies for the  determination  of  interconnection  charges  as 
well as of access charges if they are used. 
•  The  cost accounting  methodology to  be  used  by the  TO so that  the  relevant  cost 
standard can be applied. 
•  The mechanism by which changes over time of interconnection charges, that initially 
were either determined or approved by the RA, are controlled. 
•  Provision of equal access and collocation. 
•  Conditions of numbering  . 
•  Rules regarding publication of all or a selected range of the terms in interconnection 
agreements. 
•  Technical standards where they are broad enough to fall under the aegis of the RA. 
•  The  right of any party to interconnection negotiations to obtain a determination by 
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4.3.3 .Issues to be left to negotiations between the parties 
Issues that need to be resolved for an operative interconnection arrangement and that 
are not determined ex ante by the RA,  should be resolved in negotiations between the 
parties  to  such  an  arrangement.  Leaving  the  issues  to  negoatiations  does  not 
necessarily imply a declaration by the  RA  that it would in  no case  consider them  as 
subject to an ex-ante determination. It may simply reflect the RA•s assessment that the 
information required to come to a solution on the issues is so specific that the parties 
concerned should first have the opportunity to settle them. Further, the determination of 
which  topics· to-include ·jn-:1he -list -of -issues ·to-be-negatialed· is  to some degree  an 
empirical question. 
As mentioned, we next consider the issues needing agreement in negotiations between 
an  incumbent  TO  and  a  new  network  operator  for  an  individually  packaged 
interconnection  arrangement.  The  following  list  names  obvious  candidates  of  issues 
that should be included in the agenda for such negotiations: 
•  Concrete structure and rates of interconnection charges. 
•  Changes of interconnection charges over time. 
•  Locations of the points of interconnection. 
•  Concrete technical realisation of interconnection. 
•  Quality of interconnection services (signals, completion rates, etc.). 
•  Access to ancillary and supplementary services. 
•  The  precise  set  of  signalling  functionalities  to  be  provided  by  the  interconnection 
providing carrier. 
•  Network management, forecasting of traffic flow, provisioning. 
•  Realisation of network protection. 
•  Intellectual property rights. 
•  Liability and indemnity. 
•  The  method of dispute  resolution  procedure to  be  used before a determination by 
the regulator ~uld  bo requested. 
•  Dates  and  time  periods  for carrying  out  agreement,  duration  and  renegotiation  of 
agreement. 
There is the question of whether the RA should explicitly decide which issues are to be 
covered mandatorily in negotiations and by doing so limit the right of either party to an 
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ex-post determination to the items on that list. Proceeding this way could provide some 
legal  safeguard  for  the  incumbent  against the  perceived  danger of being  forced  to 
provide  interconnection  on  inessential  but  difficult-to-provide  services.  On 
consideration, there appear to be good reasons for giving greater weight to not closing 
the list in this way. There is the converse and not so unlikely possibility that particular 
services or functionalities neccessary for interconnection are not included in the list and 
that could then be used as a means to stall negotiations and to attempt not to open the 
bottleneck facilities after all. In our view it would be better to leave it to the RA as part of 
the ex-post determination on which issues it is to pass a decision. 
Parties  enter  the  negotiations  taking  the  RA•s  basic  ex-ante  determinations  as  the 
starting  point  of  their  deliberations.  The  RA  should  also,  depending  on  the  given 
situation, place particular restrictions on  the  negotiating process and  on  the  range  of 
expected results and impose minimum standards (if there are any) to be met. The most 
important  restriction  on  a  negotiation  as  a  process  would  be  the  one  regarding  a 
maximum time period within which  it should come to a conclusion and after which,  in 
case  of  non-agreement,  a  determination  of  the  RA  could  be  requested.  This  would 
place  a  bar  on  tactics  of  procrastination  and  stalling  negotiations.  Further,  some 
assurances must be obtained against the possibility that negotiations are allowed to fail 
on obviously spurious grounds. 
An important restriction that could be essential in bringing about quick results would be 
on  the  range of acceptable rates of interconnection charges. This could obviously only 
be  done  if  enough  is  already  known  in  general  about costs  and  the  degree  of  cost 
orientation of existing tariffs.  For example, suppose the  RA  knows that the  incumbent 
ro·s end-user tariff for local calls covers its costs. Then the RA should state its definite 
expectation that interconnection for originating and terminating access for a competing 
supplier  of  trunk  services  should  not  be  more  than  a given  percentage  of  that  local 
tariff. The information that we have gathered in our empirical work indicates that in this 
case,  applying  an  incremental  cost  standard  and  allowing  for  a  markup,  the  range 
should be between 50°/o and 70°/o of the local tariff. 
4.3.4  Industry committees, facilitation of negotiations, arbitration 
If the issues to be solved are of sufficient complexity so that the RA is not in a position 
to pass a determination on them, either ex-ante or ex-post, there is the institution of an 
industry-wide  committee  to  work  out  solutions.  The  RA  would  be  involved  in  the 
proceedings through active participation or participation in an observer role and would 
use its influence to support results that promise to be in the general interest. 
We  have identified three  main  groups of issues amenable to  this kind  of approach in 
which the RA takes the role more of a mediator than a regulator: 
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•  Standardisation of interfaces. 
•  Quality of end-to-end services. 
In respect of all three groups of issues there are opposing tendencies. Finely unbundled 
services, interfaces that are largely standardised, and guaranteed end-to-end quality of 
services all are supportive of competition and should therefore be considered desirable. 
At the same time,  all are achieved at the cost of inefficiencies. Very finely unbundled 
services  involve  losses  of  economies  of scope  and  scale,  and  a  great  degree  of 
standardisation and rigid quality requirements harbour the risk of stifling innovation. The 
RA is in a poor position to make the proper trade-offs to pass the right decisions. 
Generally,  the  RA  as mediator may also assist on  issues that in  principle are to be 
agreed  upon  in  negotiations,  in  other  words,  the  RA  might  act  as  a  facilitator  of 
negotiations.  The  most  typical  form  would  be  that  a  representative  of  the  RA 
participates as an observer and adviser at the meetings. The presence of the regulator 
at the negotiating table would tend to prevent deadlocks on spurious grounds (due, for 
example, to unfounded distrust by one of the parties) and thereby act as facilitator. 
When  negotiations fail,  despite the  guidance afforded by ex-ante determinations, the 
parties can  rely on  ex-post determinations to get a decision on the issues.  There is, 
however,  also the  instrument of arbitration where the  role  of arbitrator is assigned to 
outside parties. This approach has also the advantage of flexibility as, depending on the 
problem  at  hand,  the  most  knowledgeable  and  expert  persons  available  could  be 
selected.  It  would  furthermore  help  to  lessen  the  odium  of  arbitrariness  that  is 
sometimes  associated  with  regulatory  action.  The  regulatory  agency  would  have  to 
define the rules and criteria by which outside arbitrators were. to make their decisions, 
and further specify the definitiveness with which  such arbitration is to hold. Arbitration 
applied in this way is essentially a substitute for ex-post determination by the regulator 
with  the  RA  as  acting  persona  replaced  by  the  outside  arbitrator.  There  may  be 
instances,  however,  where  there are not enough people available  in  the industry with 
the  required technical as  well as regulatory expertise and who are so placed that they 
would be eligible for this kind of role. 
4.4  Implications of a an interconnection regime for the international 
settlement process 
Interconnection between incumbent telecommunications network operators of different 
countries is currently following the intema.tional settlements p:-occss, which is based on 
the presumption that these operators do not compete with each other on their domestic 
territory.  Once  a  unified  interconnection  regime  is  established  covering  the  Member 
States  of  the  EU,  whereby  new  market  entrants  will  be  able  to  compete  across 
international  borders,  the  question  arises  how  this  will  impact  on  the  international 
settlement system  and what the  policy of the  RA  should be. There are basically two 
options,  either to  bring  the  settlement system  within  the  ambit of the  interconnection 
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regime or to allow it to co-exist with it.  We will argue that the second option should be 
preferred provided that certain precautions are taken. 
Under the settlement system, a national territory appears like one single large access 
area for the partner of the incumbent TO of that country. For access to this area it pays 
one  unique  interconnection  charge,  i.e.  the  accounting  rate,  which  is  necessarily 
averaged for the whole of that territory. An  integral feature of the regime  is that the 
partner usually obtains  the  same accounting  rate  as the  interconnection  charge  for 
access to its national territory. Accounting rates are generally considered too high as 
well as the corresponding_enct~user  tariffs. 
One  of  the  main  effects  of  the  new  interconnection  regime  will  be  to  introduce 
competition  into  international  telecommunications.  New  competitors  will  be  able  to 
access customers through interconnection at the local level, paying no more than cost-
based  charges,  and  depend  for  national  and  international  transport  on  their  own 
facilities.  This  competition  will  mean that the  traditional  settlement  system  will  come 
under severe pressure. 
One  should  expect that  the  incumbent TOs will  adjust their relationships  under the 
current  settlement  system  in  response  to  these  developments.  The  new  types  of 
relationships will  depend on  the  way they decide to compete or cooperate with  each 
other in future. In principle, the new types of agreement need not differ from those that 
will  emerge  under  the  interconnection  regime  discussed  in  this  report.  However, 
incumbent  TOs  from  different  Member  States  may  have  an  interest  in  reciprocal 
agreements raising issues of competition policy if these agreements disadvantage the 
newly  entered  compet!tors.  The  regulr\tory  authorities  would  have  to  watch  out  for 
developments  of  this  nature  and  deaf  with  these  issues  by  applying  the  relevant 
competition policy either at the national or at the level of the EU. 
The current settlement system may have a longer lease on life in  relation to countries 
outside  the  EU.  One  should  expect  this  to  be  the  case  in  particular  in  respect  of 
countries with  restrictive telecommunications policies whose incumbent TOs are still in 
a  position  to  make  exclusive  dealings.  The  situation  would  effectively  amount  to  a 
prolongation of the  status quo and  need not be  affected by the  establishment of  the 
interconnection  regime.  Changes  would  have  to  await  developments  at  international 
fora  outside  the  EU,  in  particular the  new  General  Agreement of  Trade  in  Services 
(GATS) under the roof of the newly established World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
There are additional issues due to global alliances of firms based in  countries with  a 
restrictive telecommunications policy. These firms have legal advanta.ges in their hom~ 
countries and want to make use of the openness of other, more liberal countries while 
firms based in those liberal countries have no free access to the  restrictive countries. 
The asymmetry in  these  relationships has resulted  in the policy of opening domestic 
markets to foreign firms only to the extent that the  home markets of these firms are 
open to domestic operators. There is a problem with this approach as the openness of 144 
markets will always differ across sovereign nations, due to different legal systems, tax 
policies and regulatory policies. 
The EU will have to deal with this issue. The urgency to develop a policy once the EU's 
liberal  interconnection regime  is put in  place should depend on  an  evaluation  of the 
importance of the telecommunications traffic with countries posing the problem and the 
corresponding impainnent to the overall competitive situation. Again there would be a 
role for GATS and the WTO. In any case, these considerations should not interfere with 
the process of introducing the interconnection regime. 
We conclude: 
1  .  The  regulatory  authorities should for the time being  not interfere with  the  current 
international  settlement  system.  It  can  be  expected  that  this  system  will  rapidly 
adjust and with time become part of the interconnection regime in  those  countries 
covered by the regime. 
2.  The  regulatory  authorities  should  be  aware  of  the  potential  for  anticompetitive 
elements in  future  (settlement or interconnection) agreements between the former 
monopoly suppliers of international telecommunications services. 
3.  A  policy  may  have  to  be  developed  vis-a-vis  countries  not  covered  by  the 
prospective  interconnection  regime,  in  particular  countries  with  a  restrictive 
telecommunciations policy whose suppliers might exploit the liberal regime in the EU 
to their advantage. 
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5  Experience with interconnection policies in 16 countries 
A part of this  project consisted  of detailed  studies of interconnection  policies  in  the 
twelve Member States of the European Union and four overseas countries (Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and USA). This section contains summaries of these studies and 
a  cross  country  comparison.  Rea~ers who  are  interested  in  the  full-length  country 
studies are referred to the separate annex to this main report. 
5.1  Member States of the European Union 
5.1.1  Belgium 
5.1.1.1  Introduction 
By  the  ·Act  on  the  Reform  of  Certain  Public  Enterprises•  of  March  21,  1991  the 
exclusive  right to  provide  'public telecommunications'  was  given  to  the  1  00  per cent 
state-owned  enterprise  Belgacom.  This  right  comprises  operating  the  public 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  publicly  accessible  installations  (e.g.,  public 
payphones)  and  the  supply  of  the  'reserved  (monopoly)  services':  voice  telephony, 
telex, mobile, and paging services, telegraphy, and the provision of 'fixed connections' 
{leased lines). 
All  other services are  liberalised and  called  'non-reserved' or 'commercial' (e.g.,  X.25, 
value-added  services,  and  video  conferencing).  So  any  market  participant,  including 
Belgacom itself, is allowed to provide these services, provided that direct or indirect use 
is  made  of  the  public  telecommunications  infrastructure.  Accordingly,  Betgacom  is 
under the obligation to assure equal access to the reserved services for all persons or 
entities offering a non-reserved service. Betgacom is allowed to refuse access only on 
the  grounds  of  the  'essential  requirements':  security  of  network  operations, 
maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of services, and protection of data. 
The  regulatory  functions  in  Belgium  are  assigned  to  an  official administration  of  the 
state,  the  Belgian  Institute for Post and  Telecommunications ('BIPT'). The  Minister of 
Communications takes the final regulatory responsibility  . 
5.1.1.2  Status of interconnection 
At the time of this writing there are no arrangements between Belgacom and I or other 
market  participants  for  interconnection  or  special  network  access.  One  agreement, 
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Belgacom  and  Airtouch  Belgium,  a  subsidiary  of  the  US  company  Airtouch 
Communications,  are  forming  a  company for offering  mobile  communications. 
Belgacom by itself has already been operating its GSM mobile network Proximus 
since January 1994. An  interconnection agreement between Belgacom and its 
new subsidiary, Belgacom Mobile, is simultaneously being negotiated. 
Furthermore, the BIPT just authorised the private company Ram Mobile Data Belgium, 
which  is  a joint venture of the US company BeiiSouth and France Telecom  Mobiles 
International, to build and operate a mobile packet-switched network. RAM will begin to 
offer its  services in  the  first  half  _of  1995. It can  be. expected that  RAM  will. demand 
access  to  one  of the fixed  packet-switched networks in  Belgium  (the  two biggest of 
these  are being operated by Belgacom  and the bank-owned company Banksys).  As 
X.25 services belong to the non-reserved services there will probably be less need for a 
regulatory  intervention  than  in  the  GSM case  as the  parties  are  expected  to  agree 
commercially on the conditions of interconnection. 
5.1.1.3  Specific aspects and future developments 
At  the  moment  the  most  important development  in  the  Belgian  telecommunications 
sector  can  be  observed  in  the  market for mobile  services  as the  BIPT is  currently 
redrafting the telecommunications law in order to allow competition in this market. 
The  most urgent need for regulatory action  is  identified in  the field  of the GSM.  The 
81 PT  will  license  a  second  GSM  mobile  operator as  soon  as possible.  The  way  of 
regulating  interconnection  will  have  to  be  worked  out  by  the  time  the  second  GSM 
operator  has  obtained  its  licence  as  then  "there  will  be  an  exclusive  right  to 
interconnect• as the BIPT says. 
The  81 PT is  studying  possible  regulatory actions  in  the  field  of interconnection.  It  is 
regarded  as  a  matter  under  strict  control  and  approval  of  the  BIPT.  The  general 
principles of interconnection regulation will be: Agreements will be based on objective 
and non-discriminative conditions, the tariffs to be paid for access to the network of an 
operator  with  an  exclusive  right  will  have  to  be  cost-oriented  and every  reasonable 
request by an applicant for capacity, quality and location of the access points must be 
satisfied.  The  BIPT  furthermore  identifies  an  urgent  need  to  develop  a  common 
European guideline for interconnection. 
The 81 PT is currently working out a "cahier de charge• to handle the GSM case which 
will be prepublished in September 1994. It will contain the conditions for providing GSM 
mobile services and a general framework for the interconnection of the GSM network 
and the PSTN. The way of dealing with GSM interconnection will be the following: The 
two  parties  conclude  a  commercial  agreement  on  the  conditions  of interconnection 
which  will  have  to  comply  with  the  general  framework  of  the  cahier  de  charge. 
Afterwards the agreement has to be approved by the BIPT. 
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Belgacom  will  mainly  be  confronted  with  two  kinds  of  problems  in  the  field  of 
interconnection: The problems will be technical, i.e., 
- the choice of the level of the switch hierarchy at which interconnection with 
the PSTN will be realised, 
- the optimisation of routing in the PSTN, 
- measurement problems according to the fact that 15 °/o  of the  exchanges 
are not yet digitalised, 
and economic, i.e., 
- to  solve  the  problem  of  possible  substitution  effects,  Belgacom's  tariff 
strategy  has  to  be  developed  on  the  one  hand  with  reference  to  the 
European  (ONP)  legislation  on  this  issue  rcost orientation•)  and  on  the 
other  hand  with  reference  to  the  fact  that  Belgacom  should  earn  an 
acceptable  margin  above  costs  from  the  provision  of  the  product 
•interconnection•. This problem concerns the  question of how to  calculate 
exactly fully-distributed costs and especially Belgacom's access deficit. 
Another important development in  Belgian telecommunications policy is the discussion 
on the {partial) privatisation of Belgacom. As the government recently announced, it will 
sell less than 50 °/o of its Belgacom shares probably in 1995 or 1996. 
To  summarise,  all  these  developments  in  the  fields  of  privatisation  and  liberalisation 
ensure that the issue of interconnection will  rapidly be  moving into the central focus of 
Belgian telecommunications policy. 
5.1.2  Denmark 
5.1.2.1  Introduction 
5.1.2.1.1  Status of interconnection arrangements 
Denmark is a special case in the European Union in respect of telecommunications. By 
the end of 1993, the penetration of mobile telephones had reached about 6.5 per 100 
inhibitants;  approximately  1/3 of  the  terminals  met  the  digital  pan-European  (GSM-) 
standard.  In  compliance  with  European  competition  policy,  a  liberal  regime  was 
ensured  for  digital  mobile  telephony  (GSM).  Dansk  Mobil  Telefon  1/S  ("SONOFON") 
was granted a special licence to compete with the incumbent TO's daughter company, 
Tete  Danmark Mobil A/S. To date, the second GSM operator is the only independent 
national operator with full ('trunk-side') interconnection to the network of Tele Danmark 
A/S,  i.e.,  on  terms  other  than  standard  published  subscriber  ('line-side')  conditions 148  Study for the European Commiuion 
approved by the supervisory authorities. Denmark is also the EU member state with the 
highest  fixed  telephone  penetration  (58.7  subscribers  per 100  inhabitants)  and  the 
highest average usage of each subscriber line.  Overall,  Danish call  charges tor both 
fixed and mobile telephony are among the lowest in the EU. The installation charge and 
the subscription fee for fixed telephony differ between regions, an inheritance from the 
historical division of  (Southam) Denmark among four independent regional telephone 
companies  until  1991 , which  has  contributed  to  the  early achievement  of  the  cost-
based Danish tariff structure and to a pragmatic engineering tradition for interconnect 
arrangements.  Denmark  reversed  structural  policy  in  1991,  when  a  limited-liability 
·holding -company,  Tele  eanmark ·AJS-; started to·take ·over the· four regional operating 
companies and the international carrier, TELECOM AJS. 
5.1.2.1.2  Regulatory conditions for interconnect agreements 
Danish  regulatory developments are based on  liberalisation of services, not of (fixed) 
infrastructure.  This  means  that  ('trunk  side')  interconnection  to  the  concessionary 
telecommunications  infrastructure  is  presently  limited  to  wireless  networks  being 
liberalised in  pursuance of EU  competition policy. This is discussed further in  Section 
5.1.2.3. Service liberalisation, on the other hand, takes place on general public access· 
('line-side')  conditions  determined  or  approved  by the  Minister  of  Communications. 
Legally,  room  for  (re-)negotiation  of  special  interconnect  agreements  with  Tele 
Dan mark A/Sexists only for the licensed network operators of reserved services, i.e., at 
present  only  the  national  GSM  operators.  The  minister  must  approve  all  such 
interconnect agreements.  Liberalised telecommunication services are overseen by the 
Minister, notably with a view to consumer protection. Apart from  ensuring this, it would 
not  be  customary  for  Danish  politics  to  interfere  in  negotations  between  contracting 
business partners,  e.g.,  a TO  and  a VAS  provider.  Unfair competition  or misuse  of a 
dominant  position  may  be  reported  to  the  Danish  Competition  Council  or  the 
Commission. 
5.1 .2.2  Institutional and legal conditions for interconnection 
5.1.2.2.1  Market structure: the regulatory framework and entry conditions 
Danish telecommunications are  governed by the Telecommunications Act of 1897, as 
amended by later laws in  1990,  in  1992 and recently in  1994. These laws are broad 
Enabling  Acts  without  much  detail.  The  1990-amendment  of  the  law  resulted  in  a 
concentration  of the  hitherto  divested  Danish  telecommunications  infrastructure  and 
public service provision into a single private holding company, Tela Danmark A/S. This 
holding was granted an exclusive concession on the following: telephone services; text 
and  data  communication  services;  provision  of leased lines;  wireless communication 
services  (mobile  and  satellite);  point-to-point  transport  of  radio- and  television-
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· programmes.  e.g..  to  cable  operators  (CATV  distribution  itself  is  not  part  of  the 
concession); the transmission and switching facilities necessary for the above services, 
as well as for all third parties offering services to (parts of) the public. The 1990 Act also 
empowered  the  minister  to  liberalise  service  areas  originally  within  the  exclusive 
concession. This mandate was later invoked to liberalise the public data communication 
service as from  January 1993 in  accordance with  European policy, as well as private 
installation and operation of (closed) telecommunications networks on single premises. 
However,  the  1990 Act  laid  down that licences conferring  special  rights  to  a  limited 
number  of  network  operators  have  to  be  granted  by  special  laws.  Therefore,  the 
Minister is expr.essly not empowered to grant new operator licences by-Decree. So far, 
the  only case has been the special GSM Act passed simultaneously with the general 
Enabling Act. A new act is being drafted to implement EU policy on provision of certain 
wireless networks and the associated services in  Europe (e.g., using the EAMES and 
DECT-standards).  This  legal  requirement  is  of  immediate  importance  for 
interconnection arrangements between operators. Thus, the GSM  Act empowered the 
Minister to fix the conditions for interconnection to other operators. Amendments to the 
1990  Act  have  occurred  in  1992,  introducing  additional  regulation  and  control  of 
premium-rate  value-added  services  (service-900).  and  in  March  1994,  opening  pure 
resale of leased-line capacity to voice telephony. 
5.1.2.2.2  Tariff structure 
In  the  past,  the  tariffs  of  the  independent  Danish  regional  companies  were  not 
subsidised from  the  state's monopoly profits on  long-distance and  international traffic. 
So  the  tariffs  included  sufficient  return  on  investment  in  the  access  networks. 
Therefore,  Tele  Danmark's  fixed  telephone  tariffs  are  well  'rebalanced'  to  reflect 
operator  costs:  Long-distance  call  charges  (0.70  DKK  per  minute  beyond  75  km, 
including  25°/o  VAT)  are  only  about  twice  the  local  call  charges.  The  fixed  fees  for 
installation  and  subscription  contribute  significantly  to  coverage  of  the  local-loop 
(access) costs,  which  consequently do not have to  be  subsidised from  elsewhere. An 
access deficit charge on mobile calls was not found to be justified with the Danish tariff 
structure. All  public telephone calls conveyed by resellers using the liberalised leased 
lines must terminate in Tete Danmark's subscriber network(s). Therefore, such calls will 
also  be  subject  to  cost-based  tariffing  of  the  subscriber access  and  do  not  require 
separate settlements of access deficit charges. Moreover, an announced introduction of 
price-cap  tariff regulation  as  from  January  1,  1995 (instead of the  current system  of 
approval of each individual tariff change by the Minister), will allow Tete Danmark AJS 
some  extra flexibility to  respond  to the increased competition from  voice  resellers  by 
fine-tuning of its balanced tariffs, if necessary. 150 
5.1.2.2.3  Specific regulatory provisions for interconnection arrangements 
The  special  ('trunk  side')  interconnection  rights  for licensed  operators  will  generally 
follow from  the separate legislation required for issuing a special licence in Danmark 
(so  far  only  granted for the  second  GSM  operator).  As Tele  Danmark's  concession 
does not preclude operation of a similar network (and the associated public services) 
within  the  same  reserved  area,  the  interconnection  conditions  must ensure  fair  and 
non-discriminatory treatment of the interconnecting operator by the concessionary. The 
concession  describes  Tele  Danmark's  obligation  to  work  out  in  advance  such 
conditions,- which- are ··sobject-to -approvat by  ·1he -Minister  :·in ·the-actual practice,  the 
conditions were determined by negotiation of an interconnect agreement between the 
parties.  The  two  GSM  interconnect  agreements are  not available  for public  review. 
However,  the  specific  competition  rules  in  force  for  mobile  communications  are 
described  in  a  Ministerial  instruction  dated  July  8,  1993,  which  contains  provisions 
concerning 
1  )  forbidden cross subsidies 
2)  non-discrimination between similar services or networks 
3)  requirements for separate accounts in  order to control compliance with the above 
rules.  This  is  to  be  checked  by  the  external  accountants  of  the  respective 
companies,  who  are  to  issue annual  compliance statements.  It  is  not quite clear 
how the Minister would handle non-compliance, as the relevant Acts do not contain 
explicit sanctions. A possibility might be for the  Minister to report non-compliance 
to the Danish Competition Council. 
The  Minister is  empowered to  prescribe access conditions for services,  transmission 
paths and switch installations not covered by the concession or by the special licences 
referred to above. The law gives a broad outline of the considerations when formulating 
future access conditions. but refrains from detailed rules. 
The reciprocity requirements for liberalisation of pure resale of voice telephone capacity 
over  international  leased  lines  discussed  above  will  be  imposed  using  the  legal 
mandate  to  grant  permission  to  such  resellers.  Thus,  calls  from  mobile  subscribers 
connected via NMT or GSM in  Denmark may be allowed to be carried abroad by any 
service provider in the competitive domain, using pure resale of leased line capacity, if 
the  Minister accepts that the destination country has a similar liberal regime. Another 
example  of  access  conditions  for  unreserved  services  mandated  by  the  above 
considerations are  the  Service-900  requirements,  which  classify audiotex services  in 
three categories according to pricing and content, with different access conditions. All 
subscribers  have  unrestricted  access  to  Category  I  (lowest charges;  no violence  or 
information  harmful  to  children,  no  gambling  or sexual  information).  All  subscribers 
connected to switches which allow individual number blocking on request have access 
to  Category  II  (medium  charges;  no  violence  or information  harmful  to  children,  no 
gambling  or sexual  information).  Subscribers desiring access to Category Ill (highest • 
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charges) must apply for access to the operating telephone company, which is allowed 
to  offer  this  service  only  via  switches  technically  capable  of  giving  access  from 
designated subscriber lines. Obviously, the concern here is consumer protection,  not 
universal  service.  Compliance  with  the  content  regulation  of the  three  categories  is 
controlled by a special Service-900 council. 
5.1.2.3  The incumbent operator: Tale Danmark AIS 
At  least 51 °/o  of Tele  Danmark's share capital  is to be  held by the  state.  The  recent 
flotation of shares resulted in a major net capital injection into the company, which was 
allowed to keep the proceeds from the flotation of the state's shares. The shares were 
hailed  by  analysts  as  one  of  the  best  privatisation  buys  in  European 
telecommunications, and were oversubscribed by a factor of four. Tele Danmark's own 
capital rose to some 70°/o of the total operating capital. The European Commission has 
approved this  unusual arrangement. The net consolidated revenues of Tele Danmark 
AIS  in  1993 were  16,200 Mill.  DKK,  of which  72% was  earned  in  the  concessionary 
area,  and  the  rest  in  competitive  business  areas.  The  regional  operating  companies 
have  followed  their own  evolutionary strategies  until  1991, as  partly  reflected  in  the 
different fixed charges still in force. In the coming years, the presence of ISDN and the 
further  digitalisation  and  development  of  IN  will  gradually  unify the  more  advanced 
technical functions of importe:tnce for modern interconnectivity arrangements. However, 
except for any new network operators with special rights granted by law in the coming 
years (EAMES- and DECT-operators), the present legal infrastructure monopoly would 
appear to leave little scope for interconnection agreements between network operators 
in Denmark. 
5.1.2.4  The mobile operators in Denmark 
5.1.2.4.1  Tele Danmark Mobil AJS 
In 1993, 8°/o of Tele Danmark AJS  net revenues came from its daughter company Tele 
Danmark  Mobil  A/S,  which  at  the  end  of  the  year  had  72,000  GSM  subscribers, 
252,000 NMT subscribers and 59,000 paging subscribers. The net revenues originated 
from  fixed  subscriber charges  (24°/o)  and  variable  traffic charges  (76°/o).  Peak  traffic 
charges are the same for NMT- and GSM-subscribers; off-peak charges can be lower. 
In  particular, Tele Danmark Mobil offers a -vacation subscription" on  the analog NMT 
system: this may become an attractive alternative to a standard telephone in weekend 
cottages, not only for the user, but also for Tele Danmark A/S, which does not have to 
install  and  maintain  a  little-used  fixed  subscriber  line  in  rural  holiday  areas.  Tele 
Danmark  Mobil  is  free  to  lower  its  tariffs  in  the  competitive  area  (GSM),  and  may 
reduce  NMT tariffs by  up  to  25o/o  without seeking  approval  from  the  Minister.  It  has 152  Study for the European Commission 
contracts with a number of resellers. There is no shared cellular infrastructure with the 
GSM competitor, Dansk Mobil Telefon 1/S. 
5.1.2.4.2  Dansk Mobil Telefon 1/S c·soNOFON•) 
SONOFON is the brand name of the second operator with a GSM licence in Denmark. 
It  is  a  partnership  with  full  liability  of  the  partners  {1/S).  These  are  the  two 
telecommunications companies GN Store Nord (Denmark) and BeiiSouth (US), and the 
investment.  .companies. blordic. Isle-Holding  .  .and. Jncentive...respectively. By the end of 
1993, SONOFON had some 30,000 subscribers to its GSM service. ·tts traffic charges 
(DKK  1.33 per minute off-peak;  OK  2.66 per minute during peak day hours)  are  So/o 
lower than  Tele  Danmark Mobil's corresponding charges.  Despite this,  its number of 
subscribers grew more slowly than Tele Danmark's in 1993. SONOFON sources claim 
that  the  competing  GSM  operator and  his  resellers  had  offered  GSM  terminals  on 
dumping conditions during campaigns, notably during the Christmas period 1993. 
5.1 .2.5  A sketch of the two Danish GSM interconnect agreements 
SONOFON  is  not  the  ·second"  GSM  operator in  Denmark  in  terms  of  interconnect 
agreements. On the contrary, it was this operator who actually negotiated the detailed 
terms  with  Tele  Danmark  A/S  after  receiving  a  licence  from  the  Minister  in  1991. 
Subsequently, Tele  Dan  mark A/S  imposed the same terms on its daughter company 
Tele  Danmark  Mobil,  and  these  terms  were  approved  by  the  Minister,  who  thus 
appears  to  have  used  the  non·discriminatory principle  of  the  •most favoured  nation" 
approach. 
The  agreements  are  confidential.  This  is  believed  to  be  due  to  the  sensitive  pricing 
issue for the leased lines needed by both operators to connect their radio base stations 
and  GSM  switches to  the  gateway points  in  the  infrastructure of Tele  Danmark.  The 
Danish  GSM  licence  does  not  grant  permission  to  set  up  and  operate  any  own 
alternative  fixed  infrastructure  for  this  purpose,  e.g.,  using  radio  relays  links.  As  a 
compensation, it would seem reasonable to grant each public GSM operator a discount 
in  the  public  interest.  In  the  Danish  context  with  a  mature,  yet  unsaturated  analog 
mobile system (NMT), it might well be argued that such a leased-line discount should 
ensure  matching  to  the  corresponding  internal  cost  price  of  the  equivalent  fixed 
infrastructure of the  NMT system. The latter would  otherwise enjoy an  unfair pricing 
bias below GSM, simply due to its ownership by the concessionary. 
The  agreement  is  further  based  on  a  geographical  development strategy  of  mutual 
delivery from and to the Mobile Switching .Centres (MSCs) of the GSM operator via the 
nearest interconnection point in the concessionary's infrastructure; a maximum of 8 to 
10 such  points  are  eventually foreseen,  dependent on  the  growth  of traffic  volume. 
Accordingly,  the  national  interconnection  charge  (for  both  conveyance  in  the  fixed 
network and access to its subscribers)  is simply determined by the  regional  tariff for 
.. 
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fixed telephony (0.47 DKK per minute by day}, less an (undisclosed) discount. Similarly, 
the conveyance charge for international traffic (including roaming) is derived from Tele 
Danmark's international tariff system, less a discount which is understood to be smaller 
than the discount for national traffic. This might provide an incentive for SONOFON to 
exploit the  new leased-line  resale  liberalisation  in  international  roaming  agreements. 
This would presumably have to be accepted by the Danish Minister if the leased line 
would  terminate  in  the  national  fixed  telephone  networks,  and  appropriate  national 
conveyance charges were paid from there to the terminating GSM-network(s). 
F.rom  the .above indications,..Jhere..appears Jo _be.no .additional access deficit charges 
payable  to  Tete  Danmark.  This  is  reasonable  in  view  of  the  cost-covering  local 
telephone charge in Denmark. 
There is no right of equipment collocation on Tale Danmark's premises. 
It  is  our  impression  that  SONOFON  is  much  more  content  with  the  interconnect 
agreement with Tele Danmark AIS than with the aggressive marketing strategy of the 
competitor.  This  may  be  understood  by  noting  that  the  terms  were  negotiated  by 
SONOFON itself with the four regional telephone companies (acting on behalf of Tele 
Danmark A/S), and that the resulting agreement was actually drafted by SONOFON's 
legal counsel. The same terms, conditions and charges were subsequently invoked for 
the competitor's interconnection agreement with the parent company, and the  Minister 
approved  this  procedure  as  being  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  for  the  two 
interconnecting GSM-operators. 
5.1.3  France 
5.1.3.1  Introduction 
The  evolution  of  the  regulatory and  economic context  in  France is  dominated by  the 
year 1990, during which two laws were passed, one in July, which transformed France 
Telecom (FT) into a kind of public company and a second, in December, which defined 
the regulatory framework under which competition may be opened in France. Basically, 
France  Telecom  keeps  its  monopoly on  infrastructure  provision  and  voice  telephony 
and telex. A new category is defined, •bearer services•, for which a licence is needed 
from  the  Minister of  Post and Telecommunications.  Finally,  an  important category of 
networks, the so-called ·independent networks· has been authorised, for the usage of 
•closed user groups•. 
During the years 1990-92, further liberalisation measures were taken.  France Telecom 
has been given a ·contrat de Plan• which establishes the rights and duties of the public 
operator,  in  particular with  regard to tariffs.  VSAT networks (one way and two ways) 
have been authorised by the Minister. Trunked systems have been licensed to private 
operators,  in  different  parts  of  the  country.  Several  decrees  have  been  passed  to 154 
implement the liberalisation procedures contained in the law of 1990. SFR and France 
Telecom have been granted a licence to operate a GSM mobile network. 
5.1.3.2  Market structure 
At the moment, France Telecom still remains the main operator of telecommunications 
services  in  France.  SFR  (Societe  Fran~e  de  Radiotelephonie), a company held  to 
43.5°/o  by  CGE,  Compagnie  Generale  des  Eaux  (a  holding  company  specialised  in 
water  distribution,  civil  engineering,  manufacturing  of .  thermal.. equipment. .and  real 
estate  property),  Vodafone,  and  BeiiSouth,  are  providing  analog  (NMT 450)  mobile 
services  in  competition  with  France  Telecom's  Radiocom  2000,  as  well  as  GSM 
services in competition with F'"rs ltineris services. 
Bearer services may be provided upon leased lines or cable television networks. They 
are  essentially  delivered  by  Transpac,  the  subsidiary  of  France  Telecom.  Recently, 
Sprint  International  has  been  granted  a  licence  by  DGPT,  and  BT  France  is  in  the 
process of being awarded one. Compagnie Generale de Videocommunications (CGV), 
a subsidiary of CGE  operating cable  television  networks,  has been  granted a bearer 
service licence in order to provide conveyance services to the DECT network that CGV 
has been authorised to operate in Saint Maur. 
At  the  end  of  1992,  there  were,  according  to  the  DGPT,  97  independent  networks 
connected  to  the  public  network.  However,  most of these  independent networks  are 
small  networks, geographically limited. Among the largest are the ones of EDF,  which 
up to  now had  consisted  of  local  •islands• with  limited interconnection points with  the 
public networks, mainly for providing local interfaces with the customers. 
The  French  regulation  policy is framed  by the  Law  no  90-117 of  December 30,  1990 
"Defining the new regulatory framework of the  French telecommunication policy• which 
established  the  conditions  of  competition  in  telecommunication  in  France.  The  law 
declares  that  •the  public  telecommunications  operator  alone  may  establish 
telecommunications network infrastructures which are open to the general public·, but 
"by  derogation,  the  Minister of  Telecommunications may license a person  other than 
the public telecommunications operator to establish or operate a radio network, ... • The 
Law  authorises  the  Minister  to  license  wire  •independent  networks•,  namely 
"telecommunications  networks designed  for  private  or shared  use•.  •shared•  means 
that the network is ·reserved for use by several private individuals or corporate entities 
who  are  members of one  or more  closed  user groups in  order to exchange  internal 
communications  within  the  same  group.  The  regulator  himself  has  gradually  been 
extending the scope of its definition. 
Network to  network interconnections may occur,  stricto sensu,  in the following cases: 
interconnection  between  the  licensed  mobile  networks  and  the  public  network,  and 
interconnection between independent networks and the public network, subject to the • 
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restrictions defined above. But other interconnection problems may arise, related to the 
interoperability of services. 
5.1.3.3  Interconnection of mobile networks 
For  analog  mobile  services,  namely  NMT  and  Radiocom  2000,  the  agreement  for 
interconnection  has not given  special  rights  to  SFR  to  access FT's  public networks. 
SFR has leased lines to FT at list prices. SFR had an  obligation to interconnect their 
switch to the closest local switch  . 
Concerning  the  usage  of  the  network,  no  particular  charging  conditions  were  fixed 
between SFR and FT. For the traffic going from the mobile to the fixed network, SFR is 
considered as a customer to FT and has been able to get the same advantages as any 
large customer, namely, a higher subscription fee and a lower usage price (reductions 
of up to 50°/o for the usage). This special tariff designed for large subscribers is called 
"Trafic Plus·. For the traffic originated from the fixed network to the public network, the 
calling party did not have any extra expenses to pay, its call being considered by FT as 
a normal call. The difference was due by the callee. It represented a unit charge every 
8  seconds.  Therefore,  no  payment was  made  by  France  Telecom  to  SFR  for  calls 
originated from  the fixed  network to the mobile network. Those conditions have been 
changed  after  the  June  1994  determination  by  the  Minister  of  Post  and 
Telecommunications. 
For GSM  services,  an  agreement between  SFR  and  FT has also been  reached  on  a 
commercial basis.  SFR  has  recently put the dispute in  front of the  Minister who,  after 
consultation with DGPT, had to give an arbitrage. In June 1994 this arbitrage has been 
given to the advantage of SFR. 
Concerning  the  access  to  the  switched  network and  its  usage,  SFR  did  also benefit 
from the determination. Before it, the usage related payments that SFR had to incur to 
connect one of its subscribers with a third party accessible through the PSTN were the 
foltowing: 
- The tariff of the outgoing traffic from the GSM network to the PSTN was 0.4 telecom 
unit37 every 24 seconds for a local call,  and 0.8 unit every 24 seconds for national 
calls. This applied to  each  successful conversation. The  DGPT has calculated that 
the GSM operator benefited from a 20 °/o  rebate on the national traffic charges. No 
rebate was available for international calls. 
•  After the determination, the tariff for local calls is 0.169 unit every 24 seconds, and 
0.368  unit  every  24  seconds  for  national  calls.  No  rebate  is  still  available  for 
international calls.  SFR also obtains a rebate for calls to the audiotex and videotex 
kiosque  (0.063 unit per period of 24  seconds).  SFR  gets a payment from  France 
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Telecom for billing and charging (9% of the sums which have to be paid by SFR to 
France Telecom). 
•  For incoming call traffic issued from the PSTN to the GSM network, the service was 
charged,  before  the  determination,  on  the  basis  of outgoing  traffic  (0.4  and  0.8 
telecom units every 24 seconds) multiplied by 1.6. This represented the difference 
between what FT receives from the caller and what FT pays to SFR.It is the price of 
usage of the public network for an  incoming call. The coefficient 1.6 was added to 
take  account of the  discrepancy of efficiency between the two networks.  In  other 
words,. calls-originating .from. the .. PST-N-may ·AOt·FeaGh· their· termination due to  a 
lower quality of service of the GSM compared to the PSTN. In compensation for this 
gap  in  efficiency  (which  puts  a  burden  on  the  PSTN,  since  calls  that are  started 
inside it and are not terminated do not give receipts to FT),  SFR pays more to  FT 
than FT to SFR. 
- After the determination, the new tariffs applying for outgoing traffic (0.169 and 0.368 
unit every 24 seconds) are valid for incoming traffic. The coefficient of 1.6 mentioned 
above, has been decreased to 1.1. The price that a caller from the fixed network has 
to pay for reaching the callee from the mobile network has to be announced by SFR 
to  France Telecom at minimum 3 months in advance.  The  GSM  no longer has to 
provide an audiotex box or a call forwarding feature, which would improve its quality 
of service. The difference of efficiency between the two networks will be supervised 
by  a  "Comite  de  Pilotage•  (Steering  Committee)  which  will  adjust  the  coefficient 
accordingly.  As  for outgoing  calls,  a supplementary charge  is  due  by SFR  to  FT. 
equal to  9 °/o  of the sums paid by the subscribers of the  RTPC,  to take account of 
the necessity for France Telecom to charge and bill customers in lieu of SFR. 
The determination of June 1994 also presents the principles governing the evolution of 
the interconnection tariffs. Analog and digital leased lines at 64 kbit/s, 2 MbiVs, 8 MbiVs, 
and 34 MbiVs prices will evolve from March 1,  1995 to December 31,  1996 at the retail 
price index minus 3°/o.  Beyond, another price cap will be set up. For switched services, 
the  same  price cap  (RPI-3°/o  from  March  1,  1995 to  March  1,  1996) will  apply to  the 
usage  related  connection  charges,  in  absence  of  a  substantial  tariff  rebalancing  of 
subscription and local call charges. 
For telepoint services,  an  interesting case  is  CGV's experimental test in  Saint Maur, 
authorised by DGPT. The Saint Maur licence does not oblige CGV to interconnect with 
other  radio  electrical  networks,  while  the  Pointel  licence  of  France  Telecom  does 
contain  such  an  obligation.  This  asymmetry,  to  some  extent,  reflects  the  asymmetry 
between the two licences: one is ·experimental•, the other is permanent. 
On  the other hand the separation of accounts between the DECT activity of CGV and 
the rest of its activity is clearly required. The only purpose of this separation of accounts 
is to ensure that receipts and expenses generated by the licence are clearly identified. 
But the licence does not prohibit any transfer of resources between this activity and the 
rest  of  activities  of  the  group.  In  contrast,  in  the  case  of  Pointel  the  separation  of • 
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accounts is required in order to make sure that competition is not hindered by undue 
transfer  of  resources  from  activities  to  which  the  operator  has  exclusive  rights  to 
activities in the competitive domain. 
5.1.3.4  Interconnection of independent networks 
The Law of December 29, 1990 offers the possibility to set up, after authorisation by the 
Ministry,  •independent  networks•,  namely  wire  networks  to  interconnect  either  the 
members of a-corporate-entity-or·the IIISiiibers·of" a-•closed user group•, defined as a 
community of entities having a common economic or social interest but not necessarily 
linked  together  with  financial  participations  (e.g.,  a  car  manufacturer  and  its 
concessionaires). These independent networks may be connected to the public network 
but the conditions of interconnection are organised in such a way as not to breach the 
monopoly on voice telephony. 
Generally,  the  interconnection  is  handled  through  a  termination  point.  Such  a 
termination  point is,  according to the law, defined as  •a  physical point of connection, 
which meets the specifications needed for access to the network, and to transmit and 
receive data through this connection•. They are considered to be an integral part of the 
public network. 
The  practice  of  interconnection  in  France  has  been  so  far  to  scale  down  the 
potentialities of independent networks in  order not to bypass the  usage of the  French 
public  network.  For  example,  when  the  independent  network  is  accessed  by a third 
party  (not  belonging  to  the  closed  user  group)  the  communications  inside  the 
independent network may not go beyond a local taxation area. This may change in the 
future. 
5. 1.3.5  Interconnection of services 
5.1.3.5.1  Bearer services 
In  the  French  regulation,  bearer  services  occupy  a  middle  position  between  voice 
telephony (still a monopoly) and value-added service (completely open to competition). 
Bearer  services  were  originally  intended  as  data  services  (X.25  in  particular)  which 
would  be  subject  to  an  authorisation  by the  Ministry.  Bearer services  have  recently 
been extended to the transportation of voice, and this may represent a way to liberalise 
the voice telephony market without waiting for the 1998 deadline, and without passing a 
law for this. 
At  the  moment there  are  only 3 authorised owners of licences of bearer services for 
data transport: Transpac,  Sprint, and BT France (the latter has not yet officially been 
awarded the licence, but claims to have it). To these, one has to add the Compagnie 158  Study tor the European Comnislion 
Generale des Eaux for the delivery of its bearer service over its cable network to the 
DECT operator in Saint Maur. 
So far, there have been no problems raised on account of the interconnection of bearer 
services since the licences were issued too recently to have competitors arguing about 
their interconnection with Transpac or the public network. One of our interview partners, 
belonging  to  the  French  subsidiary  of  a  big  international  operator,  said  that 
interconnection of bearer services (X.25) may not be necessary for data transmission. 
But if this happened, several regulatory problems might occur such as the numbering of 
X.25  access,  the  interconnection  charges;· ·ancr perhaps-'Some···exchange· -ot-··data 
between  the  two  interconnected  network operators for network  management.  These 
issues would have to be tackled by the regulatory authority. 
5.1.3.5.2  Kiosque services 
·Kiosque·  services  are  provided  by  France  Telecom  to  service  providers  (SP)  of 
videotex  and  audiotex  services.  Under  this  principle,  FT  acts  as  a  host  which 
interconnects with SP computers and manages the commercial and technical interface 
with  the  customer.  FT  meters,  bills  and  charges  the  customer  and  pays  the  SP  a 
standard amount of money in  accordance with  the use the  customer has made of the 
SP's service. 
A point may be raised whether FT,  as the operator of the public network, is entitled to 
organise the  market for videotex and audiotex services and to establish the conditions 
of  interconnection  to  these  services  without  any  regulation  by  DGPT.  The  latter 
answers that videotex and audiotex services are  open to free competition.  If an  SP  is 
not content with the service provided by FT through the kiosque system he or she can 
have  a direct  access  to  the  customer  and  set  up  his  or  her  own  kiosque  system. 
Therefore,  there  is  no  need,  according  to  DGPT,  to  intervene  in  the  market 
organisation,  provided  FT  does  not  abuse  its  dominant position.  When  a competitive 
supply  of  either  Minitel  or  Audiotel  (the  trademark  of  FT's  services)  emerges,  DGPT 
may intervene to ensure that the conditions of fair competition are fulfilled. 
5.1.3.5.3  Intelligent networks 
The  present state of thinking in terms of access to intelligent network features is quite 
limited in  France,  particularly outside  France Telecom.  Service providers say that this 
issue is too far ahead of their concern and in  any case,  it is up to France Telecom to 
decide what would be meant by •intelligent network• since the public operator is much 
more advanced than they are on this issue. The opinion of FT is that there is no need of 
ONP  for  intelligent networks, because,  by  definition,  intelligent network functionalities 
would  be  in  the  competitive  sector,  and  ONP  principles  would  not apply to  an  area 
where  exclusive  rights  are  not  granted to  France Telecom.  It  might be  necessary to 
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dominant) position, but this could be achieved through a control ex post, on a case-by-
case basis. 
5.1.3.6  Accounting separation 
In  order to  give  a fair access to the public network to any competitor,  including  the 
subsidiaries  of the  public operator,  the separation  of accounts between  the  activities 
related to the  operation of the public network and voice telephony and telex services 
and other, competitive services (including bear.er ser.vlces) are  .required from the public 
operator in  all  the  licences granted to its subsidiaries, as well as in  its own  terms  of 
references (Cahier des Charges de France Telecom). Moreover, cost accounting may 
be  necessary in the activity of the public operator, to avoid cross subsidisation and to 
compute interconnection charges on a fair basis. 
The  French regulator seemingly does not share the attitude of Oftel exemplified in the 
document ·Interconnection and accounting separation: The next steps•. This document 
discusses  the  possibility of splitting  the  activity  of the  network  operation  of a public 
operator  into  several  costing  units  and  then  evaluates  the  cost  of  each  unit.  This 
approach  may  be  subject,  according  to  the  French  regulator,  to  at  least  three 
drawbacks: 
- The  regulator  runs  the  risk  of  having  to  do  the  business  of  the  public  operator 
managers, namely, having to know in detail the costs of each and every piece of the 
operator's activity, and to carry out this activity in place of management. 
- More  probably,  there  will  always  be  an  asymmetry  of  information  between  the 
regulator  and  the  regulated  company,  thereby  creating  the  possibility  for 
opportunistic behavior. 
- Even if the behavior of the public operator's managers is •fair·, the intimacy created 
between  the  regulator  and  the  regulated  company  through  the  common  detailed 
examination of the  accounts may give rise  to a •capture•, or at the  very least to a 
type of ·complicity•, in which each of the parties loses the perception of its own role. 
5.1.3.7  The future of regulation in France 
The French regulator is pondering a transition to a more competition oriented regulation 
regime. Interconnection issues in that repect may become essential. Whatever the form 
of liberalisation, the transition will evolve from a legal monopoly to a licences granting 
regime.  It may rely on  an  extension of the  existing  possibilities given  by the  Law  of 
December 29, 1990: 
- Independent networks are already licensed. By extending the concept of closed user 
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through the creation of a separate subsidiary by the owners of those independent 
networks {EDF, SNCF, etc.), the resale of capacity may become much easier. 
- Cable  television  networks  may  benefit  from  the  possibility  to  provide  telephony 
services  to  improve  their  profitability,  while  diversifying  their  activity  towards 
interactive image services. However, this activity may be regulated simply because 
there are many foreign investors in those companies. 
- T  eleports may offer a third altemative for the liberalisation of infrastructures, but they 
alSO- should  be.. given.. the. .obUgation..of...universal. service _provision. in .. their:. area  (at 
least)  and  their  scope  should  be  limited  in  order to  avoid  the  creation  of  local 
telephony franchises around a city. 
Whatever  its  form,  the  trend  towards  liberalisation  of the  infrastructure  provision  in 
France may be encouraged and controlled by the regulator. 
5.1.4. Germany 
5.1.4.1  Introduction 
The process towards restructuring of the postal and telecommunications sectors started 
in  1987  when  the  Government  appointed  a commission  to  review  the  need  for  and 
possibilities of a  reform  in  Germany.  This so-called  Postreform  I culminated with  the 
passage of the Poststrukturgesetz in 1989. On the organisational side, the restructuring 
involved a separation of the regulatory and operational functions and the breaking up of 
the  Deutsche  Bundespost into  three public enterprises with  DBP Telekom  (Telekom) 
taking telecommunications. 
With respect to the supply of telecommunications services, monopoly was declared the 
exception and competition the rule. While Telekom retained monopoly of the telephone 
service  and  fixed  transmission  links,  satellite  communications  for  data  and  other 
services  were  exempted  from  this  monopoly,  privately  owned  mobile  telephone 
networks  were  permitted  {and  subsequently  licensed),  and  data  and  value-added 
network services were completely liberalised. 
Implementation  of  the  reform  started  at  the  beginning  of  1990  and  has  been 
progressing since. Besides the various operations of Telekom in the market segments 
open to competition, more than 380 providers of telecommunications services were in 
February 1994 on  register with  the  Federal  Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
{FMPT).  Most notable among these are two digital cellular mobile services networks, 
more than 50 trunked mobile services networks, and 40 satellite services networks, all 
operated by private companies. A large share of the attention of the regulator has in the 
past  years  been  directed  towards  developing  and  implementing  a  framework  within 
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which  suitable candidates for offering the  mentioned services could  be  selected  and 
licensed. 
Currently (mid-1994) the second  round  of reforms,  the  Postreform  II,  has come  to a 
conclusion with passage of the corresponding laws through parliament. The reform will 
transform the successor (public) enterprises of the former Deutsche  Bundespost into 
corporations  under  private  law  and  also  create  a  regulatory  council  (the 
Regulierungsra(J. The latter will in future have powers of consent as regards regulatory 
measures and  will  have to  be  consulted by the  FMPT when  making appointments to 
key positions in the regulatory domain.-
5.1.4.2  The framework for interconnection 
5.1.4.2.1  The legal framework 
The Telecommunications Installation Act (Femmeldeanlagengesetz,  FAG) governs the 
rights  regarding  establishment  and  operation  of  telecommunications  facilities.  It 
specifies that the FMPT may grant licences for special networks to operators other than 
Telekom. Issues of interconnection are, however, not dealt with in the FAG specifically; 
conditions  for interconnection with- Telekom  are  always  specified  in  the  licence.  The 
FMPT generally assures the  right to interconnection already in  the  call  for tender for 
licences where it also provides specific information on  the matter for the orientation of 
bidders.  Concurrently  I  by  a  specific  regulatory  act,  Telekom  is  obliged  to  provide 
access to its network for the licensees. 
As  part of a set of regulations  on  the  telephone  service  and  infrastructure  monopoly  I 
the  FMPT  has  developed  general  principles  regarding  interconnection,  which  are 
primarily  aimed  at  service  providers.  These  principles  prescribe  that  leased  lines 
obtained from Telekom can freely be interconnected with each other and with the PSTN 
as well as with the networks of private service providers: subscriber lines may be used 
as  transmission  paths  for  services  other than  the  telephone  service;  Telekom  must 
assure  a  non-discriminatory  interconnection  between  subscriber  lines  and  private 
networks;  and  non-discriminatory access for service  providers  is  to  be  implemented. 
T  elekom was called upon to devise and  submit to the  Minister for approval a concept 
and a time schedule by which  it plans to comply with  the  requirements. This concept 
has  in  the  meantime  been  submitted  by  Telekom  and  is  currently  in  the  process  of 
public discussion. A decision on it by the regulator is expected by the end of 1994 (see 
Section 5.1.4.2.6). 
The  regulations state  as  a general principle that tariffs and other conditions of supply 
have to be non-discriminatory. This means that Telekom as a supplier of leased lines or 
services  over  the  telephone  network  may  not  concede  to  its  own  competitive  units 
terms that are better than offered private service providers. If there are  economies of 
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lower charges for end users there and not in  terms of lower internal prices for units 
offering competitive services. 
Access charges to compensate Telekom for universal service obligations placed on  it 
are not provided for.  Note too that these rules regarding tariffs and the setting of non-
discriminatory  internal  prices  concern  only  the  transmission  links  in  the  telephone 
network, not the switching and ancillary facilities as these are not defined to be· part of 
the monopoly. Thus, the determination of tariffs and prices for switching functions when 
carried out by Telekom for a customer/competitor is not addressed. Telekom would be 
free to set tariffs and internal prices .as dictated b.y .competifute.conditions. 
Nowhere  in  the  regulations  concerning  the  licensing  of  new  competitors  or  in  the 
licences themselves are there provisions that would make the terms and conditions of 
privately negotiated interconnection agreements publicly available. Similarly, the terms 
of  the  Mannesmann!T  elekom  interconnection  agreement,  beyond that what  is  known 
from the determination procedure (see Section 5.1.4.2.3}, are not open to the public. 
5.1.4.2.2  Current status of interconnection arrangements 
We  mentioned  above  that  there  are  now  about  380  registered  suppliers  of 
telecommunications  services.  Most  of  these  use  the Telekom  facilities  on  Telekom's 
general contract terms and conditions (this might change once Telekom's new concept 
of ONP access to its network has been approved by the regulator and is implemented). 
Interconnection arrangements in the sense that particular terms had to be arrived at or 
be determined by the regulator exist in the cases of the cellular mobile networks. 
The  first  controversial  case  of  interconnection  concerned  the  private  GSM  cellular 
mobile telephone network D 2 of Mannesmann Mobilfunk.  38 This was a pioneering case 
in  the  sense  that  for  the  first  time  in  the  German  context  the  regulator,  against  the 
determined opposition of the  incumbent carrier and much of public opinion, enforced a 
ruling  by  which  the  new  competitor  was  granted  terms  of  interconnection  that  were 
substantially  more  advantageous  than  had  initially  been  offered  by  Telekom. 
Mannesmann  and  accordingly  De TeMobil  was  also  given  the  right  to  build  its  own 
microwave  links  to  connect  Mobile  Services  Switching  Centers  (MSCs)  and  Base 
Station  Controllers  (BSCs).  This  constituted  a  departure  from  the  exclusive  rights 
normally  held  by  T  elekom  to  construct  and  maintain  fixed-link  networks.  In  Section 
5.1.4.2.3  we  provide  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  process  that  led  to  this 
determination. 
38  The conditions for interconnection of the 0  1 network to the PSTN were negotiated concurrently. No 
disputes  surfaced  regarding  the  negotiations  between  the  operators  of the  0  1  network,  at  first 
DeTeCon and afterwards DeTeMobil, on the one hand and Telekom on the other. Both DeTeCon and 
De T  eM obi  I are subsidiaries of T  elekom.  As it turned out, the charges accorded Mannesmann have 
also been applied to the D 1 operators. • 
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The consortium E-Pius, in which two large German companies, Veba and Thyssen, are 
the  major shareholders,  won  in  1993 the  licence for a digital cellular mobile  network 
using the DCS 1800 standard. In the call for tender, the charges for leased lines and for 
use  of the  PSTN  that were  determined  in  the  Mannesmann  case  were  listed  as  an 
orientation for bidders. For a more detailed analysis of interconnection issues that have 
arisen between E-Pius and Telekom see Section 5.1.4.2.4. 
Reportedly,  Telekom's established analog cellular operation,  the .so-called  C-Netz,  is 
also now going to be provided with interconnection services from Telekom's monopoly 
area on the conditions enjoyed by the th~~e digital cellular networks  . 
T  elekom  has  transferred  all  its  mobile  telecommunications  operations  to  a  1  00  °/o 
owned subsidiary, De TeMobil. This company has been awarded licences similar to the 
ones  held  by  its  privately  owned  competitors,  and  in  particular  containing  similar 
assurances regarding interconnection. 
The  FMPT  just  established  the  right  of  the  mobile  operators  to  interconnect  their 
networks  directly.  It  can  be  expected  that  there  will  be  some  interconnection 
agreements in this area in the near future. For details regarding this development see 
Section 5.1.4.2.5. 
The  licences of the  approximately 40 private satellite networks give  them  the  right to 
interconnect  with  networks  of  Telekom,  including  the  PSTN,  on  Telekom's  general 
contract  terms  and  conditions.  Satellite  networks  can  be  used  for  any  kind  of  data 
communications and for this  purpose be  interconnected with  the PSTN.  They can  be 
used for telephone service only by special permission from  the  FMPT as specified  in 
the  licence.  This  was  important  early  after  German  reunification  in  1989  as  it  was 
thought that through the provision of telephony over private satellite networks the  then 
existing  general  bottleneck  could  be  alleviated.  This  aspect  has  since  then  become 
unimportant as has the provision of telephony over satellite networks. 
The  more than  50 trunked mobile networks that have been licensed since  1990 have 
the  right  to  be  interconnected  with  the  PSTN  of  Telekom.  This  interconnection  is 
provided  according  to  Telekom's  general  contract  terms  and  conditions,  but  special 
arrangements  may  also  be  negotiated  with  Telekom  subject  to  the  approval  by  the 
FMPT as regards charges. 
In June 1994, the  FMPT selected the  Gesellschaft fur Datenfunk (GfD), a consortium 
led by AWE, one of the large electricity utilities in the country, to obtain a licence for a 
mobile  radio  data  network.  The  licence  provides  for  the  right  to  interconnect  with 
Telekom's networks. It specifies that use of the PSTN shall be according to Telekom's 
general contract terms and conditions while the terms for the provision of leased lines 
shall have to be agreed between the new operator and Telekom, subject to approval by 
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Furthermore, in August 1994 the Deutsche Funkruf Gesellschaft (DFR) and the MiniRuf 
GmbH  received  licences  for operating  private  paging  networks.  The  call  for tender 
contains  assurances  regarding  interconnection  with  the  networks  of Telekom.  The 
terms for the use of the PSTN as well as for the provision of leased lines will have to be 
negotiated with Telekom, subject, as before, to the approval by the FMPT. 
The same conditions hold for the call for tender for a terrestrial flight telephone system 
(TFTS) for which the FMPT invited bids in April1994. The licence will furthermore grant 
the  right of the  licensee to interconnect its network to fixed networks abroad  and  to 
cellular  mobile  networks  in .-Germany ..  and·-abroad  •.. So ~far-there·  -haS· -been  ·no  final 
decision  on  the  tender  as  the  first  decision  of  the  FMPT  to  license  the  Telekom 
subsidiary  De  TeMobil,  was  blocked  by  a  German  Administrative  Court  which  was 
responding to a complaint filed by two Telekom rivals for the licence. 
As  mentioned,  licences  for  the  trunked  mobile,  mobile  radio  data,  and  the  paging 
services networks contain  passages to the effect that charges for leased lines and/or 
use of the PSTN may be negotiated between the operators and Telekom according to 
the  needs  of  the  particular  services.  So  far,  the  praxis  has  been  to  grant  these 
operators no more favourable conditions than are generally extended to end users. 
5.1.4.2.3  The Mannesmann!Telekom interconnection determination: a case study in 
regulation 
The determination in the matter of interconnection of the Mannesmann•s GSM  network 
with  the  PSTN  was the most complex issue that the  regulator had to  face  so far.  The 
proceedings leading to this determination took from  October 1990 to  September 1991. 
During  this period  it occupied  front  stage  in  the  whole  public  discussion  surrounding 
telecommunications liberalisation. The case is of sufficient interest to discuss it  briefly 
below as indicative of the problems that may arise between a bottleneck supplier and a 
customer, particularly one setting out to compete with the bottleneck supplier in its own 
markets. 
Mannesmann's licence provides that it and Telekom were to negotiate regarding tariffs 
for leased lines and use of the PSTN. In case of not reaching agreement, Telekom was 
to  determine tariffs and submit them  for approval to the  FMPT. Negotiations between 
Mannesmann and Telekom were conducted from  early 1990 until October 1990 when 
they were broken off without success. Telekom then submitted a tariff proposal to  the 
Minister  with  the  request  for  approval.  The  Minister  was  immediately  aware  of  the 
significance  of  the  case.  He  informed  the  two  parties  that  he  would  need  several 
months for the necessary careful review. He appointed an advisory body of experts that 
was to consult him on the matter. 
In  February 1991  the Minister informed Telekom and Mannesmann that he  had found 
T  elekom's tariffs for both the 2MbiVs leased lines and the use of the PSTN too high. He 
requested that T  elekom revise its offer and decrease its tariffs by 60  °/o  in the case of 
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the 2Mbit/s leased lines and by 30 o/o in the case use of the PSTN. He allowed a period 
until mid-June for Telekom to respond to his request.  He pointed out that his rejection 
of Telekom•s offer followed a review of Telecom•s calculations and a comparison with 
tariffs that in other countries are paid in comparable situations. 
Telekom  did  not  comply with  the  request  Consequently,  in  June  1991,  the  Minister 
officially rejected Telekom•s offer and at the same time declared he would be prepared 
to  approve  tariffs which  relative  to the initial levels were  cut by 54  °/o  in  case  of  the 
2Mbit/s leased lines and 21  °/o  in case of the handed-over traffic, the reductions in the 
percentages· being explained "by· the Minister as representing his partial acceptance of 
Telekom•s claim that it was facing an extra burden in East Germany. At the same time, 
the  Minister announced that he  was  extending to  Mannesmann the  right to  install  its 
own microwave fixed links to connect its installations on the local level wherever it was 
advantageous  to  do  so  given  Telekom•s  tariffs  for  leased  lines.  Telekom  declared 
immediately that it was not prepared to accept the Ministers decision so that the matter 
had to be taken to the  lnfrastrukturrat which by law is the body to be consulted in case 
of  disagreements  between  the  Minister and  Telekom  in  such  matters.  In  September 
1991  this  body  sustained  the  Minister  and  Telekom  subsequently  implemented  the 
decision as regards its tariffs. 
The  monthly  rentals  for  2Mbit/s  leased  lines  that  resulted  from  the  determination 
amount  to  between  40  °/o  and  50  °/o  of  the  tariffs  according  to  Telekom's  general 
contract terms and conditions. The charges for use of the PSTN  represent rebalanced 
charges in  the  sense that the local  charges are closer to  the  corresponding end-user 
tariffs than  the  regional  and  long-distance tariffs.  This adjustment was  not part of  the 
determination  by  the  Minister  but  Telekom  was  allowed  to  carry  it  out  after  the 
determination became effective.  The  charge for access to customers at the  local level 
is  about 80 °/o  of  the  tariff for a local call  whereas the charge for use of the  PSTN  for 
long-distance conveyance is from 70 °/o to 50 °/o of the corresponding tariffs. 
The  charges  resulting  from  the  determination  were  in  principle  based  on  long-run 
incremental costs.  This standard could, however,  only approximately be  applied as all 
the  relevant  information  for  its  rigorous  application  could  not  be  made  available.  In 
March  1993, all  charges for  leased lines and  conveyance paid by  Mannesmann were 
placed under a price-cap regulation whereby the charges may be adjusted according to 
the  rate  of  inflation minus a factor X equalling 4 °/o.  The  price-cap regulation  of these 
charges also apply to the other operators of mobile services  . 
Interconnection  of  the  Mannesmann  network  actually  takes  place  at  the  second 
hierarchical level of the PSTN's trunk exchanges. As far as we know, technical aspects 
posed  difficult  problems  but  were  not  controversial  in  the  negotiations  between 
Mannesmann and Telekom. There have been complaints on the part of Mannesmann 
as  regards  the  specifications of leased  lines  that Telekom  was  ready  to meet;  these 
complaints were, however, not in the forefront of the debate. 166  Study for the European Comnissian 
As mentioned, the terms and conditions of the MannesmannfTelekom agreement hold 
accordingly  for  the  interconnection  of  De  TeMobil's  0 1  network  with  the  Telekom 
network. 
5.1.4.2.4  Interconnection of the E-Pius network and the PSTN 
As  mentioned above, the charges for leased lines and for use of the PSTN that were 
determined in the Mannesmann case were listed as an orientation for bidders in the call 
for-tender for a DCS  1·800·network: The·-E-Pfus·licence·-granted ·in 4993 specifies that 
the  terms  of  interconnection  are  to  be  negotiated  with  Telekom  and  the  ensuing 
negotiations led to a pre-agreement that was approved by the FMPT in June 1994. In 
this  pre-agreement,  E-Pius  provisionally agreed  to the  charges  of the  Mannesmann 
determination. 
Since  then,  E-Pius has  voiced dissatisfaction with a number of conditions in  the  pre-
agreement: 
- The  leased  line  interconnection  charges  (e.g.,  about  30,000 OM  per  year  for  a 
2 Mbit/s-line of  10 km  length) are  regarded  as too high  if compared  to charges  in 
other European countries. 
- So far.  a share of 70 °/o  of the traffic in the E-Pius network is outgoing and directed 
to  the  PSTN.  This traffic is  normally handed over locally. E-Pius then has to pay a 
conveyance charge during business hours of 0.088 DM  per minute to Telekom (the 
charge was raised recently from o.on OM  according to the price-cap regime). This 
amount is  not  regarded  as  cost-oriented by E-Plus as end  users have to pay only 
marginally more than this charge. 39 40 
- E-Pius claims to have no control over the quality of the transmission lines as it has to 
pay the same amount for a 2 Mbit/s-line with 96.5°/o-availability as for a 2 Mbit/s-line 
with  99°/o-availability  and  T  elekom  has  the  right  to  choose  the  kind  of  line  to  be 
provided. 
- E-Pius is not content with the availability of maintenance services. Provision of these 
services  within  12  hours  during  the  week,  within  48  hours  on  the  weekend,  and 
within 5 hours by paying a special fee, are again conditions which it claims to be far 
less favourable than those in comparable cases. 
The  above issues are the  subject of discussions between Telekom and E-Pius with  a 
view of concluding the main interconnection agreement by December 1994. 
39  End users pay for local calls on a six-minute-per-pulse basis with one pulse costing 0.23 OM. Using 
conventional conversion methods, based on an average duration of a local call of about 3 minutes, 
this amounts to a tariff of between 0.09 OM and 0.10 OM per minute. 
40  Telekom's position on this is that end·user tariffs for local calls are themselves not cost covering. 
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5.1.4.2.5  Direct interconnection of mobile networks 
The  E-Pius  licence  of May  1993 contains  an  article  which  gives  E-Pius  the  right  to 
interconnect  its  network  directly  to  the  0  networks  and  to  digital  cellular  mobile 
networks abroad. In  consequence of that the FMPT accordingly adapted the licences 
which  for the  two  GSM  networks did  not provide for this  right before that date.  The 
adaptation  became effective in  March 1994: Furthermore, the  FMPT is  preparing the 
final  version  of  the  C  licence  which  will  also  establish  the  right  of  De TeMobil  to 
interconnect the C network to .the digital mobile networks. 
So  far,  there  have  been  no  direct  interconnection  agreements  between  any  of  the 
German mobile operators.  But it can  be  expected that Mannesmann,  DeTeMobil and 
E-Pius will begin negotiations about interconnection in the near future. As there are so 
far no particular regulatory restrictions, and as mutual interconnection can be assumed 
to be in their common interest, it can be expected that these negotiations will take place 
on a purely commercial basis, without interventions of the FMPT. 
5.1.4.2.6  Telekom's concept for access to its network according to ONP 
Following  the  instructions  by  the  regulator,  Telekom  submitted  a  concept  for  the 
implementation  of  ONP  to  the  functions  of  the  telephone  network  in  mid-1993.  It 
encompasses all possible kinds of access, from the simple analog telephone access by 
the  ordinary user to  the  very special  solutions that an  interconnecting network would 
need.  The  concept  is  currently  being  discussed  with  all  interested  parties  and  a 
decision on it by the regulator is expected by the end of 1994. 
It proposes to introduce new non-discriminatory access services depending on  market 
needs. The services are  to provide access to the functions of the  PSTN, to additional 
functions  which  create  added  value,  and  to  other  networks.  "Additional  functions"  in 
particular also mean IN functionalities. 
Telekom identifies three groups of access products:  (1)  batch products for end  users, 
(2)  specific  products,  and  (3)  special  solutions.  Interconnection  services  as  generic 
products  belong  to  (2)  while  such  special  interconnection  arrangements  as  for  the 
mobile networks are grouped with  (3).  Telekom deals with  specific end-user demands 
for access also under (2) and (3); these cases need not interest us here, except to note 
that Telekom deals with  the  various  modes of access to  its network primarily on  the 
basis of the complexity of required features . 
Under "specific products" Telekom includes seven interconnection services that we  list 
below together with interpretation and comments: 
(a)  Access oriented toward local network with  SS  No  7 "A".  This  type  of access  is 
designed for large on-site installations PBXs, e.g., for airports, or private network 
operators who want to offer their competitive services locally. It appears that there 168 
is no clear boundary between access for end users and access for competitive 
service providers as this type of access is offered to both groups of demanders. 
(b)  Access oriented toward local network and intended for incoming traffic. This type of 
access  is  suitable  for  local  providers  of  information  services,  e.g.,  cinema 
announcements or other info-lines. 
(c)  Access  oriented  toward  overall  network  with  D  channel  signalling.  Once 
competition in telephony is allowed in Germany, this access could be suitable for 
resellers who would not need SS No. 7 s_ignalling. 
(d)  Access  oriented  toward  overall  network  with  SS  No.  7  "A·.  This  should  be 
considered the generic product for interconnecting networks. Note that it would be 
a bundled service. One should expect, however. that the particular requirements of 
any actual future interconnecting network would call for a solution that then makes 
it belong to group (3). As noted, the interconnection arrangements with the cellular 
mobile networks have in fact been grouped this way. 
(e)  Access  oriented  toward  overall  network  but exclusively  intended  for  incoming 
traffic.  This  access  is  intended  for  services  like  televoting,  teledialogue,  private 
information providers, interactive videotext. 
(f)  Special access for packet-based data.  This is the  typical access for data service 
providers based on  the X.25 interface. It will allow to send packet data from  X.25 
networks  to  Euro-1 SON  connections  and  vice  versa.  As  soon  as  the  tariffs  are 
approved  by  the  regulator,  Telekom  will  provide  this  type  of access  as  the  first 
special access solution available for service providers. 
(g)  IN access  with  SS  No.  7 "A".  This is  supposed to  provide access to  competitive 
additional  network functions.  Its development is  seen  to  depend  on  international 
standardisation still to be worked out. The procedures to be applied should provide 
customers with best possible protection and autonomy. 
T  elekom is in the process of developing concrete service offerings corresponding to the 
solutions  proposed  in  the  concept.  Solutions  (b),  (c),  (e)  and  (f)  are  expected  to  be 
available at the  end  of  1994 (i.e., for applications that would then be open to  private 
interests  under current  legislation).  Solutions  (a),  (d)  and  (g)  would  be  introduced  if 
sufficient demand materialises. Demand for access (d) with the specific requirements of 
networks offering competing telephone service will most certainly come forward starting 
in  1998 or even before that. 
Another important part of the  Telekom concept deals with the regulatory requirement 
whereby Telekom has to  assure equal  opportunity between  itself and  private service 
providers.  In  the  concept  this  question  is  dealt with  under the  term  •equal  access• 
according to the ONP framework directive. For Telekom this means non-discriminatory 
access,  as well  as non-discriminatory and efficient use of public telecommunications 
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networks  by  competitors,  or,  in  concrete  terms,  the  non-discriminatory  provision  of 
accesses to the telephone network as a service in the competitive market. 
As  regards  the  location  of access,  Telekom  has  studied  two  alternative  models  to 
establish equal access: 
- Collocation, meaning housing the equipment of dominant carriers as well as that of 
their competitors in the same location in order to avoid discrimination with regard to 
access to  public networks. This model is rejected by Telekom for practical,  safety, 
and business reasons  . 
- The realisation of the principle  •respective tariff= transfer price•, meaning that after 
the  definition  of  interfaces  between  the  monopoly and  the  competitive  sector the 
same  prices  will  internally  be  charged  for  the  connection  of  Telekom  Switching 
Network Nodes (SNNs) belonging to the competitive sector as for the connection of 
private  SNNs  to  Transmission  Network  Nodes  (TNNs)  in  the  area  of  Telekom's 
network monopoly. The problems relating to equal access in the case of monopoly 
transmission paths are also to be solved by this principle. The realisation would lead 
to financial  parity between Telekom competitive sectors and competitors as buyers 
of monopoly services, and thus to a non-discriminatory solution. 
It  will  have  to  be  examined whether Telekom's arguments against collocation  remain 
valid in the future and whether the realisation of the principle •respective tariff = transfer 
price" will solve all difficulties in establishing equal access. 
5.1.4.3  Evaluation 
The  German telecommunications policy has made some steps aimed at liberalisation 
and  one  can  observe  a  lot  of  activity  in  the  market.  All  in  all  about  400  service 
providers, including two big mobile operators, have joined the market. So far, however, 
no  general  regulatory  framework  has  been  developed.  The  existing  interconnection 
arrangements  (Telekom I DeTeMobil,  Telekom I Mannesmann  and  Telekom I E-Pius) 
were  regulated,  or  negotiated  case  by  case.  Service  providers looking  for access  to 
Telekom's  network  have  so  far  to  accept  the  normal  (and  therefore  high)  end-user 
tariffs and must await approval and implementation of Telekom's ONP concept. 
The parties to the individually regulated or negotiated interconnection arrangements do 
not consider the  existing regulatory decisions on  the  matter as  satisfactory.  Recently, 
E-Pius has been on the record that interconnection charges are too high and the quality 
of interconnection services is insufficient. One can assume that this by extension holds 
for the  Mannesmann I Telekom relation.  From  this it follows that additional regulatory 
work regarding the existing agreements must be undertaken. 
The ONP access concept submitted by Telekom can be expected to substantially alter 
the  situation.  Provided  tariffs  meet  the  justified  demands  of  service  providers,  the 170 
concept  constitutes  a  rather  comprehensive  set  of  interconnection  offerings.  It can 
claim  to  be  innovative  compared  to  developments  in  other  European  countries. 
Furthermore,  it  could  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  German  regulatory  framework  for 
interconnection. 
5.1.5  Greece 
5.1.5.1 - Introduction 
Three companies are the main players in the Greek telecommunications sector, which 
is regulated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
Traditionally, the most important of the three is the 100 per cent state owned Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), which has the exclusive right to provide basic 
telephony,  telegraph  and  telex  services  and  facilities,  fixed  and  mobile  satellite 
services, Data-8/C-Video leased lines services, marine mobile services, and directory 
assistance. 
In addition, two competitive providers of GSM mobile services were licensed in August 
1992 and began to offer their services in July 1993: 
1.  Panafon, owned by Vodafone (45 °/o),  France Telecom (35 o/o),  lntracom (1 0 °/o),  a 
local  telecom-manufacturer,  and  Databank  SA  (1 0 °/o),  a  Greek  value-added 
service provider. 
2.  STET  Hellas,  owned  by  STET  International  (75 °/o),  a  subsidiary  of  the  Italian 
telecommunications holding company STET SpA, Nynex (20 °/o)  and lnteramerican 
(5 °/o), a Greek insurance group. 
5.1.5.2  Status of interconnection agreements 
There  are currently three  interconnection agreements in  force:  the two fixed I mobile 
agreements  OTE I STET  and  OTE I Panafon  and  the  mobile I mobile  agreement 
STET I Panafon. At the moment, there are no arrangements for special access to the 
OTE network. Service providers are treated as normal customers. 
The three interconnection agreements were realised in two very different ways: 
- The two fixed I mobile agreements were concluded under the influence of a strong 
regulatory  involvement.  Already  in  the  two  GSM  licences  nearly  all  of the  most 
important  interconnection  issues  were  regulated  ex  ante  in  a  detailed  way. 
Furthermore, the regulator was involved in the negotiating process in order to assure 
that the conditions of the licence were fulfilled by the agreement. Finally, the licence 
contains a mediation I arbitration procedure in  the event that the operators cannot 
I 
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agree  on  interconnection  terms.  Regulatory action  of this  kind  was  necessary  in 
respect of the points of interconnection. 
- In contrast, the mobile I mobile agreement between Panafon and STET was totally 
left to commercial negotiations between the two parties. The regulator was in no way 
involved in the process. In the center of this agreement is the principle: ·each of the 
two operators keeps what he gets•. This means that no interconnection charges are 
paid by either of the two parties. The principle was introduced under the assumption 
that no  excess of incoming/outgoing traffic occurs on  either side.  At the  moment, 
Panafon  gets some benefit out of this game because 20 o/o  more traffic goes from 
Panafon to  STET than from  STET to Panafon.  But both operators expect that this 
difference will disappear in the near future. 
5.1.5.3  Approach to various interconnection issues 
As  noted above,  nearly all of the  most important interconnection issues were fixed  in 
the GSM  licences and so regulated ex ante. This involved the right to interconnect to 
the  PSTN  (fixed  in  the  licence),  fixing  not  only  the  principles  but  also  the 
interconnection  charges as  a percentage of the  GSM  operators revenues,  fixing  the 
numbering plan, imposition on the GSM operators of standards approved according to 
national  and  European  regulations,  as  well  as  prescribing  the  billing  arrangement 
between the  PSTN and the  GSM  (fixed in the licence). The issues regarding points of 
interconnection,  quality  of  interconnection  services,  and  provision  of  leased  lines  by 
OTE were left out in the conditions of the licence. They fall under the general condition 
specifying that there will be  mediation I arbitration by the  regulator in  the event of non-
agreement between the  PSTN and the GSM  operator. As  mentioned above, this  was 
invoked regarding the issue of POls with the  result that OTE has to provide access to 
its network not only in Athens but also in other large Greek cities. 
Although  there  is  no  universal  service  obligation  in  the  Greek  legislation  on 
telecommunications, one can say that as a public telecommunications operator OTE is 
implicitly under such an obligation. The new version of the telecommunications law will 
contain  an  explicit universal  service  obligation for OTE.  At  the  same  time  the  Greek 
regulator is  working  on  the  issue  of  cost-orientation.  Currently,  OTE's  tariff structure 
can not be regarded as cost-oriented as it is not subject to any cost standard. Therefore 
no  statement  is  possible  as  to  whether the  two  mobile  operators  do  or do  not  pay 
access charges, either explicitly or implicitly  . 
The mobile I mobile agreement between Panafon and STET does not need regulatory 
approval as it is completely in the private domain. This also holds for the fixed I mobile 
agreements OTE I Panafon and OTE I STET as long as each of the involved parties is 
satisfied that the conditions fixed in the mobile operators licences are met by the terms 
of the agreement. The  Ministry as regulator has access only to the  two fixed I mobile 
interconnection agreements,  not to the  mobile I mobile agreement. There is no  public 
access to any of the three agreements. 172 
It was  noted  above  that  there  are  no  regulatory  requirements  with  regard  to  cost 
standards and therefore also not for interconnection services. The licence,  however, 
contains  a  paragraph  stating  the  following:  If  during  the  eight  years  following  the 
initiation of commercial cellular services an EC directive requires the PSTN operator to 
implement cost-based pricing for providing interconnection to the GSM network, and if, 
furthermore,  the  PSTN  operator  establishes  that  its  costs  of  providing  such 
interconnection  to  the  GSM  network  are  both  determinable  and  reasonable  in 
comparison to the costs of PSTN and cellular networks in other countries, the GSM and 
the PSTN operator shall negotiate a cost-based interconnection charge. 
5.1 .5.4  Specific problems and future developments 
The  mobile operators express dissatisfaction with the speed with which OTE provides 
access  to  its  network  and  leased  lines.  It  is  particularly  noteworthy  that  the  new 
operators have to pay the normal leased line tariffs. The operators intend to construct 
their own (microwave) transmission networks according to the conditions of the licence 
but the MTC, which is responsible for the allocation of frequencies, has so far assigned 
the  required microwave frequencies to Panafon and STET only after long delays. Until 
May 1994, only the frequencies for forty links in the area of Attica had been formally  -
approved. 
It  is  to  be  doubted  that  OTE's  interconnection  charges  can  be  regarded  as  cost-
oriented. It is safe to assume that the revenues of the GSM operators, which serve as 
basis for fixing the charges, do not reflect the costs of interconnection at OTE. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1992 defines the regulatory responsibilities of the MTC 
and.  those  of  a  new  independent  state  authority,  the  National  Telecommunications 
Commission  (NTC).  Although  the  five  members  of the  NTC  were  designated  in  July 
1993 the NTC never began to fulfil its regulatory tasks. The above-mentioned problems 
perhaps could  have  been  avoided if  the  NTC  had  been  able  to  begin  to  work  as  an 
independent regulatory authority as  was initially intended.  Some of the problems may 
result from the fact that the Ministry is still in the double role of acting as owner of OTE 
and at the same time being regulator of the Greek telecommunications sector. 
Three important developments can be observed in Greece at the moment: 
- The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1992  is  under  reexamination  concerning  the 
adoption of the  EC  Directives 387  & 388/90.  Amendment of the  Act  may result in 
NTC being able to work effectively. 
- Another important fact for future developments in Greece will be the planned partial 
privatisation of OTE. As the Greek government announced in May 1994, 25 % of its 
OTE shares will be sold, with overseas investors likely to take up more than half of 
the issue. 
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- The  realisation  of  another  plan  of  the  Govemment  recently  presented  to  the 
Parliament would  have  direct consequences on  the  status of the  interconnection 
agreements in Greece: It is planned to grant OTE a licence for the provision of land 
mobile services. It can be expeded that there will be intense discussion about this 
plan  because  it  would  mean  a  clear violation  of the  passage  in  the  STET and 
Panafon  licence above mentioned which  states that there will  be no other mobile 
operator in Greece within a period of eight years (until the year 2000). 
5.1.6  Ireland 
5.1.6.1  Introduction 
The Minister for Transport,  Energy & Communications administers govemment policy 
to the Irish telecommunications sector. He currently holds the 100 per cent state share 
holding  in  the  public telecommunications operator Telecom Eireann  (TE)  and  is also 
responsible for the regulatory functions. 
Article  87  of  the  Postal  and  Telecommunications  Services  Act  of  1983  (the  'Act') 
defines the exclusive  rights  of TE.  The  European Communities (Telecommunications 
Services) Regulations (No. 45 of 1992) amended this Act and especially Article 87 to 
give effect to the European Council Directives 901387/EEC and 90/388/EEC. As of June 
1994  TE  has  the  exclusive  right  of  offering,  providing  and  maintaining  the  public 
telecommunications network and of offering, providing and maintaining voice telephony 
services, telex services,  mobile radio telephony service,  paging services and  satellite 
services within the state. 
5.1.6.2  Status of interconnection 
The  development of  a  specific  regulatory  interconnection I  special  access  regime  in 
Ireland is at a  very preliminary stage.  There are  no interconnection I  special access 
agreements yet as TE,  through Eircell,  its business unit providing mobile services, is 
currently  the  sole  telecommunications  operator  for  both  fixed  and  mobile  services. 
Service providers are treated as normal customers. 
Nevertheless, all interconnection issues are being examined urgently in the context of 
the proposed award in 1994 of a second GSM licence. This second GSM operator will 
have to be in a position to comprehensively interconnect with the fixed network. It is 
therefore expected that the official Irish position on interconnection will become clear in 
the course of 1994. 174 
5.1.6.3  Specific aspects and future developments 
It is planned to separate the regulatory functions of the Ministry from its functions as 
owner of TE and to establish in the near future an independent authority outside the 
Civil Service. One can expect this to have some influence on the regulatory process 
concerning interconnection. 
TE considers interconnection I special access as a matter of considerable significance 
in the provision of telecommunications services in a competitive environment. The Irish 
telecommunications  sector .. will .be .Jully  ..  competitive .. at  ...the .  .latest by .the -~ar  .2003 
(Ireland  received  a  five-year  exemption  from  the  European  voice  telephony 
liberalisation requirement in  1998; until now no political decision has been taken as to 
whether or not to use this potential derogation). TE regards interconnection as primarily 
a commercial and technical issue, but only after the establishment of a regime based 
on principles which require regulatory input. The principles include matters such as the 
definition of universal service obligation (there is no specific definition in  the Act or in 
other laws and regulations}, how the local access deficit should be dealt with, access 
arrangements, respective rights of the parties, and conciliation/arbitration procedures. 
TE sees interconnection as an issue to be dealt with at a national rather than European. 
level. Only broad principles should be set at EU  level as it is unrealistic to expect that 
interconnection  arrangements  will  not  differ  according  to  the  different 
telecommunications environments prevalent in the various Member States. 
5.1.7  Italy 
5.1.7.1  Introduction 
When studying the complex structure of the Italian telecommunications sector one has 
to  distinguish  between  the  situation  before  May  19, 1994 and the situation  after this 
date.  On  that  day the  shareholders'  meeting  of  Societa  ltaliana  per  I'Esercizio  delle 
Telecomunicazioni  (SIP)  decided  that  the  five  main  Italian  telecommunications 
companies will merge into one Telecom ltalia by August 1994. 
The  situation  before  May  1994  was  the  following:  The  IRI  group  - lstituto  per  Ia 
Ricostruzione  Industrials,  the  Italian  state  holding  company- controlled 
approximately 52 °/o  of  the  telecommunication  sector  sub-holding  STET  - Societa 
Finanziara T  elef6nica - which itself owns 51  o/o or more of the following companies: 
SIP, which provides the local telecommunications network and parts of the trunk 
network, local voice telephony, mobile and data communications, 
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Telespazio, which offers satellite communications facilities, and 
SIAM (Societa ltaliana Radio Maritima), providing maritime radio services. 
These four companies as  well  as the wholly and directly state-owned carrier IRITEL 
(the  former  state  agency A  SST).  which  owns  over  60 °/o  of  the  trunk  network  and 
provides European telephone and telex services, are merging into Telecom ltalia. The 
areas  which  are  still  defined  as  monopoly  services  carried  out  by  the  five  above 
mentioned companies constituting Telecom ltalia are voice telephony, the provision of 
the fixed infrastructure, and satellite communications. 
Another  important  development  in  the  Italian  telecommunications  sector  was  the 
granting of a licence for operating a second GSM  mobile communications network to 
the Omnitei-Pronto ltalia consortium at the end of March 1994. The leading position in 
this consortium is taken by Olivetti with a 35.5 o/o  stake.  SIP has been offering cellular 
mobile services since 1984 (analog) and 1992 (GSM) based on monopoly rights. 
The Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications is the regulatory authority in Italy. 
5.1.7.2  Status of interconnection 
In  the  situation  before  the  merger  that  created  Telecom  ltalia  in  May  1994,  the 
distribution  of  revenues  from  voice  telephony  between  the  different  Italian 
telecommunications operators was regulated in the following way: SIP had the task of 
collecting the revenues from its clients. 10.5 °/o  of the  revenues from a European or a 
trunk  call  over the  lritel network had to be  given  to I  rite I and  10.5 o/o  of  the  revenues 
from  an  intercontinental calf  had to  be  given to  ltalcable. This kind  of 'interconnection' 
will now become a matter of internal cost and revenue accounting. 
With  regard to the fact that there are  still  no  regulations in  the field  of interconnection 
and special access in Italy, SIP considers the Italian service providers as •users· which 
means that normal interfaces and tariffs are  applied when they get access to  the  SIP 
network. 
Nevertheless  SIP  believes  that  interconnection/special  access  is  one  of  the  most 
important issues to be tackled for the emerging of a new competitive environment for all 
telecommunications services. It is seen as an issue which has great importance from a 
political, technical and commercial point of view. It must be handled right to ensure that 
the market will develop in accordance with fair competitive rules. It is seen to be strictly 
linked  with  the  problem  of  universal  service  obligations,  cost  accounting  systems, 
access charges and so forth. 
The only interconnection case that will have to be  regulated in the next months is the 
interconnection between the second GSM network of Omnitei-Pronto and the SIP/Iritel 
network as  Omnitei-Pronto will  begin to operate in  January 1995. At  the  moment two 
main  critical  points  can  be  identified  in  the  discussion  between  the  Ministry  and 176  Study for the European Commiaion 
Omnitei-Pronto concerning the regulation of this interconnection case.  The first point 
concems the determination of interconnection charges. The second point concerns the 
routing of the traffic. Omnitei-Pronto under the leadership of Olivetti has the possibility 
to use the network of Olivetti Data Communications. Furthermore, after an agreement 
with the Italian TV company RAI, Omnitei-Pronto is able to direct its traffic over the RAI 
transmission  network.  So  Omnitei-Pronto•s  interest  is  to  route  its  traffic  as  far  as 
possible over its own trunk lines or the RAI  network. On the other side Telecom ltalia 
wants  Omnitei-Pronto  to  be  obliged  to  a  mandatory  use  of Telecom  ltalia•s  trunk 
network in  order to get its capacities fully used and in  order not to be burdened only 
with the expensive local distribution. 
As  soon  as  the  negotiations  over  the  terms  for  interconnecting  the  networks  are 
concluded,  the  Ministry will  grant the  licences  to  Omnitei-Pronto  and  Telecom  ltalia 
which will provide for the same opportunities, obligations and limits for both parties. The 
aim  of the  regulator is to assure that Telecom ltalia will have no advantage under the 
new licence.  For example, it will  be obliged to observe transparency by introducing a 
separate administration and separate accounts for its mobile services division. 
5.1.8  Luxembourg 
By  legislative action in  1990, and effective from  1992, the former state Administration 
des  Pastes et Telecommunications was converted into the public,  1  00 °/o-state-owned 
corporation  Pastes  et  Telecommunications  (P& T).  The  responsibility  for  regulatory 
matters remained with the Ministry of Telecommunications. 
The  exclusive  right  to  provide  voice  telephony  services and  the  public  infrastructure 
was given to P& T by regulations in August and October 1990. All other services via the 
fixed public network are non-reserved and do not require specific authorisation. 
P& T  so  far  (as  of  October  1994)  has  not  entered  into  any  detailed  interconnection/ 
special  access  agreements  with  other  market  participants.  All  problems  that  have 
arisen so far have been solved on an ad hoc basis. 
P& T has, however, been studying several questions in the field of interconnection and 
special access, e.g., the fixing of charges, funding  of the  universal service obligation, 
technical standards for interconnection I special access. 
In general, there is a paucity of information available on the issues of interconnection in 
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5.1.9  The Netherlands 
5.1.9.1  Introduction 
Competition  has  not  been  introduced  as yet in  the  domestic public  voice  telephone 
market or even  in  mobile telephony.  Hence, no interconnection agreements have yet 
been  made.  From  July  1,  1994,  the  incumbent  TO  (PTT  Telecom  Netherlands) 
operates a network meeting the digital GSM standard; a second GSM-operator is to be 
licensed  in  1995.  The -Government -is -ai&Q  preparing .. new legislation  to  introduce  a 
second  national  telecommunications  (fixed)  network  operator  to  compete  with  PTT 
Telecom from  1995-96, except in voice telephony. In accordance with EU policy, voice 
telephony will be liberalised as from 1998 and so can be offered by an alternative fixed 
network operator. The Dutch policies and market developments are described in  more 
detail in Sections 5.1.9.2 and 5.1.9.3, respectively. 
The  second fixed operator will need an interconnection agreement with the incumbent 
and  may,  on  the  other  hand,  offer  interconnection  to  the  various  digital  mobile 
networks, including EAMES paging networks. This makes the Dutch scope for different 
interconnection arrangements potentially wider and more complex than  in  most other-
EU member states, with the exception of the UK. The corresponding wholesale service 
arrangements of interconnect access in  preparation by PTT Telecom are summarised 
in Section 5.1.9.4. 
The  specific details of  interconnection  guidelines or requirements,  such  as conditions 
for  pricing,  quality,  capacity,  delivery time,  objectivity and  non-discrimination,  are  not 
laid  down  in  the  GSM-Iaw,  but  have  to  be  prescribed  in  more  detailed  rules  and 
regulations by Ministerial Directives yet to be  issued. The  basic principle assumed for 
interconnection  is  that  of  a  commercial  agreement  negotiated  between  business 
partners; the regulator (i.e., the Ministry) intervenes only if a determination is requested 
by  (one  of)  the  parties.  Being  commercial  contracts,  interconnect  agreements  will 
probably not be published. 
5.1.9.2  Institutional and legal conditions for interconnection. 
5.1.9.2.1  Market structure: the regulatory framework and entry conditions 
Dutch telecommunications are  governed by  the  Telecommunications Act of  1988.  As 
from January 1, 1989, the new private limited-liability holding company of PTT Telecom, 
KPN, was granted an exclusive concession on the following 
- public telephone services 
- telex and public data communication services 178 
- provision of leased lines 
- the  public  infrastructure  (i.e  .•  transmission  and  switching  network)  facilities,  both 
wired  and  wireless,  necessary for the  above  and other services  to  (parts of)  the 
general public, except broadcast (air and cable) distribution. 
The  1988 Act liberalised the terminal and value-added service markets in Holland. As 
from  January  1993,  the  public  data  communication  service  was  liberalised,  too,  in 
accordance with European policy. The latter change took place using a provision in the 
Act  allowing  (  re  )definitio~  of  the  concessi~~~ry  _  ~e~~~s by  t:Ainist~rial  Decree. 
However,  this  option  was  not  exercised  to  liberalise  the  {digital)  mobile  telephone 
service, based on  the pan-European GSM-standard. This was implemented through a 
lengthy legislative procedure, eventually resulting in a major amendment to the  1988 
Act in mid-1994. 
5.1.9.2.2  Legal provisions for mobile-interconnection arrangements and non-
discriminatory treatment of competitors. 
-
The points at issue with respect to interconnection and fair competition in the so-called 
GSM-amendments were: 
a)  the  removal from the concession of radio infrastructure required for the new mobile 
services, in particular base-station transmitters; 
b)  relaxation of the restrictions on leased-line usage, to allow a mobile licence holder to 
couple  his  cellular  base  stations  to  base  station  controllers  and  mobile  switching 
centres.  To leave licence holders more freedom  in  negotiations with  PTT Telecom, 
they  are  allowed  to  install  and  use  alternative  radio  relays  at  18  GHz  without 
separate licensing. If PTT Telecom proves incapable or unwilling to install cables to 
meet  the  fixed-networking  requirements  of  the  holder of a  licence,  the  latter may 
also seek the permission of the Minister to establish his own cable lines; 
c)  inclusion  of  an  obligation  of  the  concessionary  (i.e.,  PTT Telecom) to  provide  the 
leased  lines  specified  above  and  to  provide  the  requested  interconnections of the 
licensed  mobile  network(s)  to  the  concessionary's  infrastructure,  on  non-
discriminatory and  reasonable terms,  yet to  be  specified by Ministerial Order.  PTT 
Telecom is legally required to provide all facilities asked for, unless these 
- are technically infeasible 
- violate the integrity or other essential requirements to be met by PTT Telecom 
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d) inclusion  of  a  legal  permission  for  licence  holders  to  make  interconnection 
arrangements with 
- the infrastructure of other licence holders 
the  infrastructure  of  a  foreign  operator,  using  leased  lines  provided  by  the 
concessionary or by a third party in accordance with the Act (the latter possibility is a 
prelude to the creation of a second concessionary fixed  netwo~k operator in  1995 -
see Section 5.1.9.2.4); 
e)  inclusion·ota·provision for-Ministerial intervention at the request of a licence holder, 
in  the  event that  an  agreement cannot be  reached  with  the  concessionary  about 
conditions  for  provision  of  interconnection  and/or  leased  lines.  The  Minister  is 
required to give a decision within eight weeks of receiving the necessary information 
from  the  concessionary and  the  licence holder; they have two  weeks to  surrender 
such information. The Minister may instruct the concessionary to act otherwise, if the 
latter is  deemed to  impose unreasonable conditions or unjustified denial of service 
on the licence holder; 
f)  requirements for licence holders to treat resellers and service providers reasonably 
and on objective, non-discriminatory conditions, subject to a Ministerial Directive yet 
to be specified; 
g)  requirements for KPN  (as the first GSM licence holder) to accept a request from the 
second licence holder to be a reseller of KPN's GSM service until the second GSM 
infrastructure  has  evolved  sufficiently,  and  to  allow  the  numbering  series  granted 
under the second licence to be used on KPN's GSM network in this interim period. 
It  should be  emphasised that most of the specific details of interconnection guidelines 
or  requirements,  such  as  conditions  for  pricing,  quality,  capacity,  delivery  time, 
objectivity  and  non-discrimination,  are  not  laid  down  in  the  law,  but  have  yet  to  be 
prescribed  in  more  detailed  rules  and  regulations  by  Ministerial  Directives.  This  is  a 
matter  of  some  concern  for  the  bidders  on  the  second  GSM  licence,  who  have  to 
prepare  their  offers  in  the  second  part  of  1994.  Draft  directives  are  under juridical 
review by the Conseil d'Etat c·Raad van State•), and may not be ready in due time. 
The  GSM-amendments  were  made  very  late,  compared  to  most  other  EU  member 
states. This was partly due to the  strong emphasis in  the re-regulation on  a legalistic 
rather  than  a pragmatic approach  to  the  modification  of the  exclusive  concession  of 
KPN. 
5.1.9.2.3  Tariff regulations: Access deficit charges? 
In general, the tariffs of PTT Telecom are set by the concessionary himself, subject to a 
price-cap control regime. This has allowed PTT Telecom to begin a major re-balancing 
towards more cost-oriented tariffs in recent years. A nominal increase of 1  00°/o  for call 180  Study for the European Cormiasion 
charges  for  (long)  local  calls  within  a  year has  been  accompanied  by considerable 
public  discussion.  Although  the  overall  Dutch  consumer  tariff  basket  is  one  of  the 
cheapest  in  Europe,  PIT Telecom  has  announced  that  no  further  increases  are 
expected, before VAT is to be levied on all telecommunication transactions in 1996. 
It will thus take some time to reach completely cost-oriented tariffs in The Netherlands, 
so an access deficit charge for interconnecting operators cannot be ruled out, at least in 
the beginning. The argument is further complicated by the advent of a second operator 
as  from  1995,  who  may  offer  public  domestic  telephony  from  1998  (see  Section 
5.1.9.2.4).  . - .. - -· ..  -
The tariffs for analog leased lines rose on average by 11.5°/o  in  1993, while  those for 
digital leased lines dropped by 21 °/o.  According to the GSM amendments, the legislator 
may  allow  - or  even  expect  as  a  result  of his  permission  to  employ  alternatives  to 
leased  lines  - that  leased  lines  be  provided  to  the  interconnecting  licensees  by  the 
concessionary on more favourable conditions than the general public tariffs. 
5.1.9.2.4  Dutch perspectives on further liberalisation and interconnection needs in the 
near future 
In  1993,  the  Government published  a White  Paper on  the  future  telecommunications 
policy  in  The  Netherlands.  The  White  Paper  built  on  the  three-layer  model  for 
telecommunications provision depicted as part of Figure 2.1.2-1. 
This  layered model was  later adopted in  the  Delors White  Paper.  Briefly summarised, 
the position taken by the Dutch Government was that 
a)  future  horizontal  competition  must  be  possible  within  each  layer,  including  the 
infrastructural  (lowest)  layer,  where  a  second  operator  would  be  allowed  to 
compete with PTI Telecom: 
b)  equal  access in  accordance with  ONP-principles  must be  ensured  to  all  facilities 
and services in the  immediate lower layer. Service providers and resellers should 
enjoy terms and conditions similar to classical'vertically integrated' suppliers such 
as PTI Telecom; 
c)  interconnection agreements between operators at any one  layer should  enhance 
integrity of  infrastructure  and  effectiveness  and  national  universality  of  network 
services; 
d)  liberalisation would be introduced on basic services in a 'managed' way, so as not 
to  cause  harm  to  (the  privatisation of)  the  incumbent operator and  his universal 
service obligations. This would call for an initial delay in competition on public voice 
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Among  the  potential  new  players,  the  White  Paper  designated  the  Government's 
preferred choice of owners of a second fixed infrastructure: A licence to provide leased 
lines to third parties would be given to the carrier networks of the electric-utility sector 
and the Dutch Railways, in combination with the local CATV networks. If these parties 
ensure mutual interoperability between their networks, competition with  PTT Telecom 
on the lowest layer of Fig. 2.1.2-1  would be allowed from  1995. The GSM amendments 
to the  1988 Act allow use  of the 'second' fixed  infrastructure  in  support of  the  GSM 
operator's network, e.g., to couple base stations and mobile switching centres. 
The  advent .of. an  .altemative~.fixed--telecommlMliGations -network  in-- The  Netherlands 
enhances  the  scope  for  (negotiating)  interconnection  arrangements  in  the  years  to 
come quite significantly,  even before the 1998 liberalisation of public telephony in  the 
EU. 
5.1.9.3  Potential parties to interconnection arrangements 
In  1993, there  were  no domestic business areas yet where  competition from  parties 
with interconnection arrangements played any role, due to the delay in introducing GSM 
in The Netherlands. 
By the end of 1993, 93°/o of PTT Telecom's subscribers were connected to digital local 
switches.  This  is  a  high  figure  by  most  European  standards.  However,  the 
functionalities  of  Euro-ISDN  could  be  offered  only in  30  urban areas,  covering  some 
40°/o  of  the  potential  business  users.  There  were  7.63  million  PSTN  subscriber lines 
and only 1500 ISDN subscriber lines by the end of 1993. 
In  1993, 6°/o  of PTI Telecom's net revenues came from  its  mobile services, which  at 
the  end  of  the  year  had  some  380,000  paging  subscribers  and  240,000  voice 
subscribers. PTI Telecom introduced GSM on July 1, 1994. 
A public packet-switched mobile data service, using the Mobitex industry standard, was 
introduced  by  RAM  Mobile  Data  in  1993.  Roaming  agreements  with  neighbouring 
European countries are being prepared. There is no special interconnection agreement 
with PTI Telecom. A number of consortia have been or are being formed to be able to 
quality for the GSM-tendering procedure. The three chief candidates all involve a major 
Dutch bank (lNG, RABO and ABN-AMRO) and a foreign network operator (Vodafone, 
Bell South and PacTel, respectively). 
In view of the emphasis in the proposed tendering procedure on actual business plans 
to which the successful bidder will be committed as a selection criterion, the consortia 
are  very  cautious  with  information  about  their  individual  interconnection  plans.  This 
proves  not  only  a  problem  for  the  authors  of  this  country  study,  but  also  for  PTI 
Telecom, which is legally obliged to treat all candidates in an equal, non-selective way. 182  Study tor the European Cormission 
5.1.9.4  PTT plans for interconnect access 
PTT  Telecom  has  disclosed  interesting  information  about  its  plans  for  providing 
interconnect access to  its public switched infrastructure as a  business activity.  It is 
believed that this interesting disclosure is designed to resolve some of the deadlocks 
perceived in  the complex relation between the regulator,  the concessionary,  and the 
competing  bidders for mobile licences.· The complexity is ·enhanced by the  possible 
advent of a second fixed network operator in 1995, who will also become involved in 
considerations of interconnectivity arrangements with PTT Telecom and the successful 
bidders  for a . GSM  .. Iicence -and. E-RMES-paging -licences  .. - ...  The -interconnect  access 
includes the following standard package of service elements: 
1)  Network  coupling,  using  intemational  standards  (ETSI).  The  coupling  may  take 
place at two national access points· {NAPs), located in  Amhem and Amsterdam, 
and providing access to all 7 million PTT subscribers. 26 regional  access points 
(RAPs) will become available from 1996. Interconnect agreements will be made for 
a number of years,  based on  the interconnector's service management needs in 
terms of traffic, service levels, quality, availability and routing strategy. 
2)  Establishment of call connections, based on service management needs in terms 
of numbers and (time and space) distribution of calls, quality, and service levels; 
3)  Traffic handling within the PTT network, based on the above service management 
needs 
4)  Billing of interconnect access, standard per month. In addition, six optional service 
elements can be offered. 
The  tariffs  for  the  4  elements  included in  the  standard  package  may be  built up  as 
follows: 
1)  The  coupling  charge  will  contain  a  fixed  part  per access  port,  plus  a  distance 
dependent, fixed monthly tariff for any 2 Mbit/s leased line to the relevant NAP or 
RAP; 
2)  The call connection charge will be a fixed amount for a successful connection; 
3)  The traffic charges will be made on a per-second basis; 
4)  The interconnect access billing fee will be included in the above fees. For most of 
the optional service elements, charging will correspond to that for services in the 
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5.1.10  Portugal 
The  structure of the  telephone  industry in  Portugal  is  legally fixed  by a  division  into 
three classes of telecommunications operators. Fundamental services are reserved for 
monopoly  provision  by  government  concession  to  public  or  private  operators; 
complementary network services are open  to  licensed competition;  and  value-added 
services are open to all registered suppliers. 
Two public TOs provide fundamental services. One operator emerged from the merger 
of  Telefones  de  Lisboa  e  Porto  (TLP) .and  Telecom  P.ortugai.(TP) .in .1994. provides 
national  services and  international services to  Europe  and  North  Africa.  The  second 
operator, Marconi, provides international and offshore services. 
The  regulatory  body,  the  Portuguese  Institute  of  Communications  (ICP),  licenses 
complementary service operators and registers value-added service providers. 
The  public TOs  are interconnected at digital transit exchanges.  Mobile carriers,  other 
complementary  service  operators,  and  value-added  service  providers  are  also 
interconnected at digital transit exchanges. GSM service is provided by two operators -
TMN  (a  subsidiary of TLP  and TP),  and  its private competitor,  Telecel.  TMN  and  TP 
have some collocated equipment; Telecel has not sought collocation.  GSM and  other 
mobile  operators  lease  lines  from  the  TOs  and  are  not  permitted  to  own  fixed 
transmission facilities. 
The  major  interconnection  and  settlements  relationships  for  mobile  operators  are 
defined prior to the tendering of a mobile licence. They include the right to interconnect; 
the  right to standards and specifications, including signalling; special prices for leased 
lines  used  for interconnection;  and  special  delivery time  for services provided by  the 
fixed network operator. Quality of service standards are included in  the licence issued 
by the regulator. 
The  principles  governing  interconnect  charges  are  contained  in  a  three-year 
Convention agreed to among the government. the regulator, and the operators. Leased 
line charges for mobile operators are priced according to a two-part, distance-sensitive 
tariff,  with  distance-related  discounts.  Charges  for  conveyance  by  TOs  of  switched 
traffic interconnected to the mobile operators are based on retail call tariffs, less a 35°/o 
discount  factor  that  deducts  for  termination  of  one  end  of  each  call  by  the  mobile 
operator.  There  are  no  explicit  access  charges;  however,  urban  area  conveyance 
charges are based on the highest-priced distance band regardless of the location of the 
caller. 
Existing  cost  studies  are  considered  inadequate  to  resolve  disputes  concerning  the 
level of tariffs for leased lines and the related measurement of link distances, and the 
distribution of mobile calls among urban tariff bands. 184 
5 .1.11  Spain 
5.1.11.1  Introduction 
The  main  player  and  public  telecommunications  operator  in  Spain  is  Telef6nica  de 
Espana (T  elef6nica) which is a private company with the state as the main shareholder 
(more  than  30 °/o).  As  last  confirmed  in  December  1991  through  a  30 year  licence 
agreement between Telef6nica and the Government, Telef6nica has the exclusive right 
to provide voice telephony. 
With regard to the provision of public telecommunications infrastructure, Telef6nica has 
no exclusive rights as there are two other operators with special rights for the provision 
of telecommunications networks, and in particular for the provision of carrier services: 
- Retevision, the monopoly provider of carrier services for TV broadcasting, and 
- Organismo  aut6nomo  de  Correos,  the  monopoly  provider  of telex  and  telegram 
services. 
Normally value-added service providers are not allowed to build lines or circuits ·so· that · 
they have to lease them  from  one of the three operators. According to Article 23.1  of 
the  Spanish  Telecommunications  Law  (  .. Ley  de  Ordenaci6n  de  las 
Telecomunicaciones", LOT),  a service provider who wants to build installations on  his 
own needs a special administrative concession. Such a concession will be granted only 
in  those  very  exceptional  cases  when  there  are  no  bearer  or  end-to-end 
telecommunication  services  that  could  substitute  the  special  telecommunications 
network proposed by the concessionaire. 
The  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  Transport  and  Environment,  the  Spanish  regulatory 
authority, has furthermore licensed Telef6nica Servicios Moviles (TS-1 ),  a subsidiary of 
Telef6nica,  to  provide  analog  mobile  and  paging  services.  Two  other  licences  for 
paging services were given to the companies Sistelcom and Cersa. 
5.1.11.2  Status of interconnection 
At  the  moment  the  most  important  developments  concerning  the  issue  of 
interconnection  can  be  observed  in  the  markets  for  data  services  and  GSM  mobile 
communications. • 
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. 5.1.11.2.1  Interconnection of data service providers 
The  Royal  Decree  804  of  May  28.  1993  approved  the  technical  and  operational 
regulation for packet- and circuit-switched data service provision. The main regulations 
concerning interconnection of data service providers are contained in  Article 31  of the 
Decree: 
Technical and economic conditions for interconnection will be fixed by agreement 
between  the  parties.  In  case  the  agreement  is  not  reached  the  General 
Director.ale  of . T.elecommunications- (as ·the··  responsible ··department  of  the 
Ministry) Will fix the conditions for interconnection (regulation by determination). 
Any refusal for interconnection of an undertaking can not be based on technical 
incompatibility of the systems used when adequate international standards exist. 
The General Directorate of Telecommunications will be entitled to determine the 
appropriateness of the refusal, when it is based on technical reasons. 
Licences  for  data  service  provision  have  recently  been  granted to  nine  companies: 
Telef6nica,  Cable  &  Wireless,  Unisource  Business  Network  Espana,  lngenieria  de 
Gesti6n y Aedes, France Telecom Redes y Servicios, Megared, Sprint, IBM, and TMI 
Telemedia. So far, however, these suppliers do not seem to have been very successful 
in  the  market.  A reason  for this  could be  seen in  what the  Spanish  service providers 
describe as interconnection-related problems: 
- As mentioned, service providers are normally not allowed to have their own network 
facilities (lines or circuits).  So they have to lease lines from Telef6nica and pay the 
regulator-approved end-user tariffs which they claim to be too high. 
- Telef6nica's delivery schedules for access lines are  often  uncertain  and  there  are 
difficulties in assuring a certain level of quality of service. 
- There are restrictions on the commercial use of access facilities. For example, ISDN 
D channel access is not available for service providers. 
Perhaps some of these problems could be  solved by the above mentioned regulatory 
regime of Article 31  of the  Royal Decree 804 but so far there has been no request for 
an ex·post determination to be carried out by the regulator  . 
5.1.11.2.2  Interconnection of GSM mobile operators 
The second important development concerning the issue of interconnection is the plan 
of the Spanish Government to award two GSM licences in the course of 1994. One has 
already been granted to Telef6nica. The other one is expected to be  awarded after a 
bidding process in November or December 1994. 186 
The  regulatory  rules  for  mobile  telephony  were  fixed  in  the  Royal  Decree  1486  of 
July 1, 1994. Article 17 of the Decree establishes the right of the GSM licensee to get 
access to the PSTN. Out of 50 cities listed in the appendix of the Decree the licensee 
can choose the desired points of interconnection which then have to be provided by the 
public operator within a period of three months. 
In  Article 18 it is fixed that the  GSM  licensees may interconnect directly. The  second 
paragraph  of  Article 18  states  that there ·will  be  no  direct interconnection  between  a 
GSM  network  and  a  network  in  another country  so  that  the  traffic  will  have  to  be 
conducted over the."PSTN.· But within certain ·restrictions the regulator is able to allow 
exceptions from this rule. 
The principles of interconnection charging are regulated in the Articles 19 and 20 of the 
Decree. The general principle is written down in Article 19 and states that the charges 
for  access  to  the  PSTN  have  to  be  cost-oriented  and  need  to  be  approved  by  the 
regulator. Article 20 specifies that the conveyance charges for the usage of the network 
will be fixed by the regulator himself. These charges  als~ have to be cost-oriented and 
can contain access charges for financing the obligations of the public operator.  41 
In  the  Spanish  Official  Journal  of  September  16,  1994  the  Ministry  published  the .. 
charges  for  interconnection.  The  charges  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  a  fully-
distributed  costing  method.  The  regulator  has  not  made  use  of  his  power to  include 
access charge elements into the charges. 
For a 30-channel digital access to the  PSTN the interconnectors have to pay the  end-
user tariffs minus a 35%,-reduction on the initial connection charge and on the monthly 
rental  charge. The interconnection charges for the usage of the networks (conveyance 
charges)  were  completely defined by the  ministerial determination: For a call  from  the 
fixed  to  the  mobile  network  Telef6nica  has  to  pay  an  initial  charge  of  two  units  of 
tariffication (4.36 pesetas by July 1994) and  a usage charge of 15 pesetas per minute 
at the normal hours (monday to friday, 8.00h to 22.00h, and saturday, 8.00h to 14.00h). 
The  GSM  operators  have  to  pay  the  same  usage  charges  but  no  initial  charge. 
Furthermore,  they  have  the  possibility to  choose  the  tariff  level  (between  25  and  45 
pesetas per minute) that an end user of the fixed network has to pay for a call directed 
to the mobile network. 
Concerning the direct interconnection of mobile networks, the regulatory determination 
of  September  16,  1994  states  the  following:  If  the  GSM  operators interconnect their 
networks directly or if there is interconnection between a GSM operator's network and 
an  analog  mobile  network  the  parties  can  develop  a  proposal  of  an  interconnection 
charges  payment  scheme.  This  proposal  has  to  be  presented  to  the  regulator  for 
approval within a time of 3 months. In cases of non-agreement between the parties the 
regulator has the authority to determine the interconnection charges. 
41  Here is especially meant the universal service obligation of Telef6nica which is required to provide a 
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Clause 39 of the call  for tender of the GSM licence, published in the  Spanish Official 
Journal of September 27,  1994, contains some further regulatory rules with  regard to 
interconnection.  The  clause  sets  out  the  right  of  the  GSM  concessionaire  to 
interconnect  its  network  to  the  PSTN.  It  further  specifies  that  an  interconnection 
agreement must be presented to the General Directorate of Telecommunications for its 
approval  within  two  months  after  the  granting  of  the  second  GSM  licence.  The 
agreement  will  include  different  aspects,  such  as  the  mode  of  interconnection,  the 
criteria for traffic routing, investments into the PSTN, etc. 
It can be seen that the interconnection·  of the GSM networks with the fixed network is 
regulated  in  a  completely different way compared to the  interconnection  of the  data 
service providers. Instead of an approach favouring commercial negotiations, with  ex-
post determinations in case of failure, we find a number of important ex-ante rules from 
which follows that the regulator plays a more active role in the negotiations between the 
network operators. 
It can be expected that the interconnection issue will become of increasing importance 
in  Spain  as there are  strong  indications that the  Government will  not  use its special 
5-year-exemption on full service competition and, like most other Member States of the 
European  Union, will  open  its markets in  1998. This interpretation was  recently  - on 
October 7,  1994 - confirmed by an official communication of the Spanish Government 
setting out the telecommunications policy during the transitional period up to 1998. 
5.1.12  UK 
5.1 .12.1  Introduction 
The  U.K.  has  been  one  of  the  world's  pace  setters  in  telecommunications  policy. 
Already in  1980/81, the U.K. government formed British Telecom (BT) and abandoned 
the  traditional  PTI concept  by  severing  the  ties  between  telecommunications  and 
postal  services.  At the  same  time,  limited  market entry into telecommunications was 
allowed. In 1983 the first network entrant for fixed link services, Mercury, was protected 
against  further  market  entry  (along  with  BT)  through  a  seven-year  duopoly  policy. 
However, limited entry into telephony by cable TV operators (as network providers to 
BT and Mercury) and a duopoly for mobile services were exempted from this policy. In 
1984 the government converted BT into a pic (public limited company, i.e., a private law 
company) and divested a majority of its shares. This divestiture was accompanied by 
an  innovative  regulatory  framework  which  involved  the  appointment  of  an  industry-
specific  regulator  with  powers  to  determine  interconnection  agreement.  In  1991, 
following a review of the duopoly policy, telecommunications markets were opened to 
additional network entrants. 
Having  accumulated  10 years of valuable  experience with  interconnection  regulation 
policy, the U.K. provides the natural yardstick for other European countries. 188 
5.1.12.2  Institutional and legal conditions for interconnection 
5.1.12.2.1  Status of interconnection agreements and market structure 
A  meaningful  market  for  interconnection  could,  in  principle,  emerge  after  the 
Telecommunications Act 1981  had converted BT's monopoly rights for network services 
to  an  exclusive  privilege and  had  allowed the  government to issue licences  to  other 
network operators. 
The  first  licence,  based  on  the  1981  Act,  was  issued  to  Mercury  in  ·1982  for  fairly 
restrictive  operations.  Based  on  new  legislation,  a  second  and  broader licence  was 
issued  to  Mercury  on  November  5,  1984.  Mercury.s  first  licence  was  almost 
immediately  followed  by  an  interconnection  agreement  between  BT  and  Mercury 
(November 5,  1982), while a second agreement, based on the new licence, took until 
March  1986  to  conclude.  The  time  it  took  to  reach  the  second  interconnection 
agreement  may  actually  have  slowed  down  Mercury's  market  entry  into  public 
telephone services. 
The number of interconnection agreements and potential partners grew rapidly with the 
full  entry of cable TV companies into telephony and with the end of the duopoly policy 
end  of  1991.  For  example,  as  of  September  1993,  Mercury  had  43  interconnection 
agreements  with  fixed-link  operators and  3 with  mobile  operators,  and  it  expected  to 
sign  many more such agreements with  new licensees. Even though all licensees (yet) 
do not have interconnection agreements with each other, the number of interconnection 
agreements must, by now, have reached several hundred. Interconnection agreements 
between  fixed  networks  currently  exist  between  TOs,  between  TOs  and  cable 
operators,  between  TOs  and  CAPs,  and  between  TOs  and  service  providers.  In 
addition,  there  are  fixed  to  mobile  and  mobile  to  mobile  interconnection  agreements. 
Currently,  there are  no  agreements on  IN  services;  however,  both  the  Department of 
Trade  and  Industry  and  the  regulator  OFTEL  (Office  of  Telecommunications)  have 
taken  initiatives  in  that  direction.  The  total  estimated  sales  under  interconnection 
agreements  are  currently  in  the  range  of  500  million  pound  sterling  annually  (our 
assessment). 
The  British  telecommunications  market  continues  to  be  dominated  by  BT.  Although 
Brs share for domestic calls has dropped to  about 90°/o  and for international calls to 
below 80o/o,  BT still  has 97°/o  of subscribers.  All  other telecommunications operators 
have  to  use  Brs network to  complete  calls.  BT is  a vertically  integrated  nationwide 
provider  of  local,  long-distance  and  international  services.  Therefore,  BT  directly 
competes with the same operators to whom it provides interconnection services. 
After  initially  viewing  interconnection  as  an  unwelcome  activity  (at  least  as  far  as 
interconnection  with  Mercury  was  concerned,  but  not  necessarily  with  the  mobile 
operators  Cellnet and  Vodafone),  BT now treats interconnection  as a business in  its Network tnteroolwteetion in the Domain of ONP·  189 
own  right.  It has created •sr Carrier Services• as a division  catering  to the  specific 
needs of the U.K.'s telecommunications operators. 
After  a  slow  start,  Mercury  Communications  Ltd.  (hereafter.  MCL)  experienced 
impressive  growth.  In  1992/93 MCL had  1  0.5°k  market share in  telecommunications 
services  by  revenues.  The  largest component  of MCL's  operating  revenues  is  from 
business  customers  with  direct  fiber-optic  or  microwave  connection  to  MCL.  The 
second  component  is  from  large  indirectly  connected  business  customers  (using 
automatic  least-cost  routing  over  MCL's  network  for  long-distance  and  international 
calls)  and  the  third  from  indirectly  connected  residential  and  single-line  business 
customers.  Indirect connections mean that these customers access MCL through  the 
network  of  other  PTOs,  mostly  through  BT.  Residential  customers  mostly  use 
telephones equipped with a push button that directs the call over the  MCL network or 
telephones equipped with  a •Mercury Smart Socket• that automatically connects  with 
MCL. 
As a result of the Duopoly Review of 1991 , cable TV companies had the  right to offer 
switched  services  and  hence  to  interconnection  with  BT  or  MCL.  Telephone  lines 
supplied by 13 U.K. cable companies have grown from fewer than 2300 before 1991  to 
312,000  by  end-1993.  This  is  more  than  1°/o  of  total  direct  lines  in  the  U.K.  The 
incremental  cost  of  providing  telephone  services  is  low  for  a  cable  TV  company, 
provided the  twisted copper telephone wiring  is  done  at the  same  time  with  installing 
the coaxial TV cable. 
In  the  area  of  mobile  telecommunications,  Vodafone  and  Telecom  Securicor Cellular 
Radio Ltd.  (known as ·cell  net•  I  60°/o owned by BT and  40°/o owned by Securicor) hold 
licences for cellular mobile radio telephone networks since 1985. They now provide the 
corresponding services nationally and each has more than a million subscribers (using 
analog and  digital technology).  In addition, there are  two newly licensed mobile digital 
PCN  operators,  Hutchison  Microtel,  which  is  part  of  Hutchison  Whampoa  of  Hong 
Kong,  and  Mercury Personal  Communications Limited,  which  is the  licence  holder for 
Mercury One-2-0ne. Until very recently,  all  mobile operators  had  to  obtain  their fixed 
links from  other PTOs.  However,  Vodafone  and  Cellnet have,  in  December 1993 and 
March  1994, respectively, been licensed to provide certain of their own fixed links and 
provide land line services, and the PCN providers expect such licences shortly. 
5.1.12.2.2  Regulatory framework /licence 
The  Telecommunications  Act  1984  (in  the  following:  the  Act)  created  the  position  of 
Director General of Telecommunications (OGT) as the responsible regulator who heads 
OFTEL. Although  licences are  issued by the  responsible  Ministry (the  Department of 
Trade and  Industry) after discussion with  OFTEL, the DTI  has substantial power over 
the  monitoring  and  modification  of  licences  and  can  make  most  decisions  single 
handedly.  He  exercises  these  powers  within  the  limits  of  his  statutory  duties  and 
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and Mergers Commission. OFTEL had 147 employees in December 1993. 12 members 
of its staff are predominantly engaged in interconnection activities. 
The  main  vehicle  of telecommunications  regulation  is the operator licence.  The  Act 
requires that all  operators of public telecommunications systems,  including BT,  must 
have  a  licence  to  operate.  Since  1991  (after  conclusion  of  the  Duopoly  Review) 
licences can be issued fairly freely for the provision of services over fixed links. As of 
May  13,  1994,  44  licences  had  been  granted  and  38  more  applications  had  been 
received. 
The  operator  of  telecommunications  systems  can  be  licensed  as  a  PTO.  Being 
classified as a PTO facilitates acquiring wayleaves (rights of way) and imposes some 
duties, such as  reaching certain penetration levels (MCL) or even pr9viding universal 
service (BT), and the duties to publish prices, terms and conditions of service and not 
to discriminate. Less stringent requirements have to be met to gain licences that do not 
confer PTO status. They are usually quite restricted and apply to private networks (e.g., 
of  public utilities), closed user groups (banks) or simple resale of international private 
circuits. 
When  it  comes  to  competition  policy  in  telecommunications,  the  DGT  shares · 
responsibilities  with  the  DG  of  Fair Trading  (Section 50 of 1984 Act)  in  applying the 
relevant competition laws.  In  addition to the Restrictive Trade Practices Act  1976 and 
the  Competition  Act  1980,  further  competition  law  applying  to  telecommunications 
operators is contained in their licences. For example, Brs licence disallows provisions 
1n  interconnection agreements that are restrictive (collusive) under the Restrictive Trade 
Practices  Act  1976,  unless  the  DGT,  in  a  determination,  has  explicitly  consented  to 
such a provision. 
BT, as the dominant U.K. telecommunications carrier, is subject to a universal service 
obligation,42 subject to  non-discrimination requirements and subject to price regulation 
covering  about  64°/o  of  its  revenue.  The  API-X  type  of  price-cap  regulation,  first 
introduced  in  the  U.K.  in  1984,  has  allowed  BT  partially  to  rebalance  its  retail  tariff 
structure. However, tariff restructuring has been restricted through an  RPI+2 limitation 
on  residential  connection  charges  and  line  rentals,  an  obligation  to  offer  low-user 
discounts and an RPI+S limitation on multi-line business rentals. 
5.1.12.2.3  Legal rights concerning interconnection 
Interconnection  is  addressed  in  specific  conditions  of  all  PTO  licences.  These 
conditions,  which  provide  a  detailed  and  sometimes  complicated  framewod<  for 
interconnection agreements, are in most respects similar. However, reflecting changes 
made  after  1984,  Brs Condition  13  is  substantially  longer than  all  the  others  and 
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contains  some  items,  such  as  Access  Deficit  Contributions  (ADCs),  that  are 
conspicuously absent from the other licences. 
Brs licence  Conditions  13  establishes  a  duty for  BT  to  enter  into  interconnection 
agreements with other telecommunications operators that wish to do so, provided they 
can demonstrate that their demands are reasonable. The principle behind the duty is 
that any customer of any licensed operator should be able to call any customer of any 
other licensed operator (the •any-to-any" principle). This establishes ex-ante regulation 
of a general  right to  interconnection by network operators.  BT is  not obliged to enter 
into an  interconnection agreement if·entering into-such-an· agreement is··impracticable 
to do, or could cause personal or property damage for BT, or would impair BT's network 
and service quality, or would require network adjustment or modification. 
BT's licence  specifies a fairly detailed set of terms and  conditions to be  covered  by 
privately  negotiated  interconnection  agreements.  43  However,  interconnection 
agreements  generally  do  not  require  regulatory  approval.44  In  case  no  satisfactory 
agreement has been reached after a reasonable period of time either party can ask the 
DGT for a binding determination on specific points of disagreement. Also, the DGT can 
enforce  interconnection agreements whether they are  based on  his  determination  or 
reached by voluntary agreement. 
The  conditions  for  regulatory  involvement in  interconnection  is  specified  in  about  13 
pages in BT's licence. The DGT's powers of determination cover the same set of terms 
and conditions that are required to be covered by private interconnection agreements. 
The licence also specifies detailed criteria to be applied by the DGT in most cases. The 
criteria are particularly specific where they relate to  provisions for the determination of 
interconnection  charges  covering  the  conveyance  of  messages  (  .. conveyance 
charges  .. ).  Such charges include three elements. The first is the fully-allocated cost of 
conveyance calculated on a historic-cost basis, including a full contribution to relevant 
overheads.  The  DGT  can  decide which  are  the  relevant  BT  overheads.  The  second 
element is the applicable rate of return to relevant capital employed. The third element 
is  a  contribution  to  BT's  access  deficit  (an  ADC).  The  ADC  is  probably  the  most 
controversial part of  the  licence. Although the  licence contains a detailed specification 
of the procedures for calculating ADCs, the DGT has a fair amount of discretion in their 
application.  In  principle,  the  purpose  of  the  ADC  is  to  compensate  for  Brs access 
deficit, which  results from  regulatory restrictions on  increases in residential and single 
line business  rentals.  The  DGT has discretion to  waive  ADCs  fully  or partially within 
given parameters. The waiver may only apply to market shares of up to 1  0°/o  for any 
interconnecting  operator,  and  can  only  be  applied  to  a  market share  of  15°/o  for  all 
operators.  Only if an  interconnector's  market share  exceeds  25°/o  does the  full  ADC 
have to be paid by that interconnector. Also, for Brs financial years 1992 and 1993 the 
43  Billing and charging are part of this list which, in a similar form, also holds for mobile operators. 
44  However, the particulars of an agreement may have to be furnished to the Director General of Fair 
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ADC could be lowered if  BT did not achieve benchmark efficiency levels (using U.S. 
RBOC efficiency as a benchmark). 
An equal access stipulation was included in Brs licence in 1991, but its realisation is 
still subject to a satisfactory cost-benefit analysis of its merits. Preselection by ballot is 
not under consideration. Currently, access through three digit carrier identification code 
and automatic number identification (blue button) is required and available. Collocation 
is currently not available but was stipulated by the DGT as part of an earlier agreement 
between  BT  and  MCL.  Condition  13 also  specifies  general  principles  on  points  of 
interconnection,-while· the  -actaat-points-have-been-estabfishect-eitherthrough-private 
negotiations  or  through  DGT  determinations.  The  same  is  true  for  the  quality  of 
interconnection services. 
In  order to  deal  with  interconnection  standards,  a  Network  Interfaces Co-ordination 
Committee (NICC) was initiated by OFTEL, in March 1993, as a consultative forum,  in 
which operators, manufacturers and users can discuss standards and related technical 
issues associated with the introduction of more competition. The Committee consists of 
representatives of interest groups with  observers from OFTEL,  DTI and other bodies 
with a role in standards, such as BSI and BAST. The objective is to identify current and 
foreseen future needs for network interface standard and stimulate standards making· 
where necessary. The Committee is also called on to advice the DGT on specific issues 
(e.g.,  number  portability).  For  interconnect  interfaces,  the  DGT  may  designate  a 
standard  as  "essential"  (i.e.,  mandated)  though  in  practice  this  has  not  yet  been 
deemed necessary. Standards must comply with European standards where available, 
but most interconnection standards are currently set by a sub-group of the  NICC (the 
Interconnection  Standards  Committee),  whose  members  are  drawn  from  TOs  and 
manufacturers. 
To  sum  up,  the  provisions on  regulatory determinations leave  interconnection  issues 
primarily to private negotiations between the parties involved.  45 The DGT only comes in 
when the negotiations fail. However, in practice the DGrs influence seems to dominate 
certain aspects of interconnection agreements. 
5.1.12.2.4  Private negotiations 
The operator licences provide for ex-ante regulation of all interconnection agreements, 
including  commercially  negotiated  agreements  or  case-by-case  determinations  on 
specific  issues.  Starting  late  in  1993,  interconnection  agreements  involving  BT  are 
publicly available.  The agreement between British Telecommunications public limited 
company and NYNEX CableComms Bromley Umited (in  the following we  abbreviate 
the name for this agreement by 8-N) is one of the first interconnection agreements fully 
45  For example, interconnection charges paid to other parties than BT need not be cost-based. 
• • 
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in the public domain, and it is one that is almost entirely privately negotiated (except for 
DGT determinations on ADC waivers for both parts). 
Compared to other long-term contracts, such as in intemational coal trade and ocean 
transportation of bulk cargo and oil, the 8-N, in spite of its 154 pages, does not appear 
to  be  overly  complicated  or  overly  legalistic.  This  holds  in  particular,  since 
telecommunications interconnection is a substantially more complex and  less  mature 
commodity/service than either coal or ocean transportation. We understand, however, 
that,  even  without a determination by the  DGT,  it took nearly two years for BT and 
.NYNEX .. to  .reach ..the .J~greement.-Howev.ec, BT -bas ..sought-m.-astabtish  standard 
agreements with  cable .companies and is now well advanced in preparing a standard 
general agreement for all interconnecting operators. 
Among the clauses of this agreement most likely to contain lessons for other European 
countries are the ones on  information exchange and on equipment testing.  In order to 
implement an interconnection agreement information has to be exchanged between the 
parties  that  is  usually  not  made  available  by a  firm  to  any  outsider,  let  alone  to  a 
competitor.  Clause  9  of  the  agreement  describes  the  types  of  information  to  be 
exchanged  and  calls  for  strict  separation  of  interconnection  personnel  from  sales 
people (Chinese walls) inside the two organisations so that such sensitive information 
can only be used for purposes of the 8-N. 
Clause A  14 on switch testing is asymmetric, requiring testing of NYNEX switches by BT 
in  order  to  assure  •that  the  respective  Systems  can  interwork correctly  and  will  not 
adversely affect the  existing  services provided  by  each  System.  • Switches that have 
already been tested under similar circumstances only need a reduced level of testing. 
Intermediate  level  of  testing  is  required  for  switches  of  a type  that  was  successfully 
tested  under different conditions of implementation.  Full  switch testing  is required  for 
switches that have not been successfully tested for the same type of interconnection. 
Interconnection agreements between MCL and cable TV operators remain outside the 
public domain. MCL sees a natural alliance with cable operators. They own local loops 
all  over the  country,  while  MCL's  network is  predominantly long  distance  (except for 
London).  Agreements between  MCL and  cable  operators therefore  include marketing 
and operating agreements. At least initially. MCL does a lot of the switching. 
Between  cable  TV  companies  there  is  competition  for  the  market  rather  than 
competition in the market. Cable TV companies are allowed to interconnect directly with 
each other and to have cooperative agreements  . 
5.1.12.2.5  Regulatory determinations 
The  1986  BT -MCL  agreement  has  been  highly  influential  as  a  precedent  for  other 
agreements.  Most  of  what  we  know  about  this  agreement  comes  from  the  DGrs 
determination of terms and conditions of October 11, 1985. A very major emphasis of 194 
the 1985 determination is on the timing of interconnection. This was one of MCL's main 
issues  because  it  wanted  to  gain  access  to  customers  quickly  while  BT's  interest 
appeared to have been in delaying interconnection. Given the lack of actual experience 
with  implementing  physical  interconnection,  a  number  of  paragraphs  in  the 
determination  specifically  lay out exact time  tables  for interconnection  and  threaten 
consequences for nonadherence to the stipulated dates. 
Interconnection  prices,  under the  determination, were  not specifically cost-based  but 
rather were set to provide  incentives for MCL to build a long-distance network.  After 
their initial determination by  .OFIEUn j 985,..ST  .  .interconnedinn charges .for .MCL  have 
followed  a  RP1·3  formula.  This  was  constructed  like  a  price  cap  but  without  the 
rebalancing feature. In 1991  MCL was feeling the effect of a squeeze from increases in 
BT's interconnection charges relative to its retail prices, which had declined at a much 
faster  rate  than  RPI·3.  Under a  specific  review  clause  of the  1986  interconnection 
agreement,  MCL  asked  the  DGT for a determination with  respect to  interconnection 
charges,  and,  as  a  consequence,  from  1990/91  onward,  a  new  (unpublished) 
adjustment formula, based on BT's actual costs, was implemented. 
The Duopoly Review in 1991  resulted in major changes of BT's and MCL's licences and 
in  changed  market  conditions.  Also,  the  price  adjustment  clause  in  the  1986 
interconnection  agreement  had  proved  unworkable.  In  March  1992  BT  and  MCL 
therefore  started  negotiations for a new  interconnection agreement.  The  negotiations 
stalled on call charges and connection payments, and the parties, in June 1992, agreed 
to  ask the  DGT for a determination on these issues. A determination by the  DGT was 
published in December 1993. It covers, in particular, conveyance charges to be paid by 
MCL. 
The  calculations  of  conveyance  charges  are  based  on  component costs  and  routing 
factors.  Routing  factors are  derived statistically for each  type  of call  (local,  short and 
long  national)  based  on  samples  that  measure  the  use  of  the  network.  The  routing 
factors  represent  average  usage  of  each  network  element  by  each  type  of  MCL 
interconnection  segment.46  Current  conveyance  charges  for  delivery  of  local  calls 
amount  to  between  50°/o  and  60°/o  of  BT's  local  retail  tariffs  (depending  on  whether 
MCL interconnects to local or to trunk exchanges). 
ADCs which are paid in addition to conveyance charges are related to the profitability of 
the service in question. As a percentage of conveyance charges, they range from about 
40°/o for local cheap period calls to about 1  OOo/o  for tandem national calls. The DGT, in 
his  ADC  calculations,  had  made  comparisons  between  BT's  and  U.S.  carriers' 
efficiency and had found that no adjustment to BT's ADC for 1991/92 was necessary on 
efficiency grounds. MCL receives an ADC waiver on the first 10o/o of its local, national 
46  A 'segment' is that part of a call from the point where the call is received from a customer or handed 
over to a networ1< to the point where the network hands the call on again or delivers it to the end user. 
An  interconnected call can use one or more segments, and conveyance charges would be incurred 
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and  international  market shares,  including  MCL  calls  routed  over BT's  system.  The 
DGT justified the ADC waivers on the basis of the disadvantages of MCL relative to BT, 
in particular on the lack of number portability. Other factors, such as volume of calls per 
line and economies of scale, appear to balance each other, and were not invoked to 
justify the waivers. 
5.1.12.2.6  Agreements involving mobile operators 
Fixed-mobile  inter.connection agr:eements .differ Jrom Jixe~fixed  .  .agreements  by their 
emphasis  on  private  circuits,  which  play  a  major  role  for  mobile  operators.  The 
agreements provide  special  conditions for private  circuits  that deviate from  standard 
price.  These  special  conditions  are  restricted  to  the  purposes  of the  interconnection 
agreement so  that the  mobile  operator cannot,  for example,  resell  private  lines  at  a 
profit. Due to waivers, mobile carriers currently pay no ADCs to BT. 
As  far  as  we  know,  direct  mobile  to  mobile  interconnection  currently  exists  only 
between Cellnet and Vodafone. It involves no payment of conveyance charges, unless 
call volumes differ markedly by direction of traffic. 
5.1.12.3  Policy initiatives in the field of interconnection 
5.1.12.3.1  OFTEL initiative on •Interconnection and Accounting Separation• 
Following  a  consultative  document  and  an  intense  discussion  with  the 
telecommunications  industry,  in  March  1994,  the  DGT  issued  a  Statement 
·Interconnection  and  Accounting  Separation:  The  Next  Steps'.,  announcing  a  three-
stage  programme.  The  first  stage,  beginning  immediately,  uses  the  December  1993 
BT/MCL determination as a basis for interim charges for interconnection with BT. The 
second stage envisages a list of standard interconnection charges, a more transparent 
process  of  relating  costs  to  charges  and  accounting  separation  of  BT  -Network,  BT-
Access and BT-Retail. The third stage deals with issues •on which the substance and 
the timing of conclusions are uncertain·. 
The use of the BTIMCL determination in Stage 1 comes close to a standard price list by 
BT.  What interconnectors other than MCL would have to do to arrive at their relevant 
interconnection charges is  to adapt the  MCL charges to  their specific circumstances. 
The Statement therefore provides a ••Ready Reckoner'. based on the costs determined 
for the BT/MCL determination. from which other operators will be able to estimate the 
costs they are likely to face in interconnecting with the BT network•. What is particularly 
important is that the routing factors relevant for the conveyance charges are specific to 
each operator.  Hence, routing factors have to be  individually estimated. This presents 
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In Stage 2, OFTEL intends to proceed with accounting separation between BT-Retail, 
BT  -Network and BT  -Access. The purpose is. 
- to  allocate  srs costs  in  a  way  that  reflects  properly  the  division  between  srs 
separated activities, and 
- to demonstrate in published audited financial statements that BT's network and ADC 
charges  have  not  resulted  in  unduly  discriminatory  behavior  (or  an  unfair  cross 
subsidy). 
.  .  .  ~.  ... . 
BT  -Network account will include all services offered to interconnectors and to BT  -Retail. 
BT  -Access includes the costs and revenues of BT provision of connection, rental and 
other access services to the business and residential market. It will also show the ADCs 
received from BT  -Retail and other operators, as well as any residual access deficit. BT-
Retail  will  be  separated  into  service  categories.  It  will  contain  separate  financial 
statements for regulated and non-regulated services (in order to demonstrate absence 
of  cross subsidies flowing to non-regulated activities). The BT-Retail account will  also 
demonstrate that BT charges itself the same conveyance charge as it charges other 
operators for equivalent services. 
For  the  calculation  of  standard  charges  (for  about  70  services)  OFTEL  wants  to 
develop cost  allocation principles,  cost drivers and details for BT's transfer charging. 
The  cost  allocation  methodology  and  transfer  charging  should  conform  to  several 
pnnciples  which  include  activity  based  costing,  appropriate  statistical  sampling 
techniques,  year-to-year  consistency,  materiality47,  and  equal  treatment of BT  -Retail 
and other operators. 
The main longer term issues (Stage 3) include 
- the  cost base for interconnection charges.  For example,  forward-looking economic 
costs,  a  form  of  long-run  incremental  costs,  are  to  be  examined.  OFTEL  has 
observed that,  if  such  concepts  were  to be  adopted for interconnection costs  and 
were fed  through into interconnection charges,  this would  have an  impact on  srs 
tariff  structure  and  accounts,  although  the  DGT has ruled  out,  on  the  information 
currently available to  him,  any early adjustment to srs current price cap which  is 
due to run until July 1997; 
- charging  structure  for  interconnection  services.  Alternatives  to  the  standard  "per 
minute" unit for charging conveyance charges are to be evaluated, particularly some 
form of capacity charging; 
- the future of ADCs. ADCs reflect the fact that, under its current tariff structure, BT 
recovers many of its access costs through usage rather than standing charges.  In 
47  Materiality means a change  in  bases  of allocation  only if the  effect of the  change  is likely to  be 
material to the allocation of costs. 
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order for the  ADC  regime  to  be materially challenged,  Brs ability  to  recover  its 
access deficit, and hence the issues of whether BT should be allowed to rebalance 
its tariffs and the quantification of that part of its access deficit caused by the USC, 
would have to be considered; and 
- the addition of new interconnedion services. 
The statement on  Stage 3 is short and open ended, indicating that the DGT wants to 
keep the  issues wide  open  at this point while at the same  time  starting  an  extensive 
discussion with the industry. This· will be  .taken fmward .in .a. new. consultation document 
to be issued in late 1994. 
5.1.12.3.2  MCL's litigation on capacity-based pricing 
A DGT determination cannot be  appealed to the  MMC.  However, a declaratory ruling 
from  a commercial  court  is  possible.  MCL's  is  the  first  such  legal  action  in  the  U.K. 
against  any  regulator.  MCL  claims  that  the  DGT  has  misinterpreted  Brs licence 
Condition  13  regarding  the  costs  of  interconnection.  MCL  insists  that  only  capacity 
costs  can  be  used as  the  basis for •traffic sensitive• network costs and  that the  cost 
base should be incremental costs. 
5.1.12.3.3  Standard interconnection agreements 
As  noted  earlier,  BT  has  designed  a  standard  interconnection  agreement.  The 
agreement  could  facilitate  the  administration  of  interconnection  and  is  BT's  best 
defense against undue discrimination between other operators. For example, there are 
130 cable TV companies that want interconnection agreements. 
5.1.12.4  Conclusions: The state of the U.K. discussion 
The U.K.  interconnection area is currently the scene of great activity and wide-ranging 
discussions. The growth of new providers has produced the benefits of competition but 
has  also  led  to  inevitable  strains  on  the  regulatory  process.  Regulation  has  to  take 
account  of  large  numbers  of  participants  with  a  diversity  of  interests.  The  U.K. 
discussion  on  interconnection  currently  concentrates  on  several  key  issues.  They 
include: 
(a)  the  amount  of  information  about  itself  that  the  interconneding  parties  (BT  in 
particular) should provide each other and to the public and the transparency of the 
regulatory system; 
(b)  the  speeding  of  the  process  of  reaching  interconnection  agreements  (including 
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(c)  the justification of,  amount of and waivers for ADCs and the identification of the 
cost of the USO; 
(d)  the  definition  and  utility  of  altemative  costing  procedures  as  a  basis  for 
interconnection charges; 
(e)  the definition of interconnection services, including the unbundling of components 
and the set of services to be offered  .... 
(f)  issues  not directly related  to. cost~ ~nd charge~!.  s~~h  ___ as  _q~~lilY.  .  __ of  _i~~erconnec~ 
services, equal access, number portability and access to number information. 
(g)  The  definition of "service providers• and the form  of interconnection regimes that 
will  best  advance  competition  not only in services but also among  infrastructure 
providers. 
In  addition,  there  are  a number of  important interconnection issues that fail  to create 
protracted  disputes  involving  the  regulator.  These  include  types  of  interconnection, 
technical aspects, network security/integrity, and interface standards. 
Cost principles are seen as the most important element in interconnection agreements 
(interviews). Until now, the guiding principle has been fully-allocated historic costs. This 
is  somewhat  surprising,  given  the  openness  and  economic  sophistication  with  which 
OFTEL  has  otherwise  addressed  interconnection  issues.  BT  may  have  been  a 
constraining  factor  here.  Current  interconnect determinations  by the  DGT amount  to 
rate-of-return regulation of interconnection charges. A price-cap approach to controlling 
them has been raised as a possibility. This would raise the question of its relationship to 
the retail price cap. 
The other operators, in a January 11,  1994 meeting at OFTEL, had suggested a list of 
network  components  that  they  wanted  separately  tariffed  rather  than  having  to  buy 
bundled  services  (OUST).  The  OUST was  based  on  Brs existing  network structure 
and  consisted  of  five  categories:  (a)  basic  switching,  (b)  transport,  (c)  features  and 
intelligence,  (d)  services  (e.g.,  NIS  databases,  directory  enquiries  and  operator 
assistance), and (e) access to (possibly proprietary) interconnect information. 
Based on  Baumel's efficient component pricing suggestion, OFTEL has developed the 
concept of ADCs  and has tried to  make  them  workable.  This process has resulted  in 
very complicated and uncertain decision making. The current practice of ADC waivers 
has  an  uncertain  future,  due  to  Brs loss  of  market  share  and  due  to  the  possible 
expiration of BT's restrictions on rebalancing of its tariffs. ADC waivers are an important 
incentive  for  new  entrants.  To  gain  them,  they  have  to  submit  business  plans  to 
OFTEL. If BT's market share falls below BSo/o,  waivers have to be removed from other 
operators  in  order  to  accommodate  new  entrants.  This  situation  has  already  been 
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Equal access and number portability are among the most critical  issues likely to be 
solved  in  the  U.K.  in  the  near  future.  At  this  time,  after  nearly  ten  years  of 
interconnection, MCL has no equal access yet. Several suggestions are on the table. 
Local number portability can be achieved through rerouting (like call forwarding),  call 
dropback (local databases) or IN (further into the future). NYNEX expects to double its 
penetration rates with number portability. It also expects a specific determination by the 
end of 1994 for BT  -NYNEX on reciprocal number portability and it is confident that local 
number portability can actually be achieved by then. 
The legal and regulatory framework.provided by licences and the Act is very extensive 
and extremely specific. Whenever the circumstances change, they have to be changed, 
too. In spite of this specificity, OFTEL is a fairly small organisation, indicating that U.K. 
telecommunications regulation is fairly cheap to operate. 
A remarkable feature of U.K. interconnection regulation is the central role of the DGT. 
The  DGT has substantial authority in  shaping the overall interconnection  regime  and 
specific interconnection agreements 
While BT and some of the other operators may feel that interconnection issues are far 
too technical to be solved by an outside party (such as a regulator), OFTEL is usually 
called in or steps in only to resolve commercial issues. Technical issues are now largely 
left  for  industry  representatives  to  resolve  among  themselves  either through  private 
negotiations or through the NICC or informal work groups arranged by the DGT. It turns 
out that the remaining controversial issues are mostly of a commercial or organisational 
nature that can well be adjudicated by a regulator. 
The  U.K.  interconnection regime has evolved since it was first  set up  ten  years  ago. 
During this time, both the relevant licence conditions, interconnection agreements and 
the practice of interconnection have gone through substantial changes in  detail. Many 
of  these  changes  have  been  necessary  to  adapt  the  regulatory  system  to  new 
technological and market developments. Any interconnection regime would have to be 
open  to  accomodate  such  changes.  Other  changes  of  the  U.K.  interconnection 
framework were  due to  institutional  learning.  The  question  is  if such  learning  can  at 
least in  part be avoided by other countries, in  which interconnection arrangements are 
only  now  beginning  to  emerge  as  an  issue.  In  addition,  the  U.K.  experience  offers 
useful  insights for other administrations  of  the  complexity of issues that  need  to  be 
addressed as competition is introduced in telecommunications network services. 200 
5.2  Overseas countries 
5.2.1  Australia 
5.2.1.1  Introduction 
Until  a few years ago,  the provision of telecommunications services in  Australia took 
place-within a·  traditional frameworlr.-T-he· -AustraliaHeleea~nicatians  .Commission 
(ATC or Telecom) and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC) were the 
two (government) entities providing, respectively, domestic and international services. 
In addition there was Aussat, a provider of satellite services, which was created in 1981 
as  a  government  majority-owned  public  liability  corporation.  Uberalisation  started  in 
1988  when  as  part  of  a  general  initiative  aimed  at  modernising  the  country's  large 
public enterprises the government's telecommunications enterprises and with them the 
whole telecommunications sector were restructured. 
By  1994,  the  restructuring  had  involved passage of the  Telecommunications Acts  of 
1989  and  1991,  the  introduction  of  a  general  policy  of  competition  for  the  sector, 
creation  of  Austel  as  regulatory  authority,  creation  of a duopoly  market structure  for 
fixed  network services  by  the  merger of Telecom/OTC  (later named  Telstra  but  still 
known  to  be  Telecom) as  incumbent and  the  selection  of  Optus  as  new competitor, 
licensing of Vodafone as a third cellular mobile operator, allowing service providers to 
operate  under  class  licences,  and,  in  sum,  putting  in  place  a  regulatory  framework 
aiming to  guide the sector from a state of monopoly to one of effective competition by 
the  end of the decade. At the present time, government and Austel are preparing for a 
review of their policies with a view of ending the duopoly environment by the year 1997. 
5.2.1.2  The framework for interconnection 
5.2.1.2.1  Current status of interconnection agreements 
A key place in the development of the interconnection framework is taken by the Austel 
report on interconnection and equal access asked for by the government in November 
1990 and submitted to it in June 1991. The report was to provide relevant information to 
the  bidders for the second carrier licence. Austel carried out a thorough cost study for 
deriving interconnection charges and access charges on the basis of incremental costs. 
Points of interconnection (POls) were determined and many of the technical aspects of 
physical  interconnection  specified.  The  report  thus  provided  a  comprehensive  set  of 
technical,  financial  and  commercial  conditions  on  which  interconnection  was  to  be 
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In  November 1991, the  government selected Optus,  a  newly created  company  held 
51°/o by Australian interests and 24.5o/o each by Cable &  Wireless and BeiiSouth, as the 
second  carrier.  At  the  same  time,  it was  licensed as a  general  telecommunications 
carrier.  Based  on  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the  June  1991  Auster  report, 
interconnection between Optus and Telecom was arranged so that in April 1992 Optus 
was  in  a position to  start operations. The formal  interconnection  agreement between 
the two carriers was concluded in August 1992. 
In December 1992, a third GSM cellular mobile carrier was selected by the government 
and given a -licence.  Before this,. the .govemment-had given- assurances that the  new 
carrier would be granted access to the Telecom and Optus networks on commercially-
agreed  terms.  The  interconnection  agreement with  Telecom  was  concluded  in  early 
1994. There also exists an interconnection agreement between Vodafone and Optus. 
Service providers do not have interconnection agreements. They have access to  the 
carriers' networks, primarily that of Telstra, on conditions that in principle correspond to 
those  offered  end  users.  Telstra  has,  however,  introduced  a  particular  tariff,  the 
National  Connect  Service  tariff,  that  in  some  aspects  approaches  the  terms  of  the 
existing interconnection agreements. 
The  current market structure thus  comprises  Telstra and  Optus,  both  as  full  service 
operators, Vodatone as a third operator of GSM cellular mobile services, and more than 
1  00  service  providers  of  domestic  and  international  services,  most  of  them  being 
resellers.  Optus,  the  most important competitor,  has primarily been active in  the  long-
distance market and by the beginning of 1994 had captured shares in regional·markets 
of between 15 °/o and 20 °/o. 
5.2.1.2.2  The legal framework for interconnection 
The Telecommunications Act of  1991  guarantees a carrier the right to interconnect with 
the  networks  and  services  of  other  carriers.  This  applies,  however,  only  to  carriers 
holding  licences as either general telecommunications or public mobile  services.  The 
Act  further specifies that interconnection should  be  offered on  reasonable  terms,  that 
the  right of interconnection extends to access to supplementary services, and that the 
responsible  Minister  may  determine  principles  governing  the  calculation  of  charges 
relating to interconnection and access (he has done so: see the paragraph on the IRCP 
below).  The  Act also provides for the  registration  of interconnection agreements with 
Austel  in  order to exempt them  from  certain  strictures of the Trade  Practices Act.  In 
carrying  out  registration  Austel  in  fact  expresses  its  appro_yal _.Qf  an  interconnection 
agreement.  Further,  on  registration  interconnection  agreements  become  part  of  the 
public domain except for sections classified as confidential. 
Another  important  document  relating  to  interconnection  is  the  Telecommunications 
(Interconnection  and  Related  Charging  Principles,  IRCP)  Determination  by  the 
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Austel's determination on initial charges of June 1991  in a government directive, and to 
provide for a framework of negotiations between Telecom and Optus once the  initial 
terms and conditions cease to apply due to implementation of equal access or due to 
predetermined market share thresholds that have been passed by the new carrier. 
5.2.1.2.3  The reality of interconnection 
The  discussion  below  is  based  on  the  analysis of the  Telstra/Optus  interconnection 
agreement which also .coversJnterconnectioo.af  .OptuLGSM...cellular  .mobile .operations. 
There are also interconnection agreements entered into between Vodafone and either 
T  elstra or Optus. Their most interesting sections, however, those pertaining to charges, 
are  not  in  the  public  domain.  The  second  set  of  agreements  may  differ  from  the 
Telstra/Optus agreement in  as  much  as they were both negotiated commercially and 
have not benefited from a prior Austel determination. 
5.2.1.2.4  Interconnection between Telstra and Optus 
Current interconnection arrangements between Telstra and Optus still reflect to a large 
degree  the  determinations  of  the  June  1991  Austel  report.  The  two  parties  have 
meanwhile  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  aim  of arriving  at  arrangements  on  a 
commercial basis. 
The  two basic entities of the T  elstra/Optus interconnect structure are the POl  and the 
inter-earner charging area  (ICCA).  Within a particular ICCA, the same interconnection 
charges apply.  The  POl  is  the  geographic point with  respect to  which the charges for 
ongmating  and  terminating  access  are  determined.  ICCAs  have  been  based  on 
Telstra's charging districts. There are 205 charging districts which are again subdivided 
1nto  about  2000 charging  zones.  Optus has  reportedly  established  POls  in  70  of the 
205 ICCAs, all of them along the East, South and West Coasts of Australia. In Telstra's 
network,  interconnection  takes  place  at  the  level  of trunk switches.  Optus  is  able  to 
install some transmission equipment on  the Telsta's premises to connect its switching 
network to the Telstra gateway exchange. 
Telstra's retail prices for local calls hold within a charging zone and between adjacent 
zones.  A charging zone with  its adjacent zones is a 'local calling area'. Within a local 
area calls are normally carried by Telstra, but callers may select their carrier (Optus or 
Telstra)  for calls outside  their local area.  Having POls in  an  ICCA, Optus can  collect 
traffic from (or deliver to) parties within the ICCA at charges pertaining to this particular 
category of ICCA. If the call originates/terminates within the local calling area in which 
the  POl  has been established, a particular set of charges applies;  if  the calling/called 
party is outside the local calling area of the POl but within the same ICCA, an additional 
interconnect charge for carriage applies. These are the charges which are still at levels 
initially set by Auster and currently in the process of renegotiation. If the call leaves the 
ICCA,  then  Optus has to  provide for carriage of the  call  over links that it either has • 
Network lntercomection in 1he Domain of ONP  203 
established itself or leased from Telstra at commercially negotiated charges (subject to 
the  principles  of the  IRCP).  Charges  for supplementary services,  e.g.  directory and 
inquiry services, are also to be negotiated on a commercial basis. 
The usage charges applicable within  an  ICCA consist of per minute components  for 
switching, conveyance over the trunk network and use of the customer access network 
(CAN), and of a per call flagfall component. The charges differ according to the kind of 
ICCA (business district,  metropolitan,  rural)  and the time of the day (peak,  off-peak). 
The time dependent charges at either end (originating or terminating) during peak time 
average 3.14 cents per minute. This_ is less than s_o .o/o  of Telstra's end-user .charge for 
a local  call,  which  amounts to about 8 cents per minute.  There is  no explicit access 
charge  included in  the interconnection charges. The CAN charge, currently averaging 
to about 0.5 cent per minute, seems however to be related to an access charge. 
As  determined  by  Austel,  Telstra  is  to provide  Optus  with  equal  access  by  offering 
customers  the  choice  of  'preselecting'  their provider of  long-distance  service.  As  an 
interim  step,  before  being  able  to  accommodate  preselection,  Telstra  offers  a prefix 
solution. Preselection facilities have been made available by Telstra ahead of schedule. 
In order to hasten decisions of users to select either Telstra or Optus as their supplier 
of long-distance calls, ballots were carried in a number of areas where preselection had 
been made available. In these ballots, between 10 o/o  and 18 °/o  selected Optus as their 
supplier. 
The  interconnection  of Optus'  GSM  cellular mobile  services  with  both  Telstra's  fixed 
network  and  Telstra's  own  GSM  network  is  accomplished  within  the  same 
interconnection agreement. In general, the Optus GSM and fixed networks interconnect 
with the PSTN of Telstra at the same POls, and it appears that the same charges apply 
for  originating  and  terminating  services  supplied  by Telstra  independently of  whether 
calls  relate  to  Optus'  fixed  or  GSM  network.  This,  however,  cannot  be  said  with 
certainty  as  the  relevant  sections  of the  GSM  amendment  is  in  the  private  domain. 
Also,  the  charges  for  the  conveyance  of  calls  via  the  respective  GSM  networks  are 
covered in the undisclosed sections of the agreement. 
5.2.1.2.5  Telstra's National Connect Service tariff 
Telstra introduced this tariff in September 1992. Reportedly, the tariff was designed for 
the  needs  of AAPT,  so  far  the  most  important  new operator.  Being  a  reseller  and 
therefore  not  having  the  right  to  interconnection  in  the  sense  of  the 
Telecommunications  Act,  AAPT  had  successfully  lobbied  with  the  Ministry  of 
Communications for arrangements catering to its special requirements. 
The service is described as a national access and egress service for service providers 
with  large  volumes  of long-distance  telephony  telecommunications.  Charges  for  the 
service consist of a charge for the establishment of the service, connection charges as 
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transmission links, as well as call usage charges. The charges are lower than end-user 
charges.  However,  they  appear  substantially  higher  than  the  comparable 
interconnection charges paid by Optus. As mentioned, AAPT is so far the only user of 
the service. 
5.2.1.3  Special aspects and new developments 
·5.2.1.3.1  ··Austel-guided negotiatio"&-between-.:relstra--and Qptus-.for·subsequent 
interconnection charges 
We  have  discussed above the role  and function of the initial interconnection charges 
set by the Austel report of June 1991. We have also pointed out that they would cease 
to  apply  with  respect  to  the  CAN  charge  whenever  Optus  customers  have  the 
opportunity to preselect Optus as their long-distance supplier; with respect to carriage 
and  switching  charges  whenever  Optus'  market  share  equalled  certain  threshold 
values.  By late 1993, preset preselection targets had been met by Telstra, and Telstra 
claimed  that Optus had passed the market share thresholds  in  many of the  relevant 
areas.  Telstra  thus  requested  that  negotiations  be  opened  with  a  view  to  replace, 
wherever  the  conditions  were  satisfied,  initial  (Austel  determined)  charges  with  so-
called  subsequent (commercially negotiated) charges. The  ensuing negotiations were 
concluded in July 1994 and led to an increase in the average charge for interconnection 
within an ICC A from 3.14 to 3.5 cents. This increase of about 10 °/o  is the algebraic sum 
of  (a)  a decrease of the  charge for switching and conveyance from  2.62 to 2.2 cents 
(-16°/o)  and  (b)  an  increase  of  the  CAN  charge  from  0.52 to  1.3 cents  (150  o/o).  A 
remarkable aspect of these negotiations is the role that Austel played in them which will 
be briefly presented in the following. 
5.2.1.3.2  Provision of universal service 
The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1991  includes  specific  prov1s1ons  for  a  universal 
service scheme. They aim at geographical areas, so-called net cost areas, for which all 
relevant revenues do not cover costs. The carrier serving an area designated a net cost 
area -which in all cases has so far been Telstra- is entitled to recover the deficit (net 
cost) from a universal service fund instituted for the purpose. All carriers contribute to 
the  fund  on  the  basis  of  their  share  in  total  timed  traffic.  The  total  net  cost  of  the 
universal service obligation reportedly amounts to about 250 million Australian dollars  • 
annually.  As  Optus  has  by  1994 reached  a  share  of about  15 °/o  of total  traffic,  its 
contribution to the scheme is thus about 30 million dollars per year. 
Note that this USO is not defined in terms of providing subsidised access to the local 
network which would call for an access charge. In fact, interconnection carriers are not 
required to pay an access charge to the incumbent. Despite its similarity with an access .. 
.. 
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charge,  the CAN charge is supposed to  be  related to the actual attributable costs  of 
using the local network. 
5.2.1.3.3  Austel•s new interconnect model 
Austel  so  far  has  worked  with  two  models  of  interconnection·,  an  •access 
interconnection  model•  and  a  'symmetrical  interconnection  model'.  The  first  model 
would  apply to  a situation where  a local  carrier provides access to  a carrier offering 
long:distance .service_The  .second .model  was JboughUo  .apply  _to .  .situations where two 
networks  existed  side  by  side,  each  offering  full  service  including  access  to  local 
networks  as  well  as  local  and  long-distance  calling.  While  in  the  former  model  the 
selection of the long-distance provider is a conscious decision of the caller, in the latter 
the cross-over into another network would happen without such a decision if the B-party 
just happened to be a customer of the other network. 
Austel has for some time been dissatisfied with the two models as they seem to cover 
two  specific  cases  and  neither  seems  general  enough  to  be  able  to  cover  other 
configurations.  It  has  now presented  the  principles  for  a  new model.  The  principles 
define general buyer/seller relationships among the producers of different components 
along the value chain of an end-to-end telecommunications service. It also defines the 
relationship of carriers and service providers (both considered to be Service Deliverers) 
with  the  customer,  of  which  the  one  between  the  Prime  Service  Deliverer  and  its 
Contracting Customer is the  most important.  It is the  relationship consciously decided 
upon  by  the  customer.  It  exists  for  example  in  the  case  of  a  subscription  for  an 
exchange line, a preselection arrangement, or a contract for the provision of freephone 
service.  When  connections  come  about  under  such  a  contractual  arrangement  the 
other  Service  Deliverers  that  may  be  involved,  and  there  may  be  several,  would  be 
defined  as  Supporting  Service  Deliverers  (SSDs).  Among  the  latter,  Access  Service 
Deliverers would take a special position as almost all services need originating access 
to  be  supplied  by  such  a deliverer,  and  many  also  terminating  access.  Other  SSDs 
would  provide  carriage  and  switching  services  for  part  of  the  way  taken  by  a 
communication; these SSDs are referred to as Transit Service Deliverers. 
Important consequences are expected to follow from the principles of the model. They 
would clarify the relationships between customers and users on the one hand and the 
deliverers of services on the other as well as interconnection and 'connect' relationships 
(see  below)  between  carriers  and  service  providers.  Services  with  non-geographic 
numbering, in  particular information services, could more easily be  handled under the 
principles  of the  model.  For  services  to  be  provided by service providers, the  Austel 
endorsed process envisages 
- a Service Definition Document in which the functional definition of the service as well 
as its place in the National Numbering Plan would be provided: 206  Study tor.,. European Cormission 
- a  Network  Interfaces  Co-ordination  Forum,  encompassing  suppliers,  operators, 
users and others with an interest in the matter that would develop specifications for 
new or enhanced interfaces; and 
- Commercial  Negotiations Arrangements commensurate  with  those  provided for  in 
the Telecommunications Act for carrier interconnection relationships. 
The model in particular also deals with the gap in the TelecommunicatiOIJ~ Act whereby 
service providers (SPs) are not entitled to interconnection that network carriers, for their 
part,  ~re entitled_ to  obtain  fro"'! .  eac~. ~!her_.  __  I_~  the  .. model!._  ~P~ W!JUid  be  able  to 
'connect'  with  carriers  and  with  other SPs,  presumably on  conditions  that. are  to  be 
overseen  by  the  regulator  but  that  would  not  necessarily  correspond  to  conditions 
applying  to  carrier interconnection.  For SPs, there would thus be  'Points of Connect' 
(instead  of  Points of Interconnection) providing more functionalities than  normal  end-
user  connections  but  fewer  than  provided  by  Points  of  Interconnection  between 
carriers. 
The  model  foreshadows  the  advent  of  a  much  more  variegated  market  structure, 
especially  after  1997  when  the  duopoly  market  structure  is  to  be  abandoned.  It  is 
specifically intended to assist in the development of a common perception of the issues 
of  a Multi  Service  Deliverer Environment.  In  September 1994, the  public consultation 
process before finalising Austel's report on the model was still under way. 
5.2.1.4  Evaluation 
Part of the  Australian government's strategy had been to sell to the highest bidder the 
right  to  compete  with  Telecom  in  the  telecommunications  market.  To  enhance  the 
prospect of favourable bids  the  government felt that it  had  to  give  bidders orientation 
with  respect to  the  environment in  which  they would  have  to  compete.  Austel  worked 
out  in  detail a framework of interconnection before the tender process was started. As 
regards future regulatory policy,  many of the  uncertainties that a market entrant would 
face  were  thus  cleared  away  beforehand.  It  involved  writing  into  law  the  right  to 
interconnection  and  putting  into  place  rules  and  charges  applying  to  it.  This  strong 
regulatory action effectively opened the market and led quickly to vigorous competition. 
Currently there is a clearly discernible movement towards giving the law of the market 
more leeway. The regulatory agency encourages market entrants and the incumbent to 
face  each  other  as  they  would  if  genuine  competitive  conditions  prevailed.  The 
incentive for the parties concerned is the prospect of a successively reduced degree of 
regulatory  intervention.  The  rationale  on  the  part  of  the  regulator  is  the  desire  to 
decrease  the  risk  of  bureaucratisation  and  in  general  have  regulatory  intervention 
reduced  to a minimum level. This, however. is  more an  incentive and  promise to the 
former incumbent than to the as yet only competitor in fixed-network services. With the 
development  of  its  model  for  a  Multi  Service  Deliverer  Environment,  Auster  is  also 
opting for a greater degree of competition  in  which  deliberations in  industry fora  and 
.. 
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Austel-guided negotiations between carriers and service providers will assure workable 
competition and interworking of networks and interoperability of services. 
Another  important  feature  of the  Australian  policy  and  regulatory  framework  is  the 
interplay between policy makers and regulatory agency. The policy makers work mainly 
through  the  legislative  process  while  the  regulatory  agency  can  give  directions  to 
regulated firms and has the power to make determinations. In Australia, legislation and 
other statutes regarding telecommunications are much more specific with respect to the 
detailed facets of the sectors operations than, for example, in the UK and the US. The 
.regulatory--agency's ·function  is ·to  assure  ·that  -the  ·policies  promtJigated  through 
legislation  and  other  statutes  are  implemented.  Although  there  seem  to  have  been 
some  skirmishes  on  the  proper  division  of  labour  between  the  two  agencies,  the 
advantage  of  the  arrangement  is  seen  in  the  more  neutral  role  that  the  regulatory 
agency can assume in  the policy implementation process. It can more easily take the 
stance of an  honest broker applying a set of regulations that are concretely prescribed 
in the law. It can act as a facilitator in negotiations more easily than would be the case if 
it had the power to make decisions of a wider latitude. 
5.2.2  Japan 
5.2.2.1  Introduction 
Since April  1985 all  segments of the telecommunications market in  Japan have been 
open  to  competition.  The  former  monopoly  provider  of  most  telecommunications 
services,  NIT,  now  is  facing  competition  in  all  market  segments.  The 
Telecommunications Business Law of 1985 permitted so called New Common Carriers 
(NCCs) to provide all  types of telecommunications services in  any geographical area. 
The  Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunications  (MPT),  the  regulatory  authority  in 
Japan, however, did not develop a free entry approach in its licensing policy. It strongly 
managed competition,  mainly by structuring the  market into various segments and by 
limiting entry in these segments. 
For regulatory purposes the law distinguishes two types of telecommunications carriers. 
Type I carriers set up their own transmission network and offer their services (wholly or 
partly) on the basis of their own transmission facilities. Type I common carriers include 
NCCs  specialising  in  long-distance,  local,  mobile,  international,  and  satellite  service. 
Type  II  carriers do not rely on  their own  physical network infrastructure but offer their 
services on the basis of transmission capabilities which they lease from Type I carriers. 
Most of the Type II carriers are offering services which are normally called value-added 
services, but they also can and do provide voice telephony services. All Type I carriers 
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The  new  regulatory  structure  in  Japan,  furthermore,  has  set  up  an  asymmetric 
regulatory regime. The dominant firm, NIT, is heavily regulated in most of its activities 
while its competitors are significantly less or in practice not at all regulated. 
5.2.2.2  Status of interconnection agreements and market structure 
In one or the other way there are interconnection agreements between a variety of the 
75 new Type I carriers which have entered the market in the last decade. Economically 
most  important-as-well-as -most oritical--iA  the-tele09Rlmunications-poliqt-debate. have 
been  the  interconnection  agreements between NTI and the three NCCs which  offer 
national  long-distance  fixed  telecommuncations  services.  These  companies  are 
challenging NTT in the voice telephony and the leased line markets. Currently. there is 
no substantial competition in the local or regional market. Most of the regional carriers 
are  electric  utilities  which  make  use  of  their  existing  network  infrastructure.  Their 
business  opportunities  currently are  restricted  by regulatory decisions. They can,  for 
instance, not act as competitive access providers and connect customers directly to the 
long-distance  NCCs  for  switched  voice  telephony  offerings.  Such  type  of 
interconnection  only  is  allowed  for  leased  line  services.  Furthermore,  the  regional 
carriers are not yet allowed to interconnect their regional networks to form a nationwide 
network infrastructure. This restriction currently is under review. Many observers expect 
the  electric  utilities  to  become  a  major  competitor  to  NIT if  they  get  the  right  to 
Interconnect their regional  networks and to act as competitive access providers to the 
long-distance  NCCs.  A  regulatory  decision  on  this  issue  is  intended  within  the 
framework  of  the  general  telecommunications  policy  review  in  1995.  The  first  cable 
companies also have obtained the  right to offer telecommunications services, but they 
are not yet active in the market. 
The market position of the NCCs in the long-distance market is much more challenging 
for  NTT. Although the overall market share of all NCCs in  the telephone service still is 
low,  they were able  to  improve their position within three years from  3.1 °/o  in  1989 to 
7 .8°/o  in  1992.  These  figures  still  underestimate  the  position  of  the  NCCs.  They 
concentrate  their  activities  on  long-distance.  In  this  market  segment  they  are  more 
successful tn  some lucrative areas with highly concentrated route traffic patterns. In the 
most  interesting  areas  between  Tokyo,  Aichi  and  Osaka,  the  NCCs'  market  share 
already amounts to more  than  54°/o.  The  market for inter-prefecture calls  makes  the 
principal area of competition between NTI and the three NCCs and can be identified as 
long-distance. Their market share of this market was 26.8o/o for the year ended March 
31,  1993. 
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. 5.2.2.3  Regulatory framework for interconnection 
The Telecommunications Business Law generally assumes that Type  I carriers agree 
commercially on interconnedion or facility sharing. Before entering into an agreement 
with other carriers on  interconnedion they have to obtain authorisation from the  MPT. 
Where  negotiations  between  or among  carriers  fail  to take  place  or to  result  in  an 
agreement, the MPT can, at the request of-a concerned party, order them to enter into 
such  an  agreement  if  interconnection  is  necessary and  appropriate  to  promote  the 
public  interest.  Furthermore,  where  negotiations  fail  with  regard  to  conditions  and 
prices, the MPT.may even.act.as  .. an...arbitrator.  T.ype-~ ..carriers are obliged to provide 
interconnection. Therefore, implicitly there is a right to interconnect for new competitors. 
The  legal  provisions  seem  to  limit the  role  of the  regulator  to  an  arbitrator.  In  the 
regulatory  practice,  however,  MPT as  the  regulator  has played  a much  more  active 
role.  MPT set  the  basic  framework  for interconnection  and  had  a  strong  position  in 
determining interconnect charges, including access charges. 
5.2.2.4  Interconnection to the telephone network 
Interconnection in Japan started for the first years of competition with a regime which 
was  not regarded as  convenient for customers,  NTr and the new competitors.  Users 
could reach the NCCs' long-distance network by dialing a 4-digit access code on a per-
call  selection basis. The users and not the competitors had to pay standard telephone 
tariffs to reach an  originating and terminating point of interconnection (POl) of the new 
competitors.  In  most  cases  these  "interconnection  charges"  were  in  effect  local 
telephone tariffs. 
In that regime, the new entrants were handicapped in so far as they could not set end-
to-end call charges. They could only charge their customers for their own network part 
of  the  connection.  NTI  on  the  other  hand  claimed  that  local  calling  tariffs  were 
subsidised and that competitors were not contributing to NTT's local access deficit. 
The main problem in the Japanese environment came from the distorted price structure 
in  voice  telephony and  the  regulatory impediments to NITs rebalancing  of prices for 
local and long-distance services. Unlike the UK and partly the US situation, local tariffs 
are  more  or less  frozen  by  the  MPT.  British  Telecom  could  more  than  double  local 
calling tariffs before competition became effective and could even significantly increase 
rental charges. NTT still has to subsidise local and some other voice telephony services 
from  its  high  profits  in  long-distance  traffic.  The  NCCs,  on  the  other  hand,  initially 
concentrated their business activities on  the  most lucrative parts of the long-distance 
business  and  challenged  the  profit  capabilities  of  NTT  in  these  market  segments. 
Furthermore,  they  did  not  contribute  to  meeting  the  local  services' deficit of  NTT by 
paying access charges but used this service at a subsidised price. 
It is obvious that this situation could not be  stable over a longer period, in particular if 
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a corporation would face negative implications for its financial viability.  This is one of 
the  reasons  why  the  original  system  came  under  pressure  diredly  after  it  was 
introduced, even though it stayed unchanged for about eight years before it was finally 
adapted. 
As a reaction to the problems of interconnection and tariff distortions, in autumn 1991 
the  Japanese  MPT formulated  new ·regulations  conceming  interconnection  by long-
distance carriers to NIT's local exchange networks. The new interconnection rules go 
hand-in-hand with an organisational restructuring of NTT. In Apri11992, NTT divided its 
network-operation groups '-On-request..by  .  .MP+-· .into..one.nation  .. wide ~Long-Distance 
Communications  Sector"  and  eleven  •Regional  Communications  Sectors•.  The  new 
interconnection  rules  will  be implemented in  1994 together with  the introduction of a 
new exchange concept. Beginning in 1994 a Local Access Transport Area concept will 
be applied to the Japanese prefecture administrative areas, a system similar to the US 
LATA regions.  Altogether the country is divided into 54 prefectures. These new local 
exchange areas will  be  much  larger than the current ones.  In  the  new structure one 
point  of interconnection  in  each  prefecture will  be  established  where  NIT's and the 
NCCs' long-distance networks will be interconnected to NITs local networks. 
The process for revising the old interconnection regime started in August 1991  with the. 
issuance of  some  regulatory guidelines by the  MPT. The major principles set by the 
regulatory authority have been the following: 
- one POl per prefecture; 
- interconnection charges should be cost based and cost covering; 
- interconnection charges should be uniform nationwide; 
- interconnection charges should be based on cost information provided by NTI; 
- the NCCs should obtain the right to set end-to-end customer charges. 
Initially, it was the intention of the  MPT to include local access loss contributions into 
the interconnection charges to compensate NTI for costs for connecting customers to 
the local switch which were not covered by connection and rental charges. After lengthy 
discussions  with  NIT, the  MPT  changed  its  mind  with  regard  to  local  access  loss 
contributions.  In  the  end  it  preferred  more  of  a  first-best  oriented  price-rebalancing 
approach: NTT shall get the freedom to rebalance its tariff structure such that no need 
or no basis for local access loss contributions exists anymore. The only exception was 
made for directory assistance service charges. Given the huge deficit in this service, no 
cost covering price arrangement was regarded as suitable. 
To obtain a more favourable arrangement for information and data services, NIT had 
to provide  a  breakdown  of  revenues and expenses for each  telephone  service.  The 
MPT set rules on how to calculate these profit and loss statements. According to these 
figures  losses  occurred  with  exchange  access,  public  telephones  and  directory .. 
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assistance. The tosses in directory assistance were higher than even the local access 
toss  in  absolute  terms.  These  figures  have  convinced  the  MPT  that  cost  covering 
connection and rental charges are justifiable and necessary. 
The  overall structure of interconnection charges corresponds  to  a two-part tariff.  The 
basis  for the  fixed  monthly charge  is  the  costs for interconnecting  gateway switches 
and  the  modification  or remodelling  costs  of  local  and  toll  switches  to  take  care  of 
interconnection.  These  costs  now have  to  be  covered  totally  by_  the  NCCs  and  are 
calculated  individually for each  NCC according to the capacity it  requests.  Therefore, 
there is an element of capacity-based P~t?-~ng !~ th~ interconnection charge structure. 
The  major part of the  interconnection charges are paid for by  the conveyance of calls 
from (or to) the POl to (or from) the subscriber or public phone. Uniform interconnection 
charges have to be paid per 3 minute for each originating and terminating end of a call. 
Interconnection charges in the new structure are differentiated according to three types 
of  access  to  the  network:  (ordinary)  subscriber phones,  public payphones  and  ISDN 
access.  The  charging  differences  should  represent  cost  differences.  The  price 
difference for ISDN calls  amounts to about four times the  level of calls from  ordinary 
phones. 
The access charge component in the interconnection charges is intended to contribute 
to the directory assistance loss and will also be collected in proportion to traffic volume 
on a per-minute basis. 
Interconnection charges are renegotiated year by year. There is no price-cap type rule-
oriented  approach  to  bring  the  real  tariff  level  down  over time.  The  carriers  have  to 
negotiate on  the  basis of profit and  loss statements  provided  by  NTI for  the  various 
service  elements.  These  results  are  controlled  by  the  MPT  as  well  as  new 
interconnection charges. 
NIT Long-Distance has to pay its Regional Divisions the same interconnection charges 
as  the  NCCs.  Because  they  are  not  (yet)  different  companies,  the  charging 
mechanisms  are  realised  by  the  way  of  internal  transfer  prices  by  the  accounting 
system which  means a •virtual• payment system. Technically, interconnection for NTI 
is realised in a different way than for the NCCs. The NIT Long-Distance network is not 
separated by POls from  the intra-prefecture networks. These networks are much more 
integrated.  This  means  that  NIT  Long-Distance  is  burdened  with  interconnection 
charges  which  are  higher  than  the  corresponding  costs  of  the  actual  network 
interconnection  within  the  NTI network.  This  transfer price  mechanism  transfers  the 
(cost) benefits of NIT Long-Distance interconnection to the  Regional Division of  NTT 
and, of course, to its users. 
With the exception of the directory assistance contribution, interconnection charges are 
now  structured  overall  in  a  cost-based  manner.  Parallel  to  the  new  interconnect 
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loss making telephone services. Although originally intended for overall political reasons 
the tariff increases were not accepted and were postponed. 
5.2.2.5  Equal access 
The  revision  of the  interconnection  regime  in  1993194  did not include  a  step  in  the 
direction of equal access. Customers still have to dial a 4-digit access code when they 
want  to  reach  one  of  the  NCCs  .. There  is  no  institutionalised  process  in  which 
customers can..preselect .aJong:distance. .car.rier...Mosloflha.residential.customers  .. use 
this  way of  getting access.  Most of the business users get access to the  NCCs in  a 
different  way.  Normally,  the  NCCs provide business  users  with  so-called  least  cost 
routing adapters. They are installed at the customer premises and automatically route 
long-distance calls to one of the NCCs. 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  in  Japan  the  positions  towards  equal  access  have 
changed over time and now appear to differ from preferences in the rest of the world. It 
is  no  longer  the  competitors  who  are  requesting  equal  access,  but  NIT (and  the 
regulator) which want to go into that direction. The competitors are reluctant to change 
and seem to be satisfied with the current situation. They have the feeling that they can 
get much more customer loyalty under the current arrangements. The competitors fear 
that  they  might  lose  customers  if  an  institutionalised  preselection  process  were 
organised by the regulator. 
5.2.2.6  Equal access for service providers and intelligent network issues 
Service providers - or Type II  carriers as they are called in Japan - lease private lines 
and other telecommunications services from  Type I carriers and have developed their 
own  network using those leased facilities.  The most important services to  be  provided 
in  competition to NTI are voice message storage, packet-switching data transmission, 
facsimile  communications,  videotex,  and  other  information  services.  Since  there  is 
competition  in  the  provision  of  leased  line  service  between  NTI and  NCCs,  service 
providers  are  (at  least  to  some  extent)  protected  against  anticompetitive  behaviour 
regarding the provision of leased lines by NTI. 
tf the service providers need access to the exchange lines between customer premises 
and the wire center, they are, however, in the same position as the NCCs; they have to 
rely on  services which are provided by NTI in  a de  facto monopoly position. NTI, on 
the  other hand,  provides all  services including local access and does not depend on 
other  carriers  in  the  provision  of  its  services.  The  same  issues  of  securing  fair  and 
effective competition between NTI and Type II  carriers in the provision of value-added 
services arises as in other parts of the world. 
Up to now, the MPT as the regulatory authority has not dealt too much with the issue of 
fair competition and equal access for service providers. There are some rules against • 
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cross-subsidisation  by  Type  I  carriers  and  required  accounting  rules  to  identify 
revenues and expenses of value-added services. The value-added service sector of a 
Type I carrier has to report its own separate financial statement and has to purchase its 
network facilities from its basic service sector on a tariffed basis. 
Furthermore,  the  MPT  is  relying  on  further  network  digitisation,  SS7  and  intelligent 
network elements as efficient. means for. Type I carriers to provide adequate  network 
services and functions to service providers. It is also up to now relying on NIT to fulfill 
the  request to implement necessary measures to ensure equal access with  regard  to 
network services.and functions. 
The  MPT  is  currently  reviewing  its  open  network  policy  and  is  identifying  potential 
shortcomings in the existing policy framework. In particular, it is considering broadening 
the opening of NIT's network to accommodate the specific needs of Type  I carriers. 
Furthermore,  the  MPT is not satisfied with  the rules and outcomes of the process  in 
which  NIT and  its  competitors  interact.  NTT just responds  to  requests  from  Type  II 
carriers, and is not required to react to these specific requests. Therefore, stricter rules 
or stronger regulatory involvement and decision making are under consideration. 
5.2.2.7  Evaluation 
Competition in  Japan started in  an  environment where the  incumbent's tariff structure 
was  quite unbalanced.  Local tariffs and  some other telephone  services were  not cost 
covering. The regulator, however, did not give NIT the flexibility to rebalance tariffs. On 
the other hand, access charges were not introduced to share the  burden of  regulatory 
constraints.  This  initial  policy  approach  was  not  too  consistent.  It  caused  significant 
financial  pressure  on  NTI and  strong  pressure  to  improve  productivity.  The  policy 
approach might have induced some degree of inefficient entry. The  initial interconnect 
regime thus was not beneficial for entrants, NTI or end users. 
The policy approach towards interconnection has become more rational in the  last two 
years. The structure of interconnection charges has now become more cost based. For 
pricing  the  more  first-best  policy  approach  of  rebalancing  was  chosen,  with  access-
charge contributions explicitly excluded from that process. 
The Japanese interconnect policy has not yet stabilised. Several issues still have to be 
addressed properly. The lack of equal access and presubscription has not yet stabilised 
the  market structure.  The  same  effect  results  from  several  restrictions  which  market 
entrants  still  are  facing.  Competitive  access  provision  or  bypass  is  not  yet  allowed  . 
Long-distance carriers cannot properly interconnect with local or regional carriers.  For 
these  reasons,  Japanese  interconnect  policy  will  develop  further  over  the  next  few 
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5.2.3  New Zealand 
5.2.3.1  Introduction 
Deregulation of the  New Zealand telecommunications sector started in  1987 with  the 
separation  of  the  telecommunications·  activities--from  the  Post  Office  and  its 
incorporation  in  the  Telecom  Corporation  of  New  Zealand  (Telecom).  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1988 then  completely deregulated the sector.  From  1989 
on, anybody can enter .the  .. market,.estabUsn.and.operate..telecommuaications. networks, 
build  own  facilities  or  interconnect  with  other  carriers.  Two  additional  regulatory 
measures were  passed, the Telecommunications (International  Services)  Regulations 
Act  of  1989,  to  protect  against  interference from  dominant carriers  abroad,  and  the 
Telecommunications  (Disclosure)  Act  of 1990, to provide for transparence  of certain 
operations of the incumbent carrier. No specific regulatory authority has been set up to 
oversee  the  sector.  This  oversight is  left to the  application of competition  law by the 
Commerce Commission and the courts. 
Since  the  time  the  deregulation  process  started,  Telecom  has  been  sold  to  a 
consortium led by the  US carriers Ameritech and Bell Atlantic and two competitors for 
network  services  have  entered  the  market,  Clear  as  fixed  network  operator  and 
BeiiSouth  New Zealand  as  a GSM  network operator,  as  well  as  a number of  service 
providers  and  resellers.  There  is  now  vigorous  competition,  but  with  the  question  of 
interconnection having emerged as the central issue. 
5.2.3.2  The framework for interconnection 
5.2.3.2.1  Current status of interconnection agreements 
When  in  1991  Clear entered the market, it started with offering long-distance services. 
The necessary interconnection agreement with Telecom had to be negotiated on purely 
commercial  terms  and  was  concluded  in  March  1991 . The  agreement  provides  for 
Clear to  obtain originating and terminating access to  customers that are connected  to 
the  PSTN via Telecom's local networks. Clear has so far no direct interconnection with 
Telecom's cellular mobile services. There are  negotiations in  process which  have  not 
yet come to a conclusion. 
Soon after starting to offer long-distance services, Clear also announced plans to offer 
direct connections to business customers and the  possibility to  make local calls over 
these lines. For this it requested a different type of interconnection from Telecom than it 
had  negotiated  for  its  long-distance  offerings.  The  two  parties  have  been  unable  to 
reach agreement on this matter, and in August 1991  Clear took the case to court with 
the allegation that Telecom was abusing its dominant market position and attempting to 
keep  Clear from  entering the  market.  Although, in the meantime, Clear has started to • 
Network lntercannec:tion In the Domain of ONP  215 
offer long-distance service, the case has not yet been finally decided, having currently 
been referred to the Privy Council in London. 
There  has  also  been  an  interconnection  agreement signed  between  BeiiSouth  New 
Zealand  and  Telecom  which  took  effect  in  March  1993.  Besides  granting  BeiiSouth 
access  to  Telecom  subscribers,  it also provides for Telecom  to  carry  out billing  and 
collection function for it. The agreement has been concluded for a term of three years 
after which  it  may  be  renegotiated.  Like  Clear,  as  of  March  1994  BeiiSouth  had  no 
direct interconnection with Telecom's cellular mobile operations. 
There is little information on  arrangements between the carriers and service providers 
and  resellers  not  having their own  networks,  all  these arrangements not being  in  the 
public domain. 
5.2.3.2.2  The legal framework for interconnection 
Given  the  policy  of  the  government,  to  treat  telecommunications  no  differently  than 
other  sectors,  specific  legislation  is  kept  to  a  minimum.  In  particular,  there  is  no 
reference to interconnection in the Telecommunciations Act of 1990. 
The basis for interconnection is an undertaking by the chief executive of Telecom New 
Zealand in  1989 that interconnection will  be  provided to  market entrants on  a fair and 
reasonable  basis.  The  undertaking  is  backed  by  strong  ministerial  statements  to  the 
effect that  government expects this  undertaking  to  be  honoured.  Given  that anybody 
can  freely  enter  the  market,  no  licences  are  issued  that  would  contain  rules  and/or 
prescriptions  with  respect  to  market  behavior  in  general  and  interconnection  in 
particular. 
The  Commerce  Act  of  1986  is  the  primary  statutory  instrument  through  which 
conditions  of  effective  competition  are  secured.  The  Act  is  particularly  relevant  to 
conditions in the telecommunications sector in that it provides for the possibility of price 
control (Part IV) and prohibits abusive trade practices (Part II). Price control appears to 
have  been  an  acceptable  government  instrument  in  the  years  prior  to  1985  but  is 
currently  not  being  used.  With  respect  to  telecommunications  services  it  is  the 
government's  policy  not  to  introduce  price  controls.  As  regards  restrictive  trade 
practices, the Act prohibits collusive arrangements between competitors and the use of 
dominant market position for the purpose of restricting. preventing or deterring entry or 
eliminating a supplier from  the  market.  When  in  1991  Clear brought before the  High 
Court its case  on  local  interconnection, it  alleged that Telecom was  in  breach of this 
prescription  (Section  36).  The  Ministry of  Commerce  administers the  Commerce  Act 
relying  on  the  Commerce  Commission  as  its  enforcement  agency.  The  Commission 
has the primary function to act as a sort of prosecutor but its powers seem in fact to be 
limited.  When  in  1992  it  sought  to  evaluate  the  state  of  competition  in  the 
telecommunications  market  in  order to  determine  whether there  was  a need for  it to 216 
intervene,  a  court  action  was  initiated  by Telecom  in  which  it  was  found  that  the 
Commission had overstepped its authority when carrying out this investigation. 
There  is  a  universal  service  obligation  {USO)  placed  on  Telecom.  When  the 
government sold the company it retained a golden share in the company, the so-called 
Kiwi share. This share gives it special rights which it used to enter a special provision 
into  the  company's- articles  of  association ·that  aim  at  maintaining  certain  service 
standards. The provision specifies that the local free calling option will be  maintained 
tor residential customers, the residential line rental will not increase in real terms (i.e., it 
·will  rise  nominatly with inflation· only);'ftfral·lirte ·rentals -be--no ·higher-·than the -standard 
rental, and ordinary telephone service will continue to be as widely available as in 1990. 
5.2.3.3  The reality of interconnection 
5.2.3.3.1  Interconnection between Clear and Telecom 
The  agreement lists  15  locations at which  interconnection can  take place.  A point of 
interconnection  (POl)  is  defined  as  a  point within  a  local  network  with  reference  to 
which  interconnect charges  apply.  Physical  interconnection takes  place at Telecom•s 
trunkside  level  with  the  interface  being  located  on  the  premises  of  Clear.  The 
agreement  requires  Clear to  strictly comply with  Telecom•s  technical  standards.  Any 
additional  features  requested  by  Clear are  subject to  negotiations and  would  call  for 
extra charges. 
In general, interconnect charges paid by Clear correspond to Telecom•s retail prices as 
they  applied  in  1989.  There  is  one  important  difference  in  that  the  charge  for  local 
access  (originating  or  terminating)  is  lower than  the  retail  tariff  for  a  local  call.  The 
charge  amounts with  3  cents per minute, or 85°/o  of the  retail  price of 3.55 cents per 
minute.  For automatic number identification (ANI) that Clear needs to be able to bill its 
customers it  must pay Telecom 4 cents for each ANI  requested. Clear is entitled to  a 
6°/o rebate provided total purchases per annum exceed 15 million NZ dollar. This rebate 
must. however, be contrasted with tariff packages offered large business customers by 
Telecom that reportedly provide for rebates of up to 27 °/o. 
Clear obtained equal access facilities from  Telecom  (in  the form  of preselection) only 
after long drawn-out negotiations. Clear claimed that Telecom wanted to install •a  gold-
plated type•  of equal access and was asking too high charges for its implementation. 
The  difficulties  were  finally  resolved  in  an  arbitration  to  which  the  two  parties  had 
agreed to submit. Until the availability of equal access, customers must use a two-digit 
carrier identification code if they want Clear to carry their calls.  Clea·r must rely on  its 
marketing efforts to induce customers to preselect it as their long-distance carrier as 
there was no government sponsored ballot by which customers were asked to express 
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Also under litigation has been the request by Clear for additional  POls.  Clear wants 
them to be able to carry long-distance calls close to their destinations. For the provision 
of these extra POls Telecom has asked charges that at least in part compensate it for 
the loss of business and margins associated with Clear carrying more traffic via its own 
network. These negotiations came to a conclusion in March 1994. The charges for tocal 
access passing through these additional  POls are 3.5  cents per minute at the  peak 
higher than the corresponding charge of 3 cents for traffic over the POls covered in the 
interconnection agreement. 
The  question  of  contributions· by Glear· --to· ·the -costs- of ·  +elecom!s  universal  service 
obligation  (USC)  was  not  addressed  in  this  interconnection  agreement which  gives 
Clear access to customers for the purpose of long-distance calls.  It is,  however, the 
central issue in Clear-s local interconnection case currently in litigation before the courts 
(see Section 5.2.3.4.1 ). The stance taken by Telecom in response to Clears request for 
additional  POls has largely been  influenced by the policy Telecom has developed in 
that  court  case.  By mid-1994, an  agreement on  these issues had  been  reached  on 
terms whereby, for non-code access, clear pays Telecom 1.8 million NZ dollars for up-
front investment and 11  dollars for each customer that is using it. 
5.2.3.3.2  Interconnection between BeiiSouth and Telecom 
In  most  respects,  the  interconnection  agreement  between  BeiiSouth  and  Telecom 
contains terms and conditions that correspond to those contained in the ClearfT  elecom 
agreement. The agreement lists 17 locations at which interconnection can take place; 
as of March 1994, BeiiSouth had been using three of them. 
BeiiSouth  generally also pays charges that  correspond  to Telecom's  retail  prices;  as 
regards  charges  for  local  access,  however,  they  have  actually been  higher than  the 
corresponding retail  price for the first two years of operations and will equal that price 
starting  in  1995.  BeiiSouth  also  pays  a  7.5  cents  per  minute  so-called  commercial 
charge as the price for services rendered by Telecom for the billing and collection of 
charges  for  calls  from  its  fixed  network  to  the  BeiiSouth  network.  The  agreement 
contains a statement, not contained in the ClearfT  elecom agreement, to the effect that 
charges payable by BeiiSouth to Telecom are calculated in a way that they also cover 
an  adequate  contribution  by  BeiiSouth  to  the  costs  of  Telecom's  PSTN.  At  the 
agreement's  renewal  time,  the  amount  of  the  contribution  will  be  reviewed  with 
reference to the then established pricing principles on the basis of the court decision in 
the Clear vs. Telecom local access litigation. 218  Study for the European Comrriaion 
5.2.3.4  Special aspects and new developments 
5.2.3.4.1  The dispute between Telecom and Clear regarding local interconnection 
As  regards  Clear's  plans  to  offer  local  calling  to  its  directly  connected  customers, 
Telecom is on record that it is prepared to provide Clear the requisite interconnection at 
the  local  exchange level. The parties have, however, so far been unable to agree on 
the  commercial  terms  at  which  it  is  to  be  provided  and  after  several  months  of 
unsuccessful.negotiations  .  ..Clear  .. broughUhe..case_bsfor.s Jbe  .  .High.-Cl>ul1 claiming that 
Telecom breached the Commerce Act and was using its dominant market position with 
the  intent to prevent Clear's entry into the local telephone market In its judgement of 
December  1992,  the  Court  found  Telecom  abusing  its  dominant  market  position. 
However, in  an important subsidiary decision it vindicated the Telecom position and in 
so doing ruled that Clear would be required to pay for interconnection according to the 
Baumel-Willig  rule  (ECPR),  because  Telecom  had  based  the  application  on  its 
unconstrained monopoly prices rather than on  Ramsey efficient prices. Clear's appeal 
was sustained by the Court of Appeal by its decison of December 1993. It rejected as 
inappropriate the application of the Baumoi-Willig rule. Furthermore it found, in contrast 
to  the  High  Court, that as  a package Telecom's terms for interconnection were  more--
onerous than would have been supported by a competitive market, that they were  not 
justified and that insistence on  them  was use of dominant market position. The Court 
declined to give specific advice on how the terms should be determined, however, and 
referred  to  the  broad  principle  that  they  should  correspond  to  what  would  be 
recoverable  in  a  competitive  market.  At  the  time  of  this  writing,  the  case  is  being 
appealed to the Privy Council in London where it is still pending. 
5.2.3.4.2  An initiative by Clear 
Clear has addressed the Ministry of Commerce as well as the interested public with an 
initiative which aims at prodding the government towards a more active role in guiding 
competition in the telecommunications sector. Its position is that the government should 
provide clear direction in  terms of a set of rules within which the market players must 
operate. It would not be enough for the judiciary applying general competition law to be 
the arbiter of all disputes. As had been found out, the judiciary would not be timely in its 
decisions nor would it seem to be  able to use the powers which  it has in  an  effective 
manner. The judiciary itself would require further direction as to what is required of it. 
Government  should  provide  for  clear  prescriptions  on  issues  such  as  pricing, 
collocation,  bundling  of  services,  equal  access,  numbering,  dispute  resolution 
procedures, penalties, and technical standards. Most of the issues addressed by Clear 
are  familiar  from  other  environments  where  they  have  been  dealt  with  in  terms  of 
arguments  that  are  very  similar  to  those  used  by  Clear.  The  emphasis  placed  on • 
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dispute resolution procedures is specific to the New Zealand environment.  48 It reflects 
the  absence of an industry specific regulatory machinery.  It also reflects the  position 
taken by Clear that such a regime can be made to function successfully.  Clear is on 
record  that a regulatory  regime  like the one  in the  UK  or the  USA  is  too expensive, 
cumbersome  and  bureaucratic  to  be  a  desirable  option.  Clears  position  certainly 
reflects  an  aversion  to  regulation,  perhaps also the  conviction  that  once  established 
Clear might find  it  easier to  come  to  terms  with  a dominant competitor than  with  a 
regulator that keeps pushing for still more competiton. 
5.2.3.5  Evaluation 
New Zealand is the only country where a heretofore monopolistic telecommunications 
sector was liberalised completely, as it were, with one stroke of the pen. No regulatory 
machinery  was  put  in  place  to  manage the  transition  to  competition,  let alone  stand 
ready  to  guide  competition  also  at  a  later,  more  developed  stage.  For  this  process 
almost exclusive reliance is placed on general competition law and the institutions that 
in general enforce its provisions. 
In  all  discussions  surrounding  the  restructuring  of  the  sector  since  1987,  there  has 
hardly been  any recognition  of the  effects of economies of  scale  and  scope,  of  sunk 
costs or the existence of barriers to entry. The incumbent's advantages stemming from 
its  past  privileged  position  have  been  admitted  but  they  have  apparently been  taken 
relatively lightly. Ignoring or implicitly denying the importance of these technological and 
structural  aspects,  government  does  not  see  the  need  to  institute  explicit  sector 
regulation  to  help  to  establish  competition.  In  contrast,  it  associates with  a regulatory 
machinery  substantial  burdens  in  terms  of  bureaucracy  and  possibly  ill-informed 
decisions. An observer more familiar with the environment where regulation is the norm 
might wonder whether the  possibility that there  might be  more scope  for government 
policy to  structure the  process has been given all the attention it deserves. One might 
want to ask  whether in  opting for this general approach the  government has  weighed 
sufficiently the economic cost of the litigation it implies as against the cost of regulatory 
intervention . 
48  There  is  in  New  Zealand  an  active  discussion  going  on  about  ahemative  dispute  resolution 
processes.  Spokesmen  of  government  as  well  as  of  the  new  competitors  are  taking  part  in  this 
discussion. Representatives of incumbent Telecom have also expressed a preference for this kind of 
proceedings. As orally reported to the author, there has been the successful application of a court.; -
supervised arbitration proceeding regarding the provision by Telecom to Clear of non-code (equal) 
access for the latter's long-distance service. Generally, this kind of arbitration involves the following. 
The contending parties entrust the exchange of sensitive information to  their legal representatives 
who in tum call in experts (technical, economic, management, accounting, as the case may require) 
to evaluate on the basis of this information the parties' respective claims. Legal advisers and experts 
are  then  in a position to  relay to  their clients an  assessment  of  the  soundness  and probability of 
success of the claims. The legal representatives as well as the experts are bound to confidentiality by 
the court overseeing the arbitration process. 220 
A judgement on  New Zealand's radical approach depends on the frame of reference 
within  which  one  makes  the  evaluation.  New Zealand  policy  makers  consider  it  a 
success.  They point to price  decreases,  the  modernisation  programme of Telecom, 
Telecom's  performance  in  comparison  with  operators  abroad,  the  success  of new 
market entrants, the emergence of new services, success of New Zealand technology 
abroad, and  more.  If these achievements correspond to their expectations then  they 
are consistent with their assessment. 
But  there  is  the  other side  of  the  coin.  Telecom  is  still  by far the  dominant  market 
player. There are str.ong  .. indications-that. .Jt...accords. Jts. ,a,mpetitors..il'lterconnection on 
terms  that  are  less  than  fair and  reasonable.  Agreements that market entrants need 
with the incumbent require negotations that are long drawn-out and costly, in particular 
for the  newcomers. Telecom  has been found  on  several  occasions to be abusing its 
dominant  market  position  in  attempting  to  prevent  entry  or restrict  development  of 
services.  In  the  end  one  should expect that some  sort of tight oligopoly situation will 
evolve. Whether it will  be  as competitive and to the benefit of consumers as possible 
may be strongly doubted. 
5.2.4  USA 
5.2.4.1  Introduction 
The  US  study  is  more  complicated  than  the  other  country  studies  because  US 
telecommunications  policy  is  subject  to  complex  and  sometimes  conflicting  tripartite 
authority. Provision of local telephone service is regulated in each US state by a state 
Public  Utilities  Commission  (PUC).  At  the  same  time  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission  (FCC)  exercises  national  jurisdiction  over  radio-based  service  and 
Interstate services. In addition, the antitrust laws deal with issues of market power. As 
the pnme example, antitrust proceedings in federal court govern the divestiture of AT&T 
and  set  limits  and  conditions  on  AT&T  (the  largest  interexchange  carrier)  and  the 
regional Bell Operating Companies (AT& rs  former local exchange carriers). 
The general principle behind the division of labour between state and federal regulation 
in  the  US  is the distinction between ·intrastate• and •interstate• commerce.  Following 
this  principle,  state  regulation  is  responsible  for  intrastate  commerce  and  federal  • 
regulation  for  interstate  commerce.  Consequently,  a  single  regulated  firm  may  be 
regulated by a state PUC for its intrastate transactions and by the FCC for its interstate 
transactions. Since transactions and  the use of capital equipment and other common 
cost elements can rarely be classified as purely interstate or intrastate, the division of 
labour between state and federal regulation is frequently complex and contentious. It is 
guided by some principles, the main one being that of federal preemption, according to 
which  the  FCC  can  declare  that  federal  regulation  supersedes  state  regulation  if 
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occurs, costs are separated into federal and state jurisdictions, using a fully-allocated 
cost methodology. 
Since  interconnection  affects  both  interstate  and  intrastate  telecommunications,  it  is 
regulated on both levels, sometimes with conflicting outcomes.  In particular, the same 
type  of  interconnection  service  can  be  priced  differently,  depending  on  whether 
interstate  or  intrastate  access  is  being  purchased.  State  commissions  are  taking 
diverse approaches to issues of interconnection and local exchange competition. A few 
urban states, such as New York and Illinois, have been the first jurisdictions to require 
local  .~nterconnection ·for -special  -aoeess--and·- are·  -actively~ deliberating  policies  for 
competition in basic telephone service. Most, however, have to date kept local markets 
closed to entry. 
5.2.4.2  Common topics 
5.2.4.2.2  Market structure 
The US telephone network was vertically dis-integrated by the 1982 divestiture of AT&T 
into  an  interexchange  carrier  and  seven  regional  Bell  Operating  Companies  that 
provide  local  and  short-haul  trunk  services.  The  interexchange  market  is  judged 
moderately competitive, with  three large national carriers and dozens of smaller ones 
and many resellers.  Local exchange markets for business customers are experiencing 
competitive entry in large urban areas, but most markets remain monopolies. All  urban 
markets have two mobile carriers; a third is beginning service in a few large cities. 
5.2.4.2.3  Interconnection arrangements and equal access 
lnterexchange  carriers  interconnect with  local  carriers  for access  to  final  consumers. 
Equal-access  arrangements,  required  by  the  competition  policy  that  split  up  AT&T, 
have been fully realised.  During the period when switches were upgraded carriers with 
inferior access  quality received  substantial  discounts on  access charges.  There  is  no 
direct  interconnection  between  interexchange  carriers:  instead,  traffic  may  by 
arrangement be rerouted at an interconnecting local carrier. 
Under  federal  regulation,  mobile  carriers  are  entitled  to  any  of  several  technical 
arrangements  for  interconnection  to  local  networks.  The  mobile  subsidiaries  of  Bell 
Operating Companies are,  by court (but not regulatory)  decision, required to provide 
equal access to interexchange carriers.  In  contrast,  the  competing  mobile carriers do 
not offer equal access to their customers and instead negotiate bulk tariffs with a single 
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Other  Jocal  access  carriers  - competitive  access  providers  and  cable  television 
operators  - have  negotiated  interconnection  with  local  exchange  carriers  in  a  few 
states, encouraged by state regulators. 
5.2.4.2.4  Public access to interconnection agreements 
Generally  speaking,  interconnection  arrangements  subject  to  federal  regulation  are 
public  information.  lnterexchange  carriers  purchase  access  to  final  users  from  local 
exchange .carriers  ..under. published..tariffs:.-Service...pr.oWders.purchase access .servjces 
and  intelligent  network  service  elements  under tariff.  The  availability of the  terms  of 
negotiated interconnection arrangements under state jurisdiction varies. 
5.2.4.2.5  Interconnection charges and cost standards 
Local  carriers  collect  revenues  from  subscribers and  from  interexchange  carriers  for 
access to interstate telephone services. About two-thirds of the fixed costs of local plant 
that are allocated to the interstate jurisdiction are paid by end users in monthly common 
line  charges,  and  the  balance  is  collected from  interexchange  carriers  in  per-minute 
charges.  Traffic-sensitive  access  charges  for  conveyance  of  switched  traffic  to 
interexchange  carriers  are  levied  for  switching,  common  transport,  and  dedicated 
transport.  The  charges  of  the  major  local  carriers  were  originally  established  using 
jurisdictionally-separated, fully-allocated costs.  More  recently,  interconnection charges 
have been subject to price caps and may have moved away from those cost standards. 
5.2.4.2.6  Relation to local tariffs 
Interconnection  access  charges  collected  from  interexchange  carriers  for  interstate 
service average 4 cents per minute. 49  This compares with an average charge for local 
calling of about 9 cents per minute in cities where local calling is priced per call. 
5.2.4.2. 7  Regulatory approval 
Most  types  of  interconnection  arrangements  have  been  reached  as  an  outcome  of 
regulatory  or  antitrust  court  proceedings.  Consequently,  the  major  terms  of 
interconnection  have  regulatory  approval.  Carriers  may  file  tariffs  and  charges  for 
individual services within the frameworks established by these proceedings, and in the 
case  of price-cap regulation charges  may vary within  established ranges.  In  addition, 
voluntarily negotiated arrangements are possible and have been responsible for leading 
examples of interconnection of other access providers in local networks. 
49  When  a call  both originated and terminates over local exchange carrier access facilities,  total per-
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5.2.4.3  Special topics 
5.2.4.3.1  Interconnection pricing 
In the US an important distinction in pricing and regulatory treatment is made between 
so-called special access and switched access.  Special access is essentially a private 
line (non-switched) arrangement in which circuits are dedicated to a particular user for 
the distance between the  customer's premises and the LEC end office.  Between  the 
. LEC end office. and .the ..tXC POP- traffie-from-a -special access customer may be carried 
on  a common line with traffic from other. special access customers. Special access is 
sold on a per-circuit basis for unlimited usage up to the capacity of the circuit. 
In  switched access a LEC switch transfers traffic between  local  loops and  interoffice 
circuits to an  IXC POP.  In contrast to special access switched access is,  for the  most 
part, priced by minutes of use. From a LEC's point of view, special access retains the 
long-distance  business  of  large  customers.  From  the  IXC's  point  of  view,  it  allows 
partial  bypass when  no direct line is warranted from  the customer all  the  way to  the 
POP. Because of its close relationship to facilities-based bypass the charges for special 
access contain no or only a minimal contribution element to the LEC's deficit from local 
services. In contrast, switched access tariffs are a large source of cross subsidies. 
In  the  last  two  years  both  special  access  and  switched  access  tariffs  have  been 
unbundled  and  switched  access  tariffs  have  become  more cost-based,  although  the 
contribution element has been  retained for the time being.  Before the change,  carrier 
common  line  tariffs for switched transport had  been  under an  "equal  charge per unit 
rule"  and under a distance-equalising "five mile rule"  that were imposed in  1983 as a 
result of AT&  T's divestiture. Both were an effort to even out access costs for AT&T and 
its competitors, giving AT&T less of a scale advantage from more traffic and less of a 
location advantage from the multitude and LEG-proximity of its POPs. 
Switched transport charges,  in  1993, were  unbundled into four components.  The first 
two components- (a) for dedicated transport between the IXC POP and its designated 
LEC central office and (b) between that office and the end office serving the customer -
are  priced according to circuit capacity with  limited discount for higher capacity lines. 
The third component is shared tandem-switched transport that is priced per minute of 
use and is subsidised. This is the component most likely to be used by smaiiiXCs who 
do  not  have  enough  traffic  to  lease  dedicated  lines  between  LEC  end  offices.  The 
fourth  component  is  the  residual  interconnection  charge.  It  has  to  be  paid  for  all 
switched  IXC  traffic  that  interconnects  through  LECs.  The  residual  interconnection 
charge has been  priced to  make  the  change from  the  equal charge  rule  to the  new 
charge  structure  revenue  neutral.  The  FCC  also  has allowed  the  LECs  to introduce 
more distance sensitivity than was allowed under the •tive mile rule• and some density-
related  pricing  of  switched  access.  The  change  in  access  charges  over  time  is 
governed by price-cap rules for the large LECs, but restructuring among the different 
charge  components  is  severely  limited.  The  FCC  has  an  ongoing  proceeding  to 224  Study for the European Commission 
determine  a  long-run  charge  structure  that is  likely to track actual  LEC  costs  more 
closely than the current one. 
5.2.4.3.2  Collocation 
One of the most significant developments· on interconnection in the US have been the 
regulatory  decisions  on  collocation  taken  at  the  federal  and  state  levels.  Two 
approaches have been put forward. First, under physical collocation, the interconnector 
extends its· existing network into -tAe  LEG!s·central of:fice.and--establishes,.a  •node· -a 
location at which its network circuits terminate. This is placed in rented space together 
with both terminating and other equipment (e.g., multiplexers) owned or leased by the 
interconnector in  the  LEC's  central  office.  Circuits terminating at the  node  are  cross-
connected  to  LEC  facilites  and  each  party  remains  responsible  for  maintaining  and 
upgrading  its  equipment.  Under  the  second  approach  - virtual  collocation  - the 
interconnection point lies outside the LEC's central office, typically in a nearby manhole 
to  which  the  LEC  extends  its  network.  The  interconnection  equipment  in  the  LEC 
central office may be specified and leased by the interconnector but it remains owned 
by the LEC. 
Experience with (privately negotiated) virtual collocation in Illinois was favourable, while 
in  New  York  one  interconnector complained  about protracted  proceedings  on  virtual 
collocation and the arrangement with the other ended with physical collocation, due to 
difficulties in  reaching a satisfactory agreement on  virtual  collocation. The  FCC,  in  its 
decisions  on  expanded  interconnection  for  special  access  in  October  1992  and  on 
switched  access  in  June  1993,  required  physical  collocation,  unless  the  parties 
voluntarily agree otherwise or are specially exempted. Such exemptions could be given 
for lack of space or facilites, or if state regulation on virtual collocation was in place by a 
certain  date.  Due  to  legal  problems,  the  FCC  ruling  on  physical  collocation  was 
repealed  in  July  1994  and  replaced  by  virtual  collocation.  Nevertheless,  physical 
collocation  has  been  realised  in  many cases and  is  likely to  remain  of great practical 
importance. 
5.2.4.3.3.  Open Network Architecture (ONA) 
US  regulators  have  tried  several  policies  intended  to  create  conditions  of  equal 
competition between local  exchange carriers and  information  service providers.  Early 
rulings  attempted  to  split  carrier  lines  of  business  into  telecommunications  and 
computer/information  services  and  required  carriers  to  offer  information  services 
through  separate  subsidiaries.  This  policy  was  reversed  in  1986-88.  Carriers  were 
allowed  to  integrate  information  services  into  other  network  activities  provided  they 
adopted an open network architecture that made basic network access and information 
service  elements  available  on  an  unbundled  and  non-discriminatory  basis  to  other 
information service providers. 
c • 
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The goal of full unbundling has not been realised in practice. Access arrangements, in 
particular, continue to combine elements of local transport, switch port, and telephone 
numbering. A considerable variety of switch-based serving elements, such as automatic 
number identification and line hunting, are more generally available, but they are  not 
supplied uniformly across all seven geographic regions of the US.  High costs of more 
thorough-going unbundling and limited demand for service elements have also limited 
the effect of ONA to date. 
Development of standards for interconnection between service providers and carriers is 
facilitated  by  the  Information  -Industry  Liaison  ... Committee  that  ·meets  regularly  to 
develop  and  publish  information  and  standards  when  specific  services  and  types  of 
access are requested of carriers. 
In  addition  to  ordering  unbundling  of service  elements,  the  regulator  has  instituted 
several additional requirements. Carriers must offer services of their operations support 
systems,  including service order entry, trouble reporting,  and  network reconfiguration, 
to information service providers. Carriers may not discriminate between such providers 
and  other  customers  in  supplying  installation  and  maintenance,  and  must  report 
performance  statistics.  And,  carriers  must  establish  protective  systems  for customer 
proprietary  network  information  that  ensure  that  carriers  do  not  obtain  and  use 
information concerning service providers' customers for competitive advantage. 
Pricing  of  ONA  services  has  not  been  standardised.  Regional  Bell  Operating 
Companies have variously adopted marginal and fully-distributed cost  methodologies, 
resulting in  some large differences in  prices for technically similar services in  different 
geographic areas. 
5.2.4.3.4  Intelligent Network (IN) 
Experience with interconnection to intelligent network services in the US has developed 
in  the  markets  for  freephone  services  and  credit-card  calling,  driven  by  carriers 
competing  to  offer  regional  and  national  services.  Federal  regulators  have  required 
interexchange  carriers  and  regional  carriers  to  offer  BOO-number  freephone  service 
through national, centrally-administered databases, prescribed to promote competition 
and  remove  the  first-mover  advantage  AT&T  possessed  as  the  primary  supplier  of 
freephone numbers. When each BOO-number call is dialed, a database is first queried 
over interconnected signalling  networks to  determine the  responsible  carrier,  and  the 
call  is  routed  to  that  carrier for  further  processing.  The  database-routing  technology 
thus enables a subscriber to change to a different carrier yet retain a specific freephone 
number  and  the  value  it  may  have  developed  in  advertising  the  number  to  its 
customers. 
The early, ambitious designs of intelligent networks for local call processing have been 
scaled  back  as  the  costs  and  complexities  of  managing  interactions  became  clear. 
Local  carriers  are  nevertheless  introducing  and  upgrading  their  networks  in  more 226 
incremental fashion, driven to be less dependent on switch vendors for new features 
and call processing capabilities. 
Federal regulators have sought to extend the principle of open network architecture to 
the  services  and  components  of  a  future  intelligent  network.  The  FCC's  inquiry  is 
seeking greatly unbundled access to network signalling, databases, and call-processing 
intelligence for all types of providers and end users. To date, discussion has focused on 
the extent to which these objectives can be made compatible with protection of network 
security  and  reliability  and  realising  economies  of  scope  of  the  primary  network 
operator. 
The  concept of •mediated access· is intended to specify interfaces at which  different 
carriers and users can interconnect to intelligent network components and have access 
messages validated for compatibility. One form of mediation would place the  primary 
carrier  in  a  gatekeeper  role,  with  access  by  extemal  users  through  the  carriers 
operations  and  support system  software.  More far-reaching  proposals would  expand 
the  intelligent components that are directly accessible and establish the carrier's point 
of mediation at the core of the essential operating system for the basic call processing 
switch. 
Several  local  carriers are  beginning to test third-party access to service creation  and 
management systems and to offer read-only access to service databases. Attachment 
of  third-party databases to carriers' intelligent networks is also anticipated. In contrast, 
real-time  access  to  switching-level  functions is likely to  require  much  more  thorough 
development of mediation and network-protection mechanisms. 
Discussion  of  intelligent  network  access  and  feature  development  has  been 
successfully  assisted  by  interindustry  technical  working  groups.  These  voluntary 
bodies,  composed of  interested industry and regulatory participants, meet regularly to 
identify user demands, define requirements, and establish industry standards. 
5.2.4.4  Conclusion 
Vertical  dis-integration  created  a  huge  market  for  interconnection  of  US  telephone 
carriers.  US  regulators  and  courts  have  used  network  and  service  provider 
interconnection as a tool  to actively encourage the  development of competition in  the 
telecommunications  sector.  Equal  access,  network  unbundling  and  collocation  were 
implemented to achieve this objective. Tariff rebalancing is occurring, but more slowly 
than the federal regulator had proposed. Interconnection revenues for switched access 
were  used  to finance  the  unbalanced tariff structure.  Dual  regulation has accelerated 
the  adoption  of  expanded  interconnection  but  has  stood  in  the  way  of  uniform 
standards  for  an  open  network  architecture.  The  US  experience  shows  that 
interconnection  is  loaded  with  issues  of  market  power,  pricing,  and  negotiation 
impasses that require regulatory action. 
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5.3  Cross country comparison 
5.3.1  Facts about interconnection in country studies compared 
5.3.1.1  Different stages of evolution 
The presentation  of the  country study results  in  Sections 5.1  and 5.2 brings out the 
different levels of experience with-interconnection -of the -1-6  countries considered.  It is 
useful to classify the countries correspondingly, especially also as a backdrop for the 
comparisons on the various issues that follow. 
Basing  our ranking  on  an  overall evaluation  of the  experience  gained  by the  various 
countries, we classify them as follows: 
Much experience: 
Some experience: 
Little experience: 
No actual experience: 
USA, UK 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand 
France, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Greece 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Spain 
The USA and the UK take a position apart as interconnection has in the two countries 
been part of the telecommunications markets for ten years or more and has undergone 
steady further development.  As  regards  Japan,  although  interconnection  has  been  a 
fact there for almost as long, the development in  this country has stagnated and  only 
lately  have  there  been  adjustments  and  the  regime  been  put  on  a  sound  basis.  In 
contrast,  while  the  introduction  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand  of  competition  and 
therefore  of  interconnection  dates  to  only  three  to  four years  ago,  developments  in 
these two countries have been so sweeping that by now some considerable experience 
has  been  gained.  This  justifies  grouping  them  together  with  Japan  in  the  'some 
experience'  category.  The  five  countries  in  the  'little  experience'  category  have  been 
placed  there  as  their  experience  has  been  limited  to  interconnection  of  mobile 
operations.  None of the  six  countries in  the  last category have so far had any actual 
experience in the matter although there are preparations going on in most of them. 
The  above  discussion  is  reflected  in  Table  5.3.1.1-1.  It  shows  for  each  country  the 
realised status of interconnection for the relevant kinds of interconnection relationships 
(the countries are grouped according to above classification and the groups are set off 
from each other by differing shadings.) 228  Study for the European Comrriaion 
Table 5.3.1.1·1 :  Status of interconnection in 16 countries 
.  :--8~~--... --
- ......  :..,, 
Coun~·/:~-~;  :.~ ~.~~:, 
United States 
N 
Denmark 
Portugal  N  N 
Greece 
Belgium  N  N 
Implemented 
p  In preparation 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
p 
p  p 
N 
p  p•  N 
N 
N 
P? 
Not under consideration 
Agreement between TO and its subsidiary 
supplying mobile services 
For the  US  and the  UK we  note that they have interconnection actually realised or at 
least  in  preparation  for  each  of  the  kinds  of  relationships  considered.  This  indeed 
reflects  the  already  very  variegated  structure  of  suppliers  of  telecommunications 
services in these two countries, not only in respect of services for end users but also of 
intermediate product type services such as from competitive access providers. The US 
is  the  only country that so far has had any experience regarding  interconnection with 
intelligent networks. 
The second group of countries - Japan, Australia,  New Zealand - differs from the first 
primarily  because  of  the  few  positive  entries  regarding  interconnection  in  the 
'fixed/fixed' categories concerning interconnection between TOs and  cable  operators, 
TOs  and  CAPs,  TOs  and  service  providers.  The  lack  of  positive  entries  for  service 
providers, however, is also a consequence of the fuzziness of the term 'interconnection' 
as  applied  to  service  providers.  Their  use  of  the  network  is  in  many  instances  not 
identified as interconnection. 
The countries in the third group- France, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Greece- have 
in  common  that  they  all  have  competition  in  mobile  communications  and  therefore 
corresponding  interconnection arrangements but no fixed  network competition.  Since 
p 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
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there  is no competition  in  the fixed  network there is also no related  interconnection 
(with some minor exception in the case of France). For all these countries, changes in 
relevant national legislation would have to occur before competition to the incumbent in 
basic telephone  service could be possible.  As  will become apparent below,  although 
their  experience  with  interconnection  is  still  limited,  they  also  contribute  important 
insights regarding the terms and functioning of interconnection arrangements. 
The  last  group  of  countries  - Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Spain - have so far not had any actual interconnection experience on which one could 
draw.  In  all  but one  of them, ·there ·are -currently active--preparations  for ·at  least the 
introduction  of  mobile  competition  with  attendant attention  to  interconnection.  In  the 
Netherlands,  the  introduction  of competition  also  in  the  fixed  infrastructure  is  under 
consideration  and  the  corresponding  conditions  of  interconnection  are  under  active 
study. 
The  following  discussion  concentrates  on  countries  with  actual  interconnection 
arrangements in place. In the discussion on equal access (Section 5.3.1.4), the focus is 
on  the  five  countries  where  there  is  fixed  network  competition  and  corresponding 
interconnection, for which equal access is an issue. 
5.3.1.2  Regulatory involvement instrumental in bringing about interconnection in most 
countries 
We need not dwell on the fact that whenever a telecommunications market is liberalised 
and there are competitors to the  incumbent, the newcomers seek interconnection with 
the  established  network,  otherwise  they would  hardly  be  able  to  start  business  in  a 
meaningful way. Of interest is, however, what action was considered necessary to bring 
about interconnection in the relevant cases. The evidence from the ten countries where 
there have been interconnection arrangements is shown in Table 5.3.1.2-1 . 230  Study for the European Comniasion 
Table 5.3.1.2-1:  Approaches to the realisation of interconnection 
UK 
Japan 
Australia 
New Zealand 
France 
Germany  N  N 
Denmark  N  N  N 
Portugal  N  N 
Greece 
y  Yes 
N  No 
The terms used in the table have the following meaning: 
- Ex ante: The regulator determined essential aspects of interconnection beforehand. 
(In the following section it is re.ferred to as EAR.) 
- Mediation/Arbitration: The regulator stood by as a mediator- and possibly intervened 
as  an  arbitrator if things did not move ahead - but in  essence the parties negotiated 
interconnection on their own. (MA) 
- Case-by-case determination (ex post): The regulator intervened in the specific case 
after negotiations failed. (EPD) 
- Competition law: There was no involvement of a regulatory agency but application of 
competition law brought about interconnection. (CL) 
- Commercial  agreement  (no  regulatory  involvement):  The  parties  negotiated 
interconnection completely on  their own. There was no involvement of a regulatory 
authority nor the need for judicial action to enforce competition law. (CA) 
We leave the detailed examination of the many entries in the table to the reader. Some 
summary observations.  however.  are  of particular interest.  Ex-ante determination by 
the  regulator was used in  four countries with respect to interconnection between fixed 
networks and in eight countries with respect to fixed/mobile interconnection. This does 
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not preclude that in some of the same countries the other approaches have been used 
as well, i.e., with respect to other cases. In fact, in the US all five categories identified 
above have been applied in at least one case.  (This again testifies to the particularly 
diverse competitive environment in this country). We observe that mediation/arbitration 
has been used in three countries with respect to fixed/fixed and in  four countries with 
respect  to  fixed/mobile  interconnection.  With  seven  occurrences  we  also  note  a 
relatively frequent occurrence of case-by-case determination (ex post) by the regulator. 
Thus, for fixed/fixed and fixed/mobile interconnection,  regulatory intervention of some 
kind  can  be  regarded  as  the  predominant  influence  in  bringing  about  the  required 
arrangements  . 
This is different in the cases of mobile/mobile interconnection. The five such cases that 
we observed are the outcome of purely commercial negotiations. It should be realised, 
however, that they have less impact on the development of competition than the ones 
involving fixed networks. 
New Zealand is the one important exception in  the sense that, as we  remember from 
the country study, it is the only country where as a matter of explicit government policy 
interconnection is left to negotiations between the parties subject only,  if negotiations 
fail,  to  competition  law as  applied by the  courts.  As  shown  in  the  table,  agreements 
have in  fact been reached there just by way of negotiations but there have also been 
cases that were brought before the courts. 
5.3.1.3  Ex-ante regulation also predominantly applied to individual interconnection 
issues 
Besides asking by what kind of regulatory action interconnection was brought about in 
general,  it  is  of  interest  to  ask  by  what  kinds  of  different  approaches  the  individual 
issues surrounding interconnection have been handled. Tables 5.3.1.3-1  and 5.3.1.3-2 
address  this  question,  the  first  one  for  the  cases  of  fixed/fixed  interconnection  in 
respect of nine issues and the second for the cases of fixed/mobile interconnection with 
respect to eight issues. Table 5.3.1.3-3 provides summary statistics (percentages apply 
each  time  to  total  number of  occurrences  which  is  greater than  the  number of  cells 
because of double and triple entries)  . 232  Study tor the European Commission 
Table 5.3.1.3-1:  Approaches to various interconnection issues (fixed/fixed) 
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United States  EARICL  EARICL 
United Kingdom  EAR  EAR 
Japan  EAR  MA 
Australia  EAR  EAR 
New Zealand  CL  CAICl 
EAR 
MA 
EPD 
Ex-ante regulation 
Meditation/  Arbitration 
Ex-post determination 
EARICL 
EARIEPO/CA 
EAR 
EAAICAIMA 
CAICl 
CL 
CA 
NA 
EAR'CA  EAAICl.  EAR  CAlMA'?  CAIEAR 
EARICA  EAR  CAIEPD  EAR  UA 
-· .CA  ..  EAR  ...  MA  EAR  CA 
'II:'  .  .-
CA  EAR  EARICNMA  EAR  CA 
-· 
CA  a.  CAICL  CMWCL  CA 
Competition law 
Commercial agreement (no regulatory involvement) 
Not available 
•  Collocation was part of OFTEL's determination regarding Mercury's interconnection in 1985. 
In the 1993 determination, collocation has not been addressed, and it is currently not used. 
Table 5.3.1.3-2:  Approaches to various interconnection issues (fixed/mobile) 
United 
States 
EARICL  EARICL  MA/CA  EAR/CA  EAR/CA  CAlMA  CAIEAR? 
EAR/CA 
EPOINA• 
NA 
EAR? 
NA 
? 
United 
EAR  EARICA  EARICA  EAR  CAIEPO  EAR  MA  CA 
EAR 
MA 
EPD 
Ex-ante regulation 
Med1tat1onl  Arb1trat1on 
Ex-post determmat1on 
CL 
CA 
NA 
Competition law 
Commercial agreement (no regulatory involvement) 
Not applicable 
Table 5.3.1.3-3:  Frequency of use of different approaches 
Fixed/Fixed (%)  Flxedllloblle (%) 
EAR  39  44 
CA  30  39 
CL  tS  6 
MA  11  8 
EPD  5  3 
We  observe  that  ex-ante  regulatory  intervention  (EAR)  is  by far  the  most  frequent 
approach  - for 'fixed/fixed' it  applies  in  39  o/o  and  for  'fixed/mobile' in  44  °/o  of cases 
(where we  have not bothered to eliminate from  the total numbers the entries for New 
Zealand where the EAR approach is ruled out as a matter of principle). The next most 
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.  frequent approach is the one by commercial arrangement (CA) with 30 o/o  respectively 
39 °/o.  The application of commercial law (CL) is with  15 % for the fixed/fixed cases of 
some  importance  (primarily  because  of  New  Zealand).  The  approach  relying  on 
mediation/arbitration  (MA)  has,  with  11  %  and  9  o/o,  some  importance,  while 
ex-post determinations (EPD) occured in only a few cases. 
The issues to which EAR appears most often to be applied to are: 
for fixed/fixed and fixed/mobile:  right to interconnection, 
points of interconnection, 
for fixed/fixed in addition: 
for fixed/mobile in addition: 
and principles for interconnection charges; 
equal access; and 
numbering; 
while the issues for which CA is most often observed are: 
for fixed/fixed and fixed/mobile:  quality of service and 
standards; and 
for fixed/mobile in addition:  billing and charging. 
Of some interest is that EAR applies to issues of standardisation in four out of the ten 
fixed/mobile cases (because of GSM) but only once in the five fixed/fixed cases. Here 
predominant reliance is placed on commercial arrangements. 
Finally,  we  look  at  the  frequency  with  which  the  different countries  rely  on  the  EAR 
approach  for  dealing  with  the  various  interconnection  issues.  The  US,  the  UK  and 
Australia apply it in  the majority of cases while Japan, somewhat surprisingly, appears 
to  use  it  relatively infrequently.  Remarkable  is  that in  two of the  countries with  so  far 
less  experience  in  interconnection  matters,  i.e.,  Portugal  and  Greece,  the  EAR 
approach has been applied to the majority of issues, to six and seven respectively out 
of the eight considered. 
5.3.1.4  Equal access as a question of costs and benefits in different environments 
Equal access has been considered an essential concept in all five countries with fixed 
network  competition.  As  a  regulatory  concept,  equal  access  is  defined  from  the 
customer's  point  of  view.  Concerning  the  predominant  interconnection  case,  that  of 
access  to  the  local  network,  equal  access  gives  customers  the  opportunity  to  use 
without any bias ('equally') the trunk carrier of their choice. The choice of trunk carrier 
may be made call-by-call, on a more permanent basis or by a combination of the two. 
Besides these  general  aspects of customer choice,  equal  access  requires  the  same 
type of access, the same quality and the same price. 234 
The  practice  of  interconnection  so  far  shows  that access  to the  existing  telephone 
network has at the beginning been provided in a different way than under equal terms 
described above. This resulted from the fact that traditional telephone networks have 
not  been  designed  for  a  multi-carrier  environment.  Equal  access  cannot  be 
incorporated into an existing network without costs and transition periods. Therefore, a 
decision  has  to  be  reached  that  the  benefits outweigh  the  costs.  Reaching  such  a 
decision  may  take  time.  And  there  is  the  need  for a  transition  period  during  which 
networks are conditioned to meet the requirement. 
Table 5.3.1.4-1: ·Equal access-· 
United States  -1974  1982  1984-88  CICIPIC  Yes 
United Kingdom  -1983  1991  1995- CIC/ANI/ Blue Button  No 
Japan  1985  1990  1994-97  CICIPIC/ANI  Open 
Australia  1992  1991  1992-1995  CICIANI  Yes 
New Zealand  1989  NA•  1994- -t. ','  ..  ··  .. ·  CICIANI 
~ 
NA •  Not Applicable. Equal Access was outcome of negotiations, 
finally decided through arbitration under court supervision. 
CIC  Carrier identification code 
PIC  Personal identification code 
ANI  Automatic number identification 
Table  5.3.1.4-1  shows  the  time paths taken  by the  implementation process for equal 
access  in  the  five  countries.  In  three  countries  - the  US,  the  UK  and  Japan - it  was 
more  than  five  years  after opening  of the  market  before  regulators  required  that  the 
incumbent(s) provide equal  access.  In  the US, it was actually ordered by the  Modified 
Final Judgment which divested AT&T in  1984. It then took  several more years for the 
implementation  actually to  get  under way.  Consider,  in  contrast,  Australia,  where  the 
new  entrant  was  assured  equal  access  as  part  of  entry  conditions  and  where  the 
incumbent was given inducements to provide it quickly, which then also happened. The 
most  revealing  contrast  is  provided  by  New Zealand  where  implementation  of  equal 
access  was  gotten  under way  five  years  after opening  of  the  market and  only three 
years after the competitor started business. This case demonstrates that equal access 
is valued by the competitor more than the price paid for it, in this case a price arrived at 
by  negotiations  without  the  benefit  of  regulatory  intervention  (although  it  required 
arbitration by an independent industry arbitrator). 
Interconnection  practice  at  the  beginning  of  network  competition  allows  for  several 
forms of 'unequal access' with more or less inconvenience to the customer and more or 
less competitive  disadvantage to the  new entrants. Table 5.3.1.4-1  shows that in  the 
five  countries the  most common approach has been the use  of a carrier identification 
code  (CIC)  in  combination  with  a  personal  identification  code  (PIC)  or  automatic 
No 
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number identification  (ANI).  The inconvenience of unequal  access has in  the  UK  for 
Mercury  customers  partially  been  compensated  on  the  terminal  equipment  side. 
Mercury customers usually use a Mercury telephone handset where they simply have 
to press the 'blue button' and only need to dial the normal telephone number for making 
phone calls.  The handset compensates the inconvenience of dialing the  CIC and  the 
PIC. This solution comes close to equal access from the customers point of view. From 
the carriers point of view, this evaluation depends on the question who has to pay for 
the added equipment costs of this type of access. 
5.3.1.5  Different approaches to finance USOs 
Table 5.3.1.5-1  has been constructed to throw some light on  the relationship between 
universal  service  obligations  (USOs),  a  universal  service  fund  (USF),  and  access 
charges.so 
Table 5.3.1.5-1: Universal Service Obligations and Access Charges 
United States  N  y  y  y  y  y  N  N• 
United  N  y  y  N  y  N  y••  N 
Kingdom 
Japan  N  y  y  N  y  N  N  N 
Australia  N  y  y  y  N  y  N  ? 
New Zealand  Y?  Y?  y  N  Open  N  N  y 
France  N  y  y  N  NA  NA  y  N 
Germany  N  Y?  y  N  NA  NA  N  y 
Denmark  y  N  y  N  NA  NA  N  N 
Portugal  N  y  y  N  NA  NA  N  N 
Greece  N  Y?  y  N  NA  NA  N  ? 
NA  Not applicable 
y  Yes 
N  No 
Possibly in some states 
In principle, but currently waived 
We  observe  from  the  table  that  for  all  ten  countries  regulation  imposes  uses on 
carriers.  They consist either of the  requirement to  cross  subsidise  particular services 
through an unbalanced tariff structure or to fulfill some other obligations. Only Denmark 
has a balanced tariff structure. 
SO  By USF we mean an approach of funding USOs that does not involve access charges and obtains all 
its financing from other sources. 236 
A  USF exists in two countries,  US and Australia.  In these countries access charges 
have, however, also been imposed so that competitors contribute to the cost of USOs. 
In other words, the USF is not considered to be sufficient to cover all relevant costs. It 
should be noted, however, that an altemative to access charges is in place in  these 
countries that would at least in principle allow that USOs be completely financed by this 
route. 
As  regards access charges independent of the existence of a USF, we note that they 
are  in  use  in  all  countries  with  fixed  network  competition  or  are  at  least  under 
consideration.  Ws  make _.tbe-Jiistinction-.between _.expllcit....and .Jmplicit ~.use .of  .this 
instrument.  In  Australia the regulator would insist that there is no access ·charge;  the 
existence of the  Australian CAN charge element in  interconnection charges is,  in  our 
view, the implicit imposition of such a charge under a different name. 
Only in three of the ten countries are mobile network operators required to actually pay 
an  access  charge  component;  in  two  of  them  it  is  implicitly  included  in  the 
interconnection  charge.  The  most interesting instance of this  is  in  the  German  case 
where  the  very  method  of  computing  the  interconnection  charge  assured  that  the 
access charge was included without even making reference to it (see Section 5.3.1.8). 
Access charges as an  explicit measure for mobile operators exist in  the  UK but are 
currently waived. Therefore, according to a recent decision in an arbitration proceeding, 
France  is  the  only  country  where  mobile  operators  actually  have  to  pay  an  explicit 
access charge. 
5.3.1.6  Public accessibility of interconnection agreements 
The  issue  of  transparency  of  interconnection  agreements  appears  to  be  handled 
differently  according  to  whether  there  is  fixed  network  or  only  mobile  network 
competition. As  we observe in  Table 5.3.1.6-1, in  four of the countries with fixed/fixed 
interconnection there is public access to  at least the  regulated part of interconnection 
agreements.  The  exception  is  Japan  where  only  the  regulator  has  access  to  the 
agreements. In  the countries with only fixed/mobile interconnection, in  four cases only 
the regulator has access to the agreements while in  one case, Portugal, the regulated 
parts of agreements are open to public scrutiny. 
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Table 5.3.1.6-1:  Access to interconnection agreements 
United Kingdom  X 
Japan 
_..,.  ..... 
X 
Australia  x· 
New Zealand  -·. - .  - x-
France  x-
Germany  X 
Denmark  X 
Portugal  X 
Greece  x···  x··· 
•  Except certain parts declared confidential 
••  The regulator may give access to certain parts of the agreements to interested operators. 
••• The regulator has access to the fixed/mobile but not to the mobile/mobile interconnection 
agreements. 
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The following are some observations on approach and practice in the various countries: 
- In  the  US,  all  interconnection  agreements subject to  regulatory  review  are  on  file 
with  the  relevant  regulatory  commissions  and  are  open  to  the  public.  This  is  in 
agreement  with  the  general  approach  to  matters  of  regulation  in  this  country. 
Nowhere else in  the world are data on  regulated firms to the degree open to public 
scrutiny, and in particular to the scrutiny of competitors, as in the US. 
- In Australia, the policy appears to be related to requirements of the Trade Practices 
Act.  Interconnection agreements in  Australia can  only be  signed between operators 
of telecommunications networks with a particular licence. These agreements violate 
certain  stipulations  in  the  Act  on  non-discrimination,  which  therefore  have  to  be 
waived to some extent.  Opening such agreements to the  public permits everybody 
interested to verify that the waiver has been applied correctly. 
- In  New  Zealand,  publication  of  interconnection  agreements  is  required  for  the 
express  purpose  of  helping  to  prevent  collusion  between  the  parties  to  network 
interconnection.  This  requirement  is  one  of  the  very  few  specific  requirements 
placed on telecommunications network operators. 
- In the  UK,  the regulator has recently instituted the policy of making it mandatory to 
publish  all  new  interconnection  agreements  that  involve  the  dominant  TO.  The 
explicit  intention  is  to  allow  every  interested  party  to  verify  what  interconnection 
terms any other party is getting and to ensure thereby that no undue preferences are 
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- In France, interconnection agreements are on file with the regulator. The regulator is 
explicitly held to intervene if the agreements contain conditions that are against the 
public interest. Furthermore, he may give access to certain parts of the agreements 
to interested operators, especially when these operators have applied for licences. 
- There  has  so  far  been  no  explicit  policy  statement  on  whether  interconnection 
agreements belong to the private or public domain in  Germany.  It may be  that,  if 
Mannesmann and Telekom had been able to reach  agreement on  interconnection 
without the involvement of the regulator, as the licence actually presupposes, these 
-terms would not have.-been made-public.-As-it.tumed.out,-tbe.charges.4etermined by 
the  regulator  were  ultimately  published,  precisely  to  inform  potential  bidders  for 
another  mobile  licence  about  the  interconnection  terms  on  which  to  base  their 
calculations. 
5.3.1. 7  Evolving cost standards 
There is a regulatory requirement regarding the use of a particular cost methodology in 
four of the five countries with fixed network competition. The exception is New Zealand. 
In  the  countries  that  so  far  have  only  mobile  network  competition,  three  - France, 
Germany and Portugal- have a similar requirement. This is shown in Table 5.3.1.7-1. It 
appears that  the  closer competiticn  gets to the  core  of telecommunications  services, 
which are the services over the fixed network, the more the regulator sees the need to 
impose a requirement regarding cost standards. 
Table 5.3.1.7·1:  Cost standards prescribed by regulator 
United States  y  FDC + Accounting Separation 
United Kingdom  y  FDC + Accounting Separation Benchmarking 
Japan  y  FDC + Accounting Separation 
Australia  y  DAIC, FDC 
New Zeeland  N 
France  y  FDC 
Germany  y  FDC,IC* 
Denmark  N 
Portugal  y  FDC 
Greece  N 
FDC  Fully-distributed costs 
OAIC  Directly-attributable incremental costs 
IC  Incremental costs 
The requirement is for FDC. The regulator, however, has entered into a discussion with 
the regulated carrier regarding a methodology consistent with LAIC. 
• .. 
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The fully-distributed cost {FDC)  standard is the methodology that the regulator most 
often  requires.  The  reason  for  the  preference  for  FDC,  despite  its  demonstrated 
drawbacks, must probably be seen in tradition and in the fact that regulators have not 
had experience with other approaches. 
One  should  note,  however,  that  in  some  countries  alternative  cost  standards  have 
already been applied or are under consideration. In Australia, which in  this respect is 
the remarkable exception, the regulator followed a directly-attributable incremental cost 
(DAIC)  approach when  determining initial access charges for the  new carrier.  In  the 
UK,  for . the _  determination  .of -access· ·loss --contributions,  use  has ·been  made  of 
benchmarking whereby the  efficiency of the  regulated firm  is compared  with  network 
operators abroad (the efficiency of the US Regional Bell Operating Companies served 
as a benchmark). On  the regulators agenda of the  UK is also consideration to move 
the regulated carrier to an incremental cost methodology. This is to some extent also 
true for Germany. The most important competitor in  the  UK,  Mercury, has on  its own 
adopted  the  approach  of  Activity-Based  Costing  (ABC)  which  comes  close  to 
generating long-run incremental cost (LRIC) measures. The use of price caps to control 
tariffs  and  interconnection  charges,  for  example  in  the  US,  also  lessens  the 
distortionary impact of FDC as under this regime the  regulated firm  is allowed to set 
tariffs and charges with relative flexibility. 
On  the other hand, one should also note that for the countries having had little or no 
experience with competition in the telecommunications sector the question of the cost 
standard on which to  base the calculation of tariffs and hence interconnection charges 
is an issue which so far has attracted little attention. 
5.3.1.8  Relation of local interconnection charges to local call tariff 
In  the  Chapters  3  and  4  of  this  study,  we  extensively  discussed  the  various 
considerations  that  need  to  enter  an  optimal  design  of  interconnection  charges.  We 
analysed  in  particular  also  to  what  extent  there  are  grounds  to  include  an  access 
charge component as one of the constituting elements (Baumoi/Willig rule). 
Here we attempt to get an  indication of the extent to which considerations as reflected 
in  the Baumol/Willig rule are evident in  the access charges used in  the ten countries. 
For this purpose we have sought to establish ratios of the charges to the relevant end-
user tariffs. This could approximately be done for the relationship between the charges 
for interconnection with  the  local  network and end-user tariffs for local  calls.S1  Table 
5.3.1.8-1  presents the results that we obtained this way. 
51  More  precisely,  the  single-ended charge for interconnection with  the  local  network  (terminating  or 
originating) is compared with the tariff for a local call, both measured as a charge per minute. 240  Study tor the European Comnission 
Table 5.3.1.8-1:  Relation of local interconnection charges to local call tariffs52 
UK Mercury/BT  -55%  EPD  N  N 
Japan  130% 
V•  EAR·~  .. -·-'··  ._,·~  ...  ~·  ·.  _y  N 
Australia  .... _  ... --· .  ----·  --.....;..~ 
.  -~-.  w~  -~:-.-·'i_.  .  ·-<~·-N ..  .  •. 
Initial  <50%  y 
Subsequent  -55% 
•,  •..  MA'_;. .. :  .. :  N  y 
New Zealand 
.,..~":...,.;.. \"::·- ·'~;,  .. r"" 
.";.#,.  ...... 
Long distance  -85%  CA  N  N 
··• 
Local calling  7  CL  Open  Open 
Mobile  100%+  CA  N  y 
France  -70%  EPD  y  N 
Germany  82%  EPD  N  y 
Denmark  -120%  CA  N  N 
Portugal  65%  MA  N  N 
Greece  ?  EAR  N  ? 
EAR  Ex-ante regulation  CA  Commercial agreement 
EPD  Ex-post determination  MA  Mediation/  Arbitration 
CL  Competition law 
It  is  possible  to  provide  the  following  commentary  on  the  percentages  shown  in  the 
table: 
- For six of the ten countries, i.e., the US, the UK, Australia (initial charges),  France, 
Germany and Portugal, the charge for interconnection with the local network is lower 
than the retail tariff for making a local call. We note from the third column of the table 
that  in  each  of these  cases  the  regulator was  actively involved in  determining the 
charges.  One  should expect the  regulator to  aim  for this  result as  interconnection 
with the local network tends to use fewer resources than a local call.  53 We also note 
- two cases, i.e., Japan and Denmark, where the opposite is true. Here, however, only 
in the first case was the regulator involved, in the second the result is the outcome of 
commercial negotiations. 
52  We could not compute the ratio for the fixed'mobile interconnection in Greece as the mode of paying 
for interconnection there - a percentage of the mobile carriers' revenues - does not lend itself to this 
kind of comparison. 
53  In the UK, however, an access deficit contribution (ADC) has recently been imposed on certain calls 
made by Mercury customers. Including this ADC the UK figure would be -1  00%. 
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- The particularly low ratio shown for Australia under the 'initial' heading may reflect 
the regulator's use of an inremental cost methodology in the determination of initial 
interconnection  charges.  This  may  change  with  the  entranrs  achievement  of 
threshold  market  shares  when  the  initial  charges  will  cease  to  apply  and  new, 
'subsequent' charges will need to be negotiated on a commercial basis. 
- The  entries for New Zealand reflect a complex situation.  The  'long distance' entry 
corresponds to the charge paid by the new fixed network competitor,  Clear, for its 
interconnection  for  long-distance  calls.  The  corresponding  agreement  had  been 
concluded with Telecom  in  free  negotiations at a time  when  T  ek!com  did  not yet 
insist  on  an  access  charge  according  to  the  efficient  component-pricing  rule 
(Baumoi/Willig).  The  question mark behind the  'local calling' entry reflects the  fact 
that, so far (July 1994), no interconnection charge has been agreed upon for Clear's 
offering of local calling. For this Telecom has demanded access charges which Clear 
is  not  prepared  to  accept.  The  case  is  under final  review  by  the  Privy  Council  in 
London.  The  'mobile'  entry  reflects  the  interconnection  agreement  between 
BeiiSouth  and  Telecom  concluded  at a time  when  it seemed,  after the  first  court 
ruling in the local calling case, that Telecom would be successful with its demand for 
an access charge. 
•  The method of determining the interconnection charge in the German case perhaps 
resembles most closely the Baumoi/Willig prescription. The charge was arrived at by 
starting  from  the  actual  local  call  tariff  and  deducting  from  this  the  cost  savings 
attributed to  the  particular way in  which  the  interconnecting operator interconnects 
with  the  PSTN.  It follows that the  charge determined contains all  the  elements that 
are  included  in  the  tariff  for  the  purpose  of  financing  infrastructural  and  other 
obligations. This  would  at  least in  part explain the  high value of the  ratio  shown  in 
the table. 
As  regards any apparent dependence of the level of the interconnection charge on  an 
access charge component included in it we note (looking at the fourth and fifth columns 
in  which  it  is  shown  whether there  is  such  a component,  either explicitly or implicitly) 
that there  is  none.  We  observe cases  in  which  there  is  indeed a relatively high  level 
when  there  is  an  access  charge  (Japan,  Germany,  New  Zealand  'mobile')  but  also 
when there is none (Denmark, New Zealand 'long distance'), and we observe a case of 
a low level when  indeed there is no such charge (the UK) but also when there is one 
(the  US,  Australia). One  is led  to conclude that the fact whether an  access charge is 
included  or  not  may  not  be  so  relevant  in  determining  the  actual  level  of  the 
interconnection charge. 
The actual pricing methods for interconnection charges vary between countries in their 
sophistication  and  in  their  relationship  to  retail  tariffs.  In  nearly all  cases  the  largest 
component  of  interconnection  charges  are  on  a  per-minute  basis.  Usually,  only  the 
costs of actually establishing interconnections are not priced on  a usage basis.  Peak-
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Where  interconnection charges are to be cost-based,  regulators and incumbent TOs 
seem to have some preference for fully-distributed cost pricing of interconnection while 
interconnectors favour direct costing (no overheads) or incremental costing. However, 
price caps for interconnection services with the possibility of rebalancing are perceived 
by TOs as  a desirable means of moving away from fully-distributed pricing principles, 
while  they  are  viewed  by  interconnectors  as  a  potential  source  for  predatory  TO 
behavior (U.S.). 
5.3.2  Lessons from the country studies 
In  all  countries  that  have  introduced  network  competition  in  telecommunications, 
interconnection has been among the most pressing issues. As experienced in  the US 
from the early parts of this century onward, incumbent TOs may simply want to  refuse 
interconnection with  competing  network operators.  Later experiences,  for example  in 
the  UK  and  Germany,  show  that  incumbent TOs,  even  if  forced  to  interconnect  by 
licence  or  statute,  do  not  voluntarily  grant  interconnection  to  competing  network 
operators  at  terms  and  conditions  that  would  be  acceptable  to  regulators.  Without 
regulatory inter1erence negotiations often reach an impasse. This experience suggests: 
(a)  that a right or duty to interconnect is necessary to ensure network entry; 
(b)  that some form of regulatory inter1erence with private negotiations on interconnec-
tion agreements is helpful in reaching outcomes that regulators desire. 
The  experience  also  suggests  that  network  interconnection  is  too  complicated  and 
possibly too  individualised an  issue to  be  regulated in  all  its aspects. Thus, a balance 
between  regulation  and  commercial  agreements  needs  to  be  reached.  Since  most 
interconnection regimes start out with a highly asymmetric market position between the 
incumbent TO and the interconnector, ex-post regulation has proven to be an effective 
tool  in  helping  the  interconnector's negotiating position.  In  order to create  reasonable 
expectations about the  outcome of  ex-post regulatory inter1erence,  ex-ante regulation 
has to establish a set of basic guidelines for the issues that can be treated through ex-
post  regulatory  determination  and  the  criteria  to  be  used  by  the  regulator.  The  UK 
framework has created such  rules in  great detail. It is questionable if the  UK  level  of 
detail  is  needed  or  whether  more  general  rules  suffice.  The  trade-off  is  between 
constraining the  regulator and requiring frequent changes in the ex-ante regulation on 
the one hand and regulatory discretion and vagueness on the other. 
Most  countries  use  their  interconnection  regime  as  an  active  regulatory  tool  for 
promoting  competition  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  The  objectives  of 
interconnection regulation as revealed by regulators in our country studies include entry 
help and the viability of the incumbent. Entry help is provided to the interconnector via 
low interconnection charges (and/or high prices for retail telecommunications services) 
that  improve  their  competitive  position  via  the  incumbent  TO.  Entry  help  is  also 
provided  via  rules  that  equalise  interconnection  charges  across  interconnectors  and 
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thereby  improve  the  competitive  position  of small  interconnectors  relative  to  large 
interconnectors  (US  "equal  charge"  rule).  As  appropriate,  entry  help  is  most 
pronounced  at  the  beginning  of  the  interconnection  regime  (US,  UK).  While  the 
question of the viability of the incumbent TO is raised at the outset, it becomes a more 
pressing issue over time, as "bypass" occurs and the incumbent loses market share. A 
major  reason  given  for  this  problem  by incumbents  is  the  slow  speed  allowed  to 
rebalance retail rates. 
The viability of the incumbent is taken care of through fully-distributed cost pricing of 
interconnection  and  through  (implicit  or  e~plicit)  access  charges  Dr. access  deficit 
contributions. We have not found any satisfactory regime of access charges among the 
countries we studied. The US is actively searching for a replacement of the status quo 
approach  currently  used  (which  was  derived  largely  from  a  formula  for  separating 
interstate and intrastate costs).  The UK approach is much  more explicit and  rational 
than the US approach but it requires superhuman objectivity in making waiver decisions 
as  well  as  complicated  and  questionable  calculations.  Access  charges  have  been 
justified in  the  various countries by constraints on  tariff rebalancing and/or by  USOs. 
While constraints on tariff rebalancing should be lifted to accommodate competition and 
to  promote  cost-based  pricing,  USOs  may  actually  become  more  desirable  under 
competition. So far, only Australia has a method for establishing and financing the costs 
of USOs in place. Experience in this area is needed. 
The interaction between regulatory bodies and official competition policy in the area of 
interconnection varies among the countries studied. In New Zealand, competion policy 
fully dominates; there is no regulation. In the US the two types of policy often compete 
with  each  other.  Major  parts  of  the  US  interconnection  regime  are  the  result  of 
competition  policy,  for  example,  the  vertical  separation  into  local  and  long-distance 
carriers,  the  equal-access  stipulations  and  the  equal  charge  rule.  In  the  UK 
interconnection  regime,  the  regulator  seems  to  actively  pursue  competition  policy, 
without  facing  strong  constraints  from  other  instruments  of  competition  policy.  Our 
expectation is  that active regulation of interconnection will  eventually disappear as the 
market for interconnection matures.  Competition policy will  then have to take over as 
the  main  policy  tool  for  dealing  with  problems  arising  in  this  market.  It  is  therefore 
imperative that the role of competition policy be established early on. 
Most  countries  have  gained  their  first  experience  with  interconnection  agreements 
through fixed-mobile interconnections. For full-fledged network competition, fixed-fixed 
interconnections are currently more important. The question is, to what extent countries 
can  team  from  their fixed-mobile  interconnection  experience for the  upcoming fixed-
fixed  case  and  to what  extent they are  locked  in  by  their decisions on  fixed-mobile 
interconnections.  For  several  countries  a  particular  emphasis  of  fixed-mobile 
interconnection agreements is on low tariffs for private circuits.  In the  UK, as the only 
European country in our study with fixed-fixed interconnections, preferential tariffs for 
private circuits have not been provided under fixed-fixed interconnection agreements. 
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by competing fixed-network operators and to discourage similar investments by mobile 
operators.  That  there  can  be  ample  room  for  private  circuits  in  fixed-fixed 
interconnection  agreements  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  importance  of  the  US 
special access regime. 
Over time,  interconnection  moves from  something  infeasible or difficult to  something 
resembling  business  as  usual.  At  the  beginning of interconnection ·regimes,  there  is 
usually  a single  entrant  that  wants  to  be interconnected  to  the  incumbent  TO.  The 
timing to  realise interconnection along with starting interconnection charges appear to 
be the most  .. pressing issues_. Wbile  .  .timing to r.ealise.interconoection r.emains important 
for  the  newcomers,  the  feasibility  of interconnection  has  long been  established,  and 
most parties face other issues. Countries with long experience in  network competition 
(US,  UK)  are  confronted with  a diversity of parties that want to interconnect and  that 
have different interests. An interconnection regime that individually takes care of these 
interests  is  likely  to  become  cumbersome  and  complex.  Rather,  standardisation  of 
agreements  on  many issues  appears  possible,  leaving fewer issues that  have  to  be 
solved  for  individual  cases.  As  the  market  for  interconnection  matures,  non-
discrimination between  interconnectors becomes pressing, and the case is made that 
all  potential  interconnectors  should  be  treated  similarly  (as  in  US  expanded 
interconnection). 
How  can  countries  at  the  beginning  of  their  interconnection  regimes  learn  from  the 
more  advanced  countries,  and  what can  the  European  Commission  do to  encourage 
that?  Clearly,  the  more  advanced  countries  have  gone  through  stages  in  their 
interconnection  regimes  that  might  be  skipped  or  shortened  by  the  followers.  For 
example,  the  technical  feasibility  of  interconnection  has  by  now  been  demonstrated 
under  various  network  configurations.  There  is  ample  experience  with  location  of 
interconnection points and  with  compatibility between  different types  of  networks and 
line  capacities.  Similarly,  there  is  a long  list of  issues that  need  to  be  considered  for 
interconnection  agreements  where  the  solutions  could  be  adapted  from  UK 
Interconnection  agreements  or  US  interconnection  tariffs,  both  in  the  public  domain. 
Some  issues are  not so  clear cut but nevertheless learning is likely to be  helpful.  For 
example, the costs and benefits of equal access, while possibly different in magnitude 
across countries, are unlikely to differ much in kind. Methods for cost-benefit analysis of 
equal access may therefore be transferable. 
In the US and the UK the publicity of the contents of interconnection agreements goes 
along with with an involvement of the whole telecommunications sector in the process 
that  shapes  the  interconnection  regime.  Such  an  involvement and  public  discussion 
may  slow  down  the  speed  of  decision  making  but  it  is  likely  to  improve  the 
understanding of the issues and trust in the outcome of regulatory decisions. 
The US country study is the only one that could be relevant for the relationship between 
the  European Commission and the Member States. The US experience suggests that 
dual  regulation  causes  problems  of  jurisdictional  cost  separation  and  of  conflicts 
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reasonable  uniformity of  approaches throughout the country where  either the  federal 
regulator  has  preempted  state  regulation  or  where  competing  interstate/intrastate 
regulation  exists and  operators can  arbitrage between jurisdictions. Translated to  the 
case of the European Union this suggests that the European Commission could either 
prescribe  binding  rules  on  interconnection  or establish  European  standard  rules  that 
can be followed on a voluntary basis. Voluntary rules could lead to  a unified approach 
to  the  extent  that  arbitrage  possibilities  for  telecommunications  services  between 
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6.  Towards a European interconnect policy 
6.1  Introduction 
All  experience  with  competition  in  the  European  Union  and  in  the  rest of the  world 
proves that interconnection is the key for transforming the former monopolistic market 
structure  in  telecommunications  in~o  ·~ .competitive  _one.  Yiable  competition  is 
unthinkable  without  interconnection  between  mainly  (but  not  exclusively)  the 
incumbent's and the new competitors' networks. Economic analysis can show and can 
give  the  answer  why  that  is  the  case.  Technical  analysis  gives  evidence  that 
interconnection is feasible and more cost-effective than stand-alone solutions. We have 
developed the  argument in  more detail in the previous Chapters. Not only competition 
in  public  voice  telephony  requires  interconnection of  networks.  The  status of  service 
competition  in  the  EU  proves  that  viable  service  competition  in  other  service  fields 
benefits from interconnection to existing networks. 
Given  the  (initial)  market structures which  exist before viable competition  emerges  in 
the  telecommunications sector, the  supplier(s) and demander of interconnect services 
will  not produce results which make best use of the competitive potential in the market. 
Market structure asymmetries give incentives on the side of the dominant supplier not 
to  offer the  degree and  the  conditions of interconnection which  best serve the  public 
interest.  This  result  can  be  derived  from  theoretical  economic  analysis.  Our  rich 
empirical case studies show that this result obviously describes most of the worldwide 
experience with interconnection in the real world. 
The case for policy and regulatory involvement can be made quite easily. This holds on 
the national as well as on the European level. In the following we will focus our findings 
developed in  the previous Chapters on  the necessity and the approach of a consistent 
and coherent European interconnect policy. 
In  Section 6.2 we  deal with  the need and  reasons for a European interconnect policy. 
Section 6.3 summarises and evaluates the  elements and steps which form the current 
European interconnect policy. The final section in this Chapter tries to identify the policy 
options  and  approaches  which  do  exist  for  a  fully  liberalised  environment  in  the 
European telecommunications market and develops a set of policy recommendations. • 
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6.2  The need for a European interconnect policy 
6.2.1  Liberalisation on the Eur9pean level 
Already  in  the  1980s,  the  Eu~pean Union  took  the  initiative  to  transform  the 
telecommunications sector from aronopolistically structured to a competitive market. 
Many  (or  even  most)  of the  Me  ber States  have  adopted  their  national  regulatory 
framework according to the  requi . ments of the Services Directive54  not earlier than 
required by the Directive but in linetwith it. "They have accepted and are willing to accept 
policy  formulation  on  major  telae  mmunications  policy  issues  at  a  European  level. 
These Member States expect that policy frameworks and measures which govern and 
structure fundamental policy decisi!ns will also be developed on the European level. 
Given  the  fundamental  principles of the  Treaty,SS  the  interaction  between  European 
telecommunications  legislation  an  national  telecommunications  policy  as  described 
above does not hinder any Membe  State from opening its telecommunications markets 
to competition earlier than required by European legislation. 
In July 1993 the  European Counci  adopted a resolutionS& on the further development 
of liberalisation in the European U  ion. Liberalisation of all voice telephony services by 
and  not  later  than  January  1  ,  19  8  is  the  intended  policy  goal.  In  this  context  the 
development  of  a  framework  for  interconnection  agreements  and  the  definition  of 
principles for access charges has been  regarded  as a line  of  action  which  has  to  be 
worked out.  I 
In  May this year the Bangemann  ~roup upon  request by the  European  Council  made 
far reaching recommendations  on~he future liberalisation path in  Europe.S7 The report 
recommends  to  accelerate  the  o  going  process  of  liberalisation  and  to  open  up  to 
competition  infrastructure  and  se  ices  as  soon  as  possible.  Furthermore,  the  report 
recommends  interconnection  of  n  tworks  and  interoperability  of  services  as  primary 
Union objectives.  On  this basis a  d other contributions European decisions on  a fully 
liberalised telecommunications rna ket can be expected soon. 
Given  this  status  of  policy  decis ens,  the  Member  States  expect  a  framework  for 
interconnection or a European inte connect policy to be developed in the near future. 
----------------------~ 
54  Commission  Directive  of  28  June  990  on  competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services (90/388/EEC), OJ 16 L 192,  4.7.1990, p 10. 
55  Treaty establishing the European Co  munity as amended by the Treaty on European Union 
56  Council Resolution of 22 July 1993  n the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector 
and the need for further development in that market (93/C213/01), OJ 16 C 213, 6.8.1993, p.1. 
57  Europe and the Global Information S  iety, Recommendations to the European Council, Brussels, 26 
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6.2.2  Divergence in national approaches 
A common European interconnect policy is easier to implement when  Member States 
have  not  yet  dealt  with  interconnedion  in  their national  regulatory  framework.  This 
statement can  also  be  formulated  the  other way around.  When  all  or most  Member 
States  have  developed  a  national  interconned policy,  have  realised  interconnection 
agreements  between  networks  operators  and  the  approaches  chosen  vary 
considerably, the question on the usefulness (or the transaction costs) of a European 
interconnect policy  is  more  difficult to  answer.  In  any  case,  if many  interconnection 
agreements are in  place a new interconnect policy requiring ·amendments -or changes 
of existing agreements will be difficult to implement. 
Where  do  we  stand  in  Europe  with  regard  to  national  interconnect  policies  and 
interconnection agreements? The situation differs with regard to the  market segments 
or  interconnection scenarios on  which we  concentrate in  this study and is,  of course, 
dependent  on  the  steps  towards  competition  which  have  already been  taken  in  the 
Member States. 
Overall,  the  situation  in  the  various  Member States is  heterogeneous.  Some  Member 
States have already developed (elements of) an  interconnect policy.  In  most Member 
States,  however,  no  substantial  steps  toward  developing  a  regulatory  policy  for  the 
interconnection of networks and services have so far been undertaken and many legal, 
institutional,  technical  and  economic  barriers  against  (viable)  interconnection  still 
persist. 
Concerning  the  interconnection  between  fixed  networks,  it  is  only the  UK  which  has 
experience  with  that  type  of  competition  and  therefore  such  type  of  interconnection 
agreements.  As  the  UK  country  study  shows,  interconnection  evolves  to  be  such  a 
complex issue, that policy development in this field is not or need not necessarily be a 
one-step decision  making  process.  In  some  other Member States the  first ideas  and 
concepts  are  emerging  of  how  to  introduce  competition  into  the  core 
telecommunications  business  (network  infrastructure,  voice  telephony).  In  these 
countries the first ideas and elements towards an interconnect policy for fixed networks 
just  emerge.  A  European  interconnect  policy  could  fill  a  gap  for  fixed  network 
interconnection. 
The  situation  is  different  with  regard  to  mobile  networks.  Most  Member States  have 
introduced or are  introducing competition  in  mobile  telephony. Therefore, they had  to 
develop  an  interconnection  framework  or  are  doing  that  currently.  Several 
interconnection  agreements  ha\  e  been  negotiated  within  these  frameworks.  The 
regulatory frameworks and the agreements themselves differ in a variety of details and 
outcomes.  The  mobile  carriers  face  quite  different  points  of  departure  in  their 
competitive position between Member States. A lot of restrictions still hinder them from 
providing  the  most  efficient  mobile  networks and  services.  Many barriers to  efficient 
interconnection  still  exist  for  mobile  operators,  in  particular  concerning  direct • 
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connections  between  mobile  networks  in  different  Member  States.  A  European 
interconnect policy could harmonise interconnection frameworks and conditions. 
Together  with  developing  ONP  conditions  for  the  telephone  network  and  setting 
conditions for access to its (advanced) features, some Member States are making. the 
first  steps  towards  interconnection  in  an  intelligent  network  environment.  These 
approaches are still at an early stage in most Member States. A European policy in this 
field could take a lead for innovative and uniform approaches. 
6.2.3  European-wide networks and services 
The  main  (but  not  the  only)  argument  in  favour  of  a  comprehensive  European 
interconnect policy consisting of similar conditions of access to networks and network 
functions  under equal terms and conditions in  each  Member State can  be  made with 
regard  to  the  requirements  of  European-wide  networks  and  services.  If  network 
operators or service providers want to run a trans-European network or want to offer a 
European-wide  service,  they  will  have  to  rely  on  interconnection  to  national  public 
networks  in  many  cases.  Interconnection  can  be  a  bottleneck  if  it  is  not  provided 
everywhere. It can also be a bottleneck if the technical, economic and regulatory terms 
and conditions vary significantly between Member States. 
This reason and basis for a European interconnect policy has received the highest legal 
support in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. This Treaty has introduced a new 
'Title XII' on  'trans-European networks' into the  EC Treaty and thereby defined a new 
field of competence for the European Union. Article 129b sets the legal principles of an 
interconnect  policy  on  trans-European  networks:  "The  Community  shall  aim  at 
promoting  the  interconnection  and  interoperability  of  national  networks  as  well  as 
access to  such  networks". The basic policy on  interconnection now has a direct legal 
basis in the constitution of the European Union. 
6.2.4  Harmonising national interconnect policies 
As we will show in Section 6.3, the European Union has developed an initial framework 
for a European interconnect policy,  mainly in  the  proposed voice telephony Directive. 
As  compared to  the  regulatory and  policy frameworks  in  countries which  can  already 
rely on  some years of experience with  competition and  interconnection, the European 
policy  framework  as  defined  so  far  is  consistent  with  a  variety  of  very  different 
interconnect policies  in  the  Member States.  A harmonised approach  in  the  European 
Union would require a much more detailed approach if that is the intended objective in 
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6.3  Current European interconnect poUcy 
6.3.1  The ONP framework 
Basic principles of  an  European  interconnect policy have  been  developed within  the 
ONP framework. When the ONP concept was bom-in the eighties, service liberalisation 
and  the  provision  of  transborder  service  offerings  was  at  the  center  of  the 
Commission's  policy approach.  The  network infrastructure  monopoly of the  TOs  was 
·gene ratty accepted ·at that time 1n-Europe-:Turthennore;-most--Member·States wanted to 
reserve certain basic services for exclusive provision by their TOs. 
In  that environment the ONP concept was bom: TOs should be obliged to open  their 
network  under  fair  competitive  conditions  to  competing  service  providers  and  to 
interconnect with them. Working out the principles of the provision of the network was 
regarded as  a necessary requirement for a Community-wide competitive market.  One 
of the main  reasons to develop the ONP concept was to avoid a series of contentious 
cases  and  lengthy conflicts  concerning  infringements  of the  competition  rules  of  the 
Treaty.  Besides allowing access for competitive service providers, the interconnection 
between  TOs  in  different Member States was  a concern  of the  Commission  to  allow 
efficient Community-wide communications. 
The so-called ONP framework Directive58 lays down the principles under which service 
providers  and  users  can  get  access  to  reserved  services  and  the  public 
telecommunications infrastructure. The Directive defined ONP as •the harmonisation of 
conditions  for  open  and  efficient  access  to  and  use  of  public  telecommunications 
networks and, where applicable, public telecommunications services·. ONP is intended 
to  facilitate  the  provision  of  services  using  public  networks  and/or  public  services. 
According  to  this aim,  ONP  is  intended to promote fair competition between  vertically 
integrated TOs and  service providers which  have to rely on  services and resources of 
the  TOs  to  produce  and  offer  their  own  services.  The  second  goal  of  ONP  is  to 
harmonise technical interfaces, usage conditions and tariffs to facilitate the provision of 
pan-European  telecommunications  services.  Harmonisation  will  be  realised  on  the 
basis of European standards to be adapted by ETSI. 
Three types of principles and application criteria define the ONP regulatory framework, 
namely: 
(  1  )  harmonised conditions, 
(2)  basic principles and 
58  Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the intemal market for telecommunications 
services through the implementation of open network provision (901387/EEC), OJ l192, 24.7.1990, 
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(3)  essential requirements. 
ONP conditions include, in particular, hannonjsed conditions with regard to 
•  technical  interfaces,  including  the  definition  and  implementation  of  network 
termination points; 
•  usage conditions, including access to frequencies; 
•  tariff principles. 
The main ·emphasis··with regard to  ·technical interfaces is their conformity with European 
standards. For existing services and networks, existing interfaces should be adopted. 
Also  new  services  should  rely  on  existing  interfaces;  if  that  is  not  possible,  new 
interfaces have to be specified. For new networks, ONP requirements should be taken 
into account when specifying new interfaces. 
Usage and supply conditions refer to a standard set of contractual conditions governing 
access  and  usage  including,  for  example,  delivery  period,  quality  of  service, 
maintenance,  fault  reporting,  procedures.  They  may  include  conditions  for 
interconnection with public and private networks, conditions for resale of capacity, and 
conditions for shared use. 
Tariffs  should  mainly  comply  with  a  set  of  basic  principles  defined  below.  Further 
general  requirements  for  tariffs  are  that  they  are  cost-oriented  and  sufficiently 
unbundled.  Furthermore, tariffs must be non-discriminatory and guarantee equaltiy of 
treatment. 
ONP conditions must comply with a number of basic principles, namely: 
•  they must be based on objective criteria, 
•  they must be transparent and published in an appropriate manner, 
•  they  must  guarantee  eguality  of  access  and  must  be  non-discriminatory.  in 
accordance with Community law. 
These basic principles apply to all harmonised conditions of ONP. 
The  general  philosophy  of  ONP  is  to  realise  and  guarantee  open  access  to  public 
networks  and  services,  and  to  avoid  restrictions  on  such  access.  The  Directive, 
however, takes care of a set of •non-economic reasons in the general interest• which 
give  NRAs  the  right  ro  restrict  access  to  the  public  telecommunications  services. 
Access for users and service providers can only be restricted for reasons based on the 
following essential reguirements: 
•  security of network operations, 
•  maintenance of network integrity, 
•  interoperability of services, in justified cases, 252 
•  protection of data, as appropriate. 
In  applying  restrictions  to  access,  regulators  have  to  follow  the  principle  of 
proportionality and they shall not be excessive in relation to the aim pursued. 
6.3.2  Current ONP legislation and initiatives· · 
While  the  framework  Directive  defined  and  set  the  general  principles  of  ONP,  the 
application  to specific _ser:vjces_remains  subject-to  ..separate. Jegjslative .  ..measures.  In. 
recent years, the following areas have been addressed for legislative ONP measures: 
•  leased lines, 
•  packet switched data services (PSDS), 
•  ISDN, 
•  voice telephony. 
a)  Leased lines 
The  leased  line  Directive59  mainly  deals  with  conditions  and  specifications  on  how 
leased lines should be provided. The Directive contributes to interconnection regulation 
and  service  competition  insofar as  it  no  longer accepts  technical  restrictions  for  the 
interconnection of leased lines with each other or for the interconnection of leased lines 
and  public  telecommunications  networks,  because  they  can  be  replaced  by  less 
restrictive regulatory measures. 
b)  ISDN 
Although the Council Recommendation on the provision of ISDN&O  in  accordance with 
ONP principles aims at harmonising the conditions for open and efficient access to and 
use  of  ISDN, it does not address interconnection issues very specifically.  It is  stated 
that users are requiring further access arrangements such as M- and U-type interfaces 
which are not yet provided by TOs. This issue still is under study and not yet settled. 
c)  Packet-switched data services (PSDS) 
Similar to ISDN, this Council Recommendations is mainly dealing with supply conditions 
of PSDS and not with access and interconnection issues. 
59  Council  Directive  of  5  June  1992  on  the  application  of  open  networt<  provision  to  leased  lines 
(92/44/EEC), OJ L  165, 19.6.1992, p.27. 
60  Council Recommendation of 5 June 1992 on the provision of harmonised integrated services digital 
network {ISDN) access arrangements and a minimum set of ISDN offerings in accordance with open 
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6.3.3  The interconnect model of the voice telephony Directive&1 
The ONP rules mentioned above were primarily aimed at the definition of minimum sets 
of service features and conditions. More precise and detailed rules on interconnection 
have been  developed  in  the recently adopted Council  Directive on  the  application  of 
ONP to voice telephony. 
The Directive aims to •create the best possible regulatory environment for boosting the 
competitive provision of pan-European services using capabilities and functions of the 
public switched. telephone- network-and.  service;- whilst safeguarding the ... provision of 
universal service". Concerning interconnection, the regulatory principles primarily aim at 
avoiding abuse of a dominant position by TOs. The document deals with the provision 
of access to the public voice telephony service and the network over which that service 
is delivered for 
- end users, 
- competitive service providers, 
- public mobile telephony services operators and 
- other TOs. 
Access to voice telephony includes access to intelligent functions of the public network. 
ON P conditions for access to the fixed public telephone network shall apply to  all  the 
network technologies  currently  in  use  including  analogue  telephone  networks,  digital 
networks and the  ISDN. The  Directive does not apply to mobile telephony services in 
general, but it does apply to the use of the fixed public telephone network by operators 
of  public  mobile  services.  It  does  not  apply  to  the  direct  interconnection  between 
operators of public mobile telephony services. 
In its interconnection provision (Art. 11) the Directive seems to exclude the case for the 
interconnection  of  two  fixed  network  operators  within  the  same  Member State.  The 
wording  in  clause  22  is  different  and  seems  to  regard  this  interconnection  case  as 
covered by the  Directive.  Perhaps there might be  some openess on  the scope of the 
interconnection provisions of the Directive. 
Given this  little  (but  important)  classification  problem,  the  Directive addresses and  is 
applicable to the following interconnection scenarios: 
(  1  )  Interconnection  between  two  fixed  public  telephone  networks  from  different 
Member States; 
61  Although the  Directive was  rejected by the  European Parliament in July this year,  and although its 
future  is  unclear.  we  regard  it  as  useful  to  deal  with  its  contents  in the  same  way  as  before  the 
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(2)  interconnection  between  a  fixed  public  telephone  network  and  a  public  mobile 
telephony network within the same Member State; 
(3)  interconnection  between  a  fixed  public  telephone  network  and  a  public  mobile 
telephony network from another Member State. 
This classification on the other hand means that the Directive is not applicable to the 
following interconnection scenarios: 
(  4)  Interconnection between  tw~ mobile  t~lephony netw?rks within the same Member 
State; 
(5)  interconnection  between  two  fixed  public  telephone  networks  within  the  same 
Member State: 
(6)  interconnection between mobile networks from different Member States. 
Clause 24 addresses scenario (5) where more than one TO operates a fixed telephone 
network  in  the  sense  that  although  not  directly  applicable,  the  interconnection 
arrangements  .. should take due accounts of the principles laid down in this Directive•. If 
this  distinction  holds,  there  is  no  systematic  criterion  concerning  the  scope  of  the 
Directive.  It  neither totally excludes mobile networks nor concentrates on  crossborder 
interconnection scenarios. The outcome on applicability is more a mixture of these two 
criteria. 
The  Directive basically distinguishes three types or ways of accessing the  PSTN. The 
regulations are mainly dealing with standard access, which means interfaces for access 
at commonly provided network termination points. These types of access are  relevant 
for all or at least major parts of the whole user community. 
Beside commonly provided network termination points, the Directive deals with special 
network access  requirements,  which  will  mainly be  relevant for  service  providers  but 
might also have some relevance for some groups of larger users. Finally, the Directive 
sets  regulatory  rules  for  the  access  or  interconnect  services  which  other  network 
operators demand. Figure 6.3.3-1  gives an overview on the three types of access which 
are handled in the voice telephony Directive. • 
• 
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Figure 6.3.3-1: Types of network access 
Users  f,,  ,,'~ 
Standard net\vork 
access 
' ' 
, 
9t  , 
'  , 
'  t' 
, 
' 
Service  '1  Special net\vork 
Providers  .  I  Hj  ....... .access 
,  ,  ,  , 
l,,' 
, 
Network  I  •  Interconnection  Operators 
I 
! 
·---- -------- --------- --
According to Art.  1  0,  users can request access to the fixed telephone network at other 
network termination points than those offered for •standard access·. TOs shall·respond 
to  such  requests if they are reasonable (in  terms of technical feasibility and economic 
viability) and  NRAs have to ensure that they provide such types of access. A TO  can 
only  restrict  or deny that access after having  gotten  agreement of the  NRA.  Service 
providers  or  (larger)  users  shall  obtain  special  network  access  to  public  network 
resources  without  waiting  for  time-consuming  standardisation  procedures.  The 
Commission  can,  however,  initiate standards for new types of  network access  within 
the ETSI process. They can engage in technical and commercial arrangements with the 
TO.  There is no obligation to publish such off-tariff agreements which  makes it easier 
for TOsto discriminate. As a regulatory safeguard against such behaviour NRAs have 
the  right  to  get  access  to  such  arrangements.  The  NRA  may  intervene  in  its  own 
initiative and shall do so if requested by any party. Service providers, however, get no 
right to collocate such that they can install their equipment on the premises of a TO. 
Art.  11  sets up a regulatory framework for interconnection in  a rather broad way.  The 
main  focus  of  the  Directive  is  the  Community-wide  provision  of  voice  telephony 
services. Therefore, the Directive only deals with the three scenarios of interconnection 
mentioned above  . 
The  first  basic  princiole  of  the  regulatory  framework  is  the  right  to  interconnect. 
Operators  of  public  mobile-telephony  services  in  the  same  Member  State  and  from 
other Member States as  well  as. fixed public telephone network operators from  other 
Member States have  the  right  to  interconnect to  the  national  fixed  public telephone 
network. This right to interconnect can only be restricted with prior agreement of NRAs. 
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The second basic principle is that regulators should mainly rely on negotiations of the 
parties  involved  to  get  agreement  on  technical  and  commercial  arrangements  for 
interconnection. 
The  third  basic  principle  is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  regulator  to  intervene  in 
interconnection  matters.  Interconnection •should be  subject to regulatory  oversight in 
order to safeguard the Community-wide interests of users and ensure compliance with 
Community  law  ... •.  NRAs  might  intervene  on  their own  initiative  and  shall  do  so  if 
requested  by either party.  The  forms and types of intervention are not specified,  but 
they include the right .to set conditions oo.jnterconnedion.agr:eemeats  ..  Tbeaiteria4and 
objectives of regulatory actions are limited to conditions which are: 
•  non-discriminatory, 
•  fair and reasonable for both parties and 
•  offer greatest benefit to all users. 
Besides  meeting  these  criteria,  NRAs  also  have  to  ensure  that  interconnection 
agreements 
•  are entered into and implemented in an efficient and timely manner; 
•  include conditions about conformance to relevant standards; 
•  include conditions about conformance to essential requirements; 
•  include conditions of the maintenance of end-to-end quality. 
It is not specified whether and to what extent such requirements should be set ex ante 
by the NRA or whether negotiated interconncetion agreements should be controlled on 
their compliance  with  these  requirements.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  general  approval 
requirement of interconnection agreements by NRAs. 
In  Art.  27  the  Directive  sets  up  some  conciliation  and  dispute  resolution  procedures 
which  might also be  used in interconnection disputes. Thereafter, unresolved disputes 
with  a TO  by  any  party  concerning  an  alleged  infringement of the  provisions  of  the 
Directive can be appealed to the NRA or another independent body. Easily accessible 
and  inexpensive procedures shall be created to  resolve such disputes in  a fair,  timely 
and transparent manner. When more than one Member State is concerned, the dispute 
may also be invoked to the Commission. 
The  fourth  basic  principle  is  the  possibility  of  access  charges  to  be  included  in 
interconnection agreements. In a complicated language they are introduced as •specific 
compensation provisions62 for the telecommunications organisation in situations where 
different operating conditions, e.g., price controls or universal service obligations, are 
imposed  upon  the  respective  parties  ...  •.  Under  this  provision  potentially  many 
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.situations  might  give  reason  for  access  charges  when  even  the  monopolistic  price 
control is regarded as an asymmetric type of regulation which has to be compensated. 
Only  very  broad  and  unspecific  criteria  are  set  for  the  application  of  these 
•compensation  provisions•  or  access  charges:  They  shall  be  cost  oriented  (which 
costs?),  non-discriminatory and fully justified (according to what objective?) and  need 
approval of the NRA. 
The  fifth  basic  principle  requires  details  of  interconnection  agreements  to  be  made 
available to NRAs upon request. This principle has more relevance in what it does not 
require than in what- it does-require.-lt-does-not-require -that interconnection agreements 
need prior approval by the NRA before they become effective. Furthermore, it does not 
require public access in whole or in part to interconnection agreements. 
There  are  no  interconnection-specific tariff  and  cost-accounting  principles  defined  or 
set,  which  means that only the general principles on  voice telephony as a whole shall 
apply.  These  are  first  of  all  the  principles  of  transparency  and  cost  orientation  as 
specified  in  the  ONP  framework  Directive.  Tariffs should  be  "sufficiently  unbundled", 
independent  of  the  type  of  application  which  the  users  implement and  may  include 
"tariff  constraints  (imposed  by  the  NRA)  relating  to  the  objectives  of  universal 
telephone-service  accessibility  including  town  and  country  planning".  Of  some 
relevance for interconnection might be the provision that bulk discount schemes can be 
offered  (Art.  14(1 )).  The  tariff  regulations  should  be  supported  by  suitable  cost-
accounting systems which are deemed to control tariff principles and  restrictions.  The 
cost-accounting  rules  are  formulated  according  to  a  typical  fully  distributed  costing 
approach (Art. 13(3)). 
To  summarise,  the  voice  telephony  Directive  favours  a  'light-handed'  regulatory 
approach towards interconnection. It does not rely on  or require ex-ante regulation of 
interconnection  agreements,  but  provides  regulatory  intervention  in  case  that 
commercial  negotiations on  interconnection  fail.  The  Directive  leaves  questions open 
on  its  jurisdiction  concerning  some  (relevant)  interconnection  scenarios  and  it  is  not 
very specific in  its provisions on  interconnection in  an  intelligent network environment. 
Besides referring to the  possibility of access charges to be  included in  interconnection 
agreements,  the  Directive  does  not  contribute  to  the  definition  of  universal  service 
principles and conceptual and implementation aspects concerning interconnection and 
access  charges.  The  Commission  regards  the  provisions  for  access  and 
interconnection  agreements  in  the  Directive  as  a  sufficient  initial  framework  at  the 
Community  level.  With  phased  progress  towards  increased  liberalisation,  this 
framework may have to be reviewed. 
6.3.4  Developing universal service and access charge principles 
Although  interconnection  and  universal  service  issues  are  not  necessarily  directly 
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expe~ence around  the  world  these  issues  are  directly  interrelated.  Any  coherent 
interconnection policy has to deal with and has to decide whether or not interconnection 
charges  should  also  take  care  of  universal  service  obligations  of  incumbent 
telecommunications carriers and how and to what extent they should include access 
charge  elements.  A  coherent  policy  in  this  field  has  to  specify  universal  service 
principles, has to identify those operators which have to carry the burden of universal 
service  obligations,  if  there  are  any,  has  to  decide  on  the  appropriate  financial 
mechanism how or whether to share the burden with other suppliers in  the industry. 
Only  when  the  final  point  is  reached,  the  question  of  access  charges  arises  as 
compared to-other burden ·sharing·principles'8nd mechanisms. · 
The discussion on universal service in telecommunications has started in the European 
Union.  The  overall  goal  is  broadly  accepted  in  the  European  Union.  Some  basic 
principles  have  been  formulated  and the debate  on  financing  universal  service  has 
started. Basic principles of universal service in telecommunications, which have already 
been shortly mentioned in the Council Resolution on the review of the situation in  the 
telecommunications sector in July 199363, have been further developed and specified 
in  a  Council  Resolution  of  February  1994  on  universal  service  principles  in  the 
telecommunications sector64. 
The basic objective of the Resolution is to provide ·assistance in achieving the goal of 
universal  service  in  a competitive environment and to the progressive  rebalancing  of 
tariff  structures  .. :. Furthermore,  major  elements  constituting  universal  service  at 
Community  level  are  to  be  identified.  The  Resolution  refers  to  the  various  ONP 
measures which  are assumed to have identified the basic elements for a definition of 
universal service and does not give a specific definition of universal service itself. 
Maintenance and development of a universal telecommunications service is regarded 
as  a key factor for the  future  development of telecommunications in  the  Community. 
Universal service is not regarded as a static concept realised by a set of basic service 
elements; instead, it is regarded as a dynamic concept that •must evolve to keep pace 
with advances in technology, market development and changes in user demand•. 
Universal service implicitly is being defined by a set of principles, namely: universality, 
equality and continuity. These principles are a basis for such a service to permit access 
to  a  defined  minimum  service  of  specified  quality  to  all  users  everywhere  and  at a 
reasonable price.  Common principles for the provision of universal service should be 
defined throughout the Community while taking account of specific national conditions. 
Concerning  financing  universal  service,  the  Resolution  only  refers  to  a  basic  voice 
telephony service and not to other potential candidates for universal service. Under the 
63  Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector 
and the need for further development in that market (931C213101 ), OJ C213, 6.8.1993, p. 1. 
64  Council  Resolution  of 7  February  1994 on  universal service  principles  in the telecommunications 
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specific circumstances where this service •can only be provided at a loss or can only be 
provided  under  cost  conditions  falling  outside  normal  commercial  conditions,  that 
service  may,  where  justified  and  subject  to  the  approval  of the  national  regulatory 
authority, be financed through intemal transfers, access charges or other mechanisms 
which  take  due  account  of  the  principles  of  transparency,  non-discrimination  and 
proportionality, while ensuring compliance with competition rules in order to make a fair 
contribution to the burden which the provision of universal service represents•.  Thus, 
access charges as an instrument of financing universal service are not favoured per se. 
It is one instrument besides others. On the basis of this Resolution, the Commission is 
invited to elaborate common·aceess charge principles. 
The  discussion on  universal service in  the  European Union mainly refers to the  ONP 
framework  developed  so  far.  The  ONP  practice  so  far has  developed  the  following 
universal service concepts: 
- the basic provision of service, 
- quality of service, 
- tariff principles (including targeted tariff schemes for particular user groups), 
- dispute resolution mechanisms, 
- special public service features (e.g., emergency services), 
- certain Community-wide service features. 
The  Commission  in  a related  communication  considers the principles provided  in  the 
context of ONP as sufficient at this stage to form a basis of universal service conditions. 
Financing universal service is seen  in  the context of tariff adjustment followed  by  the 
introduction  of competition  in  the  core  markets.  The  adjustment  process  should  be 
accompanied by a number of factors: 
•  the costs of meeting universal service have to be identified; 
•  capacity  should  be  retained  to  finance  unavoidable  deficits  in  local  access  from 
more profitable parts of the business; 
•  gradual tariff rebalancing must be permitted; 
•  new entrants should make an  appropriate contribution to the provision of universal 
service and to the transfers required to finance it via a system of access charges; 
•  sufficient national flexibility should be given in line with the principle of subsidiarity; 
•  social and economic cohesion with regard to peripheral regions should be taken into 
account. 
Internal  transfers  and  access  charges  are  not  seen  as  an  alternative  to  tariff 
rebalancing  and,  without  explaining  how,  access  charges  should  not  be  used  as  a 
means  of  controlling  a  competitor's  cost  structures.  Access  charges  should  be 
structured such that necessary improvements in cost efficiency or productivity gains are 
not delayed by shifting the burden of inefficiency onto new market entrants. Generally, 260  Study for the European Comnission 
access  charge  systems  should  be  based  on  the  principles  of  transparency,  non-
discrimination and proportionality. 
6.3.5  Interconnect positions in the Green Paper on mobile communications 
In  its  Green  Paper65  on  a  common  approach  in  the  field  of  mobile  and  personal 
communications, which was published in April1994, the Commission has developed a 
policy  approach  towards  interconnection  between  different  mobile  networks  and 
between fixed and mobile.networks.-.ln-the Green.-Paper,...which has .the character of a 
policy  paper,  the  Commission  has  proposed  positions  for  legislative  measures  and 
other lines of action. The positions and recommendations of the Green Paper are now 
in the stage of public comments. 
The  Commission  emphasises the  vital importance of fair and efficient interconnection 
agreements  with  the  fixed  network for mobile  operators.  Payments  to  fixed  network 
operators for the conveyance of calls and the provision of leased lines account for 30-
500/o of total revenues of mobile network operators and, therefore, determine to a large 
extent the  economics of such  networks. The Commission  is  criticising  restrictions  on 
direct connections to other mobile operators, both within and between Member. States, 
which  do exist in  some Member States. Such restrictions hinder Europe-wide roaming 
and the establishment of trans-European networks. 
Although  the  Commission  identifies a  lack  in  the  definition  of interfaces,  it  does  not 
regard as necessary to establish further specific Directives concerning these interfaces 
and  related  interconnection  conditions  at  a Community  level.  Instead,  the  framework 
provided  by  the  ONP  framework  Directive  is  regarded  as  sufficient  provided  that 
interconnection is subject to strict supervision by NRAs. 
To  facilitate  interconnection and interoperability substantial progress is  required  in  the 
definition  of  European  standards.  Standards  are  required  for  the  following  most 
essential interfaces: 
•  the  interface between mobile networks and fixed network infrastructure, as far as  it 
is not covered by the current standards work; 
•  the  interfaces,  functionalities,  and  service  elements  made  available  by  mobile 
network operators to independent Service Providers: 
•  the  interfaces  made  available  to  access  the  intelligent functionalities  of  the  public 
fixed network(s): 
65  Towards the  Personal Communications  Environment:  Green  Paper on  a common  approach  in  the 
field  of  mobile  and  personal  communications  in  the  European  Union,  COM  (94)  145 final,  CEC, 
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•  the interfaces to be offered to mobile networks operated for own use or for use by a 
closed user group (private mobile networks) to allow interconnection with the public 
fixed network(s); 
•  interfaces allowing  direct interconnection  of mobile  networks  based  on  either the 
same or different technologies. 
The Commission intends to initiate a programme of standardisation mandates to ETSI 
to accelerate standard development in this area.  Those standards should,  in  general, 
be  voluntary.  Only in  cases necessary to  ensure basic interoperability,  references  to 
standards should be made binding  . 
In  its proposed position towards a European interconnect policy  in  the field  of mobile 
communications,  the  Commission  basically  regards  the  existing  framework  on  the 
European level for interconnection agreements, as developed by the ONP framework 
Directive, the voice telephony Directive and the Treaty competition rules,  as sufficient. 
To  facilitate  interconnection.  however,  the  establishment  of  technical  standards 
concerning interconnection interfaces should be promoted and published. 
The ONP framework might have to  be adjusted to guarantee mobile operators the right 
to  directly interconnect with  other mobile network operators,  both  within and between 
Member States. That seems to be the only legislative measure the Commissions has in 
mind to change or to adapt the existing legal framework for interconnection in the field 
of mobile communication. No further specification of the economic terms and conditions 
of interconnection agreements seems to be intended. 
6.3.6  Evaluation of current European interconnect policy 
The  fundamental  principles  for  open  network  provision  which  have  been  developed 
within the legislative ONP framework are a sound basis for a comprehensive European 
interconnect policy. Although developed for and within an  environment of monopolistic 
provision  of  voice  telephony and  network infrastructure  harmonised  conditions,  basic 
principles and essential requirements are also fundamental regulatory conditions in an 
environment of competitive provision of voice telephony and network infrastructure. 
As  compared  to  the  regulatory  framework  and  the  regulatory  rules  concerning 
interconnection in countries which have introduced competition in the core business of 
telecommunications, however, the current elements of a European interconnect policy 
are  too  broadly  defined  and  do  not  address  all  relevant  regulatory  challenges  and 
problems.  They  are  consistent  with  quite  divergent  national  approaches  in  the 
European  Union  and  therefore  neither  lead  to  harmonised  conditions  for 
interconnection nor facilitate or foster the development of European-wide networks and 
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Major policy decisions on the transition to a fully-liberalised telecommunications market 
environment are to be expected soon in Europe. This progress increases time pressure 
to  develop  a  more  comprehensive  and  detailed  European  policy approach  towards 
interconnection  and  its  regulatory  implementation.  Efficient  competition  requires  the 
appropriate interconnection regime to be available in advance. This analysis leads to 
our first recommendation: 
Recommendation 1: 
Binding European legistation dealing wittrattthe·  major interconnection issues-should be 
available and effective before full-scale competition is introduced in 1998. 
6.4  European interconnect policy in light of voice telephony and infra-
structure competition 
6.4.1  The future competitive environment 
The importance of interconnection as well as the scope and the necessity of regulatory 
action in this field strongly depends on the competitive environment which is set by the 
general  telecommunications  policy.  That is the  reason  why  nearly all  interconnection 
experience in the European Union with the exception of the UK comes from competition 
in  mobile  communications.  Without further decisions on  liberalisation  it will  mainly be 
service  providers  who  will  ask  for  access  to  the  intelligent  functions  of  the  TOs' 
telephone  networks  to  get  special  access  solutions  which  enable  them  to  compete 
against the TOs on a fair and efficient basis. 
It is obvious that the most important pressure for sufficient interconnection solutions will 
come  from  those  new  operators  who  want  to  offer  a  nation-wide  voice  telephony 
service.  Also  the  liberalisation  of  infrastructure  provision  for  liberalised  services  will 
create new interconnection cases because new operators will be able to set up nation-
wide  networks. Any meaningful decision on liberalisation therefore has to give answers 
to challenging interconnection issues. 
6.4.2  Subsidiarity 
According  to  the  European  Union's  constitutional  order,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission cannot set up a European interconnect policy and a regulatory framework 
for  interconnection  which  deals with  all  (potential)  aspects of interconnection and  all 
forms of regulatory intervention. The Treaty of Maastricht requires that the Community 
shall act according to the principle of subsidiarity in all areas which do not fall into the 
exclusive responsibility of the Community. Only when policy goals cannot be achieved • 
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on  the  level  of  Member  States,  shall  the  Community  institutions  formulate  policy. 
Although we argued in favour of the need for a European interconnect policy in Section 
6.2, it is also obvious that not all aspects of a coherent interconnect policy have to be 
developed and directed on the European level; many can efficiently be handled at the 
Member State level. Given the constitutional principle of subsidiarity, any European line 
of action with  regard to interconnection has to draw at least implicitly a line between 
national and European regulatory responsibility. To get some reference we will analyse 
in  more  depth  the  division  of  labour between  the  federal  and  state  regulations  on 
interconnection  in  the  U.S.  to  draw some  conclusions  to  the  European  environment 
from this experience  . 
Excursus:  Interconnection responsibilities within the regime of dual  regulation 
in the U.S. 
The U.S. is the only country in the world holding a long tradition with a regime of 
dual  regulatory  responsibility  between  the  federal  and  the  state  level  in 
telecommunications.  The  regime  of  dual  regulation  is  also  materialised  with 
regard to interconnection regulation. It might be useful to give some observation 
and insight into the division of labour between the federal and state regulations on 
interconnection.  66  Before  looking  into  the  interconnection  practice  of  the 
interaction between the federal  and the state level of regulation  it is essential to 
have  a look at the  ovarall  regulatory structure and  the  guiding  principles  of the 
U.S. regulatory system in telecommunications. 
U.S.  telecommunications  is  subject  to  complex  and  sometimes  conflicting 
tripartite (regulatory) authority. Provision of local and intrastate telephone service 
is  regulated  in  each  U.S.  state by a state  Public Utilities Commission (PUC).  At 
the same time the  FCC  exercises national jurisdiction over radio-based services, 
interstate and  international services.  In  addition,  the  antitrust laws,  executed  by 
the Department of Justice, deal with issues of market power. 
The  general  principle  behind  the  division  of  labour  between  state  and  federal 
regulation  in  the  U.S.  is  the  differentiation  between  .. intrastate"  and  .. interstate" 
commerce.  State regulation is responsible, in principle, for "intrastate commerce" 
and federal regulation for .. interstate and international commerce". Consequently, 
an  individual regulated firm  will, in  principle, be regulated by state regulators for 
its intrastate transactions and by federal regulators for its interstate transactions. 
This straightforward principle is hard to apply in practice, since transactions and 
the  use  of  capital  equipment  and  other  common  cost  elements  can  rarely  be 
classified  as  purely  interstate  or  intrastate.  The  dual  regulatory  system  has 
separated responsibilities by imposing a complex cost separation mechanism. 
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Besides  cost  separation  the  guiding  principle  of  separating  responsibilities 
between the state and the federal level of regulation is that of federal preemption. 
According  to  this  principle  the  FCC  can  declare  that  federal  regulation 
supersedes  state  regulation  if  interstate  telecommunications  are  materially 
affected. This principle of federal preemption has over time increased the weight 
of the FCC as a federal regulator relative to state regulation. In the U.S. it is not 
only  the  FCC  which  can  preempt  state  regulation.  Preemption  can  also  be 
initiated by a federal court67 or by Congress through legislation. 
What  has  been  the  actual ·division- of •bour  -and -fe&ponsibilities  of- regulatory 
authorities in U.S. telecommunications with regard to interconnection? We will not 
go  into  the  history  of  early  interconnection  provisions  and  arrangements,  but 
concentrate  on  the  industry  structure  that  has  been  generated  through  the 
divestiture of AT&T in 1984. In these last ten years major interconnection policies 
have  been  developed  and  this  industry  structure  is  more  comparable  to  the 
European industry structure than the old uniform Bell system. 
Since interconnection affects both interstate and intrastate telecommunications, it 
is  regulated  on  both  levels. The basic arrangements for interconnection  rely on 
the divestiture of AT&T realised by the MFJ, a measure based on  U.S. antitrust 
laws.  Until  then  interconnection  charges  between  the  Bell  system  and 
independent  operators  were  part  of  the  separations  and  settlements  process 
while  new  long-distance  competitors  had  major  battles  with  AT&T  over  these 
charges.  The  fundamental  pricing  arrangements  for  interconnect  charges  for 
interexchange  carriers  have  been  set  by  the  FCC  in  its  access  charge 
proceedings  in  1982.  Although  access  is  provided  as  a  local  service  from  the 
LECs  to the  IXCs,  the  conditions for access have been  set at the  federal  level. 
This includes access charges for a portion of the costs of the local loop placed on 
end users. With its 1982 decision the  FCC also mandated that the  LECs provide 
the  new long-distance competitors with equal access. With its ruling of an equal-
charge-per-minute-of-use  requirement  based  on  the  MFJ  provisions  the  FCC 
realised  uniform  interconnection  charges  despite  regional  or  LEG-specific  cost 
differences. 
State regulators in  the U.S. regulate access charges for intrastate long-distance 
traffic.  In  many  states  LECs  compete  with  IXCs  on  intraLA  T  A  long-distance 
services.  Intrastate  access charges  can  differ quite  significantly from  interstate 
access charges although the  access services are quite the same. This structure 
has produced arbitrage possibilities for interconnectors who try to use  the  most 
favourable  jurisdiction.  Regulators  have  reacted  by monitoring the  jurisdictional 
distribution of traffic and by rate adaption. 
67  This has happened, for example, through the Modified Final Judgement by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia that created LA  T  As within states and excluded the Bell Operating Companies 
from providing interLA  T  A intrastate services even if state regulators would be willing to permit them 
(United States and American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131  (1982)). 
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One  basic  conflict  has  emerged  in  this  structure  between  the  federal  and  the 
state  regulators:  Many  states  want  to  get  higher  contributions  for  universal 
service obligations than the FCC  is willing to accept These states have tried to 
preserve higher intrastate access charges than those prescribed by the FCC for 
interstate services. Because of arbitrage and bypass, state regulators are unable 
to  implement  their  policy  approach  to  the  extent  they  would  like  to  do.  The 
contribution element also has produced incentives and opportunities for operators 
to  arbitrage  between  states  exploiting  the  large  variation  across  states  in 
intrastate  access  charges.  That  structure  causes  potential  conflict  between 
states . 
The  most interesting case of the interaction between state and federal  regulator 
with  regard  to  interconnection  can  be  observed  in  the  field  of  expanded 
interconnection  to  the  LECs'  local  networks.  Expanded  interconnection  aims  at 
promoting  competition  at  the  local  exchange  level.  Some  innovative  state 
regulators  made  the  first  initiatives.  They  arranged  collocation  agreements 
between  competitive  access providers and  LECs  in  several  metropolitan areas. 
Those  innovative  states  influenced  the  FCC  which  in  tum  homogenised  state 
approaches.  In  1992 in  its expanded interconnection decision, the  FCC adopted 
rules  for  special  access  within  the  local  network for  interstate  services~ In  that 
decision  legally  the  FCC  did  not  preempt  the  states  on  intrastate  collocation. 
Rather,  the  FCC  has  imposed  its  collocation  rule  for  interstate  interconnection 
only.  However, for all practical purposes it is probably too costly for carriers and 
service  providers  to  differentiate  between  interstate  and  intrastate  access 
arrangements. 
A  second  constitutional  principle  has  to  be  kept  in  mind.  European  policy  can 
predominantly provide the legislative framework and provisions in a particular area. The 
administrative control and implementation remains with the Member States' institutions. 
We  have  no  regulatory  institution  at  the  European  level  which  can  directly  make  a 
regulatory determination in an  individual interconnection case.  Such  kind of regulatory 
action can only be executed by a Member State's national authority. There is one major 
exemption from  this  European constitutional principle which has some relevance in our 
interconnection context.  The  EU  competition rules as formulated in Articles 85 and 86 
of the  EEC Treaty apply directly and throughout the Community. The competition rules 
of the Treaty can be applied directly by the Commission and by national administrative 
and judicial authorities. The competition rules have direct relevance to interconnection. 
According to their character, they are not deemed to regulate ex ante but to control and 
prohibit  anticompetitive  behaviour  and  abuse  of  dominant  market  positions.  The 
relevance,  range  and  consequences  of  applying  the  competition  rules  on 
interconnection issues will be considered in more depth in Section 6.4.3.3. 266  Study for the European Commission 
6.4.3  Policy instruments 
Any  European  interconnect policy  has  to  be  developed  in  the  current  constitutional 
framework  of  the  European  Union.  According  to  Art.  189  (1)  EEC  Treaty  the 
Community  institutions  may  exercise  their  regulatory  powers  by  the  following 
instruments: 
"in  order to  carry out their task the  Council  and the  Commission shall,  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  make  regulations,  issue 
directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions". 
Regulations are  binding and  directly applicable in  all  Member States (Scherer 1990), 
have  the  force  of  law without the  need  of transformation  or confirmation  by  national 
authorities.  Directives  also  create  secondary  Community  law.  Unlike  regulations, 
however, they require transformation and implementation on the national levels before 
they  become  materially  effective.  Recommendations  and  opinions  legally  have  a 
significantly different character.  They do not have a binding force  and therefore have 
more the character of policy declarations. 
6.4.3.1  Directives as legislative instruments 
In  practice, European telecommunications policy has essentially been implemented by 
means  of  Community  law  directives.  This  holds  for  the  regulatory  approach  of 
harmonising  as  well  as  liberalising  the  telecommunications  sector.  Community 
directives have either been based on Article 100 (a) of the EC Treaty or Article 90. The 
Commission  has  used  its  regulatory  powers  under Article  90  (3)  to  abolish  exclusive 
rights  of  TOs.  European  legislation on  interconnection can  either be  based  on  Article 
100 {a)  or the  competition  rules  of the Treaty or on  both.  A priori there  is  no specific 
argument  which  excludes  one  way  or  the  ·ather.  Any  European  interconnection 
legislation  includes  an  element of  harmonising  national  approaches  and  at  the  same 
time  any  interconnection  legislation  sets  conditions  for  competition  or  regulates 
competition. 
These considerations lead to our recommendation: 
Recommendation 2: 
European legislation on interconnection could be based upon both Art. 100 (a) and the 
competition rules of the Treaty. There is no a-priori reason why one or the other legal 
basis should be excluded or preferred. 
Although Member States are obliged to implement Community law directives within the 
time  schedule  and  limits  imposed  by  the  directives  themselves,  there  is  some 
weakness in  this legislative approach to regulating the dynamics of competition in  the 
sector. Directives are addressed to and binding upon the Member States. They do not 
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directly regulate the market behaviour of dominant TOs. Member States have to take 
care of the adaption of national laws. Member States, however, have a lot of discretion 
to  decide  which  national  authority  will  be  in  charge  of  the  implementation,  the 
implementation procedure and the legal quality of the national measure implementing a 
directive. Nevertheless, failure of a Member State to implement a directive as a whole 
or in part (within the time limit) constitutes a violation of the Treaty. This situation then 
can  lead  to  an  infringement  proceeding,  which  in  itself  is  a  complicated  procedural 
issue.  The  practical  example  of  the  services  Directive  which  is  not  yet  totally 
implemented  in  all  Member  States  exhibits  the  shortcomings  and  weakness  of  the 
·European  legislative · process ·-in-·"'dealing ···with- dynamic· market· ·and ··-competition 
developments.  This  handicap  of  the  European  legislative  process  is  of  particular 
relevance in the context of interconnection regulation. As our empirical analysis shows, 
the  way  in  which  interconnection is regulated determines to a large degree the type, 
structure  and  success  of  competition  in  its  initial  stage.  Proper  interconnection 
regulation therefore is time-sensitive and should be provided in a reliable legal structure 
right from  the beginning of competition.  Furthermore, the regulatory regime should be 
able to react quickly and flexibly to shortcomings and problems. 
6.4.3.2  Direct regulatory action 
What  has  been  described  as  a  shortcoming  or  weakness  of  the  current  legislative 
approach in European telecommunications policy can only be overcome by some direct 
regulatory  action  on  the  European  level  in  the  current  constitutional  European 
environment. Direct administrative control and regulatory action  is  limited to measures 
implemented  by  the  Member  States'  institutions.  The  Commission  has  no  direct 
administrative  regulatory control  over TOs  or other regulated  entities.  Whether or not 
this division of labour is going to change is a matter which cannot be addressed in the 
specific interconnection context.  This  has to  be  done  in  a broader context.  However, 
interconnection,  in  particular  in  the  context  of  Europe-wide  carriers,  is  a  regulatory 
issue  which  will  call  for  direct regulatory  intervention  at  the  European  level  at  some 
stage of development. 
There is an ongoing debate in Europe whether or not there is a need for establishing a 
regulatory  authority  on  the  European  level.  The  most  significant  contribution  to  this 
discussion in recent months has been made by the Bangemann expert group .. Europe 
and the Global Information Society" which made its recommendations to the European 
Council on May 26, 1994. Besides pushing and arguing in favour of a more competitive 
environment  in  European  telecommunications,  the  group  also  addresses  the  future 
organisation of regulation and recommends ..... the establishment at the European level 
of an  authority whose terms of reference will  require  a prompt attention".  Concerning 
the scope of this authority's responsibility, the group states: ..,e authority will need to 
address: The regulation of those operations which,  because of their Community-wide 
nature,  need  to  be  addressed  at  the  European  level,  such  as  licensing,  network 
interconnection  when  and  where  necessary  ... ".  We  fully  support  this  view.  The 268  Study for the European Cornmiuion 
implications  of  a  constitutional  change  in  the  direction  of establishing  a  European 
regulatory  authority with  direct administrative  responsibility and power on  the  proper 
division  of  labour  between  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  needs  further 
analysis and is not covered in this study in a comprehensive way. We do, however, feel 
in a position to recommend: 
Recommendation 3: 
If  the  upcoming  discussion  on  the  organisation  of regulation  in  Europe  leads  to  the 
creation of a European regulatory authority fo-r telecommunications, ·then this authority 
should predominantly deal with all regulatory aspects of interconnection. 
In  this  context of direct regulatory action on the European level the new provisions of 
the  Maastricht Treaty on  European  Union  (the  Maastricht Treaty)  on  trans-European 
networks  need  specific  consideration.  As  referred  to  in  Section  6.2.3 the  Maastricht 
Treaty gives a high  priority to  interconnection on the objective level. Article  129c also 
requires from the Community to ..... implement any measures that may prove necessary 
to  ensure  the  interoperability  of  the  networks,  in  particular  in  the  field  of  technical 
standardisation".  This  Treaty  provision  makes  no  explicit reference  to  the  traditional 
regulatory  legal  instruments  of  the  EC  Treaty.&&  Further  legal  and  political  analysis 
should  clarify  whether  the  more  unspecific  term  'measures'  might  include  direct 
regulatory actions and measures on interconnection. 
6.4.3.3  Applying the competition rules 
At  present no  regulatory  authority exists at  European  level  with jurisdiction to directly 
implement and  enforce  EC telecommunications law. The  European Union can  provide 
the  political  concept and  the  legislative framework,  but the  administrative control  and 
implementation  remains  with  the  Member  States.  There  is  one  major exception  from 
this  European  constitutional  principle.  According  to  Art. 89  of the  Treaty  Establishing 
the  European  Community  (EC Treaty)  and  pursuant  to  Council  Regulation  no.17  the 
Commission  is  entrusted  with  the  supervision  over and  the  effective  implementation 
and  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules  as  formulated  in  Articles  85  and  86 
EC Treaty. These competition rules are directly applicable. They are not only invocable 
against  Member  States  but  also  between  private  persons.  Even  though  the  EU 
competition  rules  are  first of all  directed towards  undertakings, they also have  to  be 
respected by legislative, administrative and judicial authorities of the Member States. 
As  the  competition  rules  in  principle  cover  all  areas  of  the  economy,  they  are  fully 
applicable to  telecommunications.  Nevertheless the  application of EU  competition  law 
to undertakings in the telecommunications sector is a relatively new phenomenon. The 
68  See Scherer (1993). 
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first  formal  decision  was  made  by the  Commission  in  1982 in  the  British-Telecom 
case.&9 A prohibition in the satellite sector was issued in the Astra case in  December 
1992.70 Further violations of EU competition law in the telecommunications sector have 
been resolved through the intervention of the Commission without formal decision.71  In 
addition a series of cooperation agreements have been exempted from the prohibition 
of cartels by the Commission.  72 
A particularity of the telecommunications sector are the •Guidelines on  the Application 
of  the  EEC  Competition  Rules  on  the  Telecommunications  sector"  published  by  the 
Commission  in  September  1991.'13·1t ·was··1he-first· time  such  gurctelines  have  been 
drawn up for a specific economic sector. The Guidelines aim at clarifying the application 
of  EU  competition  rules  to  market participants  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  Of 
course,  the  guidelines do not create legally binding  rules;  however,  they indicate the 
general legal and economic principles followed by the Commission in the application of 
the  competition  rules  to  undertakings  in  the  telecommunications  sector.74  In  the 
Guidelines the  Commission  comments on  the  relationship  between the application  of 
competition  rules  and  ONP  rules.  Herewith  ONP  rules  might harmonise and  specify 
access conditions but they do not substitute competition rules in that field which means 
in the Commission's words: 
,ONP rules  cannot be  considered as competition  rules  which  apply to 
States  and/or to  undertakings'  behaviour.  ONP  and  competition  rules 
therefore constitute two different but coherent sets of rules.  Hence, the 
competition  rules  have full  application,  even  when  all  ONP  rules  have 
been adopted  ... 
Theoretically the EU competition rules, being directly applicable, regulate the behaviour 
of  market  participants  through  their  ~ere existence.  Unlawful  cartels  and  abuses  of 
dominant positions are per se  prohibited by Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty without the 
need  for  any administrative  decision.  However,  effective  control and  enforcement  by 
the  Commission are important to put the competition rules  in  concrete terms and  into 
practical effect. 
6.4.3.3.1  Elements of Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty 
Agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of  undertakings  and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
69  OJ No L 360/16, 21.12.1982, confirmed by the ECJ in case 41/83,  Italy v.  Commission, 20.3.1985, 
ECR (1985) pp.873 seq. 
70  OJ No L 20/23, 28.1 .1993. 
71  For a short overview with further references see Ehlermann (1993), pp.134 seq. (141). 
72  ibid. 
73  Guidelines on  the  Application  of EEC Competition  Rules  in  the Telecommunications Sector (91/C 
233/02) OJ No C 23312, 6.9.1991. 
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their object or effect the prevention,  restriction or distortion of competition  within  the 
common market are prohibited under Art 85 EC Treaty. 
According to Art. 86 EC Treaty the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it is prohibited in so far as 
it may affect trade between Member States. 
a)  Common prerequisites for the application of Art. 85 and 86 EC Treaty 
Both  Articles  require  that  the  ~ehav~?ur _may  ~ffect trade  be~een ~e~b_er States. 
Accordingly it is not necessary that the behaviour has in fact-affected the trade between 
Member States.  The  potential  of having  such  an  effect is sufficient.  As  long  as  the 
potential  effect is  limited to the  trade  within  the  territory of a  Member State  the  EU 
competition  rules  do  not  apply.  However,  if  a  cartel  affects  the whole  market  of  a 
Member State,  the  import opportunities from  other Member States will  in  general  be 
influenced by this fact and thereby affect the trade between Member States.75 It is not 
necessary that trade  between  Member States is directly affected.  For the purpose of 
Art. 86 EC Treaty  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  there  will  be  repercussions  on  the 
competitive structure of the Common Market.76 
The  EU  competition  rules  are  geared  to the  effect an  anticompetitive  behaviour will 
have  on  the  Common  Market.  Hence,  it is. neither important whether the  seat of the 
involved undertakings are within the territory of the EU or in a third country, nor whether 
the anticompetitive behaviour is aimed at markets within or outsid~ the EU territory.n 
Furthermore the effect of the anticompetitive behaviour on the trade between Member 
States  must  be  noticeable.78  Hence,  according  to  the  view  of  the  Commission 
agreements  of  minor  importance  are  not  prohibited  by  Art. 85 EC Treaty.  This 
constitutes  an  unwritten  element of Art. 85 EC Treaty.  To be  considered  as  of  minor 
importance the volume of the affected goods or services has to be no more than 5°/o of 
comparable  goods  or  services  in  the  Common  Market  and  at  the  same  time  the 
cummulative  annual tumover of the  involved  undertakings shall  not exceed 200 Mio. 
ECU.79 
To  determine  whether  the  effect  of  the  anticompetitve  behaviour  under 
Art. 85 EC Treaty is noticeable or one or more undertakings hold a dominant position 
within  the  Common  Market  or  in  a  substantial  part  of  it  within  the  meaning  of 
Art. 86 EC Treaty it is necessary to define the relevant market with respect to its object 
and  its  geographical  and  temporal  extension.  It  is  often  difficult  to  determine  the 
relevant market with regard to the economically comparable products and its territoral 
75  See e.g. ECJ, case 246/86, Belasco v.  Commission, ECR (1989) pp. 2112 seq. 
76  Guidelines, point 121. 
n  Bieber(1993) pp. 348 and 361. 
78  See  ECJ,  case  5169,  Volk  v.  Vervaecke,  ECR  [1969]  p.295;  case  209-215,  218178,  ECR  [1980] 
p.3125; case 42/84, Remia v.  Commission, ECR (1 985] p.2545. 
79  Announcement of the Commission of 3. September 1986, OJ No. C231/1986, p.2. 
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delimitation.  so To hold a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market 
it is not necessary that the dominant position geographically extends to more than one 
Member State. Single, even small Member States are considered to form a substantial 
part of the  Common  Market.  Parts  of bigger Member States  may  also  constitute  a 
substatial part of the common market.  81  A product market comprises the totality of the 
products which are only to a limited extent interchangeable with other products in terms 
of price, usage and consumer preference. The competitive conditions and the structure 
of supply and  demand  on  the  market have  to  be taken  into account as  well.82  In  a 
context  of  fast-moving  technology  like  telecommunications  the  relevant  market 
-definition·is "dynamic-and variable·. as 
b)  Art. 85 EC Treaty 
The behaviour addressed by Art. 85 EC Treaty are agreements between undertakings, 
decisions  by  associations  of  undertakings  and  concerted  practices.  In  general 
agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings have 
contractual character,84 but can also consist of gentleman's agreements.85 By contrast, 
concerted practices are not based on any formal or informal agreement. They can  be 
described as behaviour based on  a voluntary deliberate correspondence of intention, 
and  which  in  fact appears to be uniform.  I&  An  indication for concerted practices· is  a 
market behaviour of a competitor which does not correspond to the behaviour usually 
required  by  market  cond:tions  or  the  behaviour  of  competitors,  but  oriented  at 
information  about  the  future  behaviour  of  competitors.  87  Not  only  those  behaviours 
which  take  place  between  undertakings at the  same  economic  (horizontal)  level  are 
covered  by  Art. 85 EC Treaty,  but  also  those  between  undertakings  at  different 
economic (vertical) levels like producer and retailer. 
Agreements  or  concerted  practices  must  either  have  as  their  object  the  prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition or must have such an effect. The aim to restrict or 
distort competition, even if not successful, is prohibited as well as to cause a restriction 
or  distortion  of  competition,  even  unintentionally.88  Examples  of  agreements  and 
concerted  practices  capable  to  prevent,  restrict  or  distort  competition  within  the 
common market are given in Art. 85 para.1  lit. a-e  EC Treaty. 
80  E.g. for the market of vitamin products the Commission considered every vitamin group as a separate 
market  (see decision of the  Commission,  OJ No.l223/1976, p.27,  confirmed by ECJ,  case 85n6, 
Hoffmann-La Roche v.  Commission,  ECR  (1979] p.461); concerning the territorial limitation of  the 
relevant market the Commission considered the Netherlands as a substantial  part of the common 
market in the field of  supply with oil (see decision of the Commission OJ No. L223177,  overruled by 
ECJ, case nm, BP v.  Commission,  ECR (1978] p.1513; see also ECJ, case 247/86, ALCATEL v. 
NOVASAM, ECR [1988], p.5987). 
81  See N. Koch(1950), Art. 86, No 41  with further references to CEC and ECJ practice. 
82  Guidelines, point 26. 
83  Guidelines, point 25. 
84  R. Bieber(1993) p.347. 
85  ECJ, case 41/69, Chemiefarma v.  Commission, ECR (1970] p.661. 
86  R.  Bieber(1993). at p.347. 
87  ibid. 
88  ibid. 272  Study for the European Commission 
In  principle  interconnection  agreements  are  agreements  within  the  meaning  of 
Art. 85 EC Treaty.  Interconnection  agreements  could  have  the  potential  to  avoid  or 
restrict competition; on the other hand they are necessary to allow competition and to 
ensure  interconnectivity  and  interoperability.  This  means  that  interconnection 
agreements cannot be prohibited per se. Only specific provisions can restrict or distort 
competition. Hence, in entering into an interconnection agreement, the parties are not 
allowed  to  include  clauses  which  are  designed  to or may have  by their  content  a 
negative effect on competition. They are therefore not allowed to agree on prices which 
they will  charge to their respective customers {Art. 85 para.1  {a) EC Treaty), to agree 
upon· conditions -of·use-designed·to  ·fimit··'OT' COl aboll"'Oth:tction· -or 1echnicat ·devetopment 
(Art. 85  para.1  (b) EC Treaty),  to  share  the  market  of  supply  for  their  respective 
services (Art. 85 para.1  (c) EC Treaty), to discriminate other competitors (Art. 85 para.1 
(d) EC Treaty) or to provide unbundled services only (Art. 85 para.1  (e) EC Treaty). 
c)  Art. 86 EC Treaty 
The behaviour addressed by Art. 86 EC Treaty are abuses of a dominant position by 
one or more undertakings. According to Art. 86 lit. a-d EC Treaty such abuse may, in 
particular, consist in directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the  prejudice  of consumers;  applying  dissimilar conditions  to equivalent transactions 
with  other trading  parties,  thereby  placing  them  at a  competitive  disadvantage;  and 
making  the  conclusion  of  contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by  the  other  parties  of 
supplementary obligations which,  by their nature  or according to  commercial  usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
What constitutes a dominant position is not defined by  Art. 86 EC Treaty.  A dominant 
position  is  not  only  dependent  on  the  market  share,  but  also  on  other  factors  like 
number of competitors, market behaviour, access to raw material, technical know how, 
capital resources , etc. One can say that undertakings are in a dominant position if they 
have room for independent behaviour which enables them to act with no consideration 
for their competitors, customers or suppliers. In particular this is the case if their market 
share,  the  availability of technical  know how,  raw material  or capital  enable  them  to 
determine  the  prices  for  a  major  part  of  the  products  or  enables  them  to  control 
production or distribution. An  absolute domination is  not necessary. It is sufficient that 
the undertaking is in a position to prevent an effective competition. The reason for the 
dominant  position  does  not  matter.  Therefore  Art. 86 EC Treaty  applies  even  if  the 
competition on a specific market is excluded because of legal reasons.89 
Insofar as TOs hold exclusive or special rights for some telecommunications services, 
they hold a dominant position with respect to those services.  90 They will not lose this 
&9  ibic. 
90  See  Guidelines  point  79,  with  reference  to  Commission  Decision  82/861/EEC  in  the  'British 
Telecommunications' case, point 26, OJ No l360, 21.12.1982, p.36, confirmed in the Judgement of 
20.3.1985 in Case 41/83, Italian Republic v. Commission (1985] ECR 873. Networtc Interconnection in the Domain of ONP  273 
dominant  market  position  at  least  in  the  first  phase  of competition  independent  of 
whether or not they lose their exclusive or special rights. Applied to the interconnection 
problem  this  means  that  holders  of  national  network  monopolies  always  hold  a 
dominant  position  as  far  as  access  and  conditions  of  access  to  the  network  are 
concerned. Even after the elimination of those exclusive rights, TOs may keep or other 
firms  may  acquire  alone  or  collectively  important  market  shares  which  either  in 
themselves suffice to constitute ·a dominant position or could do so in combination with 
other factors, like technological advance and the holding of the information concerning 
access  protocols  or  interfaces  necessary  to  ensure  interoperability  of  software  or 
hardware.81 
Examples of abuses of a dominant undertaking are refusal  to supply,  discrimination, 
restrictive tying clauses, unfair prices or other inequitable conditions.  92 The refusal of a 
dominant network operator to interconnect would,  in  the  case  of bottleneck facilities, 
make  it  impossible  or  at  least  appreciably  difficult  for  others  to  provide 
telecommunication  services.  Such  a behaviour would  lead  to  a limitation  of  services 
and  of  technical  developments  within  the  meaning  of  Art. 86  (b) EC Treaty,  and,  if 
applied only to  some service providers, result in discrimination (Art. 86 (c) EC Treaty). 
The imposition of unequal interconnection charges to service providers, which includes 
the  incumbent  network  operators  themselves,  can  be  considered  as  imposing  unfair 
prices  or  trading  conditions  and  thereby  constitute  an  abuse  under  Art. 86 (a).  The 
refusal  to  unbundle  network  services  could  be  seen  as  imposition  of  supplementary 
obligations within the meaning of Art. 86 (d) EC Treaty. 
6.4.3.3.2  Exemptions 
a)  Legal exemption under Art. 90 para.2 EC Treaty 
Pursuant to Art. 90 para.2 EC Treaty the rules contained in the EC Treaty including the 
competition rules do not apply to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest insofar as their application does obstruct the performance, 
in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them and the development of trade 
is  not  affected by the  non-application  to  such  an  extent  as  would  be  contrary to  the 
interests of the Community. 
b)  Administrative exemption under Art. 83 para.3 EC Treaty 
Exemptions from  the  prohibition  of  cartels can  be  granted  by the  Commission  under 
Art. 85  para.3  EC Treaty,  either in  the form  of individual  exemptions or in  the  form  of 
group exemptions. Pursuant to Art. 85 para.3 EC Treaty such exemptions can only be 
granted if the otherwise prohibited behaviour contributes to improving the production or 
distribution  of  goods  or to  promoting  technical  or economic  progress,  while  allowing 
91  Guidelines, points 80 and 81. 
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consumers  a  fair share  of the  resulting  benefit and which  does not impose  on  the 
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives,  and does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part ot the products in question. 
Whilst a specific group exemption has not yet been granted in the telecommunications 
sector, there has been a series of individual exemptions. Examples are the exemption 
of the cooperation between Alcatel and ANT in the satellite sector,  93 the exemption of 
the joint-venture Eirpage in Ireland founded by Telecom and Motorola94 or the comfort 
letter  for  lnfonet.  in  which .inter  .. alia .  .participate Jive .. European. telecommunications 
organisations.  95  (The  Commission  has announced in  December 1992 to approve the 
cooperation  between  STET  and  AT&T.  96  Most-recently the  Commission  granted  an 
exemption/declared  as  not  prohibited  by  EU  competition  rules  the  joint  venture  of 
British Telecommunications PLC and MCI Communications lnc.B7) 
From an exemption under Art. 85 para.3 EC Treaty we have to distinguish the negative-
test  pursuant  to  Art.2  of  Council  Regulation  No.17  whereby  the  Commission  can 
declare that a particular behaviour is not prohibited by EU  competition rules.  Such  a 
declaration was made in the case of the syndicate ECR 900 for the development of a 
European mobile telecommunications system.98 
Under Art. 86 EC Treaty no exemption is possible for the abuse of a dominant position. 
Only a declaration by the Commission pursuant to Art.2 of Council Regulation No.17 is 
possible (negative-test). 
6.4.3.3.3  Legal consequences of violation 
According to Art. 86 para.2 EC Treaty any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant 
th1s  Article  shall  automatically  be  void.  This  effect  follows  directly  from  this  Article 
Without  any administrative or judicial decision.  By contrast Art. 86 EC Treaty does not 
contain  any  legal  consequences  for  a  violation.  However,  it  follows  from  Art. 1  of 
Council  Regulation  No.17/62  that  Art. 86 EC Treaty  like  Art. 85 EC Treaty  has  direct 
effect. Legal consequences from a violation, apart from Commisison intervention, result 
directly  from  national  law.  After  a  violation  of  the  competition  rules  has  been 
established,  the  Commission  under  Council  Regulation  No.17/62  is  empowered  to 
issue orders of redress and to impose coercive enforcement penalties and fines. 
93  20. Competition report [1990], points 59 and 94. 
94  20. Competition report [1990], point 60; 21. Competition report [1991), points 80 seq. 
95  Publication according to Art.19 para.3 Council Regulation No. 17,  OJ No. C713 of 11. January 1992. 
96  OJ No. C33313 of 17. December 1992 
97  The Wall Street Journal Europe, 29. July 1994. 
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6.4.3.3.4  Conclusion 
The  competition  rules  of the  EC Treaty directly apply to  most of the  interconnection 
problems.  The  advantage  of .,regulation..  through  competition  rules  is  their  unified 
application  throughout  the  Community by the  Commission.  However,  their  effect  is 
limited by their scope of application and the aim to provide for fair competition. They are 
not  designed  to  achieve  other  objectives  and  are  no  substitute  for  establishing  a 
comprehensive set of rules  for interconnection equally applicable to all  players.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  most  interconnection  agreements  have  to  meet  the  criteria  of  the 
competition  rules  of  the .EC Treaty  •..  Tbis also. means. these. provisions empower the 
Commission  to enforce  these  rules  with  regard  to interconnection  if  it  comes to  the 
conclusion that specific interconnection agreements violate the competition rules. 
We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 4: 
4.1  The  Commission  should  enforce  the  competition  rules  if  it  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  specific  provisions  in  particular  interconnection  agreements 
violate these rules. 
4.2  Enforcement  activities  should  be  concentrated  on  interconnection  cases  with 
direct relevance for European-wide networks and services. 
4.3  Applying the European competition rules might also be regarded as a European 
policy instrument in  case a Member State has not yet (properly) implemented a 
European legislation on interconnection. 
4.4  Competition  policy  should  act  against  collusive  behaviour  of  interconnecting 
parties, the refusal of a dominant network operator to interconnect, discrimination, 
unfair pricing for interconnection and the refusal to unbundle network services. 
6.4.3.4  Other policy instruments 
6.4.3.4.1  Standardisation policy 
Standardisation,  at  least  the  actual  development  of  standards,  more  and  more  is 
leaving  the  regulatory  domain.  Industry  bodies  and  institutions  (in  Europe  the  ETSI 
institute) more and more play the central role in standardisation. Three basic functions 
remain  with  the  regulator.  First.  there  is  structuring  the  standardisation  process 
including  standardisation  bodies  and  their  decision  making  process.  Second,  the 
regulator must be active in identifying areas where standards are helpful and necessary 
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development  of  standards  in  particular  areas,  for  instance  by  mandating 
standardisation  bodies  to  develop  specific  standards.  Third,  the  regulator  should 
reserve the right to promote particular standards developed by industry organisations. 
At the margin this responsibility should include the right to make standards mandatory 
in  exceptional  cases  where  there  is  specific  need  for  such  a  far  reaching  policy 
measure. 
All  the  policy  tools  and  instruments  mentioned  above  are  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Commission. Most relevant in the interconnection context is the possibility to mandate 
ETSI  to -develop ·-stanaards·which-are·f'equir-ed ·for-inter-conAeCtion··purposes or which 
would ease interconnection. We do not see any need for new institutional solutions with 
particular regard to interconnection. 
6.4.3.4.2  Information policy 
The  more  competitive  the  European  telecommunications  market becomes,  the  more 
numerous  interconnection  arrangements  will  emerge  by  agreement or by  regulatory 
determination. In the UK for example dozens of interconnection agreements have been 
negotiated.  Because  the  incumbent  TOs  are  at  the  centre  of  most  interconnection. 
arrangements  they  are  best  informed  on  the  content  of  interconnection  agreements. 
That is  one  of the reasons why we  favour a policy of public access to interconnection 
agreements. 99  Even  if in  the  future there is public access to agreements,  it would  be 
difficult for new competitors to  evaluate hundreds of interconnection agreements.  The 
interconnection  process  could  be  rationalised  and  the  market  asymmetry  could  be 
partially  compensated  if  NRAs  at  the  national  level  and  the  Commission  at  the 
European  level  would  publish  information  on  the  structure  and  content  of 
interconnection agreements. 
6.4.3.4.3  Arbitration at the European level 
Together  with  fully  opening  up  the  European  telecommunications  markets  and  the 
development of trans-European networks, the  number of cases where operators want 
to  get access to  networks in  other Member States will  be  increasing.  If the  European 
interconnection framework  is  not specified in  more  detail, commercial negotiations on 
such  interconnection arrangements might fail.  Given  the trans-national implications of 
such interconnection cases, a newly established European arbitration mechanism might 
be  introduced to bring such  unresolved interconnection disputes to a fair and efficient 
outcome. 
99  See Section 6.4.5.11. Network Interconnection in the Domain of ONP  2n 
6.4.4  Policy options 
We  see  two  major policy options  that  the  Commission  may choose.  The  first  policy 
option would  mainly rely on  the interconnect policy model developed in  the  proposed 
voice  telephony  Directive.  Under  the  second  policy  option,  the  Community  would 
develop a comprehensive interconnect policy in the ONP framework. 
The first policy option  would  regard the current elements of a European  interconnect 
policy including  the  interconnect model  in  the  proposed voice telephony  Directive  as 
sufficient  for  developing  a  fully-competitive  -telecommunications  market  in  Europe. 
Because  the  current  European  interconnect  framework  mainly  refers  to  regulatory 
principles and commercial negotiations, this approach misses a lot of opportunities to 
develop  quite  different national  regulatory policy models for interconnection.  Network 
operators may find quite different national environments under which they gain access 
to other networks. One cannot exclude that such differences cause barriers to fair and 
efficient interconnection, mainly with regard to European-wide networks and services. A 
more positive or neutral view of this policy option would  regard the existing European 
interconnect policy  framework  as  an  initial  framework.  That framework  might  be  the 
regulatory starting point under which  interconnection and interconnection agreements 
are  supposed to develop.  Under this view,  the initial framework might be adapted  or 
detailed according to experience made with it. 
The  interconnect  rules  of  the  voice  telephony  Directive  do  not  apply  to  the  direct 
interconnection  of  different  mobile  networks  within  a  Member  State  and  between 
Member States. Concerning fixed network interconnection, the Directive at least leaves 
some  uncertainty  as  to  which  interconnection  cases  it  applies  and  which  are  not 
covered.  If  it  really  does  not  apply  to  the  interconnection  of  fixed  networks  within  a 
Member State, the most important case for emerging network competition is excluded. 
Furthermore the Directive only deals with interconnection for voice telephony networks 
and  services.  Although  these  are  or  will  be  the  most  relevant cases,  interconnection 
with  or  between  other types  of  networks  will  become  a more  important  issue  in  the 
future. 
Given the essential importance of interconnection for developing a successful approach 
towards competition and given the numerous issues which have to be addressed, there 
are  good  reasons  to  develop  a  comprehensive  European  legislation  towards 
interconnection.  Furthermore,  interconnection  of  networks  is  a  broader  issue  than 
interconnection to the voice telephony networks of the TOs. 278  Study for the European Commission 
We thus clearly recommend the second policy option: 
Recommendation 5: 
5.1  European  policy  should  develop  comprehensive  legislation  towards 
interconnection which  does not only deal with  interconnection to the TOs'  voice 
telephony networks. 
5.2  Concerning  voice  telephony,  this  legislation  should  include  the  following 
interconnection cases not yet CQvered I:?Y the voice tel~phony Directive: 
(a)  Interconnection between two mobile telephony networks within the same 
Member State; 
(b)  interconnection between two fixed public telephone networks within the 
same Member State; 
(c)  interconnection between mobile networks from different Member States. 
6.4.5  Elements of a comprehensive European interconnect policy 
6.4.5.1  Granting the right to interconnection 
In  Chapter 3 we  developed  and  supported  the  position  that  the  externality argument 
and  remaining economies of scale and scope in  telecommunications networks require 
mandatory interconnection to  overcome the  aspect of  interconnection as  a bottleneck 
input  and  to  reach  a socially  desirable  degree of competition.  The  proper  regulatory 
category to handle this issue is to grant a right to interconnection to interconnectors and 
correspondingly  to  oblige  operators  to  provide  interconnection  (duty to  interconnect). 
Given  the  essential  economic  importance  of  interconnection  the  right  to  interconnect 
should be given the highest legal standard. We therefore recommend: 
Recommendation 6: 
6.1  European legislation should require the  right to interconnect and the obligation to 
provide interconnection in all relevant cases. 
6.2  This  legislation  should  be  implemented  in  Member  States,  preferably  in  the 
national telecommunications laws. 
6.3  The  right  to  interconnect should  be  specified  by  regulatory  rules  set  by NRAs 
and/or by the licences which are granted to network operators. 
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To deal with the complexities of the issue, granting the right to interconnection has to 
be specified with regard to the following aspects: 
- Which operator has a right, which operator has an obligation to interconnect ? 
- Under  what  conditions  and  circumstances  can  the  right  and  obligation  to 
interconnect be restricted ? 
- At what points should interconnection be required ? 
6.4.5.1.1  Which operator has a right, which operator an obligation to interconnect? 
Because  of  the  widespread  network  externalities  in  telecommunications  the 
interconnection  of networks  generally is  in  the  interest of  telecommunications  users. 
Therefore  each  network operator should have the  right  to  interconnect its  facilities  to 
networks  of  other  operators.  Regulators  should  not  erect  any  general  barriers  to 
interconnection  arrangements.  This  should  not  necessarily  mean  that  each  network 
operator  automatically  should  be  obliged  to  provide  interconnection.  This  obligation 
should  be  oriented  to  market  position  and  the  bottleneck  properties  of  the 
corresponding  network  or  network  facilities.  This  consideration  leads  to  our 
recommendation: 
Recommendation 7: 
7. 1  There  should be  no general regulatory barrier preventing network operators and 
service providers from entering into interconnection agreements with each other. 
7.2  Network operators endowed with a special or exclusive right creating bottleneck 
facilities,  or  having  a  dominant  market  position  due  to  actual  control  over 
bottleneck  facilities,  should  be  obliged  to  provide  interconnection  for  these 
bottleneck facilities to other network operators and service providers. 
7.3  If service providers in future gain dominant market positions due to actual control 
over  bottleneck  facilities,  these  service  providers  should  be  obliged  to  provide 
interconnection  for  these  bottleneck  facilities  to  network  operators  and  other 
service providers. 
7.4  These  principles  should  be  set  by  European  legislation,  and  specified  case  by 
case by the NRAs in granting licences to network operators. 
It is our view that at the legislative level the right and duty to interconnect should not be 
formulated  according  to  (case  by  case)  interconnection  scenarios  but  by  a  general 
principle as we are suggesting here. The interconnection scenarios as mentioned in the 
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6.4.5.1.2  Under what conditions and circumstances can the right and obligation to 
interconnect be restricted? 
In  our  evaluation  in  Chapters  2  and  4  we  did  not  find  that  meeting  the  essential 
requirements of ONP necessitates any a priori restriction on network interconnection. 
There seem to be feasible solutions to deal with essential requirements on  a contract 
basis  in  particular with  regard  to  security of network operations and  maintenance  of 
network  integrity.  Negotiating  parties  should  only  be  obliged  to  find  appropriate 
solutions to meet essential requirements. 
In  Section 3.2.6 we  have developed the case where some user groups may not have 
an  interest to be interconnected with others or with other networks. Such communities 
of interest not to be (reciprocally) interconnected should be protected in justified cases 
even  if the  other criteria as  mentioned in  Section 6.4.5.1.1  are met. This leads to the 
recommendation: 
Recommendation 8: 
8. 1  European  legislation  should  permit  communities  of  interest  in  cases  in  which 
there  is  little  or  no  demand  by  others  for interconnection  or in  which  there  is 
sufficient public  interest in  not interconnecting to justify an  exemption  from  the 
general interconnection requirement. 
8.2  NRAs should make case-by-case decisions on such requests based on published 
decision criteria, in particular those based on competition law. 
6.4.5.1.3  At what points should interconnection be required ? 
In  Section 4.2.3.4 we have argued that the regulator is not well positioned to determine 
the  proper  location  of  Interconnection  points.  On  the  other  hand,  the  right  to 
interconnect only becomes meaningful in direct relation to the level or the areas where 
interconnection  is  possible.  The  overall  structure  of  interconnection  also  defines  the 
type and structure of competition which is possible. To give an example: If there is only 
one point of interconnection available for access to a national telephone network, then 
there might be competition for international traffic to and from that Member State but it 
is not possible to compete against the TO of that Member State with regard to national 
traffic. The regulator therefore at least has to define and set a general principle on the 
structure of the network where to interconnect. 
Our  empirical  analysis  of  countries  who  have  introduced  fixed  network  competition 
shows that most regulators have been directly involved in defining the overall structure 
of the points of interconnection. In the U.S., the LATA concept was developed, in Japan 
the MFT required one point of interconnection per prefecture, in Australia the regulator 
required interconnection at the local charging area. Providing efficient interconnection in 
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.  were currently applied in  Europe quite different national solutions would seem  to be 
optimal. Very different solutions would not favour crossborder competition in Europe. 
On  the  other hand,  imposing a  common solution  for points of interconnection  could 
cause significantly different burdens for TOs to implement. This area therefore needs 
further study. 
Summarising, we thus recommend: 
Recommendation 9: 
9.1  European  legislation  should  require  that  network  operators  who  must  provide 
interconnection should offer points of interconnection that maximise the benefits 
to telecommunications users and thereby optimise opportunities for competition. 
9.2  The Commission should study whether the introduction of a common structure for 
network interconnection based on  sub-national  geographical  units  is  a feasible 
and useful approach. 
6.4.5.2  Develop a framework for negotiation 
In  Section  4.3  we  have  developed  a  model  of the  proper  regulatory  involvement  in 
bringing about interconnection agreements. According to this model the NRA should set 
some  ex-ante  conditions  for  negotiations  on  interconnection  agreements  between 
interested parties, leave major issues for negotiation, facilitate negotiations, arbitrate if 
negotiations  are  in  danger  of  failing  and  be  prepared  to  make  a  determination  if 
negotiations  have  totally  failed.  Most  of  these  regulatory  actions  are  case-by-case 
interventions which therefore typically fall into the responsibility of the NRA.·However, it 
makes  sense  to  harmonise  those  interconnection  issues  which  should  be  ex  ante 
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We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 10: 
10.1  European  legislation  on  interconnection  should  identify  those  issues  which 
should be determined ex ante by the NRA. 
10.2  Ex-ante determinations should deal with the following interconnection issues: 
•  The right to interconnection of network operators and service providers to 
.designated telecommunications networks. 
•  Principles that the NRA applies for the determination of interconnection 
charges as well as of access charges if they are used. 
•  The cost accounting methodology to be used by the TO so that the relevant 
cost standard can be applied. 
•  Provision of equal access and collocation. 
•  Conditions of numbering. 
•  Rules regarding publication of all or a selected range of the terms in 
interconnection agreements. 
•  Technical standards for interconnection if applicable. 
Most of these  issues are covered in more detail in  the following. This approach gives 
the necessary flexibility for NRAs to set those conditions which follow directly from the 
specific  national  requirements.  On  the  other  hand,  the  structure  and  conditions  of 
interconnection arrangements will have some major common features across Europe. 
A further effort to  harmonise the structure and content of interconnection agreements 
could be made by identifying those issues which should be covered by the agreements 
but which are not determined ex ante by the NRA. Identifying those issues serves as a 
guide to the  negotiationg parties and may serve as a facilitation of negotiating with  no 
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We recommend: 
Recommendation 11: 
11.1  To  harmonise  the  structure  and  content  of  interconnection  agreements, 
European legislation on  interconnection should give some guidance on  issues 
upon  which  negotiating  parties  should  agree  without  being  legally  binding  to 
them. 
11.2  Agenda items for negotiations and agreements st1ould be the following ones: 
•  Concrete structure and level of interconnection charges. 
•  Changes of interconnection charges over time. 
•  Locations of the points of interconnection. 
•  Concrete technical realisation of interconnection. 
•  Quality of interconnection services. 
•  Access to ancillary and supplementary services. 
•  The  precise  set  of  signalling  functionalities  to  be  provided  by  the 
interconnection providing carrier. 
•  Network management, forecasting of traffic flow, provisioning. 
•  Measures  for  meeting  essential  requirements  (network  security,  network 
integrity, interoperability of services, protection of data). 
•  Intellectual property rights. 
•  Liability and indemnity. 
•  The  method  of  dispute  resolution  procedure  to  be  used  before  a 
determination by the regulator could be requested. 
•  Dates  and  time  periods  for  carrying  out  agreement,  duration  and 
renegotiation of agreement. 
6.4.5.3  Define a set of regulatory interventions to make the negotiations approach 
successful 
Besides making the ex-ante determinations referred to in 6.4.5.2 we strongly support 
the approach that regulators rely on negotiations to bring interconnection agreements 
about. The (typically) asymmetric market and negotiation position between incumbent 
TOs and interconnectors we have shown in Section 4.3 as well as our case studies in 
Chapter 5 strongly support the view that regulators should reserve the right to make ex-
post determinations on major interconnection issues to make the negotiations approach 
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Recommendation 12: 
European legislation should require that NRAs have the right and the responsibility to 
make ex-post determinations on  major interconnection issues if negotiations between 
interested parties fail. 
One  should  normally  expect  that  negotiations  are  successful  and  lead  to 
interconnection  agreements.  These  agreements  will  have  to  meet  mandatory 
requirements  set  by the  RA.  The  regula~ory frame~or:~< t~e~ has to  provide a proper 
mechanism  for  control.  To  our  mind,  interconnection  agreements  should  obtain 
approval  from  the  NRA  before  they  become  effective.  This  strong  regulatory 
involvement  should  be  limited  to  the  subset  of  agreements  where  TOs  have  an 
obligation to provide interconnection. All other .interconnection agreements should only 
be  subject  to  ex-post  oversight  according  to  competition  law  criteria.  We  thus 
recommend: 
Recommendation 13: 
13.1  European  legislation  should  require  that NRAs,  before  they  become  effective, 
approve  all  interconnection  agreements  involving  network  operators  that  are 
under  the  obligation  to  provide  interconnection.  Other  interconnection 
agreements would only be subject to ex-post oversight according to competition 
law. 
13.2  Approval  of  interconnection  agreements  should  be  made  dependent  on  their 
compliance with requirements set ex ante by the NRA and their consistency with 
general competition policy standards. 
13.3  In  case  it  refuses  to  approve  an  interconnection  agreement,  the  NRA  should 
provide  for  a  mechanism  (renegotiation,  determination  by  the  NRA)  for  the 
elimination or modification of the objectionable clauses. 
Ex-post  determinations  on  issues  which  should  primarily  be  negotiated  are  the 
strongest  type  of  regulatory  intervention  and  should  therefore  only  be  regarded  as 
ultima ratio. The regulator should be prepared to use ,.weaker" forms of interventions to 
facilitate negotiations and to make parties agree on interconnection. 
The  weaker form  of intervention  is  arbitration.  The  regulator  might,  upon  request  by 
either party,  try to facilitate  negotiations by making suggestions of possible solutions. 
His  or her pure  presence in  the  negotiation process  might also  discipline  negotiating 
parties and therefore facilitate negotiations. 
Attempts  by  the  regulator  to  arbitrate  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  making 
determinations.  Determinations  should  only  be  made  after unsuccessful  attempts  to 
arbitrate.  Furthermore,  the  regulator  should  set  in  advance  a  maximum  time  period 
within  which  an  interconnection  agreement  has  to  be  reached.  We  cannot  define  a • 
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general and uniform rule on such a time period. This has to be a case-by-case decision 
of the NRA.  The general principle, however, should be that this time period should not 
technically  and  economically  hinder the  network  and  business  development  of  the 
interconnectors. 
These suggestions define the following model of intervention: 
Recommendation 14: 
NRAs ·should ·facilitate negotiations'byusing1hese-means and ·instruments: 
(a)  The NRA should set maximum time periods for negotiations in advance. 
(b)  Ex-post  determinations  should  only  be  made  after  unsuccessful  attempts  to 
arbitrate. 
(c)  Arbitration should aim at avoiding determinations. The NRA should arbitrate upon 
request of either party. 
We  expect the  number of interconnection cases to increase where an  operator from 
one  Member  State  wants  to  get  access  to  the  network  of  an  operator  in  another-
Member  State  or  where  an  operator  wants  to  set  up  a  Europe-wide  network  and 
therefore has to negotiate with many operators. Given the trans-national or European-
wide  implications  of  such  interconnection  cases  we  regard  it  as  useful  to  set  up  a 
European arbitration mechanism for such interconnection cases. Either the negotiating 
parties or a NRA might request European arbitration. We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 15: 
An  arbitration  mechanism  at  the  European  level  should  be  introduced  to  solve 
interconnection disputes 
(a)  between operators from different Member States, 
(b)  concerning European-wide network operations, and 
(c)  concerning national cases with significant European-wide implications. 
6.4.5.4  Foster efforts to standardise interconnection interfaces. 
We  have dealt with standardisation issues extensively in  Chapter 2.  The availability of 
standards for interconnection interfaces makes it easier for interconnecting parties to 
agree on technical issues of interconnection. On the other hand. developing (common) 
standards  is  a  time-consuming  process.  If  interconnection  of  competing  operators 
would only be feasible on the basis of European standards, then standards would have 
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However, we have seen in our country studies that access to interconnection interfaces 
can  be agreed upon by negotiation. In most cases these access problems could be 
dealt with without regulatory intervention. 
Our view is that mandatory standards for interconnection interfaces should be reserved 
only for services and technical components of networks for which the benefits of Union-
wide  harmonisation  are  very  high.  This  would  include  communication  technologies, 
such  as  GSM  I  designed for high  geographic portability;  network numbering systems; 
and emergency and directory services. In most other cases, standards reached through 
voluntary coordination are .more .likeJy. to-balance  .. the.gains Jrom .Japid  .. lnnovation. with 
the widest use of common interfaces. This would be in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality stated in the ONP framework Directive.100 
Article  5(3)  of  the  ONP  framework  Directive  does  provide  for  mandatory 
standardisation:  however,  present  policy101  of  the  Commission  is  that  use  of  this 
provision should be limited to strictly necessary cases of ensuring basic interoperability 
and  freedom  of  choice  for  users,  subject  to  the  principle  of  proportionality. 
Proportionality  suggests  there  must  be  gross  violations  of  basic  interconnection 
requirements to justify a requirement for mandatory standardisation. 
Thus,  the general EU-position on  standards regarding interfaces is that establishment 
of  such  technical  standards  should  be  promoted  and  published,  where  required  in 
accordance with the provisions set forth in Art. 5(1) of the ONP framework Directive 9. 
Interface  standards  should  only  be  made  mandatory  to  the  extent  required  by  the 
leased  lines  Directive and the proposed voice telephony Directive. In  all  other cases, 
the principle of voluntary standards should apply. 
Further specific Directives at  Community level concerning  interfaces are  not  deemed 
necessary  I  given  that  these  are  subject  to  strict  supervision  by NRAs  to  ensure  full 
application  of  ONP-principles,  and  to  the  establishment of suitable dispute  resolution 
and  control  procedures.  The  requirement  of  transparency  implies  that  full  access  to 
Interconnect  agreements  be  given  to  the  NRA'sl  and that the  agreements  be  made 
available to the Commission on request. This allows discovery of cases for timely action 
of the Commission, as interconnect practices and markets evolve, and in our opinion is 
preferable to a purely non-empirical approach based on a priori principles of mandatory 
standardisation. 
1  00  Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the intemal market for telecommunications 
services  through  the  implementation  of  open  network  provision  (901387/EEC),  OJ  No  L  192, 
24.7.1990, p.1. 
101  As developed in the Green Paper on Mobile Communications. 
• Network Interconnection in the Domain of ONP  287 
We thus recommend: 
Recommendation 16: 
16.1  The  Commission's  policy  of  leaving  most  interfaces  to  be  standardised  by 
voluntary  efforts  strikes  the  appropriate  balance  between  the  gains  from 
standardisation  and  the  gains  from  innovation.  We  recommend  this  policy 
approach also for standards for interconnection interfaces. 
16.2  Regutatory .  -oversight· ·of -industry ·collaboration·1o -develop--standards  will  be 
required  to  guard  against  collusive  behavior at  the  national  and  the  European 
level. 
16.3  For  a  limited  set  of  interfaces  - in  principle.  those  required  for  Europe-wide 
services, emergency and directory services - the Commission should encourage 
development  of  standards  and  be  prepared  to  make  their  implementation 
mandatory. 
6.4.5.5  Favour a strategy of tariff rebalancing in the public voice telephony service. 
This study is  not dealing with  tariff policy in  telecommunications and the  regulation  of 
telephone  tariffs.  There  is,  however,  at  least  one  relation  between  interconnection 
pricing  and  voice  telephony  pricing  which  any  coherent  interconnect  policy  has  to 
establish. One of the most significant competitive burdens for incumbent TOs can be an 
unbalanced  tariff  structure  which  does  not  prove  to  be  efficient  and  viable  in  a 
competitive  environment.  Often  enough  pricing  inflexibility  is  imposed  by  regulatory 
action.  Typically,  unbalanced  rate  structures  developed  under  the  guidance  of 
regulators and/or policy makers emerge  in  a monopolistic environment and  regulators 
are  not  able  or  willing  to  give  incumbent  TOs  the  necessary  pricing  flexibility  in  the 
emerging  competitive  situation.  The  main  tariff  distortion  where  regulators  normally 
have problems in accepting tariff rebalancing occurs in the pricing of subscriber access 
to  the  network.  It  is  a common  phenomenon  in  most countries around the  world  that 
connection charges and monthly rental charges do not fully cover the costs of the local 
loop.  These  nonrecovered  costs  cause  additional  revenue  requirements  for  usage 
sensitive  parts  of  the  tariff  structure.  We  have  dealt with  this  issue  in  Section  3.5.9. 
Some  regulators  do  not  hinder  rebalancing  in  general  but  restrict  its  degree.  As  a 
consequence access charges may have to be introduced as a contribution element in 
the  interconnect  charges  if  these  subsidies  are  significantly  large  and  lead  to  a 
demonstrable competitive disadvantage of the incumbent. 
Here we  want to discuss the  rationale  of this  regulatory policy approach to subsidise 
local access to the telephone network and want to develop our policy recommendation 
on this issue. The policy of maintaining low prices for network access historically served 
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rates of basic voice telephony in particular with regard to private households. With the 
achievement of nearly universal penetration this transfer policy from long-distance and 
international traffic loses much if not all of its justification. 
Penetration rates102 of voice telephony range from 25 to 60 in the European Union with 
an  weighted  average  of  about  45.103  There  is  no  doubt  that  countries  above  this 
average have reached nearly universal penetration and there is no economic need to 
generally subsidise local access. The only question arises, what will  happen in  these 
countries if  connection and  rental  charges are increased to reach their cost covering 
level. .Will subscrjbers to -a-significant .degree. disconnect. .trom lbe .telephone network 
and  will  penetration  rates  go  down?  All  empirical  evidence  on  price  elasticities  on 
access  prices  104  and  in  countries where  significant  rebalancing  has occured  proves 
that  that  is  not  going  to  happen.105  Such  untargeted  subsidies  to  inframarginal 
subscribers are economically inefficient. The universal service goal of regulators and/or 
their distributional concerns of protecting or subsidising specific user groups (like,  for 
instance,  low-income  or  elderly  people)  can  be  reached  by  targeted  subsidies  or 
subsidised prices for specific users at significant lower economic costs.  Optional  rate 
structures  can  be  developed  which  keep  the  administrative  costs  of  such  price 
differentiation low and are more efficient than uniform tariff structures for local access. 
The  costs  of  subsidising  targeted  customer  groups,  or.  in  general,  particular  non-
economic services, should be covered by contributions from a Universal Service Fund. 
For details of a USF model we refer to Section 3.5.9. 
Given  the  often  significant  tariff  distortions,  rate  rebalancing  normally  cannot  be 
realised in  one step.  It often will be more efficient to rebalance in several steps taking 
several  years to be  completed.  A strategy of gradual rebalancing is,  however, not an 
argument  to  postpone  liberalisation  until  full  rebalancing  has  been  materialised.  As 
pointed out in  Section 3.5.9 TOs have comparative advantages over new entrants.  If 
distortions are too significant, the instrument of access charges is available to equalise 
competitive conditions. 
102  Defined as main telephone lines per 100 population. 
103  See: Towards Cost Orientation and the Adjustment of Pricing Structures, Communication from the 
Commission, SEC (92) 1050 final, 15. July 1992. 
104  Those elasticities are in the range of -o.05. Additionally, if one takes into consideration the cross 
elasticity effects between usage of the network and access to the network, then the  net effect  of 
rebalancing on total penetration might be negligible or even positive. 
1  OS  The UK and the U.S. are quite good examples. 
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From  this  analysis  and  observations  we  derive  the  following  strong  and  important 
recommendation: 
Recommendation 17: 
17.1  The  Commission  and  Member  States  should  accelerate  a  strategy  of  tariff 
rebalancing and not accept permanent major local access losses. 
17.2  Instead of generally subsidising local access, if regarded necessary, NRAs should 
arrange  for  social  tariffs .that  provide .targeted  subsidies  to  marginal consumer 
groups.  Preferably, social tariffs should be arranged within the framework of an 
optional tariff structure. 
6.4.5.6  Set conditions for pricing of interconnection services. 
We  have  pointed out in  Chapter 3,  and our empirical analysis strongly supports,  that 
interconnect  pricing  is  a  key  factor  to  determine  the  structure  and  the  intensity  of 
competition  in  the  transformation  process  from  a  monopolistic  market  structure  to 
effective competition. Interconnection charges can not only determine SOo/o and more of 
the  new  entrant's  costs;  they  also  to  a  significant  degree  determine  his  network 
structure and therefore overall competitive strategy. What might or should be  done at 
the  European  level of  regulation  to  reach  an  efficient outcome? Incumbents and  new 
entrants often fail to  reach  an agreement in  particular on  interconnect pricing. At least 
for the initial phase of the transition to effective competition where the market positions 
are very asymmetric we recommended a strong role of the regulator. 
First of all it has to be recognised that interconnect charging regimes are arrangements 
for  individual  customers.  The  more  complex  the  market  structures  ·become  in 
telecommunications and the  more  numerous interconnection agreements become the 
more  we  anticipate  a  tendency  to  standard  price  lists  for  interconnect  services. 
Tendencies  to  regard  interconnection as  a TO's wholesale  business can  for  instance 
already be observed in the UK.  In the near future, however, the predominant pattern of 
interconnection will be customer-specific pricing. Interconnect charges therefore cannot 
be regarded as tariffs but as customer-specific prices. 
Despite this main legal and economic difference, we feel that the ONP tariff principles 
developed in  the  framework  Directive and  specified in  the  leased lines and the  voice 
telephony  Directives  are  also  relevant  principles  for  any  European  regulation  on 
interconnection.  As  required  by  the  ONP  framework  Directive  interconnect  charges 
should be  based on  objective criteria, should be cost-based, must be transparent and 
non-discriminatory and they should be sufficiently unbundled. 
Besides  these  general  principles,  regulatory  guidelines  to  be  set  as  conditions  for 
interconnection agreements have to be specified in a more detailed way. On the other 290  Study tor the European Cormission 
hand,  as  analysed  in  Chapter  4,  pricing  in  detail  should  be  left  to  commercial 
negotiations between interconnector and competitors. 
We  have  dealt  with  the  proper  interconnect  pricing  in  detail  from  the  economic 
perspective  in  Section  3.5  and  from  the  regulatory  perspective  in  Section  4.2.  In 
summary, there we have given preference to the following pricing model: 
1  .  Interconnection charges should be  based on  the  incremental cost of  the  service 
used for interconnection. 
2.  Markups  on  incremental  costs  tO" cover overhead .and .common  costs  should  be  • 
allowed. 
3.  Costs  of  conditioning  the  incumbent  network  for  competition  should  not  be 
considered part of the incremental costs of providing interconnection services to a 
specific  interconnector;  they  should  be  recovered  from  the  markup  on  all 
competitive services offered by the TO that provides interconnection. 
4.  According to the cost structure, interconnect charges may be differentiated in one-
time payments or rentals and usage-related payments. 
5.  Given  the  cost  structure  of  interconnect  services  capacity-based  charges  and 
peak-load pricing should be considered as efficient pricing options. 
6.  Optional  nonlinear  interconnection  charges  define  an  additional  option  for 
improving efficiency. 
It  is  not  our view  that the  regulator should  a priori  prescribe  one  of  the  pricing  rules 
mentioned in  (4) to  (6).  It should be a matter of negotiation between interested parties 
to  agree  on  the  pricing  rules  and  structure in  detail. The  regulator might be  forced  to 
make a choice when negotiations fail and he has to make a determination. ., 
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As  a  general  guidance  we  recommend  the  following  regulatory  rules  towards 
interconnect pricing: 
Recommendation 18: 
18.1  European  legislation  should  set  the  following  principles  with  regard  to 
interconne'd  pricing:  Interconnection  charges  should  be  based  on  objective 
criteria, be cost-based, be transparent and non-discriminatory, and be sufficiently 
unbundled and economically efficient. 
18.2  To  facilitate  negotiations  NRAs  should  set  upper  and  lower  limits  for 
interconnection charges. 
18.3  The lower limit should be the long-run incremental cost of providing services used 
for interconnection. The upper limit should be the long-run incremental cost plus a 
markup that,  when applied to each service, would lead to revenues sufficient to 
cover all revenue requirements of a TO. 
18.4  If NRAs have to determine interconnection charges they should also set charges 
within  these  bounds,  with  neither the  upper nor the  lower limit  being  excluded 
from consideration. 
18.5  Costs due to conditioning the incumbent TO's network for competition in a multi-
carrier environment (measures to ensure network security and integrity, particular 
standardisation, introduction of equal access, changes in the numbering system) 
should  be  treated  as  common  costs  of  all  networks/services  which  are 
interconnected, including services offered by the incumbent. 
6.4.5.7  Set a proper cost standard 
When it comes to practice, any economic pricing recommendation has to rely on costs, 
and this holds in particular for cost-based pricing as we are recommending here. To be 
meaningful in  practice for regulatory purposes the  opalescent concept of costs has to 
be specified by a proper standard. We have dealt with this topic extensively in Chapters 
3 and 4 and want to condense our analysis to a clear policy recommendation.  First of 
all, long-run costs should be the relevant standard to be  used. This standard has two 
implications: (1) It is forward looking. Historic costs are relevant only for determining the 
incumbent's  budget  constraint.  (2)  Long-run  costs  are  mainly  related  to  capacity. 
Depending  on  the  problem to be  addressed,  two  kinds  of long-run costs have  to  be 
distinguished:  stand  alone  and  incremental  costs.  Although  widely  used  by 
regulators  106, any fully distributed cost standard based on historic costs is arbitrary and 
106  Also the ONP leased line and the voice telephony Directives basically rely  on  fully distributed cost 
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inefficient  when  it  comes  to  pricing.  Furthermore,  it  is  incompatible  with  effective 
competition. 
When it comes to identification and control, not only theoretical correctness counts in 
regulation, practicability and feasibility in implementation is of equal importance. Activity 
based costing is the best method currently available to identify incremental costs at a 
sufficiently acceptable level. This costing methodology may not be available right away 
and  may  take  time  to  implement.  For this  case,  it  would  be  advisable  to  use  the 
information from  engineering cost  models that are routinely used in  TOs for planning 
purposes. 
We therefore clearly recommend: 
Recommendation 19: 
19. 1  The  relevant  cost  standard  for  regulatory  purpose  of  interconnection  pricing 
should be forward-looking long-run incremental costs. 
19.2  This standard can be supported using information from Activity-Based Costing. If 
the  existing costing system does not provide the proper cost information and its 
adaption  requires time,  information from  engineering cost models (which should 
routinely be available in TOs) should be used. 
6.4.5.8  Regulation of interconnect charges over time 
The regulator is not only facing the issue of regulating an initial set of pricing, he or she 
also has to develop a strategy of price regulation over time. As we have pointed out in 
Chapter 4  regulation  of  prices should be  a function  of the  emerging market structure 
and the  effectiveness of competition. The more effective competitors on the retail level 
of  telecommunications services become the more symmetric their market and to some 
extent  their  negotiation  position  towards  the  incumbent TOs.  Such  market  structure 
change  should  more  and  more  enable  them  to  negotiate  fair  and  competitive 
interconnect charges. lncreasmg competition in the long-distance retail market does not 
necessarily reduce  the  bottleneck or essential facility properties of the  local  network. 
The  market power of incumbent TOs  in  this area decreases with  alternatives to local 
access  available  to  new  entrants.  Alternatives  could  be  direct access  to  customers 
(bypass), competitive access providers or full  scale competitive alternatives like cable 
and/or mobile networks. The more these alternatives are available the less the market 
power  of  incumbent  TOs  in  offering  interconnection.  Because  there  are  strong 
tendencies in this direction the question of a proper deregulation path for interconnect 
charges emerges. 
We have argued in Section 3.5.8 that fixing cost-based interconnect charges should not 
be  a  proper  regulatory  strategy  over  time  because  it  does  not  give  TOs  the  right 
incentive to  keep  their costs  down.  With  regard  to  this  objective price-cap regulation 
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has  advantages  and  sets  better  incentives.  Furthermore,  it  provides  more  pncmg 
flexibility.  To  avoid  predatory  interconnect  pricing,  this  flexibility  should  initially  be 
restricted.  Instead of imposing lower bounds  on  prices  our preferred approach  is  a 
separate  basket for  interconnect services.  The  more  the  market  for  interconnection 
develops, interconnect charges should be more and more deregulated by giving more 
pricing flexibility. Flexibility could be increased by setting or accepting a common basket 
for retail and interconnect services. In the end, interconnect charges should be  totally 
deregulated and only be controlled via competition policy standards  . 
Summarising, .we recommend: 
Recommendation 20: 
If  the  NRA  has  determined  (initial)  interconnection  charges  or  if  interconnection  is 
offered by a TO as a standardised service offering, interconnection charges should be 
regulated by using a price-cap mechanism to give sufficient price setting flexibility. 
6.4.5.9  Develop a universal service and access charge model 
In  other parts of the  study we  have already dealt with theoretical aspects of universal 
service  and  access  charges.  The  telecommunications  policy  debate  on  this  issue  in 
Europe normally is broader.  In  Section 6.4.5.9.1  we will  take up this broad discussion 
on USOs and develop recommendations regarding USOs that should have relevance in 
the  interconnect framework.  In Section 6.4.5.9.2 we  will  develop recommendations on 
the  proper financing mechanisms for USOs. Access charges is only one of them  and 
normally  not  the  best.  If  access  charges  are  introduced  they  raise  a  variety  of 
implementation issues which we  address in. Section 6.4.5.9.3.  In  Section 6.4.5.9.4 we 
will  develop and  recommend  a universal service  and  access charge  strategy for the 
initial stages of competition. Finally, in  Section 6.4.5.9.5 we identify government policy 
objectives  that  should  not  be  allowed  to  give· rise  to  compensation  through  access 
charges. 
6.4.5.9.1  Identify or set universal service objectives and obligations in justified cases 
This  report  is  not  so  much  concerned  with  the  justification  and  scope  of  universal 
service obligations  in  general.  This  issue  has been  covered  in  more  detail  by Cave, 
Milne and Scanian (1994). Any successful interconnect policy, however, has to rely on 
policy answers on  the  USO issues to properly deal with the effects of interconnection 
on the fulfillment of USOs and the effects of USOs on interconnect pricing. 
Cave et.al.  (1994)  found four policy objectives with  regard to universal service which 
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1..  universal geographic coverage, 
2.  universal residential access at geographically averaged prices, 
3.  widely subsidised access arising through an access deficit, 
4.  targeted phone subsidies. 
Most of these issues are directly related to access pricing which we covered in Section  • 
6.4.5.5.  Despite  significant  cost  differences  relating  to  location,  geographically 
averaged phone prices are a quite commo·ri universal serVice·.or  ~pricing  .principle in the  .. 
EU.107  If  these  USOs  are  imposed  on  TOs,  they  are  not  viable  in  a  competitive 
environment  if  they  impose  loss  making  services.  This  need  not  necessarily  be  the 
case. The financial burden of geographic coverage depends on the penetration of voice 
telephony  in  a particular country.  Geographically averaged pricing for access can  be 
realised at a profitable level of prices for the access service as a whole. 
In the real world telephone companies face other obligations or restrictions imposed on 
them by governments and/or regulators than those regarded as USOs concerning voice 
telephony. These obligations can produce financial burdens and can bring them into a 
competitively disadvantageous position. 
A  few  examples  may  shed  some  light  on  such  public  service  obligations.  Many 
telephone companies provide directory assistance services or public payphone services 
which  do  not  cover  the  cost  of  providing  those  services.  Because  of  regulatory 
constraints they are  often  hindered from  offering these services on  a profitable basis. 
The  same  holds  for  some  emergency  services.  These  telecommunications-related 
public  service  obligations  which  imply  additional  revenue  requirements  for  voice 
telephony should be  regarded  in  the  same  way  as  USOs for voice telephony.  If  they 
exceed  a  certain  level  of  burden  there  should  be  contributions  by  competitors, 
preferably through the use of a USF. 
This analysis leads to our recommendations: 
Recommendation 21: 
Telecommunications-related  public  service  obligations  should  be  treated  as  USOs  in 
voice telephony. 
107  It also has significant relevance for the U.S. See Borrows, Bernt, Lawton (1994). 
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6.4.5.9.2  Identify efficient financing mechanisms of USOs 
In Section 3.2.7 we have identified different financing mechanisms for USOs and stated 
that the payment for USOs needs to have nothing to do with interconnection. The major 
alternatives to financing USOs via a component of interconnect charges called access 
charges are government subsidies, a levy on all telecommunications retail services and 
through internal subsidies by all service providers. We also have developed there the 
argument  why  access charges  are not our preferred  solution.  In  Section  4.2.2.5  we 
have  developed a Universal  Service Fund solution  as  our preferred approach.  There 
seems to .be.no experience with USF models in Europe. The models ·put into ·ptace  in 
the  U.S.  and  in  Australia,  however,  prove  that  this  approach  is  feasible  not  only  in 
theory but also in practice. Therefore we recommend: 
Recommendation 22: 
In  any  interconnection  legislation  the  European  Union  should  give  preference  to 
financing USOs via a Universal Service Fund system instead of access charges. The 
burden  of  proof  should  be  on  individual  Member  States  that  in  their  particular 
environment a USF system  is  not viable  or feasible  and  other approaches  might be 
necessary. 
6.4.5.9.3  In case of financing USOs via access charges, identify access charge 
principles 
If individual  Member States decide in  favour of  applying  access charge  regimes,  the 
question  arises  whether or not  there  is  a need  to  set  some  common  access  charge 
principles  across  Europe.  As  we  have  seen  in  our  international  comparison,  access 
charges have  a significant impact on  the  competitive  conditions of  new entrants.  We 
have seen that in  the  U.S.  access charges for interstate traffic are uniform in  the  U.S. 
while  access  charges  for  intrastate  traffic  vary  significantly.  These  differences  are 
causing significant arbitrage problems. If competition on the European level becomes a 
reality, similar problems will arise in Europe if the national access charge regimes differ 
to  some  degree.  Europe-wide  competition  and  Europe-wide  operators  thus  require 
harmonisation of access charges in the Member States. At a minimum, access charge 
regimes have to be harmonised. 
The  basic questions to  be  answered  in  any  access charge  regime  are  the  following 
ones: Who should pay access charges? What is the proper payment structure? Which 
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We recommend: 
Recommendation 23: 
23.1  If  the  European  Union  and/or  indivietual  Member States  follow  the  policy  of 
financing  USOs via  access charges,  some common  access charge  principles 
should be set at the European level. 
23.2  Access charges for financing USOs should be set in a fair,  efficient and non-
-discriminatory  way. ·They ·should···be  fulty  justified -and  meet- the  criterion  of 
proportionality. 
In the previous chapters and sections we have dealt with a variety of aspects which we 
want to summarise here.  By paying access charges, competitors should contribute to 
USOs imposed on incumbent TOs. Some licensing approaches not only impose USOs 
on incumbents but also on newly licensed operators. It would be unfair and inefficient to 
impose public interest obligations on new entrants and at the same time force them to 
contribute  to  USOs imposed on  TOs through  access charges.  Both  approaches are 
regulatory alternatives. Therefore, new entrants who themselves have to fulfill universal 
service (or other public interest) obligations should be exempted from paying access 
charges. 
The principle of efficiency with regard to access charges has to be specified because 
access charges themselves are a non-efficient solution. The adjusted principle requires 
access  charges  to  be  imposed  in  the  least  distortionary  manner.  Our  international 
comparison has shown that access charges are implicitly or explicitly set as a charge 
per unit of  interconnected traffic.  In  Section  3.5.9  we  have  discussed  that  lump-sum 
payments are more efficient than such traffic-related charges. A proper approximation 
of that principle might be charges based on  the numbers of customers interconnected 
through presubscription. 
6.4.5.9.4  Develop a comprehensive universal service and access charge strategy for 
the initial stages of competition 
When competition is being introduced in the core business of telecommunications in an 
environment of a long-standing tradition of monopolistic market behaviour and strong 
political and/or regulatory intervention, a transitional model of regulation is useful and 
appropriate to deal with the inbalances and inefficiencies of the initial situation and the 
dynamics of the emerging competition. On the basis of our analysis and the evaluation 
of international experience the following strategy with  regard to universal service and 
access charges seems to be appropriate: Potentially the major competitive burden for a 
TO might be an unbalanced rate structure in  voice telephony. We have recommended 
not to maintain this situation but to accept or even foster a strategy of tariff rebalancing. 
Although rebalancing will take some time we do not recommend compensating TOs for 
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remaining access losses via access charges in the transition period.  Otherwise,  they 
might also  lose  incentives  to  increase  efficiency  in  access  services.  The  temporary 
competitive  disadvantage  can  be  accepted  because  at  least  in  the  initial  phase  of 
competition TOs are still enjoying advantages that competitors do not have. The same 
holds with other USOs. In the meantime the NRAs might rationalise their USC policy, 
develop  USF solutions and  take  away non-telecommunications  related  burdens  from 
TOs.  In  the  meantime  a  methodology  should  be  developed  and  applied  to  identify 
remaining costs of USOs and (potentially) resulting competitive disadvantages  . 
After a period  of 3 to 5 years from  the introduction of competition  the  NRAs  should 
review the  situation.  In  particular they should reconsider the decision not to  introduce 
access  charges.  To  our mind the  initial decision  might be  revised  if competition  has 
become effective, the financial burden of USOs still is significant, a USF solution is not 
feasible  and  the  TO  is  competitively  disadvantaged  by  the  situation.  These 
prerequisites for introducing access charges might be  different from  Member State  to 
Member State  and  have to be  made operational for regulatory purposes.  Developing 
common operational criteria could be done at the  European level. NRAs then  have to 
verity and to apply these criteria to come to a final conclusion. We cannot go too much 
into detail here and  only want to give some indication that the  criteria are operational 
and  viable.  Effectiveness  of  competition  can  be  measured  by  the  market  share  of 
competitors and by movements in market shares and in prices. The financial burden of 
USOs can be identified by proper cost accounting methodology. Whether or not a USF 
solution is feasible mainly is a question of  political or regulatory decision making. The 
identification of a competitive disadvantage of the TO caused by the resulting situation 
seems  to  be  more  complicated.  If the  corresponding TO  is  financially  in  good  shape 
and earns an appropriate rate of return on capital then there is some indication that the 
asymmetric regulatory burden of USOs are outweighed by competitive advantages not 
enjoyed by competitors. Then no (urgent) need for access charges arises.  If the TO  is 
in  bad  financial  condition  and  earns  an  insufficient  return  on  capital,  the  situation  is 
more  difficult  to  evaluate  for  the  regulator.  Such  an  outcome  might  result  from  the 
regulatory  asymmetry.  However,  it  might  also  be  caused  by  poor  competitive 
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Our overall recommendation on a European policy on access charges thus reads: 
Recommendation 24: 
24.1  An imbalanced tariff structure should not be considered as part of USOs. 
24.2  Access  charges  designed  to  compensate  the  incumbent TO  for the  costs  of 
imbalanced tariffs should not be included in interconnection charges initially, as 
rebalancing eliminates them over time. 
24.3  Three to five years after the introduction ·of competition NRAs should review the 
situation and reconsider the decision not to provide for compensation for costs 
due to  remaining imbalances of tariffs. Access charges should be introduced if 
competition has become effective, the corresponding financial burden of a TO 
still is significant, and the TO is competitively disadvantaged by the situation. 
6.4.5.9.5  Reject as uses certain government policy objectives 
Telephone companies in Europe have been used by governments as policy instruments 
for a variety of policy objectives, none of which serve any telecommunications-related 
objective. A partial list of such objectives or interventions includes: 
- Subsidising postal services. 
- Holding of stocks of unprofitable public companies. 
- Supporting national production of telecommunications equipment. 
- Providing  telecommunications  services  to  government  agencies  or  other  public 
entities at no or reduced charges. 
- Contributing  to  R&D  and  education  above  the  level  necessary  for  the  business 
interest of telephone companies. 
This  list could  easily  be  expanded.  Such  non-telecommunications-related burdens all 
have one common property: They increase the costs and/or the revenue requirements 
of TOs in  the  regulated business. TOs can  make the argument that their competitors 
also should contribute to such obligations e.g., by paying access charges. 
We  recommend that the European Union not follow this line. Non-telecommunications-
related  financial  burdens  are  from  the  economic  point  of  view  a  specific  tax  on 
telecommunications services. Telecommunications is taxed for some general economic 
or  political  purpose.  This  approach  is  economically  inefficient  and  hinders  the 
deployment of  telecommunications.  Because there is  no a priori  limit in  such  type  of 
non-telecommunications-related burdens quite different national attitudes could develop 
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as we  can  observe today.  Quite different competitive conditions across Europe would 
be the result. We therefore recommend: 
Recommendation 25: 
A  European  interconnect  policy  should  not  allow  non-telecommunications-related 
financial burdens to be compensated by access charges  . 
Telephone companies sometimes claim that asymmetric regulatory treatment (besides 
USOs and the  above mentioned obligations) as compared to their competitors has to 
be  taken  into  consideration  when  determining  access  charges.  In  this  context  often 
price  regulation  and  line-of-business-restrictions  are  being  mentioned.  Such 
asymmetrically applied regulatory measures serve  as  competitive  safeguards  against 
the  abuse of  dominant market position. By definition it would be counterproductive to 
compensate  TOs  in  one  way  or  another  for  such  type  of  asymmetric  regulatory 
treatment. 
Recommendation 26: 
Access  charges  should  not  be  used  to  compensate  TOs  for  restrictions  which  are 
imposed on them to control or regulate their dominant market position. 
6.4.5.1 0  Develop a strategy for equal access and collocation 
The  Commission  should  study  how  equal  access  for  new  competitors  can  be 
introduced in all  Member States.  In  particular it should consider in  which time frame a 
harmonised approach of realising equal access can be followed given the technological 
status  of  the  telephone  networks.  The  introduction  of  equal  access  should  be 
mandatory throughout Europe because equal access is an essential prerequisite to get 
fair and efficient competition between network operators. This holds in  particular given 
the  vertically  integrated  structure  of  European  TOs.  The  additional  costs  for  the 
telecommunications  system  of  introducing  equal  access  capabilities  should  be  kept 
sufficiently low by providing a reasonable time period to implement equal access. Given 
the  international  experiences  and  the  status  of  telephone  network  digitisation  an 
implementation  period  of  four  years  for  equal  access  capabilities  for  80-90o/o  of  all 
access lines seems to be an upper bound. It should be subject to further study whether 
a shorter implementation period is feasible. This study should be undertaken as soon a 
possible.  The  sooner  there  is  a  binding  decision  on  the  European  level  on  the 
introduction  of  equal  access  the  sooner  this  prerequisite  for  fair  and  efficient 
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We therefore recommend: 
Recommendation 27: 
27.1  The Commission should study the Europe-wide implementation of equal access. 
In  this  context,  the  standardisation  for equal-access arrangements should  be 
considered. 
27.2  On  the basis of these results a strategy of introducing equal access should be 
• 
made  mandatory for Member States as soon as possible·. This strategy might  • 
imply different time  paths depending on  the status of network development in 
the Member States. 
For  operators that physically interconnect their facilities  to  another operator,  physical 
collocation of terminating equipment is usually technically superior to virtual collocation 
at  some distance from  the switching point. From the regulatory point of view physical 
collocation  should  therefore  be  the  benchmark.  If  only virtual  collocation  is  provided 
interconnectors  should  be  compensated  for  any  loss  in  quality  by  a  lower 
interconnection charge. 
This leads to the following recomrr.endation: 
Recommendation 28: 
28. 1  European  legislation  should  require  that the  incumbent TOs  offer competitors 
physical collocation of their interconnecting equipment. 
28.2  NRAs should accept equivalent virtual  collocation as an  alternative to physical 
collocation. 
6.4.5.11  Public access to interconnection agreements 
Our empirical analysis displayed a variety of approaches towards access of the public 
to interconnection agreements. These approaches are often based on the general legal 
regulatory or public policy tradition  of a particular country and do not  reflect  specific 
telecommunications  considerations.  In  some  countries  only  NRAs  have  access  to 
interconnection  agreements.  In  others,  full  access  is  possible  to  interested  parties. 
Sometimes not even regulators have access to the agreements. 
Two  basic  principles  seem  to  compete  for  a  general  policy  approach.  Regulatory 
transparency as well as a fair and level playing field requires full  access of interested 
parties  to  interconnection agreements.  On  the  other hand  there  might be  proprietary 
information  on  a  firm-specific  basis  which  has  to  be  protected  for  sound  economic 
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reasons.  One example could be some type of service innovation. A general approach 
has to bring these basic principles into the right balance. A procedural way of solving 
this  conflict might look  like  the  following:  All  interconnection  agreements  have  to  be 
registered with the  NRA.  The  register may consist of a public and a confidential. part. 
Network  operators may request for material  to  be  put in  the  confidential  part  of  the 
register. The regulator defines a set of elements in an interconnection agreement which 
have in  any case to be  made public. Furthermore the regulator defines and publishes 
criteria  on  his  decision  on  public  access.  In  any  ~se it  is  obvious  to  us  that  the 
regulator should have mandatory access to interconnection agreements and not only in 
cases where negotiating parties fail to come to an agreement and he is being involved 
to  reach  or  determine  an  agreement.  Otherwise  he  is  not  able  to  fulfill  his  task  of 
controlling whether actual agreements fit with his requirements and whether or not they 
include elements of collusive or discriminatory behaviour. 
Given this analysis we therefore recommend: 
Recommendation 29: 
29.1  NRAs  should  have  mandatory  access  to  the  full  text  of  interconnection. 
agreements. 
29.2  Interested parties generally should have access to those agreements. 
29.3  Parties  of  interconnection  agreements  should  have  the  right  to  petition  for 
confidentiality concerning specific documents before the NRA. The NRA should 
decide on such requests on the basis of published criteria. 302  Study for the European Commission 
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